Beyond the pejorative : sphere of influence in international theory by Hast, Susanna
Susanna Hast
Beyond the Pejorative
Sphere of Influence in International Theory
Acta Electronica Universitatis Lapponiensis    98
Academic dissertation to be publicly defended
under permission of the Faculty of Social Sciences
at the University of Lapland
in lecture hall 2
on Saturday 27th of October 2012 at 12
University of Lapland
Faculty of Social Sciences
© Susanna Hast, 2012
Layout: Ritva Lahtinen
Distributor: Lapland University Press
P.O. Box 8123
FI-96101 Rovaniemi
tel. + 358 (0)40-821 4242 , fax + 358 16 362 932
publication@ulapland.fi
www.ulapland.fi /lup
Paperback
ISBN 978-952-484-570-0
ISSN 0788-7604
Pdf
ISBN 978-952-484-571-7
ISSN 1796-6310
3Abstract
Hast Susanna
Beyond the Pejorative: 
Sphere of Infl uence in International Theory
Rovaniemi: University of Lapland, 2011, 313 pp., Acta Universitatis Lapponiensis 239
Dissertation: University of Lapland
ISSN 0788-7604   ISBN 978-952-484-570-0
This study undertakes to contest the concept of sphere of infl uence from a historical perspective with 
a focus on normative questions and international order. While the concept of sphere of infl uence is 
frequently used in political parlance, it has not been studied within the discipline of International 
Relations. What is more, the term ”sphere of infl uence” is used in a pejorative sense to criticise 
Russian foreign policy. The research identifi es the pejorative uses of the concept and then proceeds 
to discuss normative aspects of spheres of infl uence in international theory. In the process, sphere of 
infl uence is transformed from a map metaphor into a concept which encompasses issues of justice 
and international order.
The history of the concept of sphere of infl uence begins with identifying how it acquired its 
pejorative ring, that is, the concept became associated with the foreign policy of Russia. What follows 
are four chapters on the history and theory of spheres of infl uence. The fi rst episode explores historical 
examples such as suzerainty and colonialism, as well as the emergence of a hierarchical international 
order. The second reveals the untapped pool of ideas related to international order, sovereignty, great 
powers, the balance of power and non-intervention in the English School theory. The pluralist and 
solidarist underpinnings of international society come alive as a framework for linking the concept of 
sphere of infl uence to conceptualisations of international order. Spheres of infl uence are situated at 
the equilibrium point of a pendulum which sweeps an arc from the sovereign nation-state at one end 
to humanity at the other. 
The third chapter looks into theories on spheres of infl uence “between nation and humanity” 
which were developed in the turmoil of the world wars. The ideas of Friedrich Naumann, Carl Schmitt, 
E.H. Carr, James Burnham, Walter Lippmann and George Orwell focus more on bringing about peace 
than causing war and confl ict. Finally, a chapter on the Cold War, drawing on the example of the Cuban 
Missile Crisis, explores the period in history which has made the strongest impact on the present 
understanding of sphere of infl uence. It becomes clear that even Cold War spheres of infl uence are 
a source of theory which we have ignored. Once the historical and theoretical roots of the concept 
have been unveiled, Russian ideas on international order and infl uence beyond state borders are 
analysed in order to problematise the Western canon dealing with “Russia’s sphere of infl uence”. The 
Russian idea of a sphere of infl uence is clouded by an indecision in choosing between the pluralist 
and solidarist international orders. The Russian authors’ unwavering defence of sovereignty and 
4simultaneous admiration of ”the concert of great responsible powers” has resulted in an inability to 
openly propose a system of international governance with spheres of infl uence.
The unique contribution of this dissertation is to put forward normative considerations pertaining 
to spheres of infl uence instead of using the concept in a pejorative sense. The study connects the 
English School tradition, post-war international order, the Cold War and Russian thought with the 
concept of sphere of infl uence with the aim of initiating a debate which will enrich the discipline with 
a fresh outlook on an old but topical concept.
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7Foreword and Acknowledgements
Spheres of infl uence and understanding about them remain part of 
international politics and for better or worse will continue to be (Keal 
1983, 225). 
Th e eternal challenge of humanity is to organise the political map of 
the world. It has never been possible to make the world one, and few 
have even wanted this. In the end, the division of people by borders 
of nation-states took place. However, the state is not a perpetual and 
stable unit of the international system, but one that has been challenged 
from the day it was introduced – by the states themselves with asserted 
hierarchies and great power management. Spheres of infl uence come into 
the picture here when we discuss states and the hierarchical international 
system. Sphere of infl uence is an idea which takes a stance on the very 
core question of International Relations1 (henceforth IR): How is the 
world divided politically? 
Th is is a critical analysis and reassessment of the concept of sphere of 
infl uence with an interest in normative and theoretical questions arising 
from the past and the present. Th e concept is characterised by a confl ict 
between the lack of theoretical interest in it in IR and, at the same time, 
the frequent use of it in political discourse2. Sphere of infl uence is a 
contested concept which has awaited theoretical reassessment from a 
historical perspective for too long. Th e problem with spheres of infl uence 
is that there is no debate, or general agreement or disagreement, on the 
meaning of the concept. It simply is in its simultaneous vagueness and 
familiarity. Indeed, the term is a very familiar one, frequently deployed, 
especially when describing Russian foreign policy. Its recurrent use in 
language testifi es to its being part of our political imagination. Th is 
imagination is founded upon past experiences, namely, the spheres of 
infl uence of the Cold War. Regardless of whether we see the Cold War as 
a thing of the past, or as something still visible as a mentality of division 
1  “International Relations” refers to the discipline, “international relations” to 
relations among international actors. 
2 Th is is not to say that infl uence beyond borders has not been studied in theoretical 
terms within IR, but only that there is no interest in contesting the concept.
8and diff erence, international relations have entered a new era. In this new 
era, we still fi nd the concept of sphere of infl uence attesting to the need 
to contest the concept itself.
To my knowledge, the only study discussing spheres of infl uence is 
that written by Paul Keal in 1983. Th us, it is fi rmly rooted in the Cold 
War context. I believe it is about time to begin elaborating the theories 
on spheres of infl uence again and to become critical about the language 
we use to judge or approve of international infl uence. Th e concept of 
sphere of infl uence belongs to the jargon of International Relations and 
to political parlance. Because of the strong pejorative connotation of the 
concept, the choice to use or not to use it is political. A sphere of infl uence 
signifi es some form of infl uence beyond state borders, but not just any. 
It means a particular form of infl uence, or as I prefer, a particular form 
of international order. Some states are described as having or striving for 
a sphere of infl uence, but not all. Since not all international infl uence is 
referred to as emanating from a sphere-of-infl uence policy, there must 
be a clearly delimited space which is occupied by a sphere of infl uence. 
Th ere must also be a reason for viewing some foreign policies as pursuing 
a sphere of infl uence and denying others that connotation.
What then is it that makes a sphere of infl uence “special”; what 
separates it from other ideas on infl uence? It is the concept’s pejorative 
connotation, that is, the notion that it is a form of infl uence which implies 
contempt and disapproval. More specifi cally, it often means contempt for 
and disapproval of Russia’s foreign policy. Much as no theoretical work 
has been done on spheres of infl uence within the discipline for some 30 
years, neither has the pejorative nature of the concept been discerned. 
Th is prompts the questions: Where do the pejorative uses of sphere of 
infl uence come from? Has the concept of sphere of infl uence always had 
pejorative associations? Is there any tradition of justifying spheres of 
infl uence in international theory? Moreover, I am interested in fi nding 
out how Russian scholars and politicians write about spheres of infl uence 
when responding to accusations from other states. Th ese are the research 
questions that I will examine in the following pages. 
Research must have its anchor in the realities of life; otherwise it 
is useless. Th ere are four reasons why I consider a study on spheres of 
infl uence to be important and needed. First, as I have already stated, 
the concept deserves to be reassessed due to its persistence in political 
9language. Second, the history of spheres of infl uence is a contribution to 
the discipline of International Relations, with its concern for international 
theory. Sphere of infl uence as a concept should be contested: its uses 
should be critically examined and its meanings theoretically explored. 
Th ird, sphere of infl uence has meanings beyond its pejorative senses; 
I will present these in order to sever the seemingly unavoidable link 
between (the pejorative meaning of ) sphere of infl uence and and Russia. 
Th e aim is not to relieve Russia of its responsibility in its foreign policies 
but to refl ect on the value of using the notion of sphere of infl uence 
as a means to judge and categorise Russian foreign policy. In the spirit 
of Joseph Rotblat (2007), signatory to the Russell-Einstein Manifesto 
against nuclear weapons in 1955, I have tried to connect this research to 
the problems I have discovered in contemporary international relations. 
Th is explains the focus on the three interconnected themes of the concept 
of sphere of infl uence, its pejorative uses, and Russia.
***
Th is book is the product of my life. Finland has a strong research 
community working on topics related to Russia and in Finnish society 
at large there is a natural interest in Russian politics. I became fascinated 
with the political language involving our eastern neighbour. Th e term 
“sphere of infl uence” has a strong foothold within that language. If 
nationality explains my involvement with Russian studies, the topic of 
sphere of infl uence comes from my education in IR at the University 
of Lapland, where geopolitics featured strongly in the curriculum at the 
time. It is there that I fi rst heard of Carl Schmitt and became interested 
in the politics of territory.
 I am greatly indebted to my two supervisors, University Lecturer Mika 
Luoma-aho, PhD, and Professor Pami Aalto for supporting me all the way 
through, guiding me and showing me the way forward. Th ey were my 
mentors, not only supervisors. Mika Luoma-aho possesses a vision which 
permeates my thinking about international relations. I could always 
count on him to crystallise my arguments when I failed to do so. Th at 
kind of relationship between a mentor and disciple is indispensable. Pami 
Aalto spared no eff ort in advising me and I admire his great attention to 
detail. I can never repay that debt of gratitude, other than by writing the 
best dissertation I can.
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I would like to thank Professor Christopher Browning from Warwick 
University for his critical comments, which I turned into fuel for polishing 
my arguments and, most importantly, my life. I am grateful to Sinikukka 
Saari, PhD, for valuable comments on the manuscript. Richard Foley 
did an amazing job with proofreading, making sure the terminology and 
tenses were in order. I am grateful to Marius Lönnrot for the design of 
the book’s cover.
I thank all my teachers, professors and those friends who studied with 
me. Special thanks are due to professor Vilho Harle and Jari Koivumaa, 
who were my very fi rst teachers in the summer of 2000. Colleagues during 
my post-graduate studies at the University of Lapland also deserve special 
thanks for always reading my papers carefully and being ready not only 
to challenge me but to assist me in solving the problems which had been 
raised. Th e spirit of friendship and support among the political scientists 
at the University of Lapland is truly unique. Tiina Seppälä inspired 
me with her determination and encouragement. Professor Julian Reid 
introduced me to genealogy. Aini Linjakumpu and Petri Koikkalainen 
never failed to off er their helpful insights. Plenty of other people took an 
interest in advising me on my work.
It was at the Aleksanteri Institute in Helsinki where I was trained to 
conduct research on Russia. Support from the Institute gave me self-
confi dence to pursue my own visions. I particularly cherish the approval 
I was always able to detect in the eyes of Director Markku Kivinen. I 
off er my appreciation to those countless wonderful colleagues in and 
around Aleksanteri, especially Markku Kangaspuro, Matti Jutila, Katalin 
Miklossy, Sari Autio-Sarasmo, Heidi Marjatta Berger, Suvi Kansikas, 
Elina Viljanen, Tuomas Forsberg, Hanna Smith, David Dusseault, 
Anna-Maria Salmi, Hanna Ruutu, Ira Jänis-Isokangas, Hanna Peltonen, 
Anu Pöyry, Essi Lindroos and the rest of the staff . Th ere are so many to 
thank for giving me an idea, cheering me up, fi xing my computer and 
fi nding a book for me that the list could just go on and on. Katja Karelina 
deserves special thanks for helping me with the Russian language and 
Katri Vallaste for always being there for me – and my research. 
I thank the Centre for Russian and East European Studies (CREES) 
in Birmingham, Heinrich-Heine-Universität in Düsseldorf and the 
Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies (IHEID) 
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in Geneva for accepting me as a visiting fellow. I want to thank all 
those who supported me on my fellowships, especially Derek Averre 
in Birmingham. I off er my gratitude to those who participated in the 
English School workshop in Århus, Denmark, in 2008, especially Johanne 
Glavind, Iver Neumann and Robert Jackson. In addition, I would like 
to express my gratitude to Paul Keal (Australian National University) 
and Professor Les Holmes (University of Melbourne). Th anks are also in 
order to Ambassador Tuula Yrjölä for her support. 
I would also like to express my gratitude to the Aleksanteri Institute’s 
Doctoral Programme for funding my research and the Kone Foundation 
for a generous travel grant which made it possible for me to participate 
in conferences and visit universities abroad. I also thank the University of 
Lapland for two rector’s grants. 
Last but not least, I would like to thank my family. My aunt Pirjo 
Järvelä encouraged me to study at university, although she warned me not 
to apply to the discipline of IR, because I might end up as a researcher. 
My mother raised me well, showed me a model of a courageous woman 
and underlined the meaning of education. My husband lived with me 
through all my struggles, and never lost faith in my capabilities. I also 
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1 Introduction
1.1 A Normative Concept
Th is study is a theoretical conceptualisation of sphere of infl uence from 
a historical perspective. However, it took some time for the topic to 
settle into its fi nal form. In 2004, I decided to study “the Russian sphere 
of infl uence”. To my mind, establishing and consolidating a sphere of 
infl uence was a foreign policy tool of the Russian Federation. I was 
planning an empirical study on how Russia infl uences its neighbouring 
countries and how it is against NATO enlargement. In order to ascertain 
what Russia’s sphere-of-infl uence policy was, I only needed to fi nd out 
how Russia blackmails and oppresses its neighbours and violates their 
rights by meddling in their internal aff airs and limiting their foreign 
policy options. But it did not take me long to encounter the problem that 
there was no literature discussing, defi ning and contesting the concept of 
sphere of infl uence. To my mind, it was not possible to study the Russian 
sphere of infl uence before fi rst determining what a sphere of infl uence 
meant. Th is redirected my research to a study of the concept itself. 
I began to look for theories on spheres of infl uence, but as such 
theories did not really exist, I considered it useful to start collecting the 
theoretically and historically relevant ideas that could help in defi ning the 
concept. Th en, I discovered the meaning of sphere of infl uence, not only 
as a foreign policy tool but as a complex of ideas on 1) international order 
and 2) acceptable and unacceptable infl uence. A focus on international 
order and the normative aspects of spheres of infl uence led me to the 
what is known as the English School of International Relations and 
its potential to explain spheres of infl uence. Furthermore, order and 
justice directed my interest towards a group of theorists, active from 
the First World War until the aftermath of the Second World War, who 
were concerned with the demise of the state and the dangers of a world 
state. In addition to my interest in history, I became concerned with the 
contemporary use of term “sphere of infl uence” in political language. I 
noticed that use and non-use of the term refl ected an idea according to 
which the referent was too straightforward to require a theory, too old for 
anyone to be interested in it, or too common to pay attention to. Most 
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importantly, a sphere of infl uence was a pejorative notion. As a foreign 
policy tool it was morally unacceptable, representing injustice. Th is last 
observation, the concept’s pejorative connotation, greatly infl uenced the 
path that I would choose for writing a book about spheres of infl uence. 
Th e work had to be concerned with history; it had to be critical; and it 
had to prove that we need to be interested in the concept of sphere of 
infl uence.
I began to see the way in which the concept of sphere of infl uence 
was used as a form of discursive power. I began to make observations 
on the pejorative meaning given to the concept. Sphere of infl uence in 
its pejorative sense means not only disapproval of the practice but also 
avoiding a critical approach to the idea of sphere of infl uence and ultimately 
avoiding the use of the concept. Lack of interest in the idea of sphere of 
infl uence results in denying the concept its place in international theory, 
and ”non-use” of the concept renders it as pejorative in tone as much as 
its use does. Th e pejorative sense of sphere of infl uence does not come out 
of nowhere: it comes from the injustice that the expression carried with 
it, and especially the practical manifestations of this injustice, during the 
Cold War. With the concept of justice, I follow Hedley Bull’s (2002, 
75–76) assertion that justice belongs to the class of moral ideas which 
treat human actions as right in themselves but when it comes to world 
politics justice is often associated with equality of rights and privileges. I 
will return to Bull’s views on justice in chapter 4.4.
Spheres of infl uence constitute an issue that goes to the very core of 
international ethics. Th ey relate to another political concept which is also 
bounded by normative considerations: power. For William Connolly 
(1993, 97), the position of exerting power over others indicates a 
position of responsibility and a need for justifi cation. A sphere of 
infl uence denotes a relationship of power, and as such it comes with 
responsibility and a need for justifi cation even if those aspects are denied 
or hidden. Th us, there is something naturally normative about spheres of 
infl uence. By “normative”, I mean norms in the legal and moral sense: 
that which is considered right or wrong and just or unjust. Historically, 
a sphere of infl uence has carried with it ideas on acceptable and non-
acceptable codes of conduct and it has always necessitated justifi cation. 
In the present, the pejorative use of the concept is manifested in the 
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criticism of Russia’s foreign policy: establishing a sphere of infl uence 
as a Russian foreign policy tool signifi es imperialism, oppression, 
pressure (military, economic or political) and a Cold War mentality, 
but not subsidies, support, protection, stability or peace. All this will be 
contested in the following pages by unravelling the normative history of 
sphere of infl uence. I wish to resuscitate that part of the concept which 
expresses the tension between acceptable and non-acceptable infl uence 
in international relations by exploring the normative scope of a sphere of 
infl uence in its totality. Th e failure to discuss the pejorative nature of the 
concept of sphere of infl uence and instead taking it as something evident 
and immutable is the reason why a theoretical and historical reassessment 
is topical.
As Robert Jackson (2000, 5) puts it, “Normative discourse in inter-
national relations, as in any other sphere of human relations, operates by 
reference to certain assumptions and expectations concerning justifi ed 
and unjustifi ed conduct”. Th roughout his book Th e Global Covenant, 
Jackson (2000) argues that world politics is normative, with its own 
ethics constructed by political leaders. Spheres of infl uence belong to this 
normative order. Th ere is no international law on spheres of infl uence, but 
the principles of sovereignty and non-intervention establish the limits of 
international infl uence, and also the idea of a sphere of infl uence. Today 
there is no room for justifying the existence of a sphere of infl uence. 
Th e only way to justify the establishment of a sphere of infl uence is to 
avoid any reference to it or to formulate new expressions. Curiously, 
when looking into the past ideas on spheres of infl uence,  attempts to 
justify them have been at least as frequent as, if not more frequent than, 
condemnations of them. Chapter 5 testifi es how spheres of infl uence fi nd 
a justifi cation as they are constructed in relation to the demise of state 
sovereignty and the fear of a world state.
I am proposing here that the injustice ascribed to the concept of sphere 
of infl uence is not carved in stone. Justifi cations of spheres of infl uence 
do exist in international political thought. On a more general level, 
justifi cations of injustices also exist. Jackson argues that the stability of 
international society and especially the unity of the great powers is far 
more important than humanitarian protection or minority rights, if one 
has to choose between the two values. He asserts, “War is the biggest 
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threat to human rights. War between the great powers is the biggest 
humanitarian threat of all. Nothing else comes close.” (Jackson 2000, 
291.) Th is is the normative debate we try to avoid at present and this is 
exactly what I want to bring forth with regard to spheres of infl uence. I 
do this by presenting a history of the concept of sphere of infl uence in 
normative perspective.
1.2 “Sphere of infl uence” is What We Make of It
It is with the focus on justice and order that I began the journey to 
reassess the concept of sphere of infl uence in terms of its past and present. 
My approach to the history of the concept is constructivist, in the belief 
that a great proportion of political action consists of speech acts. I claim 
that spheres of infl uence are constructed in inter-subjective interaction. 
Spheres of infl uence do not live lives of their own separate from political 
actors and the discursive constructions of those actors. If Alexander 
Wendt (1992) says that anarchy is what states make of it, then I say a 
sphere of infl uence is what states make of it. A sphere of infl uence is not 
a permanent structure in the international system but is instead shaped 
and re-shaped in the processes of interaction and discourses among 
human beings across state borders.
According to R.B.J. Walker (1995, 6), “Th eories of international 
relations are more interesting as aspects of contemporary world politics 
that need to be explained than as explanations of contemporary world 
politics. As such, they may be read as a characteristic discourse of the 
modern state and as a constitutive practise whose eff ects can be traced in 
the remotest interstices of everyday life.” Walker also writes that “theories 
of international relations express and affi  rm the necessary horizons 
of the modern political imagination” (ibid). Th e ideas, theories and 
conceptualisations of spheres of infl uence should not be seen as mere 
explanations of world politics, but as constitutive of the practices of 
international relations. References to a sphere of infl uence enable certain 
political imaginations while limiting others. Th e concept of sphere of 
infl uence needs to be explained before it can be used to explain anything 
itself. 
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Jackson (2000, 10) writes that world politics is to a great extent a realm 
of discourse and dialogue. Modern statecraft, along with the expansion 
of the society of states, has caused political dialogue to become global 
in scale (ibid). Spheres of infl uence are constructed in discourses, and 
within ones that have a rather prominent role in international relations. 
If developing a theory on spheres of infl uence has aroused little interest in 
researchers, the analysis of discourses on spheres of infl uence – the use of 
the term “sphere of infl uence” in speech – has prompted even less interest. 
Jackson (2000, 37) puts discourses in the centre of political activity by 
stating that the most signifi cant part of international human relations is 
discourse and dialogue on what actions are acceptable, desirable, justifi ed 
and so on:
In politics, talk is not trivial; on the contrary, it is fundamental. 
Written or verbal discourse is the main vehicle of political activity. 
Without discourse there could be no politics in the ordinary meaning 
of the word. Without international discourse there could be no 
international relations.
According to Connolly (1993, 3), “to share a language is to share a range 
of judgements and commitments embodied in it”. Connolly writes about 
the “terms of political discourse”, which refer to a certain vocabulary that 
sets frames for political refl ection. More specifi cally, terms of political 
discourse refer to a set of criteria that must be met before an event or 
an act falls within the defi nition of a concept (ibid., 2). Moreover, with 
those criteria comes a judgement (ibid.). Connolly continues: “Since the 
discourse of politics helps to set the terms within which that politics 
proceeds, one who seeks to understand and to assess the structure of 
political life must deliberately probe the conventions governing these 
concepts” (ibid., 3). For Connolly, the language of politics channels 
political thought and action into certain directions and “[t]hose who 
simply use established concepts to get to the facts of political life, those 
who act unrefl ectively within the confi nes of established concepts, 
actually have the perceptions and modes of conduct available to them 
limited in subtle and undetected ways” (ibid., 1). 
In the same spirit, Iver Neumann (2008a, 62) declares on the meaning 
of ”discourse”: “It [discourse] constrains what is thought of at all, what 
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is thought as possible, and what is thought as the ‘natural thing’ to do in 
a given situation.” Th e terms of political discourse are what confi ne the 
concept of sphere of infl uence to a certain established framework, which 
I assert must be contested. A sphere of infl uence is not a fact of political 
life that can go without being critically examined fi rst and foremost as an 
idea. Sphere of infl uence, if it remains uncontested and unrevised, off ers 
a limited perception of international politics and potentially reinforces 
established practices. Even if its referent were transparent, “sphere of 
infl uence” would not lead to a blissful liberty in the use of language. All 
concepts include some uncertainty: all concepts are used and understood 
diff erently depending on the language, culture, time or even on the 
individual in question. Likewise, no concept can be totally “purifi ed” or 
made “perfect”. But to let concepts live their own life without stopping to 
enquire what they mean and how they are used limits not only thought 
but also action. Th e point of departure for this research is to view sphere 
of infl uence as an idea expressed in a speech act. Sphere of infl uence is 
a concept which encompasses ideas consisting of what Connolly refers 
to as “terms of political discourse”: the vocabulary of infl uence, criteria 
informing a judgement and the potential to channel political thought 
and action.
1.3 A Map Metaphor from the Cold War 
By now the reader might be curious to see a defi nition of sphere of 
infl uence. We must begin somewhere in order to fi nd the concept in the 
history of ideas and place it in the context of the contemporary political 
imagination. For scholars in political science, “sphere of infl uence” is a 
term used in international relations, but for those outside the fi eld it does 
not even necessarily denote relations among states. For Finns, such as 
me, “sphere of infl uence” is well established in popular language. Anyone 
who follows the Finnish media on international topics will have heard 
about “Russia’s sphere of infl uence”. Indeed, the term fi nlandisation, 
which is still a part of Finnish political jargon, describes Finland when 
drawn into the “Soviet sphere of infl uence”. Th e Finnish language also 
has its own neat and catchy term for a sphere of infl uence: etupiiri. Th e 
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word etupiiri is emotionally charged, as it stirs the identity of Finns as a 
small independent nation which has so courageously resisted the pressure 
from its big neighbour. It is no wonder then that sphere of infl uence has 
such a strongly pejorative ring to it. Th is is not the case only in Finland; 
the emotion and hostility that the Cold War image of sphere of infl uence 
evokes is shared by most of the Western world. 
I argue that the contemporary meaning of sphere of infl uence springs 
from the Cold War. Hence, the defi nitions from two analysts of the period, 
Edy Kaufman and Paul Keal, are a suitable beginning for contesting the 
concept, although its historical origins lie elsewhere:
A ‘sphere of infl uence’ can be best described then, as geographic region 
characterised by the high penetration of one superpower to the exclusion 
of other powers and particularly of the rival superpower (Kaufman 
1976, 11).
A sphere of infl uence is a determinate region within which a single 
external power exerts a predominant infl uence, which limits the 
independence or freedom of action of political entities within it (Keal 
1983, 15). 
Kaufman’s defi nition emphasises the relationship between superpowers: 
there is penetration into a region which excludes other powers from that 
region. In his defi nition Keal deals more with the relationship between 
the infl uencing and infl uenced powers: the sovereignty of the infl uenced 
is restricted. We can draw two features ascribed to a sphere of infl uence 
from these two defi nitions: exclusion of other powers and limitation 
of the independence or sovereignty of the infl uenced. Th e great power 
rivalry and its repercussions for sovereignty are the underlying tenets 
of the present discourses as well, even though they are not expressed 
explicitly. 
What then is popularly understood by “sphere of infl uence”? A google 
search on the term in October 2011 turned up a Wikipedia page which 
says ”In the fi eld of international relations, a sphere of infl uence (SOI) 
is an area or region over which a state or organisation has signifi cant 
cultural, economic, military or political infl uence”. Interestingly, states 
are not the only actors which can possess spheres of infl uence, since 
an organisation can also extend its infl uence over others. Moreover, 
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Wikipedia recognises spheres of infl uence both as formal and informal. 
In extreme cases, a sphere of infl uence can develop into a subsidiary of 
a state, that is, a satellite state or a colony. As an example, Wikipedia 
notes that Japan had an extensive sphere of infl uence during World War 
II, which could be drawn on a map as a large ”bubble”. Wikipedia also 
refers to Cold War spheres of infl uence and the Molotov-Ribbentrop 
Pact between the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany. If these arrangements 
refl ect the history of “SOI” in Wikipedia, the present is represented as a 
competition for spheres of infl uence in Eastern Europe, Central Asia and 
Caucasus. In November 2011, I went to view the Wikipedia defi nition 
again and to my great surprise the page had been modifi ed on the 15 
November to read: “In the fi eld of international relations, a sphere of 
infl uence (SOI) is a spatial region or conceptual division over which 
a state or organisation has signifi cant cultural, economic, military or 
political infl uence” (Wikipedia). What has changed in the defi nition is 
the inclusion of the element “a conceptual division”, which implies that a 
sphere of infl uence can also be an idea. But because “conceptual division” 
is not explained any further, its meaning remains unclear. I encourage the 
reader to go and fi nd out if the defi nition has again changed to include a 
discussion of a sphere of infl uence as a concept and not only as a foreign 
policy practice.
Th e notion of a sphere of infl uence extends beyond international 
relations. According to Wikipedia, a shopping mall can have a sphere 
of infl uence in retail trade and the software company Microsoft has a 
large sphere of infl uence in the market of operating systems. (Wikipedia.) 
Even though one can fi nd references to spheres of infl uence anywhere 
from sports to medical science, it is quite well established as a concept 
in IR. But it is not well established enough to have prompted a debate 
on its meaning. In comparison, the concept of security has attracted the 
attention of a large number of researchers indeed, resulting in a deluge 
of studies which redefi ne “security” such that it encompasses forms of 
threats other than merely military ones and subjects other than only 
states. Th is interest in developing the concept of security is in striking 
contrast with the disinterest the discipline has shown when it comes to 
redefi ning the concept of sphere of infl uence. 
One possible reason for this lack of interest in conceptualising a sphere 
of infl uence and debating the uses of the term, after the Cold War is 
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that sphere of infl uence represents more of a metaphor than an analytical 
concept to scholars in IR3. I view sphere of infl uence, in its present use, as 
a metaphorical expression which takes the form of a fi gure of speech, just 
like Richard Little (2007, 21–23) views balance of power. Like balance 
of power, sphere of infl uence combines two conceptual domains (that 
of sphere and that of infl uence) to correspond to a new way to explain 
a phenomenon involving the power struggle between states. In addition 
to sphere of infl uence forming a metaphorical expression, the language 
explaining the functioning of a sphere-of-infl uence policy includes 
metaphors such as “satellite” and “puppet”, referring to the ”infl uenced 
state”. Likewise, sphere of infl uence resembles the metaphorical 
expressions ”clash of civilizations” coined by Samuel Huntington (2007) 
and “heartland” by Halford Mackinder (1996). But even more so, the 
term sphere of infl uence can be likened to the term balance of power 
which expresses a set of scales where power is the target domain of the 
metaphor. With this logic, infl uence is the target domain of the metaphor 
of sphere of infl uence. Instead of a set of scales, the metaphor’s source is 
”sphere”. ”Sphere” as the source of the metaphor indicates a map with 
circles drawn on it to represent the territories of one state under the 
infl uence of another. 
Wikipedia calls the circles of spheres of infl uence “bubbles” and one 
can also fi nd the metaphor ”orbit”. Th us circle/bubble/orbit is the source 
of the metaphor and infl uence is its target. Th e idea of a circle on a 
map brings to mind a specifi c type of international infl uence: a sphere of 
infl uence. Th e sphere denotes a territory, but also something beyond that 
territory, that is, infl uence beyond a state’s border. A state border is not 
the only border that is associated with sphere of infl uence; the metaphor 
may also include the borders of the sphere, circle, or bubble. Th is takes us 
to the signifi cance of the metaphorical image: the sphere of a delineated 
territory on a map consisting of states. Th is sphere can be drawn; it is 
not abstract, which is why I have often been asked to name the countries 
within a sphere of infl uence of Russia. Th ese spheres exist as something 
as evident as anything else drawn on a map, like a geographical or at 
least a political fact. Th ey can be refuted in order to draw the circles 
diff erently, just like borders of states are sometimes re-drawn, but the 
3 See Little (2007, 19–50) for a discussion on the meaning and signifi cance of 
metaphors.
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existence of these spheres is refuted as infrequently as the existence of 
states themselves. Borders also make “sphere of infl uence” a pejorative 
metaphor, as it expresses a violation of or disrespect for a line drawn on 
a map. Th us, I argue that borders imagined on a map, borders which 
extend those of nation-states, constitute the subject which the metaphor 
of sphere of infl uence describes. Th is is why the vision of a sphere of 
infl uence as a feature on a map over presently dominates over the need to 
conceptualise a sphere of infl uence in terms of international order. 
A newspaper cartoon on the Monroe Doctrine from 1912 (Figure 
1), presented in the Wikipedia article on sphere of infl uence, illustrates 
spheres of infl uence on a map using a bubble metaphor; the spheres are 
depicted as two separate bubbles, as if there were two separate worlds 
with separate lords. In the cartoon, the American sphere of infl uence 
refl ects the application of the Monroe Doctrine.
Source: Wikipedia (copyright expired, public domain).
Figure 1. Depiction of infl uence on a map.
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As I have noted, I wish to contest the concept and the idea of sphere of 
infl uence through a historical and theoretical investigation. I argue that 
even though one should be critical of the uses of the concept of sphere 
of infl uence in shaming and condemning action, it does not mean that 
foreign policies should not be criticised. What I am after is refl ection 
on the fact that the pursuit of a sphere of infl uence does not necessarily 
always explain Russia’s motives. I also suggest that the mindset of Cold 
War spheres of infl uence can help to maintain established practices 
of thinking, speaking and acting. As a metaphor, sphere of infl uence 
provides the map image and maintains the aspect of disapproval, but it 
does not explain what a sphere of infl uence is or why it exists. I would 
contend that sphere of infl uence as a metaphorical concept leads to 
oversimplifi cation of foreign policies and motives. For example, in order 
to condemn injustice by reference to a sphere of infl uence, one should 
fi rst address the relationship between justice and the concept of sphere of 
infl uence. Th e pejorative connotation of the concept is a hidden agenda, 
and I propose we embrace transparency when using the concept to shame 
states. It should also be acknowledged that historically sphere of infl uence 
is a normative concept which has not been interpreted solely in pejorative 
terms. I will establish this argument in the chapters to come.
1.4 Contemporary Concepts of Infl uence
One explanation for the lack of interest in conceptualising sphere of 
infl uence is that there are already plenty of other concepts describing 
international infl uence. But if other concepts described international 
relations better, would not researchers and commentators then use 
those and leave spheres of infl uence in the past? My argument is that 
contemporary concepts of infl uence beyond state borders do not replace 
sphere of infl uence, because the political language proves otherwise and 
because sphere of infl uence maintains its uniqueness due to its pejorative 
connotation. I will demonstrate this by introducing the concepts of 
regional security complex, empire lite, regionalism and soft power.
Th e regional security complex theory (RSCT) proposed by Barry 
Buzan and Ole Waever helps to explain the post-Cold War order and 
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the relationship between globalising and regionalising trends (Buzan & 
Waever 2003, 3–4). Th e RSCT claims that security interdependencies 
have become increasingly regional since the end of bipolarity. Buzan 
and Waever argue that the end of bipolarity and the intrusion of the 
superpower rivalry into all regions resulted in local powers having more 
room to manoeuvre (ibid., 3). Now great powers have less incentive and 
desire to intervene in security aff airs outside their own regions (ibid.). 
As Buzan and Waever (2003, 4) explain, “RSCT distinguishes between 
the system level interplay of the global powers, whose capabilities enable 
them to transcend distance, and the subsystem level interplay of lesser 
powers whose main security environment is their local region.” For 
spheres of infl uence, the question of justice (justifi cation of infl uence) 
is more relevant than for a regional security complex, which is more 
concerned with security dependencies. Th e crucial question in the case 
of a sphere of infl uence is the relationship between the infl uencing state 
and the infl uenced state, which is not the focus of a regional security 
complex. 
Buzan and Waever (2003, 55–56) identify diff erent forms of security 
complexes by pointing to the centre of infl uence: 1) a standard RSC with 
a Westphalian, anarchic structure and no unipolar power at its centre, 
2) a centred RSC led by a great or super power and 3) a region integrated 
by institutions. RSC is a useful umbrella concept, or theory, for security 
relations, including infl uence beyond borders. A sphere of infl uence 
could be compared to a “centred RSC”. Even so, an RSC does not replace 
the idea of sphere of infl uence, because the two are not identical. First of 
all, even though a sphere of infl uence is most often defi ned as a region 
(see for example Keal’s and Kaufman’s defi nitions), historically it is not 
always regionally bounded. If we look at the Cold War, the spheres of 
infl uence of the time do not adhere to the map metaphor of a bubble, 
because infl uence was spread all over the globe. If we go even further 
back, the concept of sphere of infl uence fi rst emerges in the literature 
on colonialism, where it is also nothing like an RSC. In fact, a sphere 
of infl uence is such an old concept that comparing it to contemporary 
concepts such as an RSC does not contribute to the need to contest the 
concept itself. Moreover, if we look at political discourses, the concept of 
a regional security complex, unlike a sphere of infl uence, is nowhere to be 
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found. No other concept has replaced sphere of infl uence, RSC included. 
Sphere of infl uence is a familiar concept, easy to resort to, and has its 
purpose in the language we use.
“Empire lite” is another contemporary concept addressing infl uence 
beyond borders. For Richard Ignatieff  (2003, 89), empire lite is the new 
American Empire:
True, there are no American colonies and American corporations do 
not need their governments to acquire territory by force in order to 
acquire markets. So the new empire is not like those of times past, 
built on colonies and conquest. It is an empire lite, hegemony without 
colonies, a global sphere of inﬂ uence without the burden of direct 
administration and the risk of daily policing. It is an imperialism led 
by people who remember that their country secured its independence by 
revolt against an empire, and who have often thought of their country 
as the friend of anti-imperial struggles everywhere. It is an empire, in 
other words, without consciousness of itself as such. But that does not 
make it any less of an empire, that is, an attempt to permanently order 
the world of states and markets according to its national interests. 
(Emphasis added.)
It is interesting that Ignatieff  brings out the concept of sphere of infl uence 
while still preferring to use the concept of empire. Th e pejorative Cold 
War image of a sphere of infl uence is probably behind this choice of 
vocabulary. Th is is not surprising since United States foreign policy 
makers and analysts have never been comfortable with the concept of 
sphere of infl uence. Empire lite represents an American policy and one 
which is not colonialism. It is imperial tutelage on nation-building, to be 
seen in such places as Afghanistan, Bosnia and Kosovo, for the sake of 
global hegemony and ensuring stability in regions essential to the security 
of the United States and its allies (ibid., 89–90). 
Ignatieff  brings up questions of justice relating to the interventionism 
in the case of empire lite. Th e notion of sphere of infl uence sits squarely 
in the midst of a debate on the justifi cation of intervention by an empire 
lite or a great power, even though Ignatieff  pays no attention to the 
concept. I argue that when we look for a theoretical conceptualisation 
of sphere of infl uence, we will also fi nd a debate on the role of the 
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state. Th us, spheres of infl uence not only draw our attention to matters 
of justice but also highlight the fate of the state and the dangers of a 
world state. Th e uniqueness of a sphere of infl uence is that its normative 
nature allows us to connect the question of justice and international 
order. Th us, I fi nd sphere of infl uence situated between the discourses 
on justice and order in a way that no other concept is – and the reason 
lies precisely in our present use of the concept in shaming another state’s 
practices. Th e shaming of another state relates to the increasing concerns 
for justice (interstate and human) in international relations. Within this 
context, references to spheres of infl uence serve the purpose of pointing 
out injustice. But as a discursive tool, shaming can work as a means for 
identity-building. Western states have a long history in othering “the East” 
– and Russia especially – for the sake of identity construction (see Harle 
2000, Neumann 1999, Wolff  1994). Th us, shaming can be turned into 
a discursive tool of othering, and seeking political support from other 
states in a confl ict with the Other. Th is adds another peculiarity, and 
an ignored one, to sphere of infl uence: as a concept that is emotionally 
loaded, historically burdened and epitomised by considerations of 
injustice, it has the power to mobilise resistance and fuel resentment.
What about the concept of regionalism, then? Does that not replace 
sphere of infl uence in the contemporary international situation? 
Regionalism, especially when conceived of as regional solidarism, comes 
remarkably close to a sphere of infl uence in content. Th e diff erence 
between the two lies in the pejorative connotation of the latter. 
Andrew Hurrell’s (2007) discussion on regional states-systems or regional 
international societies is a good case in point. Hurrell (2007, 137–140) 
presents a division of identity-based solidarist regions, regions as poles 
and regions centred on powerful states. Regarding the regions centred on 
powerful states Hurrell writes, ”Such a situation may arise because the 
regional state is so overwhelmingly dominant that it can enforce its will, 
or because it succeeds in creating consensual hegemony within a region 
– maybe by providing economic benefi ts, or by underpinning regional 
security, or by claiming to embody a particular view of the world or set of 
values”. Finally, Hurrell mentions sphere of infl uence: 
Despite these diffi  culties over the longer run, it is important to hold 
open the possibility of a world order made up of large ’region-states’ 
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which might have a variety of internal forms of political organization 
– including perhaps old-style spheres of inﬂ uence, hegemonically 
centered institutionalism and unequal forms of federal union (ibid. 
141, emphasis added). 
Hurrell envisions a regionalism led by a powerful state which can take 
diff erent forms. One form is a sphere of infl uence, which belongs to the 
past (”old-style”) but can still be incorporated in the new regionalism. 
I will discuss primacy, hegemony and domination later (chapter 3.2), 
arguing that the theoretical conceptualisation of sphere of infl uence has its 
roots in separating diff erent forms of infl uence and solidarist tendencies. 
Th e point is that there is no reason to be shy in discussing the meanings 
of sphere of infl uence and searching for meaningful connections to 
other concepts, for as long as the term “sphere of infl uence” persists in 
the language of the discipline, IR needs to address the phenomenon. 
Regionalism (or an RSC) is one possible manifestation of a sphere of 
infl uence – although a sphere of infl uence is not always confi ned within 
regional boundaries – and within regionalism a sphere of infl uence can 
express a certain form of political organisation. 
Clearly, the concept of sphere of infl uence has its place in general 
discussions on acceptable or justifi ed infl uence, but the problem is that is 
not explicitly included in these debates. Felix Ciută (2006) argues that the 
debate over American hegemony revolves around the ideas of “the good 
state” or “responsible hegemon”. Ciută (2006, 183) writes, “However 
hidden, the defi nition of ‘the responsible state’ permeates all the debates 
about unipolarity, hegemony or imperialism, whether they are for, or 
against specifi c policies.” Is Russian hegemony debated in this framework? 
In a way, yes, but only in conjunction with the idea of ”irresponsible 
powers”, where Russia as a ”sphere-of-infl uence power” is the antithesis 
of the ”responsible power”. Ciută is right to argue that debates on the 
meaning of ’empire’ inevitably, but almost always only implicitly, fall 
back on a deeply normative understanding of the state, hegemony and 
empire (ibid., 187). We are on the right track here, acknowledging the 
normative aspects of hegemony or empire, but we are missing sphere 
of infl uence. Sphere of infl uence represents irresponsible conduct in the 
present uses of the concept, and bringing sphere of infl uence within the 
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debates on the nature of states, responsibility and ”the good state” would 
not only inform international theory but make it possible to contest the 
concept and assess its uses critically.
I will introduce the idea of responsible great powers in the English 
School context in chapter 4.6, but in the contemporary debates on 
power the distinction between hard and soft power potentially captures 
something about spheres of infl uence. Joseph Nye (2004, x) developed 
the idea of soft power as the ability to get what you want by attraction 
rather than coercion and payments. Nye (ibid.) writes, ”When you can 
get others admire your ideals and to want what you want, you do not have 
to spend as much on sticks and carrots to move them in your direction”. 
Hard power, by contrast, indicates economic and military might (ibid., 
5). Th e distinction between soft and hard power can be a distinction 
between more and less acceptable infl uence and in this respect relates 
to the pejorative nature ascribed to a sphere of infl uence. Nicu Popescu 
(2006) writes that the European Union has seen itself as a soft power 
but recently Russia has begun investing more in means of soft power 
in order to better justify and legitimise its infl uence in neighbouring 
states. Th is raises the question of whether hard power is what makes a 
sphere-of-infl uence policy and, if so, whether Russia is stepping out of its 
traditional sphere-of-infl uence policy if it is resorting to soft rather than 
hard means. As we will see in chapter 2.1.1, Popescu has not abandoned 
the image of Russian a sphere of infl uence even if he sees that infl uence 
has become softer. Th e relevance of the distinction between soft and 
hard power lies in its capacity to distinguish infl uence which is more 
acceptable: Soft infl uence could be a contemporary approximation of a 
sphere of infl uence but without the pejorative connotation. Even so, we 
are still faced with the fact that not even the soft-hard distinction has 
replaced the concept of sphere of infl uence in political parlance. 
Even though comparing sphere of infl uence to other contemporary 
concepts of infl uence is meaningful, I am more interested in the history 
of sphere of infl uence. In order to contest the concept, I believe the 
process must start from an inquiry into the past meanings and origins of 
the concept of sphere of infl uence. If we ignored the historicity of sphere 
of infl uence, we would end up burying a valuable body of knowledge. 
Empire lite and RSC (or regionalism, integration and so on) have their 
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place in the IR jargon, just like sphere of infl uence does. Yet, I explore 
other concepts, such as colonialism, intervention and Großraum, and I 
argue that the meaning of sphere of infl uence becomes obvious precisely 
when it is connected with related conceptions. In fact, an assessment of 
sphere of infl uence needs other concepts around it to connect the concept 
to international theory, away from metaphorical or emotional uses. But 
my view is historical, a voyage of discovery into the past meanings of 
sphere of infl uence. Th e terminology invented in IR after the Cold War 
is no longer suited to explaining the theory of international infl uence 
that I am about to present, because sphere of infl uence is a much 
older concept than regionalism, integration, empire lite or other more 
recent ideas. In fact, one should enquire why post-Cold War theoretical 
thinking on regional orders is not explicitly connected to the concept of 
sphere of infl uence, which has a long and signifi cant history. Even if more 
recent conceptualisations of regional order and international infl uence 
have succeeded in explaining present developments better, it is sphere 
of infl uence that people talk about. Politicians do not speak of regional 
security complexes or of an empire lite  , they speak about spheres of 
infl uence. Th e term “sphere of infl uence” permeates even popular 
discourses and entails a shared unspoken knowledge of ,its meaning. I 
argue that there are not many concepts depicting regional order which 
can claim such a status. Th e special nature of the concept of sphere of 
infl uence comes from its engaging normative questions as well as its long 
history and centrality in political parlance. Th us, this is a study on the 
history of the pejorative: What has made “sphere of infl uence” a pejorative 
term and how has infl uence beyond state borders been justifi ed and 
justifi cation debated? An assessment of the relationship between sphere 
of infl uence and other contemporary concepts is a topic for another 
study, which I would very much welcome, but this is a study on sphere 
of infl uence and its history.
Th e reason why I see sphere of infl uence as a concept that needs a 
theoretical elaboration is the potential it holds in addressing normative 
questions. Sphere of infl uence as an idea indicates that 1) there is a matter 
of justice in inter-state relations (justice is not confi ned to state borders) 
and 2) there is an exercise of infl uence which represents injustice. Th is 
is where I fi nd the uniqueness of the idea of sphere of infl uence. Of 
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course, sphere of infl uence is not the only concept to capture injustice 
and infl uence: hegemony, imperialism, interventionism or “export of 
democracy” are all pejorative in tone, but even so sphere of infl uence 
has persisted. Why? I suggest because of the power of the metaphor: the 
image of a map with the centre extending its power beyond its borders. 
More concretely, it endures because the Cold War map has not left our 
memories. Sphere of infl uence has taken on the function of describing 
Russia’s continuing Cold War mentality or imperial legacy (see Lo 
2002). No other concept has such a strong association with the unjust 
infl uence policies of the Cold War. Th us, regardless of the usefulness 
of other concepts in describing infl uence and justice, they have not 
superseded sphere of infl uence. But there is more than just the question 
of justice: 3) sphere of infl uence shines as a form of international order. 
It is no coincidence that during the turmoil of the world wars numerous 
fascinating ideas relating to spheres of infl uence were produced, Schmitt’s 
Großraum being perhaps the most captivating. Political theorists reacted 
to the need to fi nd solutions to problems of international relations of 
their time. Accordingly, by combining these two aspect of justice and 
order, we can begin building a meaning for sphere of infl uence beyond 
its pejorative uses. Julie Wilhelmsen and Geir Flikke (2005, 389), from 
the Norwegian Institute of International Aff airs, write that “words, 
rhetoric and concepts do matter”. Norms, both positive and negative, 
spread within the international community altering the way states act 
and interact (ibid.). Th e way we speak of spheres of infl uence matters. 
1.5 Structure of the Book
Th e history of spheres of infl uence I am about to present is not meant 
to be clear-cut. Th e purpose of this study is to address the questions 
and concerns related to the concept of sphere of infl uence in the past 
and within the contemporary political imagination. In order to open up 
new paths for understanding spheres of infl uence in the present, I detail 
a tradition of thought about spheres of infl uence – a history of ideas. 
Th ere is no explicit school of thought on spheres of infl uence, but there 
clearly is a continuity of ideas which are connected and refl ect each other. 
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I have collected thoughts on spheres of infl uence together and I make 
the case for using them in order to inspire the normative and theoretical 
discussion, which currently ignores the concept.
Th e study is divided into distinct but overlapping episodes in the 
history of the concept of sphere of infl uence. Locating the concept begins 
by presenting examples from contemporary Western images of Russia’s 
sphere-of-infl uence policy and ends in examples of contemporary 
Russian visions of spheres of infl uence. In between these two locations of 
“the present”, we fi nd sphere of infl uence constructed as a normative idea 
on international infl uence in four settings: 1) the English School account 
of the history of the system of states, 2) the English School theory on 
the institutions of the society of states, 3) conceptualisations of regional 
constellations springing from the context of the First and Second World 
War and 4) Cold War spheres of infl uence. 
In the next chapter, I explore research papers discussing Russia’s 
foreign policy to identify the uses of the concept of sphere of infl uence. 
Next, I introduce ideas on genealogy which have inspired me to look at 
the interconnectedness of past and present understandings of sphere of 
infl uence and explain my choice of sources. After we know what the nature 
of the present understanding is, we can investigate how it came about. 
Th e fi rst chapter on the English School investigates the origins of sphere 
of infl uence in relation to the history of the state-system. Suzerainty, the 
Congress of Europe, colonialism and the Monroe Doctrine are discussed. 
Th e second chapter on the English School discusses balance of power, 
sovereignty, intervention, justice, international law and infl uence as 
responsibility. Sphere of infl uence is fi tted within the pluralist-solidarist 
debate on international order. 
Th e third chapter is an episode extending from the First World War 
until the aftermath of the Second World War (1915–1950), during 
which theorists formulated responses to the crisis of the states-system4. 
Th e solution these theorists off er to the problems caused by nationalism 
and the disintegration of the sovereign state was a system composed of 
regional constellations. Friedrich Naumann wrote about Mid-Europe, 
Carl Schmitt and E.H. Carr about Großraum, Walter Lippmann about 
Good Neighbor Policy, and James Burnham about super-states; George 
4 Most of the material is related to the Second World War. Only Friedrich Naumann’s 
writings were published during the First World War (1915).
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Orwell envisioned the fi ctional Oceania and Eastasia. Th e fourth episode 
is located in the Cold War setting, which reinvented spheres of infl uence 
as a central foreign policy practice of the time. I will explore not only the 
conceptualisations of the period but also the Cuban Missile Crisis (1962). 
I set out to prove that the Cold War spheres of infl uence should also be 
analysed by reinterpreting the dynamics of the international society of the 
time. Th e fi nal episode connects the two ends of the string by coming 
back to the present understanding of sphere of infl uence. Reading Russian 
discourses uncovers the need to rethink not only the concept of sphere of 
infl uence but also our obsession with “Russia’s sphere of infl uence”. I say 
this because the analysis shows that not even the Russians themselves have 
a clear vision of international order, not to mention spheres of infl uence. 
An inability to spell out a coherent view of international order means 
an inability to address matters of injustice, to show fl exibility regarding 
the principle of sovereignty and, fi nally, to discuss a system of spheres of 
infl uence. In the concluding chapter, I encourage students of IR to take 
an interest in the idea of sphere of infl uence and I put forward thoughts 
on the relationship between spheres of infl uence, order and justice.
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2 A History of the Present
2.1 Where is the Russian Sphere of Infl uence?
Th e twenty-fi rst-century discourses on spheres of infl uence are stories 
which represent and uphold spheres of infl uence as much as the actual 
practices of states. Th e notion of sphere of infl uence emerges as an 
explanation for Russia’s foreign policy motives in its relationship with the 
post-Soviet space. Finding a research paper (written by a non-Russian) 
which would either problematise the idea of sphere of infl uence or 
prove explicitly that Russia is not constructing a sphere of infl uence is 
hard, if not impossible. Th e use of the concept of sphere of infl uence 
in describing Russian foreign policy is frequent enough to raise concern 
over the lack of critical approaches to the concept. As there almost 
seems to be an unspoken agreement among European and American 
scholars that Russia is attempting to construct or maintain a sphere of 
infl uence, it becomes diffi  cult to challenge this view. Sphere of infl uence 
is almost like a mantra, which when repeated often enough becomes 
a self-fulfi lling prophesy. Critical research should be able to challenge 
established knowledges; indeed this is the very purpose of my research. I 
do not argue that Russia is not seeking to establish infl uence beyond its 
borders, but suggest that the term ”sphere of infl uence” – in its current 
pejorative and vague use – might not serve as an accurate description of 
Russia’s foreign policy motives. 
When the concept of sphere of infl uence is used in describing 
Russian foreign policy, it represents something evident, undisputed 
and unproblematic. Given that IR has forgotten to theorise sphere of 
infl uence, it is quite understandable that foreign policy researchers refer to 
the term without questioning its meaning. Moreover, it is not possible to 
defi ne every single concept that one happens to use in a piece of research. 
As Jens Bartelson (1995, 43) states, “as soon as one decides to investigate 
something, one has to take other things for granted”. But debating a 
concept or an idea has tremendous infl uence on its use. Consider identity 
politics. Th e term carries a very diff erent meaning depending on whether 
identity is understood as innate rather than as a social relation. Racism 
thrives on the idea of natural characteristics belonging to a particular 
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nation or people. Th is notion has been contested within the discipline by 
claiming that a national – or in fact any – identity is socially constructed 
and can change and be manipulated. If IR is rich in theorising  on  identity 
and other concepts, it certainly lacks theoretical conceptualisations of 
sphere of infl uence. Th e lack of theoretical debate leads to use of the 
concept without pondering its meaning and its eff ects. It is important to 
be conscious of the fact that using the concept of sphere of infl uence to 
describe Russian foreign policy evokes pejorative associations and images 
of the Cold War. When one looks at the Russian discourses (see chapter 
7), the rich discourse on international order prove that there is so much 
more to the Russian idea of infl uence than what is currently meant by the 
concept of sphere of infl uence.
Next I will off er some examples of the uses and non-uses of the idea 
of sphere of infl uence5. On the material chosen consists of examples 
of the uses of sphere of infl uence in contemporary IR and deals with 
these in two sections. Th e fi rst comprises an analysis in which Russia’s 
regional policy is termed a sphere-of-infl uence policy and the second 
demonstrates how there has been a lack of attention to the phenomenon 
of sphere of infl uence. Western analysts produce a view of spheres of 
infl uence that shows they are not conscious of the intellectual history 
underlying the concept. Moreover, Western scholars use the concept as a 
means to highlight the alienness of Russian foreign policy vis-à-vis that 
of the Western (namely, European) states.
2.1.1 Revealing the Pejorative
It is not particularly diffi  cult to prove that there is an image of Russia 
trying to consolidate a sphere of infl uence within the post-Soviet space. 
Th ere are certain events that are referred to as if they form the body 
of criteria for identifying a sphere-of-infl uence policy. Th ese include 
energy blackmail, interference in elections, military presence and military 
intervention. Russian visions of regional integration are interpreted as a 
means to establish domination and control, and the infl uence of Russian 
culture and language and the protection of Russian minorities are also 
viewed as means to consolidate a sphere of infl uence. Th is infl uence is not 
5 Studies on Russia with English School perspectives are dealt with in chapter 7.
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just any infl uence; it is a continuation of the Soviet era, an unwillingness 
to “let go”.
Russia is the country associated with the practice of pursuing a sphere 
of infl uence more than any other great power. Curiously, Russia appears 
to be the only great power that is a captive of its tradition of infl uence. Th e 
former imperialist states of Europe, even though they still have infl uence 
in the developing world, are viewed more as the peace-builders of Europe 
than as states with sphere-of-infl uence ambitions. More interestingly, 
although denouncing imperialism, the United States also has a long 
history of international infl uence, which has only become stronger and 
wider. Despite the history of the United States as a great power with 
extensive international infl uence, ever  since the Monroe Doctrine 
(1823), in contemporary analysis the image of the United States is not 
stained with a policy of establishing a sphere of infl uence. Wilhelmsen 
and Flikke (2005, 387) explain how during the Bush administration, 
after September 11, the United States’ foreign policy was founded upon 
its status as the world’s sole remaining superpower promoting regime 
change in an anarchic international environment. Th ey continue, 
“Th is also involves the calculus that while rallying support from the 
international community and international law, the USA will reserve for 
itself the right to act unilaterally on the basis of imminent danger or even 
the suspicion that some states may have long term ambitions of infl icting 
damage on the USA”. Th en why is this not a sphere-of-infl uence policy? 
One explanation is that the United States operates on a global arena, 
thus, its foreign policy does not translate into pursuing a sphere of 
infl uence which is often envisioned as a clearly delineated region on a 
map. Another, even more convincing, explanation is the pejorative ring 
of the concept of sphere of infl uence. Even though the United States is 
often admonished for its enthusiasm for military solutions, its motives 
are seen as rooted in defending human rights and promoting democracy. 
When there is a need to express criticism of the United States’ policy, 
it is done by reference to such ideas as the empire (lite), hegemony, or 
the world police. Imagining both the United States and Russia as states 
longing for spheres of infl uence would mean equating the policies and 
interests of the two. In order to keep the two states in diff erent categories, 
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and in order to use sphere of infl uence as a pejorative expression, only 
Russia is currently associated with the concept.
Th e United States and the Soviet Union were seen as the two 
superpowers with spheres of infl uence during the Cold War. After the 
disintegration of the Soviet Union, the United States rid itself of the 
bad reputation of having a sphere-of-infl uence policy, whereas Russia 
was stuck with it. But it was not enough that Russia had to carry the 
image of a Cold War lust for infl uence: its sphere-of-infl uence policy, 
especially in the media, is often associated with imperialism. I argue 
that not taking an interest in conceptualising sphere of infl uence evokes 
images of imperial power. Th e upshot of this neglect is not only that the 
idea of sphere of infl uence is not discussed as a concept in its own right, 
but that its pejorative associations penetrate our imagination; “imperial” 
rarely indicates anything good. Bobo Lo, a well-known expert on Russia, 
describes Russia’s foreign policy as a refl ection of an “imperial syndrome” 
whereby Russia is both aware of its old empire and feels that the country 
has an imperial mission in the future (Lo 2002, 48–52). Lo adds that 
this does not mean a rebuilding of the Soviet Union, but a state of mind 
based on the attempt to increase infl uence (ibid., 52). Th e territory of the 
old empire is now seen as Russia’s sphere of infl uence. Calling a territory a 
sphere of interest gave Russia a ”moral right” to interference (ibid., 115). 
Lo continues that since the break-up of the Soviet Union, the idea of a 
sphere of infl uence has lived strong and that in the background one can 
fi nd a wish to preserve what remains of the Cold War status quo (ibid., 
114–115). In this respect, for Lo, the history of Tsarist Russia and the 
Soviet Union are visible in the current foreign policy thinking in Russia. 
Th ere is no denying that Russia is interested in international infl uence. 
But what kind of infl uence? For Lo it is a mixture of an imperial mission 
and Cold War spheres of infl uence. Th ere are two shortcomings in Lo’s 
account: 1) knowing that Russia’s present ambitions have something to 
do with its past status and infl uence does not contribute to defi ning what 
Russia’s present idea of a sphere of infl uence is, and 2) the continuation 
of an “imperial mission” and a “Cold War sphere of infl uence” leaves no 
room for any other interpretation of Russia’s sphere of infl uence than 
a negative one. Th is is not to say that Lo wants to contribute to the 
pejorative meaning of sphere of infl uence. However, by not saying what 
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he means by the expression or, rather, by implying that it means imperial 
infl uence, he reinforces the image of infl uence in a pejorative sense, 
evoking the contempt and disapproval that are not openly discussed and 
argued for, but that come with the choice of expression.
Th e way Western analysts see it, Russia’s involvement in regime change 
in another state, unilateral action within foreign territory and protecting 
national interests are nothing other than consolidation of its sphere of 
infl uence. Wilhelmsen and Flikke (2005, 388) write, “Even though 
the structural position of today’s Russian Federation in international 
relations is not as strong as formerly that of the Soviet Union, Russian 
unilateral military action against terrorist bases in Georgian territory and 
Russia’s more assertive policies in Central Asia all reveal that Russia has 
not given up on preventing the geopolitical space of the Commonwealth 
of Independent States (CIS) from eroding, or on preserving the post-
Soviet space as a sphere of infl uence.” If we think about the informative 
value of this sentence, we can say that the message is that Russia has 
preserved some infl uence in its neighbourhood. For Wilhelmsen and 
Flikke, Russia’s infl uence is based on military action, assertive policies 
and “holding on to a geopolitical space”. “Geopolitical” implies power 
deriving from territory, which is why the concept of sphere of infl uence 
is invoked to explain Russia’s actions and motivations. Th e problem with 
this kind of logic is that there is no set of criteria allowing one to determine 
that Russia’s unilateral action in Georgian territory and assertive policies 
in Central Asia signify a sphere-of-infl uence policy. Th ere is no list of 
actions to determine whether some conduct belongs to the category 
“sphere-of-infl uence policy” or not. If there were such a list, then we 
should also have a list of actions that do not constitute such a policy but 
would be in the category “infl uence of some other kind”. We do not 
know if the authors would, as a rule, deem any unilateral military action 
(that is, intervention) to be part of a sphere-of-infl uence policy of, or 
perhaps only when such an action is disapproved of by the international 
community. Would they see Russian humanitarian intervention as 
“preserving the post-Soviet space as a sphere of infl uence”? Moreover, we 
do not know if Wilhelmsen and Flikke consider infl uence approved of by 
the infl uenced states to be a manifestation of a sphere-of-infl uence policy. 
Some post-Soviet states might in fact view their relationship with Russia 
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as benefi cial, despite their being under some form of Russian infl uence. 
Does the consent of the infl uenced mean that the relationship between 
the infl uencing and the infl uenced states is integration, cooperation or 
alliance instead of a sphere of infl uence? In fact, one justifi cation for 
establishing a sphere of infl uence is in that such a policy involves infl uence 
which respects the rights of the infl uenced states and benefi ts them as 
well. Later I present the suzerain treaty as an example of this (chapter 
3.2), and I discuss Naumann’s and Lippmann’s ideas as representing a 
vision of mutually benefi cial infl uence (chapter 5). 
When students and researchers look for analyses of Russian foreign 
policy, especially on the Internet, they often come across policy reports 
by think-tanks. One such think-tank is the European Council on Foreign 
Relations (henceforth ECFR). One of the papers by the ECFR on Russia 
is “A Power Audit of EU-Russia Relations” by Mark Leonard and Nicu 
Popescu, from 20076. Another paper by the same institution is titled 
”Th e Limits of Enlargement-Lite: European and Russian Power in the 
Troubled Neighbourhood”, from 2009, written by Nicu Popescu and 
Andrew Wilson and dealing directly with spheres of infl uence. Th e 
ECFR reports present a sphere-of-infl uence policy as something uniquely 
Russian. Popescu and Wilson (2009, 29) write, “Moscow has been trying 
to establish a sphere of infl uence in its ‘near abroad’ since the break-up of 
the Soviet Union”. What enables the pejorative interpretation of Russia’s 
infl uence is the discourse on a more positive form of infl uence exercised 
by the European Union, creating a dichotomy of bad and good infl uence. 
Bad infl uence means “an activist Russia that aims to bring countries into 
its sphere of infl uence” and good infl uence means “an EU that wants 
to spread democracy, stability and the rule of law” (Popescu & Wilson 
2009, 5). Leonard and Popescu (2007, 8) go a little bit deeper into the 
diff erences between the two types of infl uence: 
Whereas the EU stands for an idea of order based on consensus, 
interdependence and the rule of law, Russian foreign policy is 
motivated by a quest for power, independence and control. Th e EU’s 
main concern is to ensure that its neighbourhood is peaceful and 
6 Th e paper is “an audit of the power that the Union wields over its most important 
neighbour, Russia” conducted by a team of researchers from all 27 EU member states 
(Leonard & Popescu 2007, i).
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well-governed. Russia wants to expand its sphere of infl uence and 
achieve control of economic interests and energy assets in neighbouring 
countries and the EU.
In this account, the infl uence of the European Union, aimed at bringing 
about a peaceful neighbourhood and conducted with respect for the rule 
of law, stands in sharp contradiction to Russia’s infl uence, which is based 
on economic interests and power ambitions (sphere of infl uence). Does 
this mean that the EU member states have no economic interests or need 
for additional energy assets elsewhere and that the EU is not moved by 
power? And that Russia has no interest in contributing to a peaceful 
neighbourhood, but acts on its power and economic ambitions? I argue 
that the infl uence of Russia and of the EU is a more complex issue. All 
countries have national interests and all international actors have interests. 
Russian politicians and researchers have made the argument for national 
interests an art form. For Russians, the right to pursue national interests 
is seen as countering the threat of being ignored by the international 
community and of being forced to accept rules dictated from the outside. 
For Russians the discourse on national interests is aimed against those 
who try to dismiss Russia’s voice or try to manage world aff airs without 
the country. ”National interests” is a sort of realist voice in Russia’s foreign 
policy discourse and, as I will later show (see chapter 7), Russians do not 
share the utopian dream of a common humanity, but they certainly have 
an interest in a well-governed and peaceful neighbourhood. Th e question 
is how to bring this about and what a well-governed neighbourhood 
looks like. For Russia, “well-governed” means operating according to 
the same kind of managed democracy as their own, with democracy 
imported from abroad seen as a source of instability rather than of peace 
and prosperity. Second, economic interests motivate all countries and 
regional integration projects in the world, without exception. I believe 
the dichotomy of good and bad infl uence of this sort serves the purpose 
of an identity project by excluding the alien other. Following is another 
quotation on the diff erence between infl uence in a positive and in a 
pejorative sense:
From their perspective, EU governments are not trying to build a sphere 
of infl uence in the neighbourhood; they are allowing neighbouring 
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countries to fulfi l their right to embrace universal values such as 
democracy and the rule of law. But that is not how things are perceived 
in Moscow, which sees its infl uence receding as the EU and NATO 
gradually encroach on the countries of the former Soviet Union […] 
(Popescu & Wilson 2009, 47.)
Here, infl uence without the sphere, that is, without the pejorative 
element, means “allowing neighbouring countries to fulfi l their right 
to embrace universal values such as democracy and rule of law”. Th e 
method is “allowing” and the content is “promotion of universal values”. 
In fact, quite rightly, Popescu and Wilson argue that this is not what 
Russia is doing. As I will later show, in chapter 7, Russian analysts are 
not eager to speak on behalf of universal values, because for them there is 
universal international law, but there are no universal values. For Russians, 
promotion of universal values is interpreted as a violation of the right to 
choose one’s own path of development. For Russians, it is infl uence in 
the pejorative sense, and even more so when the promoter is the United 
States or NATO. Th us, we can see that the pejorative meaning attached 
to sphere of infl uence is not only evident within the Western world, but 
sphere of infl uence is pejorative for Russia as well (see chapter 7).
 If the ECFR reports have now established the diff erence between 
Russia’s and the EU’s infl uence, the next step is to present the Russian 
worldview in its full compass. Th is worldview is expressed in a sphere-
of-infl uence policy that serves to dismiss international society with its 
common rules and institutions:
When ‘coloured revolutions’ swept through Georgia and Ukraine in 
2003 and 2004, the Russian elite was plunged into deep depression 
about Russia’s declining infl uence in its ‘near abroad’. But the elite’s 
foreign policy failures toughened it for what it sees as a competitive 
struggle for infl uence in a hostile, Hobbesian world. (Leonard & 
Popescu 2007, 17.)
Th e claim that Russia is struggling in a hostile Hobbesian world is not only 
interesting but alarming. Describing the Russian worldview as Hobbesian 
is a strong statement, not backed by any empirical evidence, that invokes 
an expression we are expected to be familiar with. Bull (1966b, 37) explains 
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that the Hobbesian state of nature is a state of war: “Sovereign states, on 
this view, fi nd themselves in a situation in which their behaviour in relation 
to one another, although it may be circumscribed by considerations of 
prudence, is not limited by rules or law or morality”. If one interprets a 
“Hobbesian world” as characterised by a war of all against all, this can 
hardly be the Russian worldview. Th e offi  cial Russian worldview, read 
from speeches and statements by the country’s representatives, is based 
on the idea of international order as multipolarity, where the great powers 
provide stability and security in concert. Moreover, Russia emphasises 
the role of the United Nations (henceforth UN) and international law 
as the founding pillars of international relations (see Foreign Policy 
Concept of the Russian Federation 2008). For Russia, international law 
thus means the upholding of international order, that is, the system of 
sovereign states, and not, for example, human rights. Moreover, what 
is said about international law relates to defending Russia’s right as an 
equal member of the great power club. Resort to international law is a 
mask for making sure the country is not left out of the decision making 
concerning important world aff airs. Equality for Russia means equality 
among the great powers, not among all states. Even considering that the 
Russian view of international law is somewhat self-serving, it is obvious 
that Russia is anchored in the international community and its principles. 
Th is makes the claim of a Hobbesian worldview at best a partial truth of 
Russian foreign policy. Military juxtapositioning is still visible in Russian 
foreign policy, but does not the same hold true for the United States’ 
foreign policy, even though it is not called Hobbesian? For Leonard and 
Popescu, the terms “Hobbesian” and “sphere of infl uence” betoken the 
negative associations of Russian foreign policy, where the use of the two 
concepts can be misleading. Th e pejorative uses of sphere of infl uence 
signify imposing on Russia the image of unjust infl uence, whereas the 
EU’s infl uence, for example, represents an acceptable, softer means 
to impose a preferred regional order. Th e idea of Russia’s Hobbesian 
worldview is an extreme example of simplifi cation, but it illustrates the 
kinds of criteria and judgements a particular conception can entail and 
how it can restrict our perceptions.
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2.1.2 Blind Spots
As I have argued, contesting the concept of sphere of infl uence has been 
neglegted. Yet, there is an exception: an article titled “Russia’s Spheres of 
Interests, not Infl uence” by a well-known Russian scholar and director 
of the Carnegie Moscow Center, Dmitri Trenin (2009). Trenin implies 
that he is about to unravel the meaning of “sphere of infl uence” and 
“interests”: “Th us, a question arose: what is the diff erence, if any, between 
the sphere of interests proclaimed by the current Russian leadership, and 
the more traditional sphere of infl uence condemned by international 
public opinion?” (ibid., 4) and “More specifi cally, is the current usage 
of the spheres of ‘privileged interests’ instead of ‘spheres of infl uence’ 
signifi cant or is it a mere window dressing?” (ibid., 5). Trenin nevertheless 
fails to provide the answers to these questions. What he does off er is an 
account of the historical development of Russia’s sphere of infl uence.
According to Trenin (2009, 6), the Soviet Union treated the countries 
of the Warsaw Pact and Council for Mutual Economic Assistance 
(COMECON), as well as Cuba, Mongolia and Vietnam, as belonging to 
its sphere of infl uence. Trenin (ibid.) describes how this was a question 
of territorial control: “Moscow’s political supremacy was underpinned 
by its ideological domination, and backed by military presence and 
bloc discipline, made credible by the periodic use of force. In economic 
terms, the Soviet sphere was a closed system built on the centralized 
allocation of resources”. With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the 
end of the Cold War, the sphere of infl uence dissolved and “[i]nstead 
of contest and rivalry, they [Russia] sought inclusion and integration. 
Instead of bickering over the spheres of infl uence, they aimed at joint 
global leadership alongside Europe and the United States.” (ibid., 7). 
Disappointed with not being accepted as a partner in European security 
structures, and with NATO’s enlargement plans, the Russians declared 
that sphere of infl uence as a concept was alive and well in international 
politics. “It was only the masters and hegemons that had changed.” (Ibid., 
8.) Trenin (2009, 10–11) describes the Russian foreign policy approach 
in 2003 as follows:
Moscow had to keep the CIS space from expanding politico-military 
alliances such as NATO. It had to be able to mediate and manage 
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confl icts among its near neighbors. It had to exercise political leadership 
within the commonwealth and, no less important, keep it within the 
Russian cultural sphere. Th e plan was to make Moscow a mecca for 
ex-Soviet elites, much as London has been one for the former British 
empire, and Paris for the francophonie. 
Th is is a very interesting historical account of how Russia’s approach to 
(a certain) sphere of infl uence developed. But what about the diff erence 
between infl uence and interest? Trenin (2009, 12–13) writes:
Te current policy of Russia’s spheres of interest dates back from the 
mindset of the mid-2000s. Compared to the Soviet Union’s, the 
Russian Federation’s sphere is not only much smaller, but also much 
‘‘lighter’’ − ‘‘interests’’ after all are not as compelling as ‘‘infl uence.’’ In 
Russia, and throughout the former Soviet Union, ideology has been 
replaced by pervasive pragmatism. Th ere is no hint of political control 
by Moscow either”. […] Unlike ‘‘infl uence’’ which tends to be both all-
inclusive and exclusive, ‘‘interests’’ are more specifi c and identifi able. 
Rather than whole countries, they include these various politico-
military, economic and fi nancial, and cultural areas within them”.
According to Trenin, a sphere of interests is smaller in geographic terms 
and can consist of parts of states instead of whole states; it is “lighter” 
and more specifi c, without ideological and political control. I fi nd it 
problematic to dissociate political and ideological aims from the pursuit 
of “pragmatic interests”. First, Trenin evokes the Cold War by connecting 
infl uence with ideology, ignoring the spheres of infl uence that existed 
before the Cold War. Second, one could say that ideological struggles 
still persist in the form of resisting “forceful imposition” by the West 
of its form of democracy (see more in chapter 7). Attempts to draw a 
distinction between ideology and pragmatism also raise the question 
whether a sphere of infl uence that is defended for the sake of a balance 
of power is ideological or pragmatic. Are regional integration projects 
ideological or pragmatic? Moreover, what does Trenin really mean by 
“ideology” and “pragmatism”? When it comes to the claim that there is 
no hint of political control by Moscow, many Western analysts would 
disagree; they point to the energy disputes with Belarus and Ukraine, 
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confl icts with Georgia, the bronze soldier dispute with Estonia in 2007 
and other aspects of Russia’s recent activity in the post-Soviet space. Th us, 
establishing the idea of a sphere of interests without political control, 
as distinct from a sphere of infl uence with political control, would 
necessitate agreement on what constitutes “political control”. For Trenin, 
political control has a pejorative connotation, while interests are purifi ed 
of all that makes infl uence unacceptable; but this does not explain the 
diff erence between infl uence and interests in practical terms. Here we 
come back to the question of what constitutes a sphere-of-infl uence 
policy, and we have not, in fact, got very far in separating interests and 
infl uence. What also remains unclear is whether infl uence can include 
interests and interests can include infl uence.
Replacing the word “infl uence” with “interest” also entails a risk of 
simply inventing a new term to justify infl uence by claiming that is 
fundamentally diff erent, as if to avoid the moral judgment that infl uence 
carries with it. Rather than replace one term with another, it is necessary 
to go to the root of the referent, to look at the discourses on spheres of 
infl uence, meanings given to the concept and to refl ect on the structures 
of the international system which underpin the practice. When we know 
what notions the old concept incorporates, we can begin to develop a 
new concept to describe Russia’s infl uence. I admire Trenin’s attempt to 
put the question of sphere of infl uence on the table; it was a necessary act 
in itself. Unfortunately, his analysis does not produce theoretical insights. 
It does not free Russia from the stigma of being a sphere-of-infl uence 
power as long as the concept is not  questioned in greater detail.
We have now seen the pejorative use of the concept of sphere of 
infl uence and Trenin’s attempt to replace “infl uence” with “interest”. A 
third option is to forget about the concept and the term altogether. Russia 
as a Great Power: Dimensions of Security under Putin is a book edited by 
Jakob Hedenskog et al. (2008). Th is collection of articles includes no 
discussion of spheres of infl uence. Neumann (2008b, 2008c) discusses 
Russia as a great power without any mention of spheres of infl uence 
or other possible forms of territorial infl uence. Ingmar Oldberg (2008, 
2010), from the Swedish Institute of International Aff airs, also ignores 
spheres of infl uence. In an article titled “Russia’s Great Power Strategy 
under Putin and Medvedev”, Oldberg (2010) lists a wide range of great 
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power strategies of Russia – international organisations, organisation in 
the post-Soviet space, the political use of borders and territorial integrity, 
the political use of Russian minorities, military bases and activities, 
economic means and energy as a political lever – but not a policy of 
establishing or consolidating spheres of infl uence. Is it so that spheres of 
infl uence are not relevant anymore? If this is the case, it should be said 
out loud. Th e point is not that great power status necessitates territorial 
infl uence, but that one should notice if it does not. In the case of Russia, 
accused of attempts to control the post-Soviet states, it would be of utmost 
importance to underline that other strategies for maintaining great power 
status than territorial infl uence. Discussing spheres of infl uence allows us 
to take notice of other explanations and other forms of infl uence than 
negative ones. It allows us to discuss how infl uence aff ects sovereignty, 
what the relationship between the infl uencing and the infl uenced power 
is like, or how infl uence is related to attempts to maintain the pluralist 
international order. Th e problem is the indiff erence within IR towards 
the concept of sphere of infl uence, which leaves Russian foreign policy 
analysts without the necessary disciplinary debate that would give them 
tools for identifying diff erent forms of infl uence and their normative 
aspects.
In the introduction, I identifi ed the core problems of the concept 
of sphere of infl uence at present: Th e fi rst is the lack of interest in the 
concept itself; the second is the range of pejorative associations which the 
concept has acquired. When the two problems are put together – lack of 
explanatory power and pejorative meaning – use of the concept can result 
in simplifi cations. Evoking the idea of a sphere of infl uence, without a 
robust conceptualisation to underpin it, reduces Russia’s interests and 
infl uence to lines on a map, and imputes to them negative designs; 
and ignores how spheres of infl uence are conceptualised in Russia, how 
spheres of infl uence relate to international order and how they are or can 
be justifi ed (if they can). We need to debate the meaning of sphere of 
infl uence and to do so with reference to international theory. Sphere of 
infl uence is not just an expression of disapproval but a concept which tries 
to explain something about international relations. If we acknowledge 
these two factors – that sphere of infl uence is used pejoratively and 
that the purpose of the concept is also to explain, not only to condemn 
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something – we can approach it as a contested concept. Once we become 
conscious of our own uses of the concept, we can begin to discern Russian 
views on spheres of infl uence. And once we have become critical about 
the concept of sphere of infl uence and its uses, we can become critical 
about the policy of pursuing spheres of infl uence. 
 
2.2 On Methodology
It seems clear that diplomacy’s present plight cannot be understood, 
or even be described as such, unless some knowledge of its origins is 
available. In practical terms, if we are to know what diplomacy is, 
or where it might be heading, we must know how it came into being. 
(Der Derian 1987, 2.)
Ever since I decided to pursue a PhD, I have been studying spheres 
of infl uence. I wanted to study Russia’s sphere of infl uence but could 
not fi nd literature on the concept itself. So I changed my focus to the 
concept of sphere of infl uence and kept Russia in the picture because 
the two had become so strongly intertwined. Methodologically, I went 
from writing “a theory on spheres of infl uence” to “a genealogy of sphere 
of infl uence” and fi nally to something in-between the two. Genealogy 
is an inspiration to me, because of its focus on the interconnectedness 
of past and present and its critical approach to “regimes of truth”. I 
do not aim for methodological purity, which is why this is not a study 
using genealogical methodology. Th is study is the discovery of diff erent, 
competing or complementary truths that have not yet been discovered 
and would remain undiscovered without an interest in the history 
of the concept of sphere of infl uence. In simple terms, this study is a 
theoretical reassessment of sphere of infl uence, but one which draws on 
the genealogical approach of problematising that which is evident in the 
present by looking into the past.
It would be fair to say that this research comes close to conceptual 
history  and includes elements of discourse analysis; yet, what has truly 
inspired me methodologically is genealogy, even though I am not true 
to genealogy either. Th us, I devote some space here to explaining what I 
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take from genealogy for the study of the concept of sphere of infl uence7. 
Genealogy is a methodology of historical research which has been 
developed and used by such scholars as Friedrich Nietzsche and Michel 
Foucault. Nietzsche’s “Genealogy of Morals” (2003) is based on the idea 
that concepts such as good, bad, evil, guilt and punishment, which are 
commonly and unquestioningly viewed as moral issues, have no such 
origin. For example, guilt originally meant owing a debt and punishment 
was a means to ensure that the debt would be repaid (Nietzsche 2003, v–
vi). It is the genealogical approach of Nietzsche that revealed where these 
concepts came from and how they developed into what they are today. 
Foucault’s genealogy is concerned with the development of the prison 
system in Discipline and Punish: the Birth of the Prison (1979). Foucault 
(1979, 30–31) explains his motivation for a genealogical approach as 
follows:
I would like to write a history of this prison, with all the political 
investments of the body that it gathers together in its closed architecture. 
Why? Simply because I am interested in the past? No, if one means by 
that writing a history of the past in terms of the present. Yes, if one 
means writing the history of the present. 
Foucault wants to uncover the past of the prison system, not for the sake 
of knowing history, but for the sake of knowing the present. Foucault 
describes not only the birth of the prison but also the idea of prison as 
a contemporary form of the use of power. Foucault (1979, 23) states 
that the means of punishment should not be viewed as consequences 
of legislation or as products of structures of the society but as means of 
power. Th e same applies to spheres of infl uence. I try my best to look 
into the phenomenon without disillusionment resulting from my own 
prejudices, my own past. Th is has prompted me to take the step towards 
presenting ideas which try to justify spheres of infl uence, not only to 
undermine them. Contesting the concept of sphere of infl uence, an 
undertaking which I call for, means recognising that not only the policies 
of, but also the language on spheres of infl uence are a means of power. 
A sphere of infl uence belongs to the world of language as much as to the 
7 My use of genealogy is instrumental and I will not engage in debates over genealogy 
in this study.
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world of deeds, and language is what I am interested in here. Th e term is 
endowed with power in language use: a state can be accused of pursuing a 
sphere-of-infl uence policy and a state can deny an interest in establishing 
a sphere of infl uence. Th e term ”sphere of infl uence” is interpreted, used 
and misused in language, or omitted, as means of power. 
Foucault’s genealogy is concerned with knowledge, and particularly 
with what he calls “subjugated knowledges”, which are the historical 
contents buried and disguised in a functionalist coherence or formal 
systemisation. Subjugated knowledges for Foucault (1980, 81–82) 
also mean “a whole set of knowledges that have been disqualifi ed as 
inadequate to their task or insuffi  ciently elaborated: naïve knowledges 
located down on the hierarchy, beneath the required level of cognition or 
scientifi city”. It is from the insurrection of these subjugated knowledges 
that the history of sphere of infl uence emerges. I consider the knowledges 
I am about to present as subjugated in relation to the idea of sphere of 
infl uence, and this is why bringing them forth is important: sphere of 
infl uence is not only a Cold War concept, and it can have connotations 
other than pejorative ones. Th e material, where sphere of infl uence is 
constructed as the middle way between nation and world state, represents 
for international theory the reinvention of spheres of infl uence as justifi ed 
and desirable entities . I believe knowledge of that history could allow 
us to contest the present use of the concept of sphere of infl uence as a 
pejorative Cold War map metaphor. 
Colin Gordon (1980, 233) summarises Foucault’s genealogical 
question as “what kind of political relevance can enquiries into our 
past have in making intelligible the ‘objective conditions’ of our social 
present, not only its visible crises and fi ssures but also the solidity of 
its unquestioned rationales?”. Gordon (1980, 242) writes, “If Foucault 
poses a philosophical challenge to history, it is not to question the reality 
of ‘the past’ but to interrogate the rationality of ‘the present’”. Very 
descriptively, he continues that Foucault’s genealogy “would mean a study 
of the specifi c eff ects of practices whose rationale is the installation of a 
regime of truth” (ibid.) Sphere of infl uence represents a sort of regime of 
truth. It excuses its user from exploring the rationale of the concept itself, 
and its explanatory power, as long as the concept is taken for a granted, 
that is, as a truth. In IR “contested concepts” (such as political, security, 
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identity) are the prevailing paradigm: Th ey are more the rule than the 
exception. Why is sphere of infl uence not a contested concept then? Th e 
reason is not only the lack of analytical interest; the concept is left intact 
because it incorporates buried, subjugated knowledge. As long as it is an 
uncontested concept, it can be used as a regime of truth.
From genealogy I draw the critical approach to regimes of truth and set 
out to open up a way to debate the meanings and uses of the concept of 
sphere of infl uence. I defend the choice of my sources with the potential 
they hold in approaching spheres of infl uence as a part of international 
theory and in revealing the subjugated knowledges related to the concept 
of sphere of infl uence. I also opt to present history as episodes and 
examples in terms of the present. Because sphere of infl uence is at present 
used as a pejorative metaphor, one relying on a particular geopolitical 
interpretation, I wish to bring forth that knowledge about spheres of 
infl uence which to date has remained subjugated. 
2.2.1 Episodes and Examples
If genealogical history happens to be rewritten, it is because the present 
changes. If the present changes, it is partly because history is rewritten 
(Bartelson 1995, 78).
A more recent study on the genealogy of sovereignty, by Jens Bartelson, is 
“a political history of the knowledges that makes sovereignty intelligible” 
(Bartelson 1995, 53). Drawing on Foucault’s focus on the interplay 
between past and present knowledges, Bartelson has constructed a more 
detailed model for genealogical research. Here I borrow Bartelson’s idea 
of studying the history of the present in terms of its past, presented 
as episodes. History is not explained as it actually happened; rather, 
genealogy tries to explain how the present became possible (Bartelson 
1995, 7–8). Genealogy is episodical, showing “how the past exists only by 
virtue of being reconstructed from a present, and how this present itself is 
contingent upon that very past” (ibid., 75). A genealogy focuses on those 
episodes of history that are meaningful for understanding that which 
has been problematised in the present. To be episodical, genealogy is 
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exemplary: selected examples drawn from the past when grouped together 
form episodes (ibid., 7–8). In this case, the episodes form a body of 
knowledges missing from the present, and it is these hidden knowledges 
that are the cause of the pejorative meaning given to sphere of infl uence.
Compared to conventional history, genealogy does not try to describe 
a past event or age in its entirety but only those episodes which help to 
explain the present (ibid., 76). Th e purpose of the history of sphere of 
infl uence is neither to fi nd the proper origin of the concept by going 
through archives nor to discover everything about it. I search for those 
visions which have led to the present understanding of the concept as well 
as those which are not currently attached to it. Th e latter are as signifi cant 
as the former, because their being ignored or overlooked explains why the 
present understanding of the concept is pejorative and why, historically, 
sphere of infl uence is not a pejorative notion. 
 Bartelson (1995, 77) writes about the possible objections to genealogy’s 
view of history due to its fusion of past and present, the fl uidity of its 
object of study and the fact that episodes and examples are not selected 
with a stable set of criteria or are not necessarily representative. Because 
I take genealogy as the starting point for my interest in the interplay of 
past and present understandings of sphere of infl uence, I must address 
this criticism. I read the past and the present within the limits of my 
capabilities, of course. Th e history of sphere of infl uence in this study 
thus focuses on Western and Russian discourses, in both of which the 
term and its referent are pejorative. I set out to answer the question, What 
are the historical roots of the concept’s pejorative associations and how 
can we explain them? Next, the episodes refl ect the fact that sphere of 
infl uence as a concept emerged after the conceptualisation of state. I refer 
to ideas of sphere of infl uence before the system of states but in principle 
the system of states is the framework for the theoretical conceptualisation 
of sphere of infl uence. Th e approach is thus one where sphere of infl uence 
is studied not only in terms of the history of the concept but as a history 
of related ideas – Großraum, Mid-Europe, Good Neighbor Policy, super-
state – and of the ideas which help to frame the concept’s pejorative 
connotations (sovereignty, intervention, international law). Th e impetus 
for embracing this approach lies not only in the pejorative uses of the 
term but also in the present need for a theoretical conceptualisation that 
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is broader in perspective than just a conceptual history. Th e choice of 
related concepts framing the idea of sphere of infl uence is not arbitrary. 
If we go through the literature on the concept of sphere of infl uence, we 
fi nd it enveloped in these concepts. 
When I propose that the ideas of the English School on the institutions 
of international society are relevant for understanding spheres of 
infl uence, this is not (only) because I personally think this is a justifi ed 
assertion but because the only available study on the concept (Keal 
1983) points in this direction. When I chose to include Schmitt’s idea 
of Großraum, it was not only because it addresses spheres of infl uence as 
aspects of international order, but because there is enough evidence to 
argue that he was writing exactly about spheres of infl uence. Th us, there 
clearly had to be a connection to the concept of sphere of infl uence, 
even though in some cases the concept is not evoked at all. It is left 
to the reader to challenge my choice of sources if need be. Th ree types 
of sources are ultimately brought to bear: 1) texts dealing directly on 
sphere of infl uence (focusing on Paul Keal, especially chapter 6 on the 
Cold War), 2) texts which refer to sphere of infl uence and which end 
up explaining sphere of infl uence through the history of the system of 
states and international institutions (those written by the English School, 
discussed in this chapter) and 3) past ideas on spheres of infl uence with 
diff erent names (theorists in the period of the world wars, discussed in 
chapter 5). Th e Russian discourses form an episode like the others but 
there I take the liberty of analysing the texts with the knowledge acquired 
from the earlier episodes. 
When I sought that which would enable a theoretical conceptualisation 
of sphere of infl uence, I became less interested in all possible, even 
relevant, historical origins and I began a journey towards the body of 
theory which could explain the concept of sphere of infl uence in the 
present. In the past, the concept not only took on many diff erent meanings 
but also assumed diff erent names. Th e purpose is not, however, to cover 
all possible related concepts, but only those which fulfi l the criteria of 
answering the normative question regarding justice and which relate to 
international order. I believe that the full scope of sphere of infl uence 
would be hard to capture without refl ections on international order and 
related concepts if its meaning is to be more than borders on a map. And 
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as long as its use is pejorative, there is reason to believe that the concept 
of sphere of infl uence is a political one. If it is a political concept, it is also 
a contested concept or, rather, should be. Attaching sphere of infl uence 
to selected concepts perhaps fi xes its meaning to a certain framework 
but it should be noted that even Bartelson (1995, 88), who explicitly 
wrote a genealogy of sovereignty (whereas I am merely using genealogy 
as a stepping stone), had to resort to conceptual antecedents from the 
Renaissance, when sovereignty had not yet been articulated. Th us, even 
genealogy, despite its attempts, has diffi  culties in avoiding defi ning its 
object of study. I want to emphasise that my approach is not the only 
way to historically conceptualise sphere of infl uence. It is a theoretical 
conceptualisation which is conditioned by the present pejorative uses of 
the concept. A new, diff erent present may later require a new history of 
the concept. 
It is the present pejorative uses of the concept of sphere of infl uence 
which explains the choice of focusing on the themes of order and 
justice, because through this perspective we can begin to contest and 
conceptualise that which appears obvious in the present. I found the 
potential to theorise sphere of infl uence and address its pejorative uses in 
the literature of the English School (episodes one and two). Th e English 
School encompasses a historical perspective on international relations 
in addition to the normative theory for which it is famous, and this 
enabled me to discover both the historical origins of sphere of infl uence 
and discuss order and justice within the English School framework. 
Many of the English School texts were written during the Cold War 
but I discuss the Cold War as a separate episode focusing more on the 
specifi c circumstance of superpower rivalry. Th e English School history 
and theory in chapters 3 and 4 deal with the society of states, in which 
states form a community with common rules and institutions. Th e rules 
and institutions of international society relate to a sphere of infl uence not 
only as the framework through which we can understand the concept but 
most importantly as the normative framework for assessing it. System of 
states, hierarchy, great powers, intervention, international law, justice, 
sovereignty and balance power are the concepts that are of importance 
for sphere of infl uence here. Th ey are closely interlinked and need to be 
discussed if one wants to discuss sphere of infl uence. I have tried to frame 
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sphere of infl uence in this way: Th e present is the starting point since 
it is where the need for a genealogy of sphere of infl uence comes from. 
Th e present directs my attention to that which is missing: a theoretical 
and normative discussion. At the theoretical level, the core question 
is the relationship between spheres of infl uence and sovereign states. 
Th e normative question is whether spheres of infl uence are unjust and 
whether a system can be given priority over its individual members, that 
is, whether it can override the conventional precedence of international 
order. 
In addition to the episodes dealing with the English School, the 
relationship between spheres of infl uence, order and justice can be found 
in what I call “the world wars episode” (episode three). Th ere I fi nd a place 
for sphere of infl uence in international theory as a concept casting doubt 
on the viability of a world state and as a defence of plurality. Th e world 
wars signifi ed yet another period in history which caused intellectuals in 
the West to reconsider what the international order should look like in 
the post-war world. Something old was crumbling and something new 
was about to be built. All ideas spring from their political and cultural 
contexts, but the period of the world wars in particular produced the most 
interesting and theoretically developed visions of spheres of infl uence. As 
an alternative to universalism, sphere of infl uence becomes not only a 
matter of international order, but a development path which is supported 
and defended; the concept loses its pejorative pall. Bartelson (2009) 
writes about the dilemma of the universal and the particular – the idea 
of a world community on the one hand, and the bounded community of 
a state, nation or people, on the other. A sphere of infl uence represents 
a bounded community, but one which settles in between the idea of a 
world community and of a nation-state. Contemporary IR has neglected 
the relevance of spheres of infl uence in the debates on the universal versus 
the particular. Despite its potential, the idea of a sphere of infl uence has 
not been theorised as a solution to the disintegration of the system of 
states and the problems of forming a world community. Th is potential 
is based on the history of international thought, which I will analyse in 
this study. 
Th e fourth episode is a period in history known as the Cold War and 
includes a reading of an illustrative incident, the Cuban Missile Crisis. 
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Th e signifi cance of this episode lies in the fact that as the dominating 
reference to envisioning the nature of spheres of infl uence it makes the 
concept the pejorative metaphor it presently is.  What happened to 
sphere of infl uence during the Cold War was that the concept came to 
denote so powerfully the superpower rivalry of the United States and 
the Soviet Union that its broader meaning and history were forgotten. 
Even though the extreme circumstances of bipolarity made sphere of 
infl uence look like a Cold War concept, it has had a much longer history. 
Ignoring the idea of sphere of infl uence in the history of international 
theory has reduced it to geostrategy: imagining spheres of infl uence as 
circles on a map without asking what “a satellite” is or what makes “a 
camp” and what “bloc discipline” means for international order (see 
also chapter 5.1). Even during the Cold War the theoretical interest in 
spheres of infl uence was minimal, being limited to occasional references 
by the English school, Paul Keal’s book from 1983 and Edy Kaufman’s 
remarks from 1976. After the Cold War, a new era of confusion emerged 
and the idea of sphere of infl uence was left unproblematised. During 
that era, the injustice of spheres of infl uence became so obvious that 
there was no reason to open up normative questions relating to the 
phenomenon. If there was a need to theorise on regional developments 
or international infl uence, other concepts would come to the rescue and 
sphere of infl uence could be left as a reminder of Cold War practices, and 
the continuation of Russian foreign policy. Political leaders and analysts 
in the West soon observed that the idea of sphere of infl uence was alive 
in the foreign policy of Russia, but they were not interested in addressing 
the import of the concept for discussing the new world order. But neither 
the idea of an international society nor its connection to spheres of 
infl uence was crushed under the Cold War’s unique bipolarity. Th e need 
to problematise the concept of sphere of infl uence did not disappear, nor 
has it disappeared in the present.
Th e fi fth episode is what I call “the present”. It is present in two 
contexts: present for the discipline of International Relations and present 
for Russian scholars and politicians with an interest in international 
aff airs. Th e fi rst part of the episode I have already presented. As I have 
argued, writings in the West on spheres of infl uence are dominated by 
the presence of Russia. Since spheres of infl uence are associated with 
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Russian foreign policy, I decided that the Russian visions of spheres of 
infl uence must be explored. I think that if we really want to problematise 
the present, we fi rst need to identify what and where exactly the practices 
or discourses we want to problematise are. Th is present thus becomes as 
much a matter of location as of time. Th e view on sphere of infl uence 
diff ers dramatically when observed from two diff erent locations. One 
could say the Iron Curtain is still there when it comes to understanding 
spheres of infl uence. Th us, the fi nal piece of the puzzle are the present 
Russian visions of spheres of infl uence; when this is in place, I believe we 
have the ingredients needed to analyse spheres of infl uence in the twenty-
fi rst century.
For Bartelson the aim of genealogy is to explain how present features 
that are deemed unproblematic, timeless and without history have 
been formed out of the past. Th is means bringing forward subjugated 
knowledges. When it comes to the concept of sphere of infl uence, the lack 
of historical and theoretical interest is so pervasive that nearly all sources 
represent essentially subjugated knowledge. Th ese are marginalised texts 
even though in many other contexts they represent nothing less than 
“great texts”, as in the case of the thinking of the English School and 
Schmitt’s and Carr’s works. Th us, in its totality, the genealogy of sphere 
of infl uence is buried knowledge. First, it is not recognised that the idea 
of sphere of infl uence has an intellectual history: spheres of infl uence 
exist only as a foreign policy practice. Th ere has been no attempt to look 
beyond the observed practice or the concept and connect the idea of sphere 
of infl uence to the institutions of international society. Somehow, spheres 
of infl uence have been seen to operate alongside the balance of power as 
normal conduct of the great powers, but without anyone exploring the 
relationship between the two concepts. Spheres of infl uence have not 
been examined  in the texts that are concerned with the disintegration of 
the system of sovereign states. In fact, spheres of infl uence have not been 
examined in terms of any international theory whatsoever. Moreover, the 
historicity of the concept of sphere of infl uence is not fully appreciated. 
Th ere is ignorance of history, which manifests itself in confi ning the 
concept to the Cold War era (or sometimes the colonial era). What is 
missing is the period of the world wars, the history of the United States’ 
infl uence, and the emergence of great power order. Th ese represent the 
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subjugated knowledges and the Cold War is the source of the dominant 
knowledge. Accordingly, the purpose of the following historical inquiry 
is to reveal subjugated knowledges relating to the concept of sphere of 
infl uence, stretching the limits of our present knowledge further and 
deeper into history.
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3 The Origins of Spheres of Infl uence 
Th e English School of International Relations combines normative theory 
with an analysis of the international system and its history, making it 
a fruitful source for discovering the history of sphere of infl uence and 
material for a theoretical conceptualisation. While interest in the English 
School has been increasing within the discipline there has been no interest 
in searching for the concept of sphere of infl uence in the literature of 
the School. I found my way to the English School after the realisation 
that spheres of infl uence have something to do with the system of states, 
which came to me from reading on Schmitt’s Großraum. Th e question of 
justice is discussed by the English School in a way which creates potential 
to theorise on the normative aspects of spheres of infl uence. Moreover, 
Keal’s study on spheres of infl uence is not only strongly associated with 
English School theory but directly linked to the thinking of Bull, under 
whom Keal did his doctorate. Hidemi Suganami (2010, 16) includes Keal 
in a group of those people to whom “the founding fi gures had exerted a 
formative infl uence directly or indirectly”. To my knowledge, there is no 
other extensive study on spheres of infl uence than Keal’s, and his Unspoken 
Rules and Superpower Dominance (1983) represents the spirit and agenda 
of the English School. Th us, Keal’s theorising is my point of departure and 
it has led me to the normative theory of the English School.
Excluding Keal’s work, the uses of the concept of sphere of infl uence 
are mostly (but not wholly) limited to Bull’s scholarship. Th is does not 
necessarily make the English School any less relevant as a source of 
theorising on sphere of infl uence. Th e knowledge of the English School 
on the concept is subjugated as much to the writers themselves as it is to 
those who attempt to make sense of those writings. Th e neglect of the 
concept by the English School is already an important fi nding, because 
it attests to the mysterious simultaneity of familiarity and unfamiliarity 
with it. Th e realist accounts of anarchy and the system of states might 
appear as a more natural source of the history of sphere of infl uence, but 
in my opinion the English School addresses the present problematique 
of the concept’s pejorative meaning more comprehensively and  enables 
the discovery of subjugated knowledge. Moreover, a focus on the 
English school does not exclude the realist schools of thought in IR; it 
58
only excludes the idea of sphere of infl uence in a realist world without 
international society, that is, without the driving force of shared rules 
and norms, because the concept of sphere of infl uence is theoretically 
located within international institutions, not outside of them. A sphere 
of infl uence requires some understanding and agreement among states 
in order to operate. Here I prefer to present a certain vision of spheres of 
infl uence, one that discusses order and justice, but also one that includes 
the pejorative and the realist voices even though I am not analysing the 
entire spectrum of classical realist or neorealist literature. A theoretical 
conceptualisation of sphere of infl uence does not have to include 
everything, and in this study the delineation of sources has been done 
with a preference for the work of the English School.
In this chapter I will discuss the origins of the idea of sphere of 
infl uence within the framework of the system of states and international 
order. I take up suzerainty and colonialism, as related but also separate 
ideas on international infl uence. I also discuss the Congress of Vienna 
and the United States’ Monroe Doctrine, which represent historical 
landmarks in the development of the thinking on spheres of infl uence, 
both as discourses and as practices. But fi rst some words on the English 
School itself are in order. 
3.1 The British Committee 
on the Theory of International Politics 
Excellent accounts and analyses have been written on the English School 
by   Tim Dunne (1998), Brunello Vigezzi (2005), Andrew Linklater and 
Hidemi Suganami (2006) and Barry Buzan (2004a). I content myself 
here with a short introduction to the School without the debates that 
the English School theory and methodology have increasingly aroused. 
As a school of thought, the English School emerged from the British 
Committee on the Th eory of International Politics. Th e fi rst formal 
meeting of the Committee was held in January 1959 by a group of 
scholars who set out to investigate questions of international theory 
(Dunne 1998, xi). Herbert Butterfi eld and Martin Wight were the 
organisers of the Committee, which would come to include Hedley Bull, 
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Adam Watson, R.J. Vincent and others. In total, the members, guests 
and contributors comprised some 50 people with varying backgrounds 
(Vigezzi 2005, vii). According to Dunne, during the “formative years” 
of the Committee (1959-–962), Diplomatic Investigations (1966) was 
written, which elaborated the conception  of international society. Th e 
period from 1964 onwards Dunne calls the second phase, which was 
characterised by growing interest in methodology and a comparative 
sociology of the historical states-system. No collaborative publication 
came out of these studies, but the phase did see two signifi cant works, 
Wight’s Systems of States (1977) and Watson’s Evolution of International 
Society (1992). Th e culmination of the Committee’s work was a volume 
edited by Bull and Watson titled Th e Expansion of International Society in 
1984. (Dunne 1998, xiii–xiv.)
Th e most important sources from the English School in establishing 
the connection between spheres of infl uence and international society 
are Bull’s Th e Anarchical Society (2002), published in 1977, and Wight’s 
Power Politics8 and Systems of States9. I found elements of the concept of 
sphere of infl uence in Bull’s institutions of international society and in 
Wight’s ideas on the system of states and hierarchy. Watson’s account 
of the history of the states-system and Vincent’s work on intervention 
fi ne-tuned the theoretical conceptualisation of sphere of infl uence in the 
English School framework, while Paul Keal’s work provided the signpost 
for theorising on and historically contextualising the concept. I do not 
adhere to the work of the original members of the School but rather use 
material from people who refl ect or have done research on the School. 
Th ese include Buzan, Little and Jackson, who have contributed (along 
with many others) to the re-emergence of the English School as one of 
the most signifi cant and intriguing traditions in IR. 
Th e contribution of the English School to the idea of sphere of infl uence 
comes from the historical account of the emergence of not only the system 
of states but also, and in particular, the great power order. Within that 
history we can fi nd the Congress of Vienna (1815), the United States’ 
8 Systems of States was collected from Wight’s writings from the last years of his life 
and published as a book in 1977 (Wight 1977, 1).
9 Power Politics was fi rst published as pamphlets by the Royal Institute of International 
Aff airs in 1946 and in 1978 as a book after Wight had already passed away (Wight 1995, 
7–9) .
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Monroe Doctrine (1823) and the practice of colonialism. In the next 
chapter I will illustrate the second important fi nding from the English 
School literature for conceptualising sphere of infl uence: the pluralist-
solidarist debate, which emerged from a discussion on the institutions 
of international society. I argue that sphere of infl uence is a conception 
of a territorial order in between the system of states (pluralism) and the 
cosmopolitan world community (solidarism). As Dunne (1998, 142) 
writes, Bull developed the pluralist and solidarist wings of the English 
School by exploring the normative possibilities of the society of states. 
Th is normative refl ection is what makes the English School so signifi cant 
for conceptualising sphere of infl uence. 
Vincent played with the pluralist-solidarist division within the fi eld of 
human rights, trying to build a bridge between the two (Dunne 1998, 
xiv). Wight and Watson inserted hegemonic order as the central tendency 
of international society – lying between the extremes of sovereignty and 
empire – while also refl ecting on the pluralist-solidarist debate. Regardless 
of Paul Keal’s work on sphere of infl uence and international order, the 
English School has not made spheres of infl uence part and parcel of the 
society of states. A sphere of infl uence is not an institution of international 
society to Bull (2002) and not even a derivative institution for Buzan 
(2004a). Even so, if we acknowledge that sphere of infl uence is not only 
a concept which works in isolation, as a tool of foreign policy, but that 
it is an idea which explains international order, we can use international 
society as a point of departure for discussing the normative aspects of 
establishing spheres of infl uence. Th eory on international society breathes 
life into the idea of sphere of infl uence, giving it a dimension outside 
the pejorative uses of the term and its attachment to foreign policy. Th e 
pluralist-solidarist debate makes the concept of sphere of infl uence part 
of the theorisation on international order even if the English School 
itself has failed to realise this. A sphere of infl uence becomes transformed 
from a foreign policy tool into an idea about the nature and form of 
international order between nation and humanity.
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3.2 From Suzerain to Sovereign, 
from Independence to Hegemony
Th e concept of sphere of infl uence appeared only after the emergence 
of the system of states. As such it describes relations among states and 
is a part of the international order of states. But it is possible to look 
beyond the system of states, and indeed we can fi nd a model which bears 
a resemblance to the idea of sphere of infl uence: the suzerain system. 
Although I focus on the idea of sphere of infl uence as deeply rooted in 
the system of states, a wider historical perspective helps to locate sphere 
of infl uence in the framework of international order. Th is is where the 
work of Bull, Watson and Wight comes to my aid. 
Common to Bull, Wight and Watson is an interest in suzerain systems 
and hegemony. Wight (1977, 23) explains that a system of states means 
that states claim for themselves independence of any political superior 
and recognise the validity of like claims to independence by all others. 
Th is has been formulated in the doctrine of legal equality of states (ibid.). 
But there is also something Wight (1997, 24) calls suzerainty, where one 
among a group of states ”asserts unique claims which the others formally 
or tacitly accept”. ”Th is is the suzerain, the sole source of legitimate 
authority, conferring a status on the rest and exacting tribute or other 
marks of deference” (ibid.). In the international states-system, the 
fundamental political principle is to maintain a balance of power, but in a 
suzerain state-system the policy is divide et impera (ibid.). Bull (2002, 11) 
explains Wight’s suzerainty as a system of one state imposing supremacy 
over others; this is why it is a suzerain state system, not states system. Bull 
(ibid.) continues that Wight also diff erentiates primary and secondary 
states-systems, with the former composed of states but the latter of 
systems of states, often of suzerain-state systems. Bull writes that there 
is a diff erence between hegemony in an international system and in a 
suzerain-state system. In a suzerain-state system, hegemony is permanent 
and unchallengeable, while in a system of states hegemony can pass from 
one power to another and can be disputed (ibid., 10–11). Th is diff erence 
means that the only international system is a states-system, since under a 
suzerain system only one power can be sovereign.
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In Th e Expansion of International Society, Bull and Watson (1985, 
1–3) use the concept of suzerainty to explain the international system 
before the emergence of sovereign states. Bull and Watson state that 
the European expansion began in the late fi fteenth century, and before 
that the world consisted of several regional international systems with 
distinctive rules and institutions based on the dominant regional culture. 
Th e most important systems were the Arab-Islamic system, the Indian 
subcontinent, the Mongol-Tartar dominion of the Eurasian steppes, and 
the Chinese system. Th ese systems were hegemonial or imperial with a 
suzerain supreme ruler at the centre. Th e ruler “exercised direct authority 
over the Heartland; and around this empire extended a periphery of 
locally autonomous realms that acknowledged the suzerain’s overlordship 
and paid him tribute”. Within these systems there was no attempt to 
question the hegemonial nature of the system and thus the states in the 
periphery did not combine forces to overthrow the ruler. Th ey assumed 
that there would always be someone who would lay down the rules and 
control the relations among the members of the system. Bull and Watson 
also point out that the regional international systems had limited relations 
with one another as compared to those within the system. (Ibid.)
For Wight (1977, 29), if there was any system of states operating in 
medieval society, it was the suzerain system. Th e suzerain existed even 
before medieval times. Wight (1977, 25) mentions the Hittite Empire in 
the Near East during the latter half of the second millennium B.C. which 
dominated over lesser powers. Michael Horton (2009) writes about 
”suzerainty treaties” by the Hittite Empire in which a lesser king (vassal) 
in need of help entered into a covenant with the great king (suzerain), 
or the great king rescued the lesser king from peril and thus considered 
it his right to annex the vassal’s lands by covenant to his empire (Horton 
2009, 24–25). Th e treaties stipulated the duties of the vassals as paying 
taxes to the great king, abstaining from alliances with other kings and 
abstaining from complaints against theirs. Th e suzerain in return pledged 
to guard his vassal. Horton writes that there were no obligations for the 
suzerain, who acted in absolute freedom. (Ibid., 27–28). What separates 
these suzerain treaties from modern analogues is that the suzerain was 
like a loved and revered father (ibid., 25). Th e covenant was not merely a 
legal contract; it ”involved the deepest aff ections” (ibid.). 
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If we want to fi nd the earliest sphere-of-infl uence agreements, the 
Hittite suzerain treaties could be examples. What is curious about 
a suzerain treaty, however, are the ideas of protection, acceptance, 
legitimacy and the respect for the great king – all features absent from 
our present understanding of spheres of infl uence. Th e present idea 
of sphere of infl uence recognises neither legitimacy of the infl uence 
involved nor goodwill on the part of the infl uencing power. But if we 
look at the origins of great power infl uence represented by the Hittite 
king, the relationship between the sovereign and the vassal is not 
necessarily one of injustice. Th en why is a sphere of infl uence necessarily 
unjust? Could it be that the norm of state sovereignty is so powerful 
as to always disapprove of international infl uence? Th e answer is yes 
in the case of spheres of infl uence, but not all international infl uence 
is negative. Th e EU’s international infl uence is often viewed positively 
even though it also has its opponents. Th ose who argue for a need for 
humanitarian intervention, or accept it, do not engage in debates over 
violations of sovereignty. Infl uence in the form of developmental aid is 
sometimes criticised but more often it is seen as benefi cial and necessary. 
Th is explains why it is diffi  cult to associate the fatherly infl uence of 
the suzerain with spheres of infl uence. If we look at Keal’s (1983,15) 
defi nition, a sphere of infl uence “limits the independence and freedom 
of action”, thus violating sovereignty. Th is violation is what affi  rms the 
pejorative connotation of the concept of sphere of infl uence, and this 
mindset makes it diffi  cult to imagine a positive normative agenda on the 
part of the infl uencing power.
In the current popular use of the term “sphere of infl uence”, especially 
in the media, the pejorative element is often expressed as imperial 
domination. “Imperial” does not automatically have a pejorative 
connotation, but when the imperial power is Russia, this is often the case. 
Th e term “imperial” evokes an image of a suzerain who deprives other 
states of their independence. Th e infl uencing power in the case of a sphere 
of infl uence is not Horton’s fatherly suzerain, but Bull’s and Watson’s 
Supreme Ruler. However, sphere of infl uence is not necessarily an idea 
which entails a loss of independence by the infl uenced states. Falling 
under another power’s sphere of infl uence might violate their sovereignty 
but more often independence and sovereignty (or at least an illusion of 
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them) are upheld within a sphere of infl uence (see Carr 2001, 213–217; 
Lippmann 1945, 77; Naumann 1917, 254–255; Schmitt 2003, 252). 
I argue that in international theory a sphere of infl uence rarely implies 
imperial authority. Th e suzerain and the vision of imperial authority 
reinforce the pejorative interpretation of spheres of infl uence and eclipse 
images of those spheres of infl uence that do not aim for total domination 
and absorption. Suzerainty, as an historical example, can work as a model 
of a sphere of infl uence, but we can fi nd conceptualisations that are 
even better-suited to situating spheres of infl uence in the framework of 
hegemony and hierarchy. 
Watson and Wight observe that the European system was a succession 
of hegemonies rather than a pure Westphalian system (Watson 2007, 
11). Watson establishes an idea which diverges from his earlier strict 
separation of systems of independent states, suzerain systems and 
empires. He proposes a spectrum ranging from absolute independence 
to absolute empire, these two extremes being theoretical absolutes, not 
practical realisations. Between independence and empire lie hegemony 
and dominion. ”Independent states in a system indicates [sic] political 
entities that retain the ultimate ability to take external decisions as well 
as domestic ones” (Ibid., 19). When a hegemon emerges, it is able to ”lay 
down the law” on behalf of others concerning their relations, but leaves 
them domestically independent (Ibid., 20). For Wight, a suzerain’s claims 
that he was entitled to decide on the rules and institutions of international 
society were backed up by legitimacy and an  acknowledgement by others 
of the need for suzerainty – this legitimacy the hegemon lacks (ibid., 18). 
Dominion means imperial authority which can determine how other 
communities are governed but allows them to retain their identity and 
some control over their aff airs (ibid., 21). For Watsin Empire means direct 
administration of diff erent communities from an imperial centre (ibid.). 
Watson sees this model as a pendulum with a gravitational pull away 
from the extremes towards the centre. What Watson wants to illustrate 
with the pendulum is ”the tension between the desire for order and the 
desire for independence” (ibid). Th e signifi cance of the pendulum idea 
lies in its establishing hegemony and domination as the equilibrium 
point of the pendulum – not necessarily the ideal state of aff airs, but 
somehow one more natural than the extremes of independence and 
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empire. If hegemony and dominion are where the international system 
tends to gravitate, this is the logical space also for spheres of infl uence, 
which will lie somewhere between the two. Before the states-system the 
pendulum did not exist, only the empire, that is, the suzerain system. 
With the introduction of states the independence end was born, creating 
the possibility of a pendulum movement. Within this pendulum a sphere 
of infl uence is not quite a suzerain system but defi nitely does not belong 
to the independence end either.
Bull explores this middle ground which Watson sees as the equilibrium 
position of the pendulum. According to Bull (2002, 196), great powers 
assert and are accorded the right to play a part in determining issues 
aff ecting the peace and security of the international system as a whole, 
thus bearing a managerial responsibility. Great powers unilaterally exploit 
their local preponderance: they agree on spheres of infl uence and joint 
action in a great power concert (ibid., 200). Bull identifi es three forms 
of preponderance: dominance, hegemony and primacy. Dominance means 
habitual use of force by a great power against lesser states and disregard of 
universal norms such as sovereignty, equality and independence in relation 
to those states (ibid., 207). Th is is not quite imperial sovereignty but 
treating small states as second-class members of international society. As 
an example, Bull cites the United States’ policy of military interventions 
in Central America and the Caribbean from the late nineteenth century 
until the introduction of Roosevelt’s Good Neighbour Policy in 1933 
(ibid.). For Bull what lies at the opposite extreme to dominance is primacy. 
Primacy is achieved without use or threat of use of force and with no 
more than an ordinary degree of disregard for sovereignty, equality and 
independence (ibid., 208). Primacy manifests itself among states whose 
peoples display some signs of being a single political community. Bull 
cites the British Commonwealth, which was founded without coercion 
or systematic disregard for sovereignty. Th e position the United States 
holds in NATO is also a form of primacy. (Ibid.) 
Between dominance and primacy lies hegemony. Hegemony involves 
occasional and reluctant resort to force and the threat of force (Bull 2002, 
209). Th e great power does not disregard the principles of sovereignty, 
equality and independence but is ready to violate them if needed (ibid.). 
For Bull, hegemony describes the relationship between the Soviet Union 
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and Eastern Europe. Th is is an important example, because what Bull 
describes as Soviet or US hegemony is the same as what we call a sphere 
of infl uence. According to Bull (2002, 212), the Soviet Union recognised 
the sovereignty, equality and independence of the Eastern European states 
but also limited these rights through the Brezhnev Doctrine of 1968, 
which treated any threat to a socialist country as a threat to the socialist 
community as a whole. Likewise, the relationship between the United 
States and Central America and the Caribbean (but not South America) 
is one of hegemony, where the United States resorts to force only in 
extreme cases (ibid.). Bull (2002, 212) concludes that even though the 
hegemony that the United States and the Soviet Union represented  is 
regarded as unjust, it nevertheless produced a kind of order. Th us, Bull 
off ers us a way to diversify the idea of sphere of infl uence beyond the 
confi nes of its pejorative connotation. Bull’s forms of preponderance are 
divided in rather vague terms in relation to violation of sovereignty and 
resort to use of force, but they do indicate a separation between more 
or less forceful and acceptable forms of infl uence. Th e three levels of 
preponderance do not settle the question of what constitutes a sphere of 
infl uence but they help to visualise spheres of infl uence which can take 
many forms and aff ect sovereignty diff erently.
If we do not fi x sphere of infl uence to any of the three categories of 
preponderance but think of it as a fl uid concept that can signify varying 
degrees of control and resort to use of force, we have the possibility to 
analyse infl uence within the entire spectrum of dominance, hegemony 
and primacy. Th e normative eff ect of this would be to conclude that 
a sphere of infl uence exemplifying primacy is more acceptable than 
one involving infl uence, which is closer to dominance because the 
rights of the infl uenced are more violated within dominance than 
primacy. Conceptualising diff erent levels of infl uence as having diff erent 
implications for sovereignty, independence and equality, leaves room 
to speculate whether a sphere of infl uence takes the form of one of the 
three or to which end of the spectrum it comes closest. In this manner, 
we can imagine infl uence without the dichotomy of good infl uence and 
bad infl uence. Th is would mean dissociating the concept of sphere of 
infl uence from any particular state (Russia) and also dissociating certain 
foreign policy practices (such as interfering in elections or raising energy 
67
prices) from sphere-of-infl uence  policies. Instead, infl uence would be 
identifi ed and evaluated on the basis of its implications for sovereignty, 
independence, equality, use of force and other relevant normative 
indicators.
3.3 The Congress of Vienna and the Concert of Europe
I, therefore, think that we should recognize the world, not as a hierarchy 
of states or a suzerain system, but as an international society managed 
to some extent by a group of Great Powers. Th is pattern is somewhat 
similar to the nineteenth-century concert in Europe. (Watson 2002, 
150.)
Spheres of infl uence in both the past and the present are viewed as 
the privileges of great powers. A sphere of infl uence is an extension of 
the ideas of hierarchy and inequality in the international system. For 
the normative reading of sphere of infl uence, this means taking into 
consideration possible justifi cations for great power management and 
the silent acceptance of inequality as the nature of the states-system. If 
the emergence of the system of states was the beginning of the present 
international order, then the emergence of “great power order” was the 
beginning of spheres of infl uence. Th e origins of that order can be traced 
back to the Congress of Vienna (1815) and the Concert of Europe. 
Th e signifi cance of these two historical events is not so much in their 
content, but in their recurrent appearance in texts dealing with spheres of 
infl uence, both in the past and in the present. Th e point is not to evaluate 
the real meaning of the historical events, but to reveal the discourses 
which have constructed them as meaningful.
I agree with Watson that the battle for and against hegemony is at the 
centre of the international society. Hegemony is thus also at the heart 
of sphere of infl uence. Th e European international society of sovereign 
states emerged out of the fi ght against the hegemony of the universal 
church (Watson 1985a, 13–16; also Jackson 2007, 6–8). Nevertheless, 
the principle of sovereignty did not kill hegemony. Reading from Bull 
and Watson (1985, 6–7), we note fi rst that the European system consisted 
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of a number of empires, even with the emergence of state sovereignty. 
Second, the idea that states were equal in rights emerged in the middle 
of the eighteenth century only to experience a setback in the nineteenth 
when the Great Powers formed the Concert of Europe, claiming special 
responsibilities for maintaining order and special rights that the small 
powers did not possess (ibid.). Watson (1985a) explains that within the 
development of the European society of states two principles became 
crucial: all member states were to be regarded as juridically equal and 
their sovereignty was absolute. Regardless of this, the European system of 
states did not disregard the great diff erences of power among its members. 
In the nineteenth century, the tradition of balance of power experienced 
a transformation as the European states agreed that order should be 
maintained by the hegemony of the fi ve great powers acting in concert. 
Other states remained juridically sovereign but were to be accorded only 
a secondary role. Th is was also the time of colonisation, when Britain, 
Russia and France began to impose their government on almost all of 
Asia and Africa. By the end of the nineteenth century, the management 
of international society had also been entrusted in part to the United 
States and Japan, thus taking it outside of Europe. (Ibid., 23–30) ) We 
can conclude here that for a system of states inequality and diff erences of 
power have existed side by side with the principle of sovereignty, which is 
in fact the context for spheres of infl uence.
In Systems of States, Wight (1977) discusses the emerging “great power 
system” and inequality in international relations. In his view, the grading 
of powers can be traced back to the beginning of the international 
system. However, it was in the Congress of Vienna after the Napoleonic 
Wars, in 1815, that great-power status became regularly established 
in international politics. Th e Congress abandoned the old order of 
precedence among sovereigns, which was based on antiquity of title. Th is 
was changed when the American revolutions, the French Revolution, and 
Napoleon’s abolition of the Holy Roman Empire made empires, kingdoms 
and republics all equal in diplomatic rank. A doctrine of equality of states 
became accepted among international lawyers. As Wight points out, “[b]
ut in terms of politics, as contrasted with those of diplomatic theory and 
international law, the Congress of Vienna replaced the old system based 
on tradition by a system based on power.” Wight goes on to note that 
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“[t]he modern European states-system, while formulating the principle 
of the equality of states, has modifi ed it by establishing the class of great 
powers. Since 1907, if not since 1815, their responsibilities and privileges 
have been recognized in international law.“ (Watson 1977, 41–42.)
 Carsten Holbraad (1970) devoted an entire book to the Concert of 
Europe. Holbraad’s (1970, 5) main interest, like my own, was not to 
analyse the practice itself but to study the contemporary ideas on the 
institution. He explains how the Concert of Europe emerged from the 
French Revolutionary Wars and the Napoleonic Wars, ending with the 
First World War. Th e Concert was meant to be a congress with regular 
meetings but as such it broke down in 1822 due to disagreement 
among the allies. It continued to function as an informal institution of 
cooperation and consultation on European politics. After the Napoleonic 
Wars, Austria, Prussia, Russia and Britain took charge of the negotiations 
in Vienna and signed the Quadruple Alliance in Paris on 20 November 
1815, which contained a plan for the conduct of European politics. 
Th e original membership of the Concert was later increased by the 
acceptance of France and in the middle of the century by admission of 
the Ottoman Empire, Italy and Germany (in the place of Prussia) and it 
also included cooperation with the United States. (Ibid., 1–2.) Holbraad 
observes, “However, the Concert of Europe was more than a practice 
which developed into an institution. It was also an idea.” Th e Concert 
came to signify the idea of a loose association of great European powers 
consulting and cooperating with one another occasionally. (Ibid., 3–4.) 
Holbraad  studies the diff erent meanings given to the Concert of 
Europe, and fi nds three main lines of thought: the Concert of Europe 
was envisioned as an instrument for preserving the dynasties of the 
boundaries of the Vienna Settlement; as a system maintaining a balance 
of power in Europe; and as a means for humanitarian reform or as the 
seed of international organisation (ibid., 8). Th is is where Holbraad’s 
account of the Concert becomes interesting for the idea of sphere of 
infl uence. It is not only that sphere of infl uence is an idea of great power 
management; it is an idea which evolves from great power cooperation 
and competition. Cooperation and competition are engraved also in 
the idea of a concert, which expresses a certain form of international 
order. Wight (1966a, 154) points out that “[t]he Concert of Europe 
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was in origin and essence a common agreement on the balance of 
power”, an observation refl ecting the dual purpose of the great powers 
to maintain their own status and prevent others from gaining excessive 
power. Holbraad examines German and English visions of the Concert 
of Europe and discovers that for Germans the idea initially was that of 
European unity and cosmopolitanism but that it eventually turned into 
state individuality and anti-European nationalism. Holbraad (1970, 
112–113) explains:
Th is drift of ideas refl ected the course of history. Th e doctrines of 
monarchical solidarity in the defence of the existing order were fostered 
by the tranquillity in international relations which followed the wars 
against France and the Congress of Vienna. Th e revival of the theory 
of power balance was promoted by the return of alliance politics after 
the years of congress diplomacy. Th e spirit of national ambition and 
the philosophy of state egotism were encouraged by the deterioration 
in international relations, which started with the Crimean War and 
culminated in the First World War, and by the decline of the European 
system, which went hand in hand with the rise of world powers.
Where the Germans turned against the Concert of Europe with extreme 
nationalism, their British counterparts drifted towards internationalism, 
upholding the idea of a concert even to inspire the establishment of 
the League of Nations. According to Holbraad, the view that prevailed 
in Britain was the progressive one with two branches: one dominated 
by humanitarian notions and the other by organisational ideas. Th e 
humanitarian line of thought supported joint intervention in the aid 
of subject peoples based on the ideas of political freedom and national 
liberty. Th e organisational version viewed the Concert as a means to 
pacify international society and as the seed of its organisation. (Holbraad 
1970; 117–118, 206.) 
Th us, the Concert of Europe becomes multi-faceted. At its strongest, 
it expressed the dream of a cosmopolitan international society and at 
its weakest it became consumed by nationalism. As a cosmopolitan 
idea, the Concert could justify intervention, what we would today 
call humanitarian intervention.  Th e Concert can  also be seen as a 
step towards a world organisation which would express the inherent 
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inequality of the system as built upon the special role of the great powers. 
Where does sphere of infl uence emerge within the visions of a concert? 
Sphere of infl uence is lurking there between the cosmopolitan and the 
nationalist, off ering solutions to the defects of both. As I proceed to 
discuss the pluralist-solidarist debate (chapter 4) and the ideas springing 
from the tragedies of the world wars (chapter 5), I will fully establish 
that the heritage of sphere of infl uence lies within these discourses. As 
for the cosmopolitan approaches, intervention is a central theme for the 
concept of sphere of infl uence, not only because it is seen as a means 
to further a sphere-of-infl uence policy, but also because it entails the 
normative problem of when it is acceptable to violate the principle of 
non-intervention. A world organisation represents, on the one hand, 
the institutionalisation of hierarchy10 and, on the other, the problem 
of power being concentrated in one location, in the hands of the one 
sovereign. For those visions of spheres of infl uence which emerged from 
the ruins of the Second World War, the threat of world government or 
world empire represents a universe against which a system of  spheres of 
infl uence needs to be established. Th us, the fascinating history of sphere 
of infl uence has its roots deep in the idea of great power management and 
the Concert of Europe.
3.4 Agreements on Spheres of Infl uence 
and Colonial Infl uence 
When fi rst this phrase [sphere of infl uence] was employed in the 
language of diplomacy I do not know, but I doubt if a more momentous 
early use of it can be traced than that in the assurance given by Count 
Gortchakoff  to Lord Clarendon in 1869, and often since repeated, that 
10 Andrew Hurrell (2006, 10) writes about institutionalised hierarchy as exemplifi ed 
in bodies such as the United Nations Security Council and G8. Wight (1995, 43) also 
took up this theme of institutionalised hierarchy in Power Politics when he claimed 
that the status of great power fi rst obtained legal recognition through the possession 
of a permanent seat in the Council of the League of Nations. Since great powers had 
greater interests, they had the right to decide on behalf of the smaller ones at the League. 
According to Wight, the League of Nations continued the system of the Concert of 
Europe, where the great powers acted as the directorate (ibid.).
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Afghanistan lay ‘completely outside the sphere within which Russia 
might be called upon to exercise her infl uence’. (Curzon 1907, 42.)
A central part of explaining the concept of sphere of infl uence is exploring 
its relationship to concepts which are related yet diff erent. After the Cold 
War meaning of sphere of infl uence, the second most prominent use of 
the term is to denote the relationship between European powers and their 
colonies. Th e fi rst historical idea after the suzerain system or suzerain treaty 
resembling a sphere of infl uence is that of an empire or imperialism. In its 
present use, and in other historical uses excluding colonialism, sphere of 
infl uence is nevertheless more informal and less comprehensive. In terms 
of Watson’s (2007) pendulum idea, an empire indicates direct infl uence 
while a sphere of infl uence belongs more to the equilibrium point of the 
pendulum (hegemony or dominion). Hardt and Negri (2001, xii) explain 
how European imperialism was an extension of sovereignty beyond the 
borders of the imperialist state. If we look at the Cold War “spheres of 
infl uence”, there was no complete loss of sovereignty and the group of 
theorists I will later introduce all essentially defended the independence 
of the infl uenced (Schmitt and Burnham the least) (see chapter 5). A 
sphere of infl uence rarely indicates absorption or conquest but rather an 
occasional violation of sovereignty or maintenance of at least some level 
of sovereignty even under domination. Th e imperialist associations of the 
concept reinforce its pejorative connotation and strip it of its potential 
to defend, if not sovereignty of the nation-state, at least a plurality of 
bounded communities. In the present, the empire analogy is problematic 
because of the ambiguity of the concepts of empire or imperialism. I have 
already presented empire lite as a name for the new American foreign 
policy. Hardt and Negri (2001) use “Empire” to denote a new global 
form of sovereignty, a kind of global covenant that knows no territorial 
or temporal boundaries. Hardt and Negri (2011, xii) in fact draw a clear 
line of demarcation between imperialism, founded on sovereign states, 
and Empire, which means the end of sovereign nation-states. Th e essence 
of the concept of sphere of infl uence is deeply rooted in a plurality of 
the international system, which is not the case for the Empire in the 
sense used by Hardt and Negri. To be more precise, the Empire of Hardt 
and Negri is not the equivalent of a sphere of infl uence, but rather of 
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the single sovereign, or ”universe” In fact, it was to counterbalance  a 
world organisation in the form of an “Empire ” that visions of spheres 
of infl uence were developed during and after the two world wars (see 
chapter 5).
Keal (1983) explores a whole group of concepts which needed to be 
distinguished from the concept of sphere of infl uence. He argues that 
separating sphere of infl uence from “sphere of interest” would be like 
splitting hairs, but that  the latter is more acceptable than the former. 
Likewise “spheres of action”, which were used in the scramble for 
Africa; spheres of preponderance, which signify superiority of power 
and infl uence; and “zones of infl uence” all mean the same as sphere of 
infl uence. Keal also distinguishes a sphere of infl uence from a buff er zone, 
which can comprise independent or neutral states. A buff er zones can 
coincide with a sphere of infl uence but might include territories which 
do not fall within a sphere of infl uence. By the same token, a sphere of 
infl uence can comprise areas which are not buff er zones. Keal borrows 
the defi nition of buff er zone from Wight. (Ibid., 19–27) Wight (1995, 
160) explains buff er state as “a weak power between two or more stronger 
ones, maintained or even created with the purpose of reducing confl ict 
between them”. Wight continues that each stronger power has a vital 
interest in preventing others from controlling the buff er. Great powers 
seek to either keep the buff er neutral and independent or try to control 
the region. Wight divides buff er zones into trimmers, which play the 
great powers against each other; neutrals, which do not have any active 
foreign policy; and “satellites”, which are states whose foreign policy is 
controlled by another power. If a small power agrees to a treaty to give 
away its sovereignty, it becomes a protectorate. (Ibid.) 
For Keal spheres of restraint are grey areas in which no one power is 
predominant. “Frontiers” involve relations between the infl uencing states 
(two great powers) but not relations between the infl uencing state and 
the infl uenced state. Frontiers demarcate interests, but not necessarily 
infl uence, of great powers. (Keal 1983, 28–33.) I fi nd these distinctions 
rather unclear in defi ning what a sphere of infl uence is for two reasons: 
First, they lack the type of analysis I proposed in chapter 3.2, which 
would see infl uence from the perspective of sovereignty and hegemony. 
Second, Keal does not pay attention to the politics of language. In Keal’s 
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time, sphere of infl uence was less of a curse word and more of a simple 
fact of international life; thus, unlike today, the political uses of concepts 
such as sphere of infl uence was not as relevant as an object of study as 
it is for me. What I would like to embark on next, instead of dwelling 
on the aforementioned concepts, is a closer look at colonial infl uence, 
because at some level colonial practice can be considered as the historical 
predecessor of sphere of infl uence; it refers to an essentially similar, yet 
not identical, policy.
M.F. Lindley (1926), a source referred to by Bull (2002, 212–213) 
and Keal (1983, 16–17) alike, establishes the relationship between 
colonialism and spheres of infl uence. For Lindley (1926, 207–208), a 
sphere of infl uence has four uses: 1) It  can entail a promise to abstain 
from acquisition of sovereign rights within the sphere allotted to the 
other. In this case the agreement is between colonising powers over an 
unorganised area. 2) It can mean recognition of special interests within a 
territory, which is sometimes called sphere of interest. Th is is an agreement 
between colonising powers relating to the territory of a third state. 3) It 
can be an agreement regarding the territory of a third state made by 
agreement with that state. For example, a state can promise not to dispose 
of a part of its territory to any other than the interested power. 4) It can 
be “inappropriate areas which adjoin, or are economically, politically, or 
strategically important to, territory already in the possession of a State”. 
In this case there is no international agreement.
For not only Lindley but also Bull (2002, 212) the fi rst sphere of 
infl uence agreements are represented by the colonising activity of the 
Crowns of Castile and Portugal in the fi fteenth century. Th e basis of those 
agreements were papal bulls, about which Lindley (1926, 124) writes, “At 
the time of the great discoveries, the popes claimed the power to grant 
Christian monarchs the right to acquire territory in the possession of 
heathens and infi dels”. Lindley continues that the modern era of spheres 
of infl uence began after the Berlin Conference (1884-1885), where it was 
formally recognised that a territory might be under the infl uence, distinct 
from protection or sovereignty, of a power. Th e term “sphere of infl uence” 
had been used ten years earlier in Anglo-Russian negotiations on Central 
Asia, but was not yet formally recognised then. (Ibid., 209–210.) 
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Lindley’s account is from the 1920s, when neither the Cold War spheres 
of infl uence nor the ideas on super-states and concentration of power 
were in sight. Colonial infl uence was the dominant form of international 
infl uence for the European powers, and at the time a sphere of infl uence 
could not carry any other meanings. It is fair to say that colonial infl uence 
is what gave birth to the concept of sphere of infl uence. Yet something 
also separates the present understanding of sphere of infl uence from its 
colonial past: a colonial relationship was actually an agreement between 
the colonising powers, and the relationship between the infl uencing and 
the infl uenced was not disputed. Th e infl uenced party was stripped of 
its rights – if it even had any rights to begin with. Th ere was no need to 
debate inequality of power and the level of sovereignty accorded to the 
infl uenced, because the colonial powers were the only sovereign powers. 
In 1907, Lord Curzon traced the history of the concept of sphere 
of infl uence by connecting it with the idea of protectorates. A sphere 
of infl uence represented an idea between the more developed form of 
infl uence, the protectorate, and the less developed sphere of interests 
(Curzon 1907, 43). Bull (2002, 215) had read Curzon and explained 
the scale as ranging from 1) spheres of interest, which tend to become 
2) spheres of infl uence, then 3) protectorates and fi nally 4) annexation. 
If protectorates and annexation are the formal and more constraining 
forms of infl uence, then a sphere of interest is something even less formal 
or less compelling than a sphere of infl uence. Th is is the idea Trenin 
(2009) tried to express by distinguishing between spheres of infl uence 
and spheres of interest (see chapter 2.1.2). For Curzon (1907, 41), the 
concept of protectorate was more accurate in defi ning colonial infl uence 
than sphere of infl uence, which had become commonly used but which 
was less precise. What the concept of sphere of infl uence denotes is 
infl uence by one power to the exclusion of others but to a degree chosen 
by that power based on its needs and preferences. Moreover, the native 
government is left as it is and its sovereignty can even be reaffi  rmed, but 
political infl uence and commercial exploitation are seen as the rights of 
the interested power. Nevertheless, there are no express rules laid down 
on spheres of infl uence. (Ibid., 43.) For Curzon, as I read his work, 
“protectorate” is the appropriate term for a colonised status since a sphere 
of infl uence appears to be a more unoffi  cial form of infl uence. A sphere 
76
of infl uence also gives more freedom to the infl uenced, although Curzon 
does not explore in detail the diff erence between a protectorate and a 
sphere of infl uence in this respect. 
Geddes W. Rutherford wrote an article in Th e American Journal 
of International Law in 1926 about spheres of infl uence as an aspect 
of semi-suzerainty in which he also explored the diff erence between a 
sphere of infl uence and a protectorate. Rutherford (1926, 317) writes 
that a protectorate requires or at least suggests recognition. “Spheres of 
infl uence, whether aff ected by unilateral or bilateral arrangements, are 
not considered as binding on Powers not parties to such arrangements” 
(ibid., 304), whereas protectorates are recognised by third parties (ibid., 
318). Moreover, a sphere of infl uence does not imply responsibilities, 
unlike a protectorate does. Rutherford also explores negative and positive 
aspects of infl uence, but because he does not discuss the normativity of 
infl uence, there is really nothing in his work that defi nes positive and 
negative. In fact, control over foreign policy of the infl uenced state is 
both positive and negative for Rutherford and he only discusses the 
pervasiveness of that infl uence, not its justifi cation. With a stance on 
normativity Rutherford could have discussed responsibility as positive 
infl uence, but he does not take a step in this direction either, because 
in his opinion responsibility is not an element relevant to spheres of 
infl uence. Although in many particulars Rutherford’s analysis of spheres 
of infl uence makes them sound essentially like colonial relations, he 
attempts to draw a line between a sphere of infl uence as a more informal 
type of infl uence and a protectorate as complete territorial control. Th is 
distinction is one between political infl uence and direct authority (ibid., 
316). In fact, it goes to the very core of the concept of sphere of infl uence 
and it deserves more attention. 
Kaufman (1976, 10–11) sought to separate spheres of infl uence from 
colonialism by introducing the term sphere of direct infl uence. Kaufman 
associates the concept of sphere of infl uence with the colonial period, but 
recognises several concepts which describe the formality of the colonial 
relationship. Th e more formal types of domination include colonies 
and protectorates, whereas spheres of infl uence are less subject to the 
controlling power. Kaufman explains how colonialism was de jure control 
of foreign territories but, at a later stage, when most geographic regions 
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were distributed and the doctrines of nation-state and self-determination 
became widespread, de facto spheres of infl uence were introduced. (Ibid.) 
For Keal (1983, 45), spheres of infl uence have been agreed upon on the 
basis of tacit understandings instead of formal agreements ever since non-
European powers became infl uential in international politics and state 
sovereignty was established as a universal principle. Bull (2002, 213–
214) is sceptical about the existence of even tacit agreements on spheres 
of infl uence. He urges us to separate the fact of a sphere of infl uence 
from the right to a sphere of infl uence. Th is means that even though a 
great power might recognise another’s sphere of infl uence, it does not 
necessarily deem it legitimate. As an example, the European powers did 
not think that the proclamation of the Monroe Doctrine by the United 
States gave it a right to exclude them from the hemisphere; rather, they 
saw it as an American policy that they should take into account. Bull 
continues that the line between an agreement on facts and on rights is 
not always clear-cut. In fact it would seem logical that there is no form 
of recognition at all that would give legitimacy to a sphere of infl uence. 
It would seem more likely that great powers are always reluctant to 
recognise even the fact of a sphere of infl uence. (Ibid.) 
For Kaufman and Keal, colonial infl uence and spheres of infl uence 
indicate separate levels of formality or legitimacy of infl uence. Colonies 
could be established based on formal agreements, whereas spheres of 
infl uence imply tacit agreements. Keal (1983, 22–23) explains how 
the concept of sphere of infl uence was fi rst used in connection with 
the partition of Africa, with the term implying territorial acquisition. 
When infl uence was exerted on states, diplomats avoided using of the 
term “sphere of infl uence”, because it was no longer about the acquisition 
of territorium nullius. For Keal the origin of spheres of infl uence was 
in the colonialist tradition, but they later lost the meaning of territorial 
acquisition and became political and economic infl uence in the aff airs 
of another state. (Ibid.) Finding the historical roots of the concept of 
sphere of infl uence in colonialism is only the beginning. We need to 
fi nd additional sources that have contributed to our present political 
conception of the phenomenon. One of the most powerful images of 
sphere of infl uence, depicted in the cartoon presented in Wikipedia, is 
the famous Monroe Doctrine (see chapter 1.3).
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3.5 The Monroe Doctrine 
Th e Monroe Doctrine had its origin in President James Monroe’s annual 
address to the United States Congress on 2 December 1823. For many 
it is the embodiment of a sphere-of-infl uence doctrine: It represents the 
beginning of a division of the world into spheres of infl uence, even a 
new international order. Th e Monroe Doctrine is also seen as explaining 
the vagaries of United States foreign policy: Sometimes it adheres to the 
Doctrine, sometimes it repudiates it. Th e Doctrine also appears to have 
had some universal meaning and it had  considerable bearing on to the 
principles of sovereignty and intervention. For these reasons, for the 
importance that the Monroe Doctrine is ascribed by those who theorise 
on spheres of infl uence, I have chosen to look in more detail at the 
discussion on the Doctrine. 
In the Doctrine, President Monroe urges the European states to 
stay out of the Western Hemisphere. It is a declaration which forbad 
the European states to intervene on the American continent, where the 
United States was the sole guardian of hemispheric security. Explaining 
the background of the Doctrine, Watson (1985b, 137) writes that 
Washington and Jeff erson argued that the Old and New Worlds were 
two separate spheres of political activity which should have as little to do 
with each other as possible. Th e Monroe administration feared Russia’s 
activities in Alaska and that the Holy Alliance would restore the Spanish 
Crown in the Americas (ibid.). Th e doctrine states: “[T]he American 
continents, by the free and independent condition which they have 
assumed and maintain, are henceforth not to be considered as subjects 
for future colonisation by any European powers”, repudiating European 
colonialism. Th e Doctrine also denies the right to extend any infl uence in 
the Western Hemisphere by the European states: “We owe it, therefore, 
to candor, and to the amicable relations existing between the United 
States and those powers, to declare that we should consider any attempt 
on their part to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere as 
dangerous to our peace and safety”. (Monroe 1823.)
Vincent (1974, 111–112) reads the Doctrine as a doctrine expounding 
both the right to intervention and the principle of non-intervention . Th e 
Monroe Doctrine embodied an isolationist principle, but if the United 
79
States had to use force to prevent European infl uence it would depart 
from the principle of non-intervention. In Vincent’s estimation, the 
interventionist interpretation of the Doctrine came much later. After the 
Latin American colonies achieved their independence, the United States 
followed the principle of non-intervention and the isolationist mode. 
“It was not until the end of the century that new interpretations of the 
Monroe Doctrine coincided with the growth of American power and 
turned the policy of non-intervention into one of intervention, and the 
threat to the independence of the Latin American states then seemed to 
come as much from the United States as from across the Atlantic”. (Ibid., 
119.) Th eodore Roosevelt disregarded the principle of non-intervention 
and instead saw it as the right of the United States to intervene in the 
aff airs of the hemisphere (Fursenko & Naftali 1998, 9; Spykman 1944, 
62–63.) Th e Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine, articulated 
by President Th eodore Roosevelt (1904), continued and strengthened 
the thrust of the Monroe Doctrine, introducing the idea of the right to 
intervention:
Chronic wrongdoing, or an impotence which results in a general 
loosening of the ties of civilized society, may in America, as elsewhere, 
ultimately require intervention by some civilized nation, and in 
the Western Hemisphere the adherence of the United States to the 
Monroe Doctrine may force the United States, however reluctantly, in 
fl agrant cases of such wrongdoing or impotence, to the exercise of an 
international police power.
Where the Monroe Doctrine denied the European states the right of 
interference in Latin America and the Caribbean, the Roosevelt Corollary 
justifi ed the United States’ interference in those areas. In practice, the 
Corollary had little to do with relations between the Western Hemisphere 
and Europe but served to justify increased use of military force to restore 
internal stability to nations in the region. President William Howard Taft 
followed the foreign policy of intervention after Roosevelt and so did 
Woodrow Wilson after him. Vincent (1974, 121–122) writes that Wilson 
even took the principle of “protective imperialism” further in practice 
than its inventor, Roosevelt. When we bring in Vincent’s interpretation, 
the Monroe Doctrine begins to address its relationship to intervention. 
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Th is relationship boils down to the problem of legitimacy of intervention 
and intervention as a tool of sphere-of-infl uence policy. Th e original 
meaning of the Monroe Doctrine was non-interventionist. It meant only 
fending off  the infl uence of other powers. As a declaration of a sphere of 
infl uence, it defended the rights of the infl uenced and was very restrained 
when it came to the United States’ own infl uence. Later, the Doctrine 
became a declaration justifying intervention, either betraying its original 
meaning or only extending it to include the establishment of infl uence in 
addition to counteracting that of other states. In this light, the Monroe 
Doctrine raised the normative question of justifi cation. 
Kaufman also explains the relationship between the Monroe Doctrine, 
intervention and sphere of infl uence. According to Kaufman (1976, 
178), the Doctrine was seen as the fi rst step in declaring a right of the 
United States to spheres of infl uence, but it would be the turn away from 
isolationism to interventionism or imperialism that marked the emergence 
of the practice of spheres of infl uence. For Kaufman, the meaning of the 
Doctrine for the United States’ infl uence in Latin America could not be 
overemphasised as it became a foreign policy principle that had been 
maintained for such a long period of time (ibid.). Indeed, the meaning of 
the Doctrine was not confi ned to the hemisphere but was recognised by 
the League of Nations Charter in Article 54 as regional “understanding” 
(Kaufman 1976, 179; also Keal 1983, 107–109).
Th e signifi cance of the Doctrine for the present research lies in its 
exemplifying a “sphere-of-infl uence doctrine”. When we get to Schmitt’s 
work in chapter 5, the Monroe Doctrine is ascribed yet another meaning: 
a threat to the pluralist system of states (see Schmitt 2003, 281–283). 
For Carr (1965, 45) the Monroe Doctrine represents the space between 
nationalism and internationalism, not the threat of world domination 
Schmitt saw. When we study Franklin Roosevelt’s Good Neighbor Policy, 
analysed in detail  by Walter Lippmann, the Monroe Doctrine is again 
refl ected against the principle of non-intervention and acceptable forms 
of infl uence within the international system (see chapter 5). It is curious 
how spheres of infl uence are not very often connected at the present time 
with the Monroe Doctrine and United States foreign policy.
In 1916 Th e New York Times featured a long article on the Monroe 
Doctrine by Rear Admiral French E. Chadwick in which he suggested 
81
extending the principles of the Doctrine to include the world, abolishing 
spheres of infl uence and laying the road for peace. “Spheres of Special 
Infl uence” for Chadwick meant the evil of imperialism. “Man’s 
inhumanity to man” could only be stopped under the Golden Rule, 
and that could happen by the application of the Monroe Doctrine to 
the entire world. “We want no imperialism; we want only justice in the 
world”, Chadwick wrote. (Chadwick 1916.) Even though Chadwick did 
not want to call the Monroe Doctrine a sphere-of-infl uence policy, and 
even though he specifi cally defi nes a sphere of infl uence as meaning a 
colonial policy, I believe that he is addressing exactly the point where 
colonialism is transmuted into sphere-of-infl uence policy. Th ey become 
two diff erent forms of infl uence. Th e diff erence between the two is the 
tacitness of spheres of infl uence compared to the explicitness of colonial 
i nfl uence but also the persistency of spheres of infl uence, and especially 
their role in political imagination, as a source of disputes among states. 
Th e idea of sphere of infl uence represents stability and instability alike; 
it is salvation as well as ruin. It brings states together but it also divides 
them. Sphere of infl uences thus becomes refl ections of international 
theory – theory on international order, states and sovereignty. And the 
Monroe Doctrine emerges as a signifi cant signpost which represents the 
advent of spheres of infl uence in international theorising.
 
3.6 Order and Spheres of Infl uence 
As we approach international society and the normative aspects of 
spheres of infl uence in the next chapter, I would like to direct attention 
to the idea of international order. International order, to which I have 
already referred several times, links this chapter on history with the 
next one, which deals with international society. International order is 
the framework for an inquiry into the history of spheres of infl uence. 
We cannot understand spheres of infl uence without understanding 
international order, because international order is what makes spheres of 
infl uence facet of international theory. International order, and especially 
the pendulum movement within it, enables us to imagine where spheres 
of infl uence are situated within the political organisation of the world.
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International order can be understood in many ways. A common 
understanding of the term “international order”  is to depict global power 
relations as multipolar, bipolar and unipolar. In this case, order means 
the type of hegemony within the international system, that is, whether 
there is a single dominant power, or two or more. At the core of IR is 
the concept of “anarchical international order”, which means that there 
is no authority above the states. International order can also be used to 
denote a historical period, such as that of the Concert of Europe or the 
Cold War. In such a use, international order entails more information 
than just polarity or anarchy. Th e Cold War order, for example, is an 
order of bloc politics and ideological competition by nature. But for 
spheres of infl uence, and the English School theory, international order 
is something more. It signifi es the political organisation of the world 
expressly as a system/society of states. 
International order is important to Bull; he examines it in Th e Anarchical 
Society (2002), fi rst published in 1977. Keal follows in his footsteps to 
theorise on sphere of infl uence and order. For both Bull and Keal, it is 
important to notice that order has a purpose. Order is not promoted for 
its own sake, but for some purpose laid down by international society 
(Keal 1983, 194–195). Bull (2002, 3–4) explains that order is something 
more than simply regular behaviour. Bull claims that states’ behaviour in 
war and crisis, even though it would seem organised and orderly, is not 
an expression of order in social life. Order in social life has certain goals 
and values to promote and thus cannot encompass merely any regular 
relations. (Ibid.) 
Th en what is the purpose of international order? According to Bull 
(2002, 16) international order is “the pattern or disposition of activity 
that sustains the primary, elementary or universal goals of the society of 
states, or international society”. Th is is important for the idea of sphere 
of infl uence: international order sustains the goals of the society of states, 
which means that that the components of that order are states. For Bull, 
the fi rst goal is the preservation of the system and society of states as the 
prevailing form of universal political organisation. Bull refers to instances 
in history where this has been challenged by a dominant state trying 
to form a universal empire: the Habsburg Empire, Napoleon’s France, 
the Th ird Reich and, as Bull notes, “perhaps post-1945 America”. 
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Th reats have also come from ‘supra-states’ such as the Papacy, the Holy 
Roman Empire and even the United Nations. (Ibid.) Th e second goal of 
international order for Bull is maintaining the independence or external 
sovereignty of states. Th e preservation of the system nevertheless comes 
fi rst, encouraging and tolerating such practices as agreements establishing 
spheres of infl uence (ibid., 17).
Th e third goal of international order is peace, which, like sovereignty, 
is again subordinate to the preservation of the system itself but also 
subordinate to the preservation of sovereignty of independent states. 
Fourth, Bull lists the goals of “limitation of violence resulting in death or 
bodily harm, the keeping of promises and the stabilization of possession 
by rules of property” as those of international society. (Bull 2002, 17–
18.) Th e emphasis Bull gives to the preservation of the system of states 
– over sovereignty and peace – as the main goal of international society 
becomes extremely relevant for spheres of infl uence when refl ected 
against Schmitt’s (2003) fear of the universalisms of the Soviet Union and 
the United States and the need to preserve the pluralism of the system 
(see chapter 5). In Bull’s theory, spheres of infl uence represent a practice 
of limiting sovereignty which is acceptable as long as it does not threaten 
the international order of states. Bull does not discuss the possibility that 
sphere of infl uence could violate the principle of sovereignty in a way 
that would challenge the fi rst goal of international order, although he 
discusses alternatives to states-systems. Schmitt, by contrast, sees spheres 
of infl uence, or Großräume as he called them, as representing a new 
international order, an alternative to the state. Th is will be discussed more 
in chapter 5.
Bull (2002, 102–104) also discusses the means by which international 
order is sustained. He argues that international order is maintained through 
the balance of power. For Bull the main function of the balance of power 
is to maintain the system of states against conquest and incorporation 
into a universal empire. Bull continues that the balance of power tends 
to operate in favour of great powers at the expanse of small ones. He 
explains how the balance of power is necessary for the preservation of 
the system: “From a point of view of a weak state sacrifi ced to it, the 
balance of power must appear as brutal principle. But its function in the 
preservation of international order is not for this reason less central”. 
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(Ibid.) Th e balance of power as a means to maintain the preferred order 
necessarily violates the rights of individual members of the society of 
states, just like spheres of infl uence do – all for the sake of the order. Th e 
normative web around sphere of infl uence is woven out of these elements: 
the justifi cation of the primacy of the system of states, the justifi cation 
of violations of sovereignty in the name of the balance of power, and 
other great power management tools. Th e historical development, as I 
have presented earlier, has been one from de jure sovereignty to de facto 
great power management. In the next chapter I will explore the elements 
making up international society, as well as its normative underpinnings, 
in more detail.
Keal discusses the relationship between order and spheres of infl uence 
in detail, and poses the question whether spheres of infl uence contribute 
to order. His (1983, 199) answer is that the contemporary international 
order relies on superpower relations and, more specifi cally, order rests 
on the pillar of mutual acquiescence with regard to spheres of infl uence. 
For Keal “[s]pheres of infl uence contribute to order between infl uencing 
powers, and hence to order in general, through tacit understanding 
which serves the goals of social coexistence, and by contributing to what 
infl uencing powers perceive as necessary to a balance of power” (ibid., 
209–210). According to Keal, the defence of spheres of infl uence in 
general has been that they diminish the possibility of confl icts in the 
international system. Hierarchical relationships maintain order within a 
bloc and a sphere of infl uence removes the area from external challenges, 
thus contributing to order. Relations among the infl uenced states are 
kept in check by the infl uencing power, thus limiting confl icts. Keal 
describes how a relationship of dependence is also a synonym for a 
sphere of infl uence: ”Th rough aid, trade and investment and through 
the harmony of interest between the elites in both the infl uenced states 
and the infl uencing power, control has been established and can be 
maintained.” Th us, Keal reasons that as a form of dependence a sphere 
of infl uence can lead to disorder by unjust distribution of wealth, which 
will prompt revolutionary action for economic and social justice. Th is 
might have consequences for the international system, especially if armed 
confl ict breaks out between the infl uencing and the infl uenced and if an 
outside power intervenes. (Keal 1983, 199–203.) 
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For Keal (1983, 204–207), spheres of infl uence contribute most 
importantly to stability of possessions, limitation of violence, and to the 
sanctity of contracts or stable expectations – all elements of the fourth 
goal of Bull’s international order. Th is is so because a sphere of infl uence 
is removed from the disputes between the infl uencing powers. Moreover, 
spheres of infl uence contribute to order between infl uencing powers and 
order in general through tacit agreements. (Ibid.). Keal also points out 
the relationship between a balance of power and spheres of infl uence: “So 
far the argument has been that spheres of infl uence contribute to order 
between infl uencing powers, and hence to order in general, through 
tacit understanding which serves the goals of social coexistence, and 
by contributing to what infl uencing powers perceive as necessary to a 
balance of power” (ibid., 209). Th e problem is, as Keal notes, that for 
spheres of infl uence to contribute to order static relations are required, a 
status quo, but social systems are constantly changing (ibid., 211). 
For Keal (1983, 197–199), stability of possessions is safeguarded 
not only in sovereignty but also in spheres of infl uence. Th us, Keal 
does not contrast sovereignty and spheres of infl uence but sees both 
as contributing to the same goal of international order. As elements of 
international order spheres of infl uence remain squarely within the limits 
of the system of states, and for Keal there is no need to discuss spheres 
of infl uence as something distinct from that system. Where Bull claims 
that the most important goal of international order is preservation of the 
system, to which sovereignty was subordinate, Keal sets sovereignty with 
the principle of non-intervention as the most important goal. (Ibid.) 
Th is is because for Keal there is only one international order and that is 
the system of states. Bull, instead, discusses alternatives to the system of 
states, such as an order consisting of a universal empire. But if the system 
of states is turned into a universal empire, spheres of infl uence are no 
longer relevant. International order is relevant for spheres of infl uence, 
because it encompasses the question of how spheres of infl uence fi t within 
international society and whether the system of states can accommodate 
violations of sovereignty. International order is not necessarily composed 
of states, and this Bull (2002) recognises as well. But as  a concept sphere 
of infl uence was born namely out of the state-system and great power 
management. Th e fact that spheres of infl uence support the system of 
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states while violating its core principles is a fascinating theoretical aspect 
of the concept of sphere of infl uence which I will later explain within 
the framework of the pluralist-solidarist debate and also explore in the 
context of Russian discourses in chapter 7.
Th e relationship between order and spheres of infl uence is also 
worth looking at from the normative perspective, asking whether the 
maintenance of international order is a justifi cation for a sphere-of-
infl uence policy which violates sovereignty. We have already seen how 
for Keal spheres of infl uence can contribute to international order. Bull 
takes the essentially same position when justifying the special status of 
great powers. For Bull (2002, 199–200) the contribution of great powers 
to international order derives from the inequality of power within the 
states-system. If all were equal in power, it would be hard to see how 
international confl icts could ever be settled. Inequality of states simplifi es 
the pattern of international relations. Bull explains how great powers 
contribute to international order when they manage relations with each 
other by preserving a balance of power, seeking to limit and avoid crises, 
confl ict and war among themselves and imparting a central direction to 
the aff airs of international society. (Ibid.) According to Bull, great powers 
manage relations with each other fi rst and foremost by preserving the 
balance of power, which provides conditions under which the system of 
states can endure (ibid., 201). Because of the order which the inequality 
in power produces, other states accept the special rights and duties of 
great powers. Even though at times great powers deliberately manufacture 
crises, measures to avoid and control crises are an essential part of the 
‘management of great power relations’, as Bull points out. (Ibid., 203–
206.)
 Bull (2002, 199) indicates that spheres of infl uence (those of the 
United States and the Soviet Union) prevent, keep within bounds, help 
to resolve and contain confl icts. Bull further explains how the United 
States and the Soviet Union refrained from unilateral intervention in one 
another’s sphere of infl uence. Th e two great powers behaved as if they 
recognised a rule prohibiting direct infl uence on each other’s spheres of 
infl uence. (Ibid., 202–204.) Bull also underlines that these are the roles 
that can, and sometimes do, promote international order but that great 
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powers also frequently act in ways that cause disorder by upsetting the 
general balance and causing confl ict and wars (ibid., 201).
Th ere are two conclusions to draw about the relationship between 
spheres of infl uence and international order: 
1) Th e relationship between spheres of infl uence and order falls within an 
international system composed of sovereign states. Both Keal and Bull are 
able to incorporate spheres of infl uence within the system of sovereign 
states; there is no fundamental confl ict between infl uence and sovereignty. 
Th e system of states does not crumble because of spheres of infl uence. 
Enough plurality and sovereignty remains to provide the foundation of 
the states-system. What is more, spheres of infl uence even support the 
states-system as a means of great power management that prevents the 
emergence of a universal empire. In chapter 7, we will see how Russian 
analysts struggle to incorporate within the system of sovereign states the 
inequality that great power management and spheres of infl uence require.
2) Spheres of infl uence in Bull’s and Keal’s conceptualisation can contribute 
to international order. We should not ignore or take for granted the 
relationship between spheres of infl uence and international order, which 
happens if spheres of infl uence are taken to signify only a self-serving 
foreign policy practice. Spheres of infl uence can still mean a power game, 
but this game aff ects international structures, which is why we should be 
interested in the eff ects of spheres of infl uence on the system, not only 
on its members. What we can conclude from Bull’s and Keal’s discussion 
is that there is some potential for good in great power management 
and spheres of infl uence. For Keal, spheres of infl uence contribute to 
international order by stabilising relations among great powers, but the 
injustice that a sphere of infl uence entails can also become a source of 
confl icts. Another hindrance to spheres of infl uence providing benefi ts for 
international order is that the stability and predictability which spheres 
of infl uence create are subject to constant change. As the distribution of 
power within the system changes, so do the spheres of infl uence. Bull, 
too, views spheres of infl uence, although based on inequality, as a practice 
which promotes order. Spheres of infl uence function as a part of great 
power management, which is a necessity for settling confl icts among 
states. Th ese are important perspectives in questioning the pejorative 
associations of the concept of sphere of infl uence in the present. 
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4 International Society 
and the Normative Question
In order to unravel the normative aspects of spheres of infl uence, I will 
next look into the English School literature on international society. We 
now know that for Bull and Keal spheres of infl uence can contribute 
to international order, but there is more to be discovered by examining 
further the idea of international society. Bull’s list of the rules and 
institutions of that society frame the concept of sphere of infl uence: it 
can be conceptualised by exploring the rules of sovereignty and non-
intervention and examining the institutions of great power management, 
balance of power and international law. But going through how the 
English School defi nes these concepts would not contribute to the 
theoretical conceptualisation of a sphere of infl uence unless I could 
establish a meaningful relationship between them and the concept of 
sphere of infl uence. As I looked at the present pejorative use of the term 
”sphere of infl uence”, the normative dimension appeared to me to be 
the link which would reveal what we need to know about the English 
School approach to the phenomenon. Th us, the logic of this chapter is to 
discuss great powers, balance of power, sovereignty, non-intervention and 
international law from the perspective of justice.
4.1 The Rules and Institutions of International Society
According to Buzan (2004a, 161), the concept of institutions is central 
to the English School because it entails the substantive content of 
international society and underpins what English School writers mean 
by “international order”. Th e subject of the institutions of international 
society is quite complex within the English School literature (see Buzan 
2004a). As this is not a study on the English School, I take the liberty to 
pass over much of the controversy that surrounds the subject and explore 
that which we need to know in order to ponder spheres of infl uence 
from a normative angle11. Th e foundations of English School thinking 
11 For a discussion on international society see Little 2002, Buzan 2004a, Roberson 
2002.
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lie precisely where sphere of infl uence can be located: 1) international 
society as a community of states with rules and institutions and 2) the 
pendulum movement within this society between independence and 
empire or, in other words, between pluralism and solidarism.
I wrote earlier that for the English School international order is 
predicated on the system of states, but even more so on a society of states 
or international society12. In a well-known quotation, Bull (2002, 13) 
explains that “[a] society of states (or international society) exists when 
a group of states, conscious of certain common interests and common 
values, form a society in the sense that they conceive themselves to be 
bound by a common set of rules in their relations with one another, 
and share in the working of common institutions”. He continues, “An 
international society in this sense presupposes an international system, 
but an international system may exist that is not an international 
society”. Th is means that states may interact without common interests 
and values, forming a system but not a society. (Ibid.) Th e English School 
conception of international society resonates with the idea of a society 
of state-persons, which means that one can, to some extent, apply the 
”domestic analogy ” (states as a society of individuals) to understand 
international relations. States want to construct a society in which they 
are able to peacefully manage relations among themselves; as part of the 
process they promote common values and abide by common rules. More 
and more states are also willing to agree on principles such as human 
rights, protection of which necessitates relinquishing some sovereign 
rights and according human justice a place alongside interstate justice.
R.J. Vincent (1990, 39) describes Bull’s international society as 
a “Grotian world” between the Hobbesian rejection of a society of 
states and the Kantian idea of a cosmopolitan society of individuals13. 
Where the Hobbesian view of international relations is a state of war 
against all, the Kantian is based on transnational social bonds between 
individual human beings (Bull 2002, 23–24). Th e Grotian tradition 
stands between the realist and universalist traditions and emphasises that 
common rules and institutions limit confl icts among states. In other 
12 See Little (2007, 140-148) on the discussions of the usefulness of separating 
system from society. 
13 However, Bull (2002; 39, 49.) writes that the international system [in his time] 
included traits of all the three traditions: 1) war and struggle, 2) elements of transnational 
solidarity and confl ict and 3) cooperation and regulated intercourse among states. For 
Bull one of these three elements can predominate in diff erent times and places over others.
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words, states are bound by the rules and institutions of the society that 
they are members of. Moreover, they are bound by rules of not only 
prudence and expedience but also law and morality. (Ibid., 25.) Th e 
Grotian conception of international society is also called solidarist, in 
contrast to a pluralist view, in which states are able to agree only on 
certain minimum purposes (Bull 1966a, 52). Although Bull (1966a, 68) 
argues in Diplomatic Investigations that the members in Grotius’ system 
of are not states but individuals, he writes in Th e Anarchical Society that 
the immediate members of international society are states rather than 
individual human beings (Bull 2002, 25). Bull’s international society 
takes the state as the principal member but infuses it with solidarism, 
which makes the system into a society.
 Th us, for Bull, international society is characterised by states that are 
bound by common rules and institutions. Bull explains that rules may have 
the status of international law, of moral rules, of customs or of established 
practice; or they may be operational rules worked out without formal, 
or even verbal, agreement. For Bull, sovereignty and non-intervention 
are rules of coexistence. (Bull 2002, 64–67.) Bull (2002, 71) defi nes 
institutions as follows: “By an institution we do not necessarily imply an 
organisation or administrative machinery, but rather a set of habits and 
practises shaped towards the realisation of common goals”. Institutions 
are an expression of and means for collaboration among states. Th us, 
rules are agreed among states, even if only tacitly, whereas institutions 
emerge as practices or habits. Like rules, institutions enable collaboration 
among states; that is, they produce enough solidarity to make the system 
function as a society.
Th e international institutions, according to Bull (2002, 71), include 
balance of power, international law, the diplomatic mechanism, the 
managerial system of great powers and war. Bull (2002, 68) writes that 
states themselves are the principal institutions of international society in 
that they make the rules of coexistence (sovereignty and intervention) 
eff ective. Th is makes institutions mechanisms for the enforcement of 
rules. Wight (1995, 111) and Jackson (2000, 58) have slightly diff erent 
versions of the institutions and Buzan (2004a) identifi es primary and 
secondary institutions in diff erent interstate societies. For the purposes of 
this study, it is not of great importance to debate the diff erences among 
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sets of rules and institutions and make lists of them but to recognise 
that the principles which determine relations among states also govern 
spheres of infl uence, and infl uence the possible justifi cations for them.
As I have written already, a sphere of infl uence is not listed as an 
institution or a rule within the English School theory. Th e concept appears 
occasionally but it is never explicitly situated within the international 
society of the English School, not even by Buzan. I fi nd it very curious 
that the English School ignores the phenomenon in this way. Luckily for 
us, Keal did not ignore the concept and its role within the web of rules 
and institutions. When it comes to spheres of infl uence, Keal (1983, 
2) writes about tacit understandings between great powers and “rules 
of the game” instead of laws or written agreements. In his estimation, 
tacit understandings of spheres of infl uence provide unwritten rules or 
guidelines for promoting common interests. Th ese understandings may 
violate international law but they nevertheless contribute to international 
order. (Ibid., 3.) According to Keal, underlying tacit understandings about 
spheres of infl uence is the fact that accepting sovereignty as a universal 
principle made formal agreements on spheres of infl uence unacceptable 
in practice. Keal explains that great powers can no longer make explicit 
agreements such as they did during the European expansion. Formally, 
they deny having spheres of infl uence, but agreements are made that are 
unspoken or tacit. (Ibid.; 45, 207.) Keal thus diff erentiates the more 
formal agreements on expansion (colonialism) and the more informal 
agreements on spheres of infl uence. 
What we have here is the argument by Bull that international society 
is built on certain rules and institutions and by Keal that spheres of 
infl uence are founded upon “unwritten rules or guidelines for promoting 
common interests”. Th e rules and institutions of the international society 
also off er a relevant framework for conceptualising sphere of infl uence 
as a special relationship between states. It would be diffi  cult to imagine 
spheres of infl uence without the notion of sovereignty, great and small 
powers, intervention and the balancing game. It should be noted, though, 
that Bull’s rules and institutions are contested concepts in themselves 
and I will discuss and analyse these concepts as they are defi ned by the 
English School. Moreover, because the purpose of this study is not to 
analyse all possible aspects of the focal rules and institutions, I will 
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confi ne myself to trying to establish the normative relationship between 
those rules and institutions and spheres of infl uence. I believe that by 
focusing on the normative – the hidden knowledge which is lacking 
in the present – I will avoid the pitfall of making spheres of infl uence 
dependent on some specifi c defi nition of, for example, sovereignty. 
Exposing spheres of infl uence to a normative dialogue with the rules and 
institutions of international society avoids fi xing concepts to a particular 
defi nition. We can and should still contest the concepts of balance of 
power and sovereignty even if we argue that they are the framework for 
understanding spheres of infl uence.
 
4.2 Classes of Power and the Balance of Power
As I have argued, the concept of sphere of infl uence in international theory 
owes much to the theory on the institutions of international society and 
the rules of coexistence, of which I have chosen to discuss the ones I 
consider most relevant. In this chapter I briefl y return to the subject of 
great power management, but I also discuss the status of being a great 
power and its pejorative aspect. Th e balance of power is constructed as 
a great power management tool just like spheres of infl uence, making 
the two closely associated. Th at which Keal calls the infl uencing state is 
the great power. Th e infl uenced state belongs to the class of small or lesser 
powers. Edy Kaufman (1976, 27–28) writes on great power infl uence, 
“Furthermore, it was always a condition of acceptance as a world power, 
that one maintained a position of supremacy in one’s own region of the 
world, and this is a further inducement to the superpowers to subjugate 
their nearest subsystems”. For Kaufman, becoming a world power 
requires infl uence beyond state borders, and specifi cally infl uence in 
the nearest territories. A sphere of infl uence is thus what makes a power 
great, making the status of great power important for theorising spheres 
of infl uence.
Th e concept of a great power needs some additional scrutiny. First, 
a conceptual clarity about great powers and other powers needs to be 
achieved. Starting with great powers, Bull (2002, 194–195) writes that 
when speaking of great powers there are two features at play: there needs 
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to be two or more great powers comparable in status and a club with a 
rule of membership. Members of the great power club are all in the front 
rank in military capacity, with no one power being superior to others 
(ibid.). Bull does not, in the end, give a full account of the diff erences 
between diff erent powers, which is why I consider it useful to examine 
Buzan’s reasoning. Buzan (2004b) has classifi ed powers in terms of three 
categories: superpowers, great powers and regional powers. Superpowers 
exercise global political and military reach. Concerning great powers 
Buzan writes, “[W]hat distinguishes great powers from merely regional 
ones is that they are responded to by others on the basis of system-
level calculations, as well as regional ones, about the present and near 
future distribution of power.” What makes great powers diff erent from 
superpowers is that great powers need not be present in all parts of the 
world. For a great power it is enough to operate in regions other than its 
own. Regional powers, by contrast, have capabilities in their regions, but 
are not active on the global level. Th ey are excluded from system-level 
calculations but they dominate security relations locally. (Buzan 2004b, 
69–72, 76.) 
In light of Buzan’s analysis, regional powers could also pursue spheres 
of infl uence, or at least they have some infl uence within their own 
region. During the world wars, a sphere of infl uence referred specifi cally 
to regional infl uence confi ned within the borders of what was a new 
territorial entity, but the infl uencing state was always a great power. 
During the Cold War, the superpowers, with their world-wide infl uence, 
were seen as being able to establish spheres of infl uence. Today Russia is 
described either as a great power or a power with great-power ambitions, 
a characterisation which links the idea of sphere of infl uence to the class 
of great powers more so than to that of regional powers. Th e idea of a 
concert of great powers, promoted by Russia, is also an idea of a club of 
great powers and not regional ones. Th e balance of power belongs also 
to the great power order as a mechanism of great power management. 
Th us an actor perceived as having a sphere of infl uence has been and still 
is a great power rather than a regional power. What we can also observe 
is a triangle of a sphere of infl uence, great power status and a balance of 
power, in which the three elements belong together and aff ect each other.
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Th e class of small or minor powers is not dealt with by Bull or Buzan. 
For spheres of infl uence, the category of the infl uenced (small) powers 
is nevertheless signifi cant. Small powers are the targets of infl uence and 
should thus also be separated as a distinct group. States in all three of 
Buzan’s classes of power are “great” in relation to small powers and have 
the capacity to extend infl uence over smaller states. Perhaps the category 
of small powers could then be defi ned as those states which are under the 
infl uence of other, greater, powers. Small states are the objects of power 
politics, “puppets” and “satellites” to use the metaphors of infl uence. 
On the other hand, small powers can infl uence the balance of power 
by shifting allegiances. A small power can have a stronger economy 
than a greater power as measured by other indicators. Small powers can 
gain from their close relationship with a greater power, adding to their 
military strength, economic strength or prestige. Th us, small states are 
not necessarily insignifi cant actors. In fact, a sphere of infl uence does not 
necessarily involve total subjugation of the small infl uenced powers. On 
balance, the class of small powers is every bit as ambiguous as any other. 
More importantly, this ambiguity means that the relationship between 
the great and the small, as well as the direction of infl uence between 
them, is not that clear-cut either.
Th e classifi cation of powers into super, great, regional and small 
in the context of spheres of infl uence adds to the concept’s pejorative 
meaning. Th e strict division into the great infl uencing power and the 
small infl uenced power creates an image of one-way infl uence and the 
guilt of the great versus the innocence of the small. A great deal of great 
power management is accepted among states, such as occasional military 
interventions or the institutionalised hierarchy of the United Nations 
Security Council. But when it comes to sphere of infl uence, a small power 
is perceived as the victim and the infl uencing power takes on a negative 
status. Th is is one way in which the concept of sphere of infl uence is used 
in a pejorative sense: it is seen as predicated on a dichotomy of the bad 
infl uencing power and the suff ering infl uenced power. Breaking down 
this dichotomy would mean discussing the role of great powers as system-
level players and the role of small states as infl uenced powers. In the end 
it means looking at the interests of the focal actors but at the same time 
situating spheres of infl uence within the international system, that is, as 
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an aspect of great power management and a means of balancing. If the 
roles given to the infl uencing and the infl uenced power in contemporary 
uses of the concept of sphere of infl uence are ascribed a pejorative 
meaning, the same semantic burden is laid upon the concept of balance 
of power. Th e pejorative associations of the concept of sphere of infl uence 
in the context of the balance of power emphasise the role of small states 
as objects of great power games. But by connecting spheres of infl uence 
and a balance of power with the same objective of preventing a single 
hegemon from emerging, the normative horizon widens and a sphere-of-
infl uence policy denotes not only hunger for power and subjugation of a 
weaker party but also a defence of the plurality of international society. 
Discussing how much infl uence we can accept for the sake of the system, 
at the expense of the infl uenced, sets the stage for a normative debate 
between spheres of infl uence and a balance of power.
For Wight (1966a, 153), balance of power is used in a normative way 
to denote the principle that the balance ought to be evenly distributed. 
Balance of power is endowed with a normative element in that it is often 
seen as a power game which does not treat small states fairly, just like a 
sphere of infl uence. Th is makes it unjust. On the other hand, balance of 
power is associated with the positive function of maintaining international 
order and, more specifi cally, maintaining a plurality of states and thus 
preventing world domination by a single power. Butterfi eld (1966, 32) 
compares a balance of power to a Newtonian system of astronomy where 
“[a]ll the various bodies, the greater and the lesser powers, were poised 
against one another, each exercising a kind of gravitational pull on all the 
rest – and the pull of each would be proportionate to its mass, though 
its eff ect would be greatly reduced as it acted at a greater distance.” If we 
think about the pendulum idea, it is as if balance of power is situated 
within hegemony and domination. A balance of power requires a certain 
amount of hegemony, which makes international society drift away from 
independence, but it also prevents a system of empire taking over.
For Bull, there is a general balance of power in the international system, 
which means the absence of a preponderant power from the system as a 
whole. In a local or particular balance of power, a preponderant power 
is missing from one area or segment of a system. Local balances are 
subordinate to the general balance. (Bull 2002, 98–99.) Under this logic, 
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spheres of infl uence work on both levels: they maintain a general balance 
between great powers or superpowers, and at the local level, where spheres 
of infl uence are established, balance is replaced by preponderance. Th us, 
a sphere of infl uence eliminates a balance of power locally, but this does 
not lead to the collapse of the general balance. In fact, the distinction 
between general and local balances does not seem very signifi cant for 
international order, because in the end it is only the general balance 
which maintains the system of states.
I have already introduced Little’s (2007, 34) balance of power as an 
image of a set of scales, but for spheres of infl uence the question is, What 
is the relationship between spheres of infl uence and a balance of power? 
Bull (2002, 98) implies that balance of power has something to do with 
spheres of infl uence. According to Bull, one strategy (in addition to 
military technology and industry) to augment a state’s strength is the 
exploitation of the existence of other states by absorbing, partitioning 
or allying with them. Wight (1966a, 149) also mentions alliances and 
affi  nities as means to achieve a balance. For Keal, spheres of infl uence 
contributed, at least in the infl uencing powers’ view, to the maintenance 
of a balance of power. Keal (1983, 209) writes, “So far the argument has 
been that spheres of infl uence contribute to order between infl uencing 
powers, and hence to order in general, through tacit understanding 
which serves the goals of social coexistence, and by contributing to 
what infl uencing powers perceive as necessary to a balance of power.” 
In both world wars and the Cold War period, the idea of international 
infl uence was always more or less connected with the idea of a balance of 
power. When the term ”sphere of infl uence” was used to denote colonial 
relationships, the concern was not so much with international order, 
which is why Lindley (1926) and Lord Curzon (1907) did not discuss 
balance of power. Th e concept of sphere of infl uence is also rather lacking 
in the literature on balance of power. Th e likely reason for this is that 
balance of power, as a concept, is primarily concerned with the eff ects 
of an increase in a state’s power through war and conquest, and less with 
infl uence. Herbert Butterfi eld (1966), for example, discusses balance 
of power at length without mentioning spheres of infl uence. Russian 
analysts also keep the two concepts of spheres of infl uence and balance 
of power separate. A balance of power is readily advocated but spheres of 
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infl uence rarely are. Th e relationship between the two lies in the fact that 
both are constructed as methods to maintain the system of states and that 
spheres of infl uence can help to establish or maintain a balance of power.
Th e idea of a balance of power, unlike spheres of infl uence, recognises 
small states as both victims and actors in the balancing game. Bull (2002, 
103–104) writes, “From the point of view of a weak state sacrifi ced 
to it, the balance of power must appear as a brutal principle. But its 
function in the preservation of international order is not for this reason 
less central”. For Bull the general balance of power is what matters and 
if small states must be sacrifi ced for international order, then so be it. In 
a contrasting perspective, Butterfi eld (1966, 142) explains how writers 
in the eighteenth century thought that a balance of power guaranteed 
the existence of small powers and actually gave them more room to 
manoeuvre in terms of foreign policy, as they were not mere satellites. 
A balance of power vindicated small states (ibid., 145). For Wight, in a 
system that rests on a balance of power, small states can sometimes hold 
the decisive power with regard to the balance (Wight 1966a, 161), which 
implies vindication rather than victimisation. In a sphere-of-infl uence 
system, small states are not vindicated in this way. Neither Keal nor Bull 
discusses the possibility of small powers being vindicated within a sphere 
of infl uence, or even having the power to play great powers against each 
other by choosing the sphere they want to belong to. Th us, with this 
logic, when a sphere of infl uence is used as a means to achieve a balance 
of power, it is always in full control of a great power and small states 
are kept on a tight leash. Small states are not able to shift their affi  nities 
but rather are at the mercy of the infl uencing states, meaning that small 
states have no power where a balance of power is concerned. Connecting 
spheres of infl uence and a balance of power reveals how for Keal and 
Bull a sphere of infl uence is not a source of vindication of small states 
– unlike a balance of power may be. What is interesting is the question 
of whether vindication of small states is how things ought to be, because 
following the logic of “spheres of infl uence contributing to order with 
stability of possessions” it would not seem like a good idea to give small 
states too much room to manoeuvre. Butterfi eld (1966, 145) explains 
that within the European balance of power, freedom has been promoted 
before peace, precisely because considerations of the balance of power 
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vindicated small states. In a way, this provides the answer to the question 
posed above: even if vindication of small states means confl ict and war, 
a choice will be made in favour of a balance of power over a universal 
empire. Th ere ought to be freedom, which means the vindication of small 
powers, because freedom means freedom from a universal empire.
A balance of power takes precedence not only over the rights of 
small powers but also over international law. According to Bull (2002, 
103–104), the relationship between balance of power and international 
law is paradoxical. He writes that the existence of a balance of power is 
essential for the operation of international law, but maintaining a balance 
often involves violating that body of law. Th e reason why international 
law requires the functioning of a balance of power is that the basic 
rules of international law depend on reciprocity. In the case of a single 
preponderant power, that power would not need to obey the rules of the 
society of states and could act as it pleased instead. (Ibid.) Bull writes, 
“Th e requirements of order are treated as prior to those of law, as they 
are treated also as prior to the interests of small powers and the keeping 
of peace” (ibid., 105). Th is principle applies to the idea of sphere of 
infl uence, if, like a balance of power, establishing a sphere of infl uence is 
viewed as a preventive measure against the danger of a universal empire. 
In such a case, sphere of infl uence also necessarily overrides peace, the 
rights of the small, and law. Order, when maintained by a balance of 
power and spheres of infl uence, works to justify the breaking of even the 
basic rule of the system itself: sovereignty. I will discuss the relationship 
between international law and spheres of infl uence later. Th e section to 
follow presents the principles of sovereignty and non-intervention.
4.3 Sovereignty and Non-intervention
I have argued that the history of spheres of infl uence is the history of 
the system of states. Th is makes sovereignty of utmost importance for 
spheres of infl uence. In his Genealogy of Sovereignty, Bartelson (1995, 
22–24) argues that the idea of sovereignty is the essence of international 
political theory. Sovereignty explains the international system and 
defi nes the state. Bartelson asserts that “sovereignty is constituted as a 
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primitive presence from which all theorizing necessarily must depart, if 
it is to remain international political theorizing”. (Ibid.) Sovereignty is 
so powerful a presupposition to a student of international relations or 
anyone who wants to analyse international relations that it must belong to 
the very heart of the idea of sphere of infl uence. To quote Walker (1994, 
62), “Spatially, the principle of state sovereignty fi xes a clear demarcation 
between life inside and outside a centered political community”. Spheres 
of infl uence break the holiness of this demarcation by intruding upon 
the territory of another sovereign. Spheres of infl uence essentially involve 
violation or non-violation of sovereignty, yet this core consideration has 
drawn surprisingly little theoretical interest.
I treat sovereignty as the principal organising idea of the system of 
states and as an idea which determines much of the meaning of the 
concept of sphere of infl uence. Sovereignty is often divided into external 
and internal. Bull (2002, 8) defi nes internal sovereignty as supremacy 
over all other authorities within a given territory and population, and 
external sovereignty as independence of outside authorities. International 
theory is interested specifi cally in external sovereignty and the nature 
of the system as anarchical. For Wight, sovereignty is a claim to be 
politically and juridically independent of any superior. Legal equality of 
states means a claim of independence of any political superior while at 
the same time recognising the same claim by all others. Wight continues 
that these accepted principles have nevertheless not guaranteed equality 
in practice. (Wight 1977; 23, 42, 130, 135.)
Th e relevance of sovereignty for sphere of infl uence can be illustrated 
through the principle of non-intervention. Th e relevance of intervention 
is in the diffi  culty of defi ning sovereignty and that which constitutes a 
violation of sovereignty. Waltz (1979, 95–96) makes an interesting claim 
in arguing that sovereignty does not mean that states are able to do as they 
wish. Sovereignty does not mean freedom from the infl uence of other 
states: “Sovereign states may be hardpressed all around, constrained to 
act in ways they would like to avoid, and able to do hardly anything just 
as they would like to” (ibid., 96). Waltz (ibid.) continues, ”To say that a 
state is sovereign means that it decides for itself how it will cope with its 
internal and external problems, including whether or not to seek assistance 
form others and in doing so to limit its freedom by making commitments 
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to them”. Because of the diffi  culties in defi ning the terms of sovereignty 
it is not easy to come to terms with the relationship between spheres 
of infl uence and sovereignty. Following Waltz’s logic, we could enquire 
if the establishment of a sphere of infl uence, in the end, even violates 
sovereignty. Is it just a relationship of dependency which does not clash 
with sovereignty? At the same time, the concept of sphere of infl uence 
appears to entail a claim that the infl uencing state violates the sovereignty 
of the infl uenced. Th e problem becomes one of choosing between the 
idea of a sphere of infl uence which does not confl ict with sovereignty and 
a sphere of infl uence which clearly violates sovereign rights. Th is is where 
the concept of intervention becomes useful in trying to determine when 
or if a particular sphere of infl uence involves a violation of sovereignty. 
Intervention can constrain the internal and/or external choices of a state 
to such an extent that it constitutes as a violation of sovereignty in Waltz’s 
terms. Th us, we could conclude that at least interventionist approaches 
to establishing or maintaining a sphere of infl uence are in violation of 
sovereignty. Th e nature of intervention is still a matter of debate but at 
least the concept provides a topical and easily accessible means to discuss 
whether spheres of infl uence necessarily involve violations of sovereignty.
 Keal (1983, 182) and Wight (1995, 194) refer to intervention as 
a means to assert a sphere of infl uence. According to Vincent (1974, 
330–331), respect for the rule of non-intervention means that states 
recognise the existence and legitimacy of others. Th e rule of non-
intervention is fundamental to the international order of states, because 
it establishes respect for sovereignty and it determines whether the nature 
of the system is Hobbesian-Grotian-Kantian or as pluralist-solidarist. 
Intervention belongs to the same category as spheres of infl uence, 
balance of power and great power management in that while they clearly 
represent inequality, they are also often accepted and seem to be integral 
parts of the functioning of the international system. For Wight (1966b, 
111), intervention even rises above all other forms of conduct with the 
controversy it generates:
Intervention perhaps gives rise to more controversy than any other 
international conduct. Violating the assumption of the equal 
independence of all members of the society of states, it is prima facie 
a hostile act. Yet it is so habitual and regular that it is impossible to 
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imagine international relations without it; and international law can 
only make a system out of it by losing touch with diplomatic facts.
Intervention is controversial not only as an act, but also as an idea. As 
Wight (1966b) puts it, intervention as a concept is fl uid and imprecise. 
Bull (1984b, 1) states that intervention can be forcible or non-forcible, 
direct or non-direct, open or clandestine. For Stanley Hoff man (1984, 
9), intervention can be explicitly coercive, such as economic coercion, 
and implicit, such as bribery and propaganda bombardment.14 According 
to Vincent (1974, 8), intervention is coercive interference accompanied 
by the use or threat of force. Bull (1984b, 1) describes intervention as 
interference in another state’s jurisdiction over its territory, citizens, and 
right to determine its internal aff airs and external relations. Intervention, 
just like a sphere of infl uence, entails inequality in power. To quote Bull 
(ibid.):
A basic condition of any policy that can be called interventionary 
in this sense is that the intervener should be superior in power to the 
object of the intervention: it is only because the former is relatively 
strong and the latter relatively weak that the question arises of a form 
of interference that is dictatorial or coercive.
Bull (1984a, 184) asserts that great inequalities of power make 
interventions possible. Nevertheless, the simple fact of inequality of 
power between states is not tantamount to interference; inequality 
is actually inherent in the system of states. Involvement in a state’s 
sphere of jurisdiction needs to be dictatorial or coercive in nature to be 
called illegal interference. (Ibid., 187–188.) Bull’s distinction between 
dictatorial and coercive intervention and “the mutual involvement of 
peoples in one another’s aff airs” is of course a matter of interpretation and 
causes disagreements over those actions to be counted as intervention 
and those which cannot be. But the idea of coercive intervention versus 
non-coercive involvement off ers a perspective from which one can refl ect 
on sphere of infl uence. As the concept is pejorative in tone, references 
14 In the same volume Windsor (1984, 50) argues that economic coercion or 
propaganda do not constitute as intervention since they are a state’s normal foreign policy 
tools counting only military force as intervention.
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to a sphere of infl uence would imply coercive involvement, but any 
consideration of the concept in a normative perspective would prompt 
a debate on whether the infl uence involved is coercive infl uence or non-
coercive, or “non-forceful involvement”. 
Bull (1984b, 1) continues that throughout modern history it is the 
great powers that have had the capability to intervene, meaning also that, 
by defi nition, a great power cannot be the object of an intervention, since 
then it would no longer deserve to be called a great power. It then follows 
that great power status and intervention go hand in hand, which is not 
far from saying that being a great power and having a sphere of infl uence 
are closely linked. Intervention, depending on whether it is justifi ed or 
not, becomes a matter of great power responsibility or privilege. Whether 
an intervention is justifi ed or not, the small state’s sovereignty is always 
violated, even when the people of the state stand to gain from it.
What makes the topic of intervention even more complex is the blurring 
of the distinction between acts of intervention and non-intervention. 
Wight (1995, 199) writes that non-intervention can be just as positive a 
policy as intervention: “Hence the truth of Talleyrand’s sardonic remark 
that ‘non-intervention is a term of political metaphysics signifying almost 
the same thing as intervention’”. Non-intervention can mean support for 
some cause (other than that achieved by intervention) or its purpose could 
be to prevent intervention. Hoff mann (1984, 8) puts forward the same 
claim, pointing out that even non-acts can constitute intervention, also 
referring to Talleyrand. As regards spheres of infl uence, non-intervention 
could signify the acceptance of another power’s sphere of infl uence. It 
could mean a failure to come to the rescue of a small power falling into 
the hands of the infl uencing power. In such a case, by analysing policies 
of intervention and non-intervention, we could determine how spheres 
of infl uence appear as great powers refrain from intervening in territories 
under the others’ infl uence. Russia’s ability to intervene in the territory of 
Georgia, and the reluctance of others to take any counter-actions could 
be interpreted as Russia consolidating and other powers acknowledging a 
Russian sphere of infl uence. Non-intervention could also mean resistance 
to acknowledging a sphere of infl uence, for example, in the case of Russia 
abstaining from participation in the intervention in Yugoslavia and thus 
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abstaining from taking part in causing Kosovo to fall under Western 
control.
Th e moral element of intervention is evident. Whereas the concept of 
sphere of infl uence does not appear in international law, this is not the 
case for intervention. International law is very clear about intervention: 
non-intervention is the rule, whereas intervention is an exception 
to that rule (see Bull 1984b, 2). Th e principle of non-intervention is 
necessary to the principle of sovereignty. As Vincent (1974, 14) puts 
it, “Th e principle of non-intervention identifi es the right of states to 
sovereignty as a standard in international society and makes explicit the 
respect required for it in abstention from intervention”. Th e principle of 
sovereignty requires that intervention must always be somehow justifi ed. 
Bull (1984b, 2–3) lists exceptions, recognised by international lawyers 
and moralists alike, when intervention can be justifi ed. Th e invitation 
of an incumbent government, counter-intervention, self-defence and 
collectively authorised intervention can serve as such exceptions (ibid). 
In Th e Anarchical Society, Bull (2002, 138–139) observes that although 
international law forbids states to intervene in one another’s internal 
aff airs, it is argued that sometimes considerations of the balance of power 
require intervention in order to establish a great power’s infl uence or to 
resist the infl uence of a great power. Also Wight (1995, 196) notes how 
international lawyers have given their blessing to intervention when it 
is meant to maintain a balance of power. Th ere is also an exception to 
the rule of non-intervention inscribed in the United Nations Charter. 
Keal (1983, 183) explains that Article 51 permits an exception to the 
non-intervention rule where intervention can be accepted if it is for self-
defence in the event of an armed attack.
According to Vincent (1974, 11–12), many international lawyers view 
the motive for intervention as determining the legality of the act. But 
this causes further confusion as to whether an instance of interference 
that is considered lawful can be called intervention anymore (ibid.). 
What is unlawful intervention and what is tolerable interference? 
Although intervention involves the threat or use of force, Wight (1995, 
192) explains, even an off er of friendly assistance may be suspect as to 
its motives and be denounced as intervention. Th is was the case when 
the Soviet Union denounced the United States’ off er of Marshall Aid 
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to Europe in 1947. Watson (2002, 151) points to the fact that there 
is a large grey area of pressure and interference where interveners can 
operate while appealing to international peace and security. Great powers 
have the leverage to balance between intervention and non-intervention 
and there is constant dispute regarding the justifi ability and illegality of 
interventions. Th e idea of a sphere of infl uence actually off ers a solution 
to the uncertainty of intervention. Th e advantage Keal (1983, 197–203) 
sees in spheres of infl uence is that they contribute to stable possessions 
and thereby limit the possibility of confl icts. Th us, spheres of infl uence, 
under this logic, would serve to limit confl icts over interventions between 
great powers as they could freely intervene within their own sphere of 
infl uence and refrain from intervening in those of others. It would not, 
however, resolve the issue of spheres of infl uence potentially subjugating 
smaller states and violating the principle of sovereignty. For Vincent 
(1974, 8) it is important that intervention is defi ned as something that is 
not a permanent state of aff airs. Intervention occurs but it also must cease 
at some point in order to qualify as intervention (ibid.). Interpreting 
Vincent, a permanent state of intervention could actually be understood 
as a sphere of infl uence. Th is idea is not articulated within the English 
School; it is something I am reading between the lines.
Acknowledging the idea of sphere of infl uence would then render 
intervention what might be called structural intervention. Bull (1984b, 
5) refers to this term, but Philip Windsor (1984, 45) explains it in more 
detail: 
But at the same time a general assumption persists of a world so 
dominated, indeed permeated, by sheer power that it becomes almost 
futile to discuss the question of intervention by the superpowers because 
it is like asking what contribution oxygen makes to our ability to 
breathe in the atmosphere.
What Windsor (1984, 46) is talking about is “a fundamental and 
permanent form of intervention, even a kind of structural intervention 
aff ecting the activities of all kinds of other states in the world”. Windsor 
explains how the Brezhnev Doctrine was the Soviet version of structural 
intervention: “Th e Brezhnev Doctrine is similarly an appeal to an 
overriding moral or historical principle, claiming a higher legitimacy 
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than that of international law. […] Th e Soviet Union, in other words, 
has created a higher order of legitimacy for intervention.” (Ibid., 54–55.) 
Windsor does not consider this to have been unique to the Soviet Union, 
as the United States also claimed a higher legitimacy than international 
law by its mission of defending other countries against a universalising 
foe (ibid., 57–58). Windsor concludes that whereas the Soviet Union was 
practicing structural intervention in Eastern Europe, the United States 
was doing the same in Latin America (ibid., 64). 
Bull also comes close to theorising spheres of infl uence as involving 
acceptance of intervention. He elaborates on intervention within 
diff erent world orders. In a world with central international authority, 
the rights of the authority to intervene might be unlimited. In a world 
of regional international organisations, there might be unlimited power 
to interfere within particular regions. Similarly, in an order ruled by a 
small number of great powers, intervention would be accepted within 
the dominated regions. (Bull 1984a, 185.) Th e two last options could 
be called spheres of infl uence, but Bull does not mention the concept 
in this connection. Bull continues that any one of the three options 
would mean a drastic alteration of the current system of sovereign states. 
Abandoning the rule of non-intervention would mean abandoning the 
right to sovereignty and independence. Bull argues that regardless of 
how the European Community or proletarian internationalism might 
develop, there was still an overwhelming consensus on sovereignty and its 
corollary principle of non-intervention. (Bull 1984a, 185–186.) Bull also 
suggests that abandoning the rule of non-intervention, that is, accepting 
intervention in general, would mean the end of the system of states as 
we know it. Th is is what Schmitt, Carr, and Burnham also foresaw (see 
chapter 5).
4.4 A  Regional Solidarist Order
As we examine the relationship between sovereignty, intervention/non-
intervention and spheres of infl uence further, we reach a point where we 
must broach the question of the nature of international society. Th is is 
the most important contribution of having studied the literature of the 
106
English School, because it makes it possible to situate the concept of sphere 
of infl uence more securely at the equilibrium point of the pendulum of 
international society (see chapter 3.2). Th e pluralist-solidarist divide is, in 
fact, the cornerstone of the following episodes, which makes it even more 
fundamental to the theoretical conceptualisation of sphere of infl uence.
In explaining the pluralist-solidarist divide, I begin with Buzan’s 
(2004a) insights. Pluralist international society is state-centric and 
assumes that international law is made by states (positive law). Pluralism 
is concerned with the preservation of political and cultural diff erence and 
distinctness. Solidarists are more concerned with the rights of individuals 
(natural law), cosmopolitan values and shared moral norms15. Buzan 
ponders whether the two are necessarily opposite ideas of state primacy 
versus a cosmopolitan position or, rather, two ends of a spectrum. Th e 
spectrum option is possible if sovereignty is more of a social contract 
– something open to negotiation – than an essential condition. At 
the pluralist end of the spectrum, international society is thinner and 
collective enforcement of rules will be diffi  cult. At the solidarist end, 
collective enforcement might be accepted in some areas. Th e pluralist-
solidarist divide implicitly answers the question of intervention: in 
focusing on shared moral norms, solidarism is a more interventionist 
view of international society, according to Buzan. (Buzan 2004a, 46–47.) 
But the spectrum metaphor relieves intervention from turning solidarism 
and pluralism against each other. Buzan explains, “In this view, so long 
as one does not insist that individuals have rights apart from, and above, 
the state, there is no contradiction between development of human 
rights and sovereignty. If they wish, states can agree among themselves 
on extensive guarantees for human rights, and doing so is an exercise 
of their sovereignty, not a questioning of it.” (Ibid., 48–49.) For some, 
solidarism means stepping from an international (state-based) into a 
world (non-state-based) society, but Buzan does not consider it useful to 
assume that solidarism is tantamount to embracing a world society (ibid., 
50–59). Keeping solidarism as a feature of international society allows 
Buzan (2004a, 59) to reason that 
15 See Buzan’s (2004a, 159) fi gure depicting the pluralist-solidarist spectrum of 
interstate society.
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[i]n substantive terms, pluralism describes ‘thin’ international societies 
where the shared values are few, and the prime focus is on devising 
rules for coexistence within the frameworks of sovereignty and non-
intervention. Solidarism is about ‘thick’ international societies in 
which a wider range of values is shared, and where the rules will be 
not only about coexistence, but also about the pursuit of joint gains 
and the management of collective problems of in a range of issue-areas.
Getting back to sovereignty and intervention, Buzan (2004a, 219) writes 
that “sovereignty means diff erent things at the pluralist and solidarist 
ends of interstate society.” He (ibid.) continues: 
In a pure Westphalian interstate society, virtually all intervention is 
both illegal and illegitimate (except against forces aiming to disrupt or 
overthrow interstate order). In a thick, solidarist international society 
such as that represented by the EU, the agreed unpacking of sovereignty, 
and the establishment of agreements about elements of justice, and the 
rights of individuals and non-state actors makes many more kinds of 
intervention both legal and legitimate.
In Buzan’s opinion, sovereignty and intervention can be reconciled 
within the same international society. Hoff mann understands the role 
of intervention in international society in a way which fi ts in with 
Buzan’s vision of a spectrum. Hoff man (1984, 11–12) explains that 
the question has never been one of international society choosing 
between intervention and non-intervention but rather of the forms and 
likelihood of intervention given the nature of the international system as 
decentralised units without a common superior. Even though for Hoff man 
intervention is a reality not necessarily because of solidarist tendencies 
in international society but because of anarchy, he nevertheless implies 
that sovereignty and intervention can coexist if sovereignty as a principle 
is understood as something fl exible and leaves room for exceptions. 
Infl uence, like intervention, has always been a part of the states-system. 
Th e same applies to the relationship between spheres of infl uence and 
sovereignty: infl uence does not automatically mean violation of the 
principle of sovereignty. Spheres of infl uence and sovereignty can coexist 
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when the infl uenced power accepts its position and when the infl uencing 
power off ers something in return.
Depending on the interpretation of sovereignty, which is looser at 
the solidarist than at the pluralist end of the spectrum, intervention is 
more or less acceptable. In addition, the consideration of justice, such 
as protection of human rights, loosens up the concept of sovereignty to 
include the legitimacy of intervention. Is then a solidarist international 
society also more tolerant of spheres of infl uence if it is more tolerant of 
intervention? A sphere of infl uence could incorporate regional solidarism 
as a voluntary “unpacking of sovereignty” and great powers could agree 
on a certain acceptable level of regional hegemony. Solidarism could 
make interventions within a sphere of infl uence a matter of agreement. 
Solidarism could not, however, explain away the potential for injustice in 
the case of spheres of infl uence nor could it likely tolerate the divisions 
that spheres of infl uence would create and maintain. If the world is 
moving in a solidarist direction, it is necessary to look at spheres of 
infl uence in a context where sovereignty is not as rigid as it is in a pluralist 
international society. Th is opens a way to discuss the normative aspects 
of justice in the case of spheres of infl uence in a world where no state can 
thrive on its own. 
Jackson’s Th e Global Covenant (2000) deals with the normative order 
of the system of states and provides some very interesting remarks on 
sovereignty and intervention. For Jackson (2000; 19, 23) the global 
covenant signifi es “the underlying moral and legal standards by reference 
to which relations between independent states can be conducted 
and judged”, and its fundamental underlying ethos is pluralism. Th e 
international society is a societas rather than a universitas (ibid., 105). 
Jackson’s societas and universitas are other names for a pluralist and 
solidarist international order, respectively:
Th e great political transformation symbolized by Westphalia can be 
captured conceptually as a reconstruction of European politics from that 
of universitas, based on the solidarist norms of Latin Christendom, 
to that of societas, based on the pluralist norms of state sovereignty, on 
political independence. (Ibid., 165.)
Jackson (2000, 127) argues that only in Europe or “the West” are there 
indications of an emergent universitas. Th e European universitas is 
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regional and not universal and elsewhere societas prevails (ibid., 127–128). 
Th e Peace of Westphalia was the symbol of the political transformation 
from the Christian order to the system of states (ibid., 164). In a very 
Schmittian tone,16 Jackson (2000, 168) appears to prefer societas over 
universitas, that is, freedom over hierarchy:
Th e societas of sovereign states is the idea and institution that expresses 
the morality of diff erence, recognition, respect, regard, dialogue, 
interaction, exchange, and similar norms that postulate coexistence 
and reciprocity between independent political communities. Th e 
language of societas is the language of political freedom as opposed to 
that of universitas, which is the language of political hierarchy and 
religious or ideological orthodoxy based on a political community of 
some sort.
It is clear that Jackson’s universitas has relevance for spheres of infl uence 
when he begins discussing the Cold War. During the Cold War, Eastern 
Europe, in its subordinate position to Moscow, formed a universitas 
where only the Soviet Union enjoyed the rights of sovereignty and non-
intervention. Th is ran counter to the pluralist norms of international 
society. Th e League of Nations Covenant (Article 21) confi rmed the 
validity of spheres of infl uence but after 1945 spheres of infl uence did 
not have such legitimacy. “Th e USSR operated in a fashion that could 
only be justifi ed, if justifi ed at all, by a concept of legitimate spheres of 
infl uence.” (Ibid., 255.) Th e United States, too, proclaimed this doctrine 
in its neighbourhood. By contrast, Gorbachev’s speech to the Council of 
Europe in 1989, an articulation of what was also known as the Sinatra 
Doctrine, was a declaration of a societas ending the Soviet hierarchy in 
Eastern Europe. It was an acknowledgement of the pluralist norm of 
international society and a repudiation of the Brezhnev Doctrine. Russia 
and Eastern Europe thus returned to the societas of sovereign states. 
(Ibid.; 168, 256.)
Jackson’s (2000, 169) own normative conclusion is that societas is the 
superior order: Th e pluralist doctrine of non-intervention is the core 
doctrine of the global covenant and “to date the modern societas of sovereign 
16 Schmitt was the proponent of pluriverse against universe, which would destroy 
political plurality in the international system. See more in chapter 5.3.
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states has proved to be the only generally acceptable and workable basis of 
world politics”. Jackson thinks it is ironic that some scholars now oppose 
state sovereignty and long for political and ideological solidarity in world 
politics. Th ey wish to reinstate an universitas of a gentler kind based on 
popular consent rather than military conquest or political revolution. 
But, as Jackson writes, universitas was originally a medieval political-
religious idea involving ideological orthodoxy and political hierarchy – 
exactly what sovereign states were created to escape from. Jackson goes 
on provocatively: “It [longing for political and ideological solidarity in 
world politics] is also ironical in light of the successful world-wide revolt 
against imperialism in the twentieth century which justifi ed the abolition 
of colonialism in the name of local political freedom: in the name of self-
determination and state sovereignty.” (Ibid. 168–169). Russian analysts 
would agree with Jackson; they are not ready to accept an universitas, as 
I will show in chapter 7.
For Jackson, the sovereign state has constitutional immunity and a 
fundamental right to non-intervention, making the ethics of intervention 
a negative ethics. Jackson writes that “non-intervention is the prima-facie 
norm of a pluralistic international society” whereas intervention requires 
justifi cation. Jackson introduces three main justifi cations for intervention: 
1) international order: valid reasons for international peace and security 
or national security17, 2) consent: a request of the legal government of 
the target state, and 3) humanitarianism: protecting the people of the 
target state. Jackson considers the third justifi cation to be controversial 
since it goes beyond the rules of the UN Charter. According to Jackson, 
humanitarian intervention has the potential to challenge the societas. In 
an universitas, humanitarian considerations would override sovereignty 
and the question would become whether there is a transformation under 
way to a global universitas where the rule of non-intervention would 
no longer be the guarantor of sovereignty. (Jackson 2000, 250–252.) 
Humanitarian intervention relies on universal human rights, whereby it 
represents an element of universitas for Jackson. 
Th e relationship between humanitarian intervention and spheres of 
infl uence is interesting, because the concept of humanitarian intervention 
is so recent that no references to it can be found in the history of spheres 
17 “National security” was used as an argument by Russia to defend its intervention 
in South-Ossetia in August 2008 (see chapter 7.5.3). 
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of infl uence. If we look at international society from Jackson’s perspective 
(instead of Bull’s spectrum), humanitarian intervention represents a 
discourse against pluralist international society18 whereas spheres of 
infl uence, even with the potential and likely violations of sovereignty they 
entail, represent a defence of plurality. In Bull’s spectrum, humanitarian 
intervention does not automatically signal the emergence of an 
universitas and thus is easier to accommodate with spheres of infl uence 
in the middle of the pluralist-solidarist spectrum. Th e main diff erence 
between humanitarian intervention and intervention within a sphere of 
infl uence is found in their legitimacy in discourses. A humanitarian cause 
can be accepted as a motive for intervention while ambitions of creating 
a sphere of infl uence cannot. Yet, establishing a sphere of infl uence and 
humanitarian intervention are not opposite or separate forms of conduct. 
A humanitarian cause could be invoked in order to avoid an intervention 
being associated with a sphere-of-infl uence policy – as if purifying the 
motives of the infl uencing state. Today, humanitarian reasons are the 
only possible justifi cation for intervention, and if spheres of infl uence 
exist, intervention within one can only be defended on humanitarian 
grounds. If intervention is a central tool of sphere-of-infl uence policy, and 
a humanitarian cause can be used as an excuse, then any interventionist 
state – not only Russia – can be accused of trying to establish a sphere of 
infl uence. For many Russian analysts, humanitarian intervention is sphere-
of-infl uence policy in disguise. Humanitarian intervention is a matter 
of interpretation, hence the disagreement between Russia and Western 
states on the intervention in Yugoslavia in 1999 and the disagreement 
on the nature of Russian intervention in South Ossetia in 2008. In fact, 
many Russians avoid making the claim of humanitarian intervention, 
because of the supposedly political uses of the term. For many Russians, 
Western “humanitarian interventions” represent sphere-of-infl uence 
policy and for many Western commentators Russian intervention in the 
territory of Georgia was an expression of a sphere-of-infl uence policy. 
Th us, the relationship between humanitarian intervention and a sphere-
18 For example, humanitarian intervention as the responsibility to protect principle, 
embraced by the UN World Summit in 2005, transfers the responsibility to protect 
people from states which fail to do so to the international community (see Evans 2008). 
Responsibility to protect is more closely associated with the idea of universitas as a 
collective and solidarist means to govern international aff airs.
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of-infl uence policy is not only in how these actions represent solidarism 
but, and primarily, in how they are justifi ed.
I would say that the establishment of spheres of infl uence and 
humanitarian intervention are more interconnected than separated 
by the discourse on their legitimacy. Likewise, the separation of 
sphere of infl uence and humanitarian intervention at the level of the 
pluralist-solidarist debate is artifi cial if we challenge the core meaning 
of solidarism. Th e problem with Jackson’s universitas is that we do not 
know who gets to decide on humanitarian intervention. Who holds the 
decisive power over the normative? In the case of Watson’s pendulum it 
is the Empire, but the more vague concepts of cosmopolitan, solidarist 
and world society leave the questions of agency unresolved. Is solidarism 
simply a thick international society or is it a cosmopolitan word society? 
Solidarism needs to be articulated also in a concrete political setting, 
because otherwise we do not know how to situate spheres of infl uence 
and humanitarian intervention.
Th is is where we fi nd the weakness of the English School theory: an 
inability to specify where power lies and who the actors in a solidarist 
society are. Buzan (2004a, 47–48) writes that the pluralist side is easily 
identifi able as a system consisting of states but the solidarist side blurs the 
diff erence between international and world society because it ties together 
state and non-state actors. For Buzan, the problem is the impreciseness of 
the idea of world society. Even though world society occupies a central 
position in English School thinking, the concept is not systematically 
elaborated. (Ibid., 44.) Since Buzan discusses solidarism within the 
society of states, endowed with sovereignty and the right to intervention, 
he keeps solidarism within the limits of international society. It makes me 
wonder where pluralism really turns into solidarism. 
 I argue that humanitarian intervention fi ts into the cosmopolitan ethos 
of a solidarist society less than the English School conceptualisations would 
suggest. To my mind, humanitarian intervention does not jeopardise 
pluralism as such, but rather – and specifi cally – the plurality of sovereign 
states. An international society where humanitarian intervention is 
legitimate is a concert of great powers and/or multiple regional societates 
maintaining a certain level of pluralism. In this order, great powers 
would decide on humanitarian intervention. Even within the EU, which 
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represents a solidarist order for both Buzan and Jackson, greater powers 
have the fi nal say. In terms of this logic, humanitarian intervention, like 
any intervention, sits well in solidarist international society, which does 
not abandon the system of states. In fact, the idea of regional solidarism 
makes it possible to imagine a solidarist international society (a plurality 
of regional units) that allows humanitarian intervention.
In an argument close to my reasoning regarding the conceptual 
confusion about solidarism, John Williams (2005, 19–38) asserts that 
contrary to the general English School view, a world society does not 
have to be cosmopolitan. Williams wants to challenge the idea that 
pluralism belongs to international society and solidarism to world society. 
He writes that a world society where political activity is principally 
focused on individuals (and where states are not the predominant actors) 
can maintain plurality in some form. In other words, diversity can be 
accommodated in such a society. Williams (2005, 33) continues, “Th us a 
partly de-territorialised pluralist modus vivendi off ers a normative agenda 
for world society.” Again the English School is theorised in terms of the 
mysterious notion of solidarism – mysterious because it is so diffi  cult to 
conceptualise. Th e argument that a world society of pluralism indicates 
“non-territorial forms of politics” (ibid., 35) still prompts the question of 
what exactly happens to territorially bound communities in a solidarist 
international society or in a solidarist or pluralist world society. Th e 
usefulness of the pluralist-solidarist debate is undermined if there is no 
clarity as to what kind of political organisation is envisioned. Emphasising 
the importance of regions, Buzan’s and Waever’s regional security complex 
– and even more so Hurrell’s regional solidarism – off ers answers to the 
contemporary need to make sense of the pluralist-solidarist divide19. But 
there is no attempt to situate spheres of infl uence in this debate, because 
the concept has not been situated at all in international theory. Perhaps 
the pluralist-solidarist debate does not even need spheres of infl uence, but 
a sphere of infl uence can be theorised by situating it within this debate. 
If we take into account Keal’s and, to a lesser extent, Bull’s interest in 
discussing spheres of infl uence as contributing to international order, it 
is reasonable to assume that this international order has something to do 
with pluralism and solidarism.
19 Th ere are many more studies on regions which I will not present here (for example 
Weinert 2011).
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At the end of the day, by reading the English School we do not fi nd 
out who it is that would be in charge of a solidarist order or world society. 
Would it still be states, or a mix of state and non-state actors? Would 
it be a world organisation – or even a universal empire? Th e reason 
why this question is compelling is that the answer to it would make 
it possible to situate spheres of infl uence more fi rmly in the middle of 
Watson’s pendulum of international society, provided both ends were 
clearly defi ned. Sphere of infl uence emerges out of the English School 
literature as a pluralist concept, as part and parcel of the system of 
states, but it also expresses ideas of breaking state borders to form bigger 
units than states. What makes a sphere of infl uence diverge from the 
pluralist ethos of the state is the idea of a regional unit, the Großraum 
for Schmitt (2003) and Carr (2001), Mid-Europe for Naumann (1917) 
and the “Good Neighbor Policy” for Lippmann (1945). Th ese regional 
units are constructed not only out of infl uence but also out of unity 
and necessity. Th is necessity is the prevention of major wars by unifying 
states to form bigger entities. Jackson, by discussing spheres of infl uence 
as an aspect of universitas, does make the move towards seeing spheres 
of infl uence as part of a solidarist order. Spheres of infl uence are then 
regional solidarist orders which allow the pluralist order to survive on the 
global level. Th is solidarism is not restricted to “one humanity” but can 
include several regional international societies within the international 
order. Th e idea of a regional solidarist order also takes the pejorative ring 
out of sphere of infl uence. However, given the inadequate defi nition of 
solidarism, it remains diffi  cult to imagine what the relationship between 
spheres of infl uence and solidarism would be on a global scale: Would 
solidarism mean the end of great powers and their spheres of infl uence, or 
would great powers maintain their dominant position even in a solidarist 
international society?
4.5 International Law and Justice
Th is section focuses on English School theory on international law and 
justice in relation to spheres of infl uence. It is nothing new to say that 
infl uence in international relations is not distributed equally. Some 
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members of the society of states can better proclaim and defend their 
interests (Bull 2002, 53). When one looks at the justice or injustice of 
spheres of infl uence, the fi rst thing is to ascertain what international law 
has to say on the subject. References to international law are also the 
source for fi nding arguments for and against spheres of infl uence. Th e 
relationship between spheres of infl uence and international law, in the 
present, rests on the assumption that international law does not recognise 
a right to a sphere of infl uence. Instead, international law sets limits on 
pursuing international infl uence; it does this through the principles 
of sovereignty and intervention, but also through rules on the use of 
violence.
Keal writes about international law and its relationship to spheres 
of infl uence. According to Keal, in 1945 the allied powers met in Yalta 
to agree on the principles of the government of former satellites and 
liberated countries. Th e powers subscribed to principles that would 
ensure their cooperation and allow democratic government in Eastern 
Europe in line with the Atlantic Charter. (Keal 1983, 87–88). Soon 
thereafter the United Nations Organisation Charter was drawn up in San 
Francisco. Keal considers the Charter important for spheres of infl uence 
because Article 2(1) lays down the principle of sovereign equality and 
Article 2(4) states, ”All members shall refrain in their international 
relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or 
political independence of any state, or in any manner inconsistent with 
the purposes of the United Nations”. In this connection, Keal writes: 
“Spheres of Infl uence are not consistent with the principle of sovereign 
equality”. Infl uencing powers have used force against the integrity and 
independence of states and contravened the Charter. (Ibid., 90.) I will 
later show, in chapter 7, how the Russian analysts take international law 
and its historical documents so seriously as to make one wonder how they 
could ever argue for spheres of infl uence. 
Bull (2002, 126) states that since self-help is a part of enforcing 
international law, the distribution of power dictates conformity to 
this law. But it would be too simplistic to claim that the international 
order is one where great powers take matters of law to their own hands, 
disregarding the rights of the small. What I have tried to convey through 
the presentation of the institutions of international society is that the 
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question of whether spheres of infl uence are inherently unjust is far from 
settled. As Keal (1983, 199–203) suggests, even development aid can 
be seen as infl uence which can cause confl icts. Intervention and non-
intervention as principles which are connected to spheres of infl uence 
emerge from a jungle of arguments over legality and legitimacy. Th en there 
is the matter of “stability of possessions” as contributing to the lessening 
or controlling of confl icts by the infl uencing powers (Keal 1983, 199–
203) and fi nally the big question of spheres of infl uence as potentially 
contributing to international order. All these considerations suggest that 
we should look more deeply into the many diff erent arguments on the 
justifi cation of sphere-of-infl uence   policies. 
Bull argues that conformity to international law20 and violation of it 
are not separate forms of conduct. In his estimation, international law 
is obeyed by most states most of the time. Even when laws are violated 
it might still embody some elements of conformity, making the line 
between conformity and violation blurred. (Bull 2002, 131–132.) Th e 
same applies to justice. A great power could argue for establishing a 
sphere of infl uence (violation) against foreign aggression (conformity or 
upholding the right of another state to sovereignty). Is not a sphere of 
infl uence actually a perfect example of violation and conformity taking 
place at the same time? If the existence of a sphere of infl uence implies a 
relationship between two or more great powers, the sphere of infl uence 
is established not only to infl uence another state but to prevent another 
great power from infl uencing that same state. During the Cuban Missile 
Crisis (described in more detail in chapter 6), both parties, the United 
States and the Soviet Union, expressed their wish to protect the Cuban 
20 Bull defi nes international law as “a body of rules which binds states and other 
agents in world politics in their relations with one another and is considered to have 
the status of law”. Bull explains that there are rules which states and other agents see 
as binding one another which constitutes an international society. It is, nevertheless, a 
matter of controversy whether these rules have a status of law due to the lack of an 
enforcing and sanctioning world government. (Bull 2002, 124–125.) International law 
rests much upon self-help including the use and threat of force. Members of international 
society often take the enforcement of international law in their own hands which makes 
international law function as a part of balance of power. (Ibid., 126.) Th e other members 
of international society might disagree on which is the lawbreaking party to a confl ict and 
which upholds the law (ibid., 127).
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people from the other superpower’s tyranny. What a sphere of infl uence 
can be, refl ecting on what Bull writes about international law, is a mixture 
of a violation of the principle of sovereignty and an attempt (even if a self-
serving one) to protect the sovereignty of the infl uenced or to maintain 
the system of states as the preferred international order. 
Another more or less accepted argument for a sphere of infl uence can 
be the maintenance of a balance of power. Bull (2002, 138) explains 
how an interest in a balance of power might clash with international law. 
Balance of power is a principle that maintains international order but the 
means of achieving a balance might involve acts of violating international 
law. In this case, we are not talking about justice and the rights of 
individual states, but of the overriding interest in maintaining a balance 
of power for the sake of the system of states. Bull in fact comments on this 
dilemma with regard to international law: “It is often argued, however, 
that considerations of the balance of power require intervention in the 
internal aff airs of a state in order to establish a great power’s infl uence 
in it, or resist the infl uence of another great power, because of wider 
considerations of the distribution of power in international society at 
large”. (Bull 2002, 138.)
Regardless of system considerations and the reasons promoted by the 
infl uencing power, the perspective of the infl uenced state is what matters 
most when judging the act of infl uence. If the infl uenced state feels its 
rights are being violated then the argument about protection can hardly 
justify a sphere-of-infl uence policy. However, the fact that a state is 
claiming that its rights are being violated by a sphere-of-infl uence policy 
does not automatically mean that injustice has occurred, or even that any 
sphere-of-infl uence policy has been implemented. States can abuse the 
idea of spheres of infl uence to get support from other states in a dispute 
with a greater power. Th e relationship between the infl uencing and the 
infl uenced power becomes more complex when we do not automatically 
view the small states as victims of a sphere-of-infl uence policy. Th en it is 
more a question of enmities, alliances and identities than of international 
law whether infl uence is accepted or not. 
Th e contemporary discourse has taken a fi rm stand against spheres of 
infl uence expressly on the basis of justice, even more so than on the basis 
of law. Keal (1983, 204) makes a clear judgment about the relationship 
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between spheres of infl uence and justice: “Th e freedom and independence 
of infl uenced states is always impaired and no matter how much they 
contribute to order, spheres of infl uence are necessarily unjust”. For Keal, 
even though spheres of infl uence contribute to international order this 
comes at the price of justice (ibid., 209–210). He explains, “Th e injustices 
inherent in spheres of infl uence such as inequalities in the distribution of 
wealth, violation of the doctrine of sovereign equality of states, and the 
denial of equality of individuals might simply nourish seeds of disorder” 
(ibid., 212). Th us the unjust nature of spheres of infl uence is at the same 
time a source of disorder. To summarise Keal’s argument, spheres of 
infl uence might contribute as much to international order as to disorder, 
but in the end they are based on injustice.
Bull explores justice in world politics in Th e Anarchical Society. 
Firstly he discusses the meaning of justice as actions considered right in 
themselves and thus belonging to the class of moral ideas separate from 
law, prudence, interest or necessity. Justice is also often understood as 
equality in respect of rights and privileges. Bull explains that there is 
substantive justice, or recognition of rules about rights and duties; and 
formal justice, “the like application of these rules to like persons”. (Bull 
2002, 75–76.) Bull (2002, 76) writes: 
Demands for ‘justice’ in world politics are frequently demands for 
formal justice in this sense: that some legal rule, such as that requiring 
states not to interfere in one another’s domestic aff airs, or some 
moral rule, such as that which confers on all nations the right of self-
determination, or some operational rule or rule of the game, such as 
that which requires great powers to respect one another’s spheres of 
infl uence, should be applied fairly or equally as between one state and 
another.
Th us, there are two aspects to justice: 1) the contents or the rules 
stating what course of action is considered right and what is wrong and 
2) the equal application of these rules. Curiously, Bull presents spheres 
of infl uence as manifestations of justice, but it is justice in the second 
meaning, formal justice, according to which great powers have equal 
rights to spheres of infl uence. What Bull does not say is whether a sphere 
of infl uence is considered just according to the fi rst aspect, substantive 
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justice, that is, whether a sphere of infl uence is just in the fi rst place. My 
principal concern is substantive justice, but I am interested in formal 
justice as well – albeit not as relations among great powers but as the 
equal application of rules among all the members of international society.
Bull’s point is that the current institutions of international society do 
not support justice in world politics, but rather international order is often 
at odds with justice. International society is at odds with cosmopolitan 
justice, human justice and often with interstate or international justice. 
Interstate justice is best served in international society as states may add 
moral imperatives to the rules of their coexistence, whereas justice for 
humankind (cosmopolitan) or individuals (human) does not fi t in with 
the workings of international society as it is managed by the states. (Bull 
2002, 87.) Cosmopolitan justice could be realised only in a cosmopolitan 
society. Bull writes, “But to pursue the idea of world justice in the context 
of the system and society of states is to enter into confl ict with the devices 
through which order is at the present maintained”. Th e same applies to 
human justice: it is simply incompatible with the present international 
order, where human rights enjoy no precedence over the rights of the 
states. (Bull 2002, 85–86.) Concerning the justice of spheres of infl uence, 
Bull (2002, 89) makes the following statement:
Great powers contribute to international order by maintaining local 
systems of hegemony within which order is imposed from above, and 
by collaborating to manage the global balance of power and, from 
time to time, to impose their joint will on others. But the great powers, 
when they perform these services to international order, do so at 
the price of systematic injustice to the rights of smaller states and 
nations, the injustice which has been felt by states which fall within 
the Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe or the American hegemony in 
the Caribbean, injustice which is written in the terms of the United 
Nations Charter which prescribe a system of collective security that 
cannot be operated against great powers, the injustice from which 
small powers always suff er when great ones meet in concert to strike 
bargains at their expense. (Emphasis added.)
Systematic injustice is like systemic intervention: it takes place so 
frequently as to eff ectuate a status quo and something that is quietly 
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accepted. Bull (2002, 221–222) also writes about justice when dealing 
with international order managed by the great powers. He notes that the 
great power order does not provide justice for all. Bull doubts whether 
there should or could be equal justice within the society of states at all. 
For him it appears that any international order must have its custodians 
and guardians. In fact, Bull proclaims that the great power order enjoys 
wide support but that great powers constantly need to secure and preserve 
this support. He explains that “the great powers cannot formalise or make 
explicit the full extent of their special position” since it would engender 
more antagonism than the international order could support. Th is is why 
the society of states is based on equality, rejecting hierarchical ordering. 
But international society does not require perfect justice, because all states 
value order over justice. Nevertheless, if great powers seem to be both 
undermining order and denying justice, the legitimacy of their position 
is eroded. (Ibid.) 
What has all this to do with spheres of infl uence, other than Bull 
mentioning the concept in two instances? Bull (2002, 83) maintains that 
justice is realisable only in a context of order. If we understand the world 
as an international society with certain “rules of the game” – such as 
spheres of infl uence being a part of great power management – what are 
the possibilities for justice? For both Bull and Keal balances of power 
and spheres of infl uence violate justice in relation to small states while 
nevertheless maintaining international order. Th is order also prevents the 
world from turning into a cosmopolitan society, thus leaving us to settle 
for interstate justice. An order supporting spheres of infl uence fi ts in well 
with the idea of interstate justice, for it deals with relations among states 
and not among individuals. It is much harder to evaluate what spheres 
of infl uence would mean to human justice than to justice among states. 
Clearly, spheres of infl uence, in terms of Bull’s defi nitions of justice, 
would mean formal justice between the great powers. Nevertheless, reading 
Bull more carefully, spheres of infl uence do not, in the fi nal analysis, 
leave much consideration for justice. Instead, Bull refers to “systematic 
injustice” in the case of spheres of infl uence. Th is translates into formal 
justice among great powers and systematic injustice against the small. 
Th e present inquiry into the English School institutions reveals that 
the apparent normative  aspects  of spheres of infl uence not only spring 
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from the present pejorative use of the term in the context of Russian 
foreign policy research but also emerges from the theory articulated by 
the English School. Th is theory reveals that sovereignty is not the same 
for all states, that the international system is founded upon the inequality 
of states, and that sphere of infl uence is a manifestation of these two 
features of the system. Th us, the normative aspects of spheres of infl uence 
come from the inequality that they presumptively entail . Th e reason why 
inequality is inherent in a sphere of infl uence is that we do not have a 
theory, concept, idea or practice relating to the phenomenon which does 
not embody this inequality. Even Keal, who recognises some advantages 
of spheres of infl uence, cannot argue that spheres of infl uence do not 
violate equality in some way or the other. But what can be investigated is 
whether this inequality is always necessarily bad, and especially whether 
it is bad from the perspective of the entire society of states and not only 
from the perspective of its individual members. It can also be debated 
whether the relationship of inequality within a sphere of infl uence has 
only negative consequences for the infl uenced states or if those states 
can still benefi t somehow from being within the sphere of infl uence. We 
cannot ignore so easily, however, that there is a certain power relation 
at work even when infl uence is accepted by the infl uenced states. Some 
form of hierarchy and inequality always comes when a sphere of infl uence 
is created. 
4.6 Infl uence or Responsibility?
In chapter 3.4, which deals with agreements on spheres of infl uence, 
I explore diff erent concepts that come close to the idea of sphere of 
infl uence. When it comes to justifying spheres of infl uence, terminology 
again takes on importance. Th is terminology, which draws a distinction 
between spheres of infl uence and spheres of responsibility, is completely 
ignored in the present discourses on spheres of infl uence. When Lindley 
writes of protectorates, he means “protection” given by the infl uencing 
power to the infl uenced at the price of the loss of some, but not all, 
elements of the protected state’s sovereignty. As he (1926, 181) explains:
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Th e assumption by a comparatively powerful State of the duty of 
protecting a weaker State is an institution of considerable antiquity. 
In the earlier instances the weaker State might gain the advantage 
of protection without losing its sovereignty. In the later examples of 
the older type of protectorate, however, an essential feature of the 
arrangement has been that the protected State has handed over the 
conduct of its external aff airs to the protecting Power, or accepted its 
dictation in regard to those aff airs, and has thus parted with part of 
its sovereignty without, however, losing the whole of its independence.
Protection implies something “good” that can come out of spheres of 
infl uence against the totally negative view of spheres of infl uence as forms 
of domination. Th is raises the question whether spheres of infl uence 
are necessarily always manifestations of systematic injustice based on 
power politics. Should not those with greater power in fact have more 
responsibility for peace and stability?
Bull off ers one answer by distinguishing positive and negative sphere-
of-infl uence agreements. Th e European expansion was a negative sphere-
of-infl uence agreement while the agreement on the occupation of 
Germany by the Soviet Union, United States, Britain and France was 
a positive agreement. In the case of Germany, there was a common task 
of occupying the territory of the defeated enemy and preventing the 
resurgence of the Nazis, among other things. It was a common endeavour 
for whose implementation each party took responsibility. (Bull 2002, 
215.) Responsibility is the key word here. Bull (ibid.) makes reference 
to Lippmann’s idea of good neighbours and spheres of responsibility, 
described in U.S. War Aims (1944). Th us, there could potentially be 
positive spheres of infl uence based on responsibility that would be 
diff erent from negative spheres of infl uence. Keal also mentions spheres 
of responsibility. As an example, he points to France claiming a sphere of 
infl uence in Morocco but with the idea that France would preserve order 
and assist with various reforms there (Keal 1983, 23–24).
Wight also refers to the idea of great power responsibility, claiming 
that great powers have great responsibilities. Th ey need to protect 
smaller nations; they must seek to serve, not to rule. Great powers have a 
managerial role due to their preponderance. (Wight 1977, 139.) Wight 
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(1995, 43−44) notes, “For since great powers have wider interests and 
greater resources than small powers, the main duty of settling international 
aff airs must fall upon them; and it was hoped that they would develop, as 
it has been said, from great powers into Great Responsibles”.
For Jackson, in general the great powers have a special role in the society 
of states. He argues in Th e Global Covenant that great powers have a special 
responsibility for maintaining peace and security in the world, because 
they can do both the greatest harm and greatest good in world politics 
(Jackson 2000; 139, 173). Moreover, great powers can expect other states 
to recognise their special rights. Minor powers are not able to contribute 
to peace and security the way the great powers can. World peace rests on 
the shoulders of the great. (Ibid., 140–142.) Bull (2002, 194–195) calls 
the special rights and responsibilities of great powers their managerial 
responsibility. For Jackson, this sort of inequality is quite natural and 
also desirable. But global security needs supporting institutions other 
than the class of great powers only: it requires a balance among the great 
powers and their concerted action. A balance of power works against 
the emergence of a world empire or government that would destroy the 
plurality of states. A concert means that great powers cooperate in the 
management of world aff airs. Th e concrete manifestation of this order is 
the Security Council of the UN with its special responsibility for peace 
and order. (Ibid., 201–202)
Th e responsibility of great powers that Jackson, Wight, Bull and Keal 
discuss can be refuted, as Jackson (2000, 376) indicates, by saying that 
it is only a façade masking selfi sh interests and hegemonial ambitions 
and an excuse for exploitation and oppression. But if great powers had 
no responsibility for their actions and if they did not see the need for a 
normative discourse (justifi cation) they would, as Jackson (2000, 377) 
puts it, only have desires and power: 
Th e strong would be free to exploit their power to the full. Th e weak 
would be obliged to surrender in silence to the hegemon or else face 
the consequences. Is that how members of international society, great 
and small, conduct themselves in their relations? I believe the evidence 
indicates otherwise. 
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Holbraad (1979, 13) sums up the dual role of great powers within the 
states system as follows: “Th us, they may be seen as both as the potential 
wreckers and as the ‘great responsibles’ of the world”. Even if the great 
powers could produce positive infl uence they would also represent 
systematic injustice in their managerial role. Acting in concert, great 
powers might be able to maintain order by a balance of power, but there 
would be no one to monitor the justice of their actions. Even if the great 
powers were called “the great responsibles”, we would be left with the 
dilemma of injustice versus order. Th en we would have to ask ourselves 
whether the negative aspects of great power management outweigh its 
positive infl uences on international order. If we put on the table the 
perspective that great power management and spheres of infl uence, both 
of which help to limit confl icts and maintain international order, and 
compare these to the inequality of such a system and the violation of 
rights of the infl uenced – the justice side of the phenomenon – which 
do we value more? Only then we can decide what kind of normative 
meaning we should give to the concept of sphere of infl uence. Surely we 
would have diffi  culties imagining a sphere of infl uence unequivocally as 
a practice of peace. But we could try to decide if a sphere of infl uence 
should be understood as a controversial practice, like intervention 
(sometimes necessary, most of the time against international law), or if it 
should be judged as the greatest evil of humankind, like war.
4.7 Conclusions on the English School
I have tapped the undiscovered pool of English School theory on the 
relationship between international society, its rules and institutions, and 
spheres of infl uence. What the English School account of international 
society has contributed here is 1) the location of spheres of infl uence 
between pluralist and solidarist orders and 2) the normative question 
of the justice of a sphere of infl uence. Spheres of infl uence belong at 
the equilibrium point of the pendulum or the middle of the spectrum, 
as do hegemony or domination. Th is is where balance of power can 
also be found, because a balance of power violates sovereignty within 
a strict pluralist society and yet it  also supports the pluralist system by 
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preventing one single hegemon from emerging. If sovereignty can be 
understood as a social contract, intervention does not belong solely to 
the solidarist end of the spectrum, but rather states can agree on the use 
of intervention. Not even humanitarian intervention need be a fatal blow 
to pluralism. Th us, intervention also swings on the pendulum towards 
the centre. In the spectrum metaphor, sovereignty and intervention can 
coexist, and so can sovereignty and sphere of infl uence. Th e usefulness of 
applying Buzan’s idea of a spectrum lies in its freeing sovereignty from 
its Westphalian chains, thus liberating the concept of sphere of infl uence 
from its pejorative shroud. Even though the English School does not 
locate sphere of infl uence within solidarism (any more than within 
pluralism), Jackson’s regional societas indicates that unity and spheres of 
infl uence belong together. I will elaborate on the solidarist idea of sphere 
of infl uence in greater substance in the following chapter.  
When it comes to the normative question, the problem is between 
maintaining international order at the expense of the small versus justice 
for all. According to the English School literature, small states can be 
vindicated in a struggle for a balance of power but not  in a struggle for 
spheres of infl uence. In fact, the core question of justice is the right of small 
states to their independence. Great power infl uence as such is acceptable, 
or indeed even necessary, but a sphere of infl uence always comes down to 
the rights of the infl uenced. I have tried to show in this chapter that the 
matter of justice where spheres of infl uence are concerned is a complicated 
one. For example, conformity to international law, the source of the 
notions of international justice, as well as violations of international law, 
are relevant for contesting the concept of sphere of infl uence. When there 
is a struggle over infl uence, one great power can be accused of trying 
to violate sovereignty of the infl uenced while another can claim to be 
defending sovereignty against the aggression of the fi rst. If we take the 
relationship of intervention to justice in the case of a sphere of infl uence, 
the need arises to discuss what kind of intervention is coercive and what is 
“the mutual involvement of peoples in one another’s aff airs” if one wants 
to start making lists of what acts make up a sphere-of infl uence-policy. 
For example, one might ask whether development aid can be a sphere-of-
infl uence policy? Conceptually spheres of infl uence also place limitations 
on intervention (great powers do not intervene in each other’s spheres 
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of infl uence), giving room for a discussion of normative considerations. 
Finally, the idea of spheres of responsibility takes the normative question 
to an entirely new level by giving the practice of establishing spheres 
of infl uence legitimacy as such. In Bull’s terms that means spheres of 
infl uence become a matter of substantive justice, not only a matter of 
promoting international order or a balance of power. Th e next chapter 
takes the normative issues in this direction.
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5 Between Nation and Humanity
Grand designs are important. Th ey furnish analytical models for public 
discussion of important problems. Th ey provide criteria by which to 
test the long-run consequences of various short-run alternatives. Most 
grand designs are, however, presented by their author as one best hope 
of avoiding a fresh descent into the maelstrom of global war. (Fox 
1944, 159.)
During the aftermaths of the First and Second World War, many 
theorists put forward ideas, “grand designs”, on the organisation of the 
international system with a view to saving their own country from peril 
and securing peace in the future21. It is the purpose of this chapter to 
connect these grand designs to the history of spheres of infl uence. In 
theoretical terms, the grand designs place spheres of infl uence in the 
middle of the pluralist-solidarist spectrum, contributing to a connection 
between the notions of spheres of infl uence and international order. 
Normatively, the designs represent the subjugated knowledge of spheres 
of infl uence without their pejorative associations. 
Th e German writers Schmitt and Naumann are well known for 
envisioning this new world order from a German perspective, Schmitt 
(2003 [1950]) writing on Großräume and Naumann (1917) on Mid-
Europe. Schmitt advocated political pluralism in the form of three 
Großräume – Germany being one of them – which would save the 
world from a universalist conquest. In the United States, the concern 
was the same: to ensure that country had the role of a great power and 
to avoid major war at the same time. Burnham’s (1947, 227) vision is 
a ”democratic world order” founded upon the American universalism, 
exactly that which Schmitt was afraid of. What Burnham criticised 
was a soft approach to world order that would allow the Soviet Union 
to continue its attempts at world domination; he felt that it was the 
communist threat that justifi ed the United States’ role as the World 
Empire. Burnham’s world-view was circulated widely among the general 
public by the work of Orwell. But there was also a vision, very diff erent 
21 For Naumann, the context was World War I and for others World War II and its 
aftermath.
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from Burnham’s and one that Burnham could not support, called the 
Good Neighbor Policy, which was declared by President F. Roosevelt and 
Lippmann. Roosevelt’s and Lippmann’s basic concern was what kind of 
infl uence would be the right one for a new regionalism. 
Th e German intellectuals Naumann and Schmitt, the famous Carr, 
the less famous American analysts Burnham and Lippmann, and the 
novelist/journalist Orwell were all concerned with the fate of the system 
of states. Bull (1966b, 36) notes that “[t]he feeling of unease about 
the system of states is a deep-rooted one in Western thinking about 
international relations”. Th is unease was common to these theorists and 
prompted them to speculate about spheres of infl uence. Bull (ibid.) gives 
express ion to the apprehension: 
Whether by a social contract among the nations or by conquest, 
whether gradually or at once, whether by a frontal assault on national 
sovereignty or a silent undermining of its foundations, the problem of 
international relations, if it is soluble at all, is taken to be in the last 
analysis the problem of bringing international relations to an end.
Th e dominant storyline of the period of the world wars is that of the 
struggle between universalism and pluriversalism, Word Empire and the 
system of states. What the idea of sphere of infl uence represented, with 
all the diff erent names given to the phenomenon, was a solution to the 
threat of universalism. It was a compromise in which super-states replaced 
the deteriorating nation-states and the nationalism that had led to war. 
Th is compromise would aff ect state sovereignty and would strengthen the 
system of great power management that had been created in the Congress 
of Vienna. Moreover, a system of super-states, if it were to function on 
the basis of a balance of power, would prevent not only the destruction of 
political plurality but also major wars. Th e dilemma of the pluriverse and 
universe is still as topical as it was a hundred years ago. Th ere is even more 
pressure to come to terms with the tension between international society 
(that of states) and world society (that of individuals). Will territorially 
bounded communities continue to exist, and if they do, within states or 
some other units? Will globalisation and the increasing focus on human 
justice lead to a cosmopolitan world society of individuals or to a world 
society which can still uphold plurality? Th e subjugated knowledge of the 
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English School and the theorists concerned with the world wars bring the 
nature of international society into the limelight in connection with the 
concept of sphere of infl uence.
5.1 The Geopolitics of Spheres of Infl uence
Th e concept of sphere of infl uence is generally associated with the 
tradition of geopolitics22, which studies the relationship between territory 
and politics (see Ó Tuathail 1998, 1; 1996, 7). Classical geopolitics 
has had a rather bad reputation and in my opinion this has reinforced 
the pejorative associations of the concept of sphere of infl uence. 
Geopoliticians have been seen as motivated by political ambitions and the 
use of geopolitics as a tool for power (see Ò Tuathail 1996; 7, 68–69). A 
typical way of understanding geopolitics is found in the following words 
of Charles Clover (1999, 9): ”Few modern ideologies are as whimsically 
all-encompassing, as romantically obscure, as intellectually sloppy, and 
as likely to start a third world war as the theory of ’geopolitics‘”. Colin 
S. Gray explains how many of the critics of geopolitics, like Clover, 
have viewed geopolitics not so much as an analysis of the problem of 
international society but as part of the problem itself (Gray 2005, 18). 
Gray (2005, 27–28) continues:
Geopolitics, like strategy, is an equal opportunity tool of analysis. Each 
suff ers from guilt by association: with confl ict, war, and suff ering; with 
some dangerous sounding, even crazy, ideas; and in general with an 
approach to the world that focuses upon competition rather than co-
operation. Some scholars would shoot the geopolitical messenger and 
condemn the geopolitical message that explains the dynamic spatial 
dimension to some persisting patterns of confl ict in international 
relations. One might as well condemn medical research for its obsession 
with disease.
 
Spheres  of infl uence are easily associated with such classical geopolitical 
scholars as Halford Mackinder (Heartland), Nicholas Spykman (Rim-
22 Rudolf Kjellén (1864-1922), a Swedish political scientist, was the fi rst to use the 
term “geopolitics” and is known for describing the state as a living organism. 
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land), A.T. Mahan (Seapower), Friedrich Ratzel (organic state theory) 
and Karl Haushofer (Lebensraum). Ó Tuathail (1998, 5) calls the work 
of this group imperialist geopolitics. Brian W. Blouet (2005, 3) writes 
that Mackinder, Haushofer and Ratzel were all active in political life and 
tried to infl uence international relations. Haushofer’s Lebensraum (living 
space) in particular off ers an idea of expansion in the most pejorative 
terms. Blouet explains how Haushofer wanted the expansion of Germany 
to include all German-speaking peoples and the creation of a “Greater 
Germany”. However, Gray (2005, 27) argues that Haushofer cannot be 
accused of being the evil genius behind Nazi expansion to achieve world 
domination. Spheres of infl uence are by defi nition – those defi nitions 
we have available – related to power and ultimately to confl icts and 
the exercise of power using violence, that is, exactly what geopolitics is 
“obsessed with”. Th e vision of the evilness of geopolitics, represented in 
particular by German geopolitics, and its association with the concept of 
sphere of infl uence has contributed to the concept’s pejorative meaning.
Spheres of infl uence as circles on a map owe much to Halford 
Mackinder’s (1861-1947) concept of the Heartland23. Schmitt (2003, 
37) writes in the foreword to Nomos of the Earth that he is indebted to 
Mackinder. Burnham (1947, 103) also used Mackinder’s terms “World-
Island” and “Heartland”. Likewise, Nicholas Spykman (1944) used 
Mackinder’s Heartland concept and developed his own: Rimland. Paul 
Coones (2005; 65, 80) argues that during the last decade there has been 
a growing interest in the concept of the Heartland in certain political and 
intellectual circles in Russia (“Eurasianism”). Mackinder was a geographer 
and a political geographer, not so much a theorist. His Heartland is not 
really a sphere of infl uence, but the notion does refl ect Mackinder’s fear 
of the emergence of a single world power and his defence of the system of 
states. What Mackinder (1996, 106) produces are terms which describe 
territories and their power relations, as the well-known dictum states:
 Who rules East Europe commands the Heartland;
 Who rules the Heartland commands the World-Island;
 Who rules the World-Island commands the World.
23 See Th e Geographical Pivot of History (2004 [1904]) and Democratic Ideals and 
Reality (1996 [1919]) from Mackinder.
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For Mackinder, the Soviet Union comprised much of the Heartland, 
and World-Island meant the joint continent of Europe, Asia and Africa. 
North and South America, Britain, Malaya, Japan and Australia are 
smaller islands, or “satellites”, on Mackinder’s map (ibid.; 198, 65, 67, 
50). In the idea of the Heartland, a sphere of infl uence is reduced to a 
territorial metaphor, which urges us to content ourselves with a map of 
infl uences and power struggles instead of thinking about what spheres of 
infl uence mean for international society. 
Spheres of infl uence are present as circles on a map in geopolitical 
literature, where they represent a balancing game and a facet of geostrategy. 
Th e geopolitical intention is to discover who will rule the world and how, 
not to discuss matters of sovereignty, intervention, justice and other 
themes which relate to the pejorative associations of the present idea of 
sphere of infl uence. Imperialist geopolitics represents spheres of infl uence 
as aspects of geostrategy, the association of geography and military 
elements with politics. Moreover, there is no comprehensive engagement 
with the idea or the concept of sphere of infl uence, because the imperialist 
dimension does not capture the originality of the phenomenon. Th ose 
geopolitical visions which have ended up in this book not only reinvent 
spheres of infl uence as a new form of territorial organisation but also 
explain their raison d’être in terms of international order. I do not want 
to eliminate the territorial element from spheres of infl uence, and the 
writings I have chosen articulate the spatiality of spheres of infl uence. But 
they also add something more: the idea of a society of states, and even 
the pluralist-solidarist debate. Th is means that even though the visions 
presented in my sources come with rather nationalist aims, they are 
combined with considerations of the institutions/rules of international 
society and normative questions.
If geopolitics does not off er enough tools for theorising spheres of 
infl uence, neither does the realist school of IR. My selection of sources in 
this chapter represents realist voices, particularly in the form of Carr and 
Burnham, but the realist school as such is not the source for the study of 
spheres of infl uence. For John Mearsheimer (2001, 14), the three most 
infl uential realists of the twentieth century are Carr, Hans Morgenthau 
and Kenneth Walz. Morgenthau’s Politics Among Nations (1993) deals with 
imperialism but not spheres of infl uence. Waltz’s system theory (1979) is 
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even less interested in the concept of sphere of infl uence. Waltz discusses 
the advantages of a bipolar great power order over a multipolar order. 
According to Waltz, and contrary to the general view, interdependence 
does not necessarily enhance possibilities for peace, because confl icts take 
place specifi cally among those actors which are in contact with each other. 
For Waltz, interdependence in a multipolar system means vulnerability 
and instability, whereas a bipolar system is more stable and less confl ict-
prone. Even though Waltz admits that wars of lesser scale have been 
fought within the bipolar system that prevailed during the Cold War, 
he does not explore the relationship between confl icts, bipolarity and 
spheres of infl uence. (Waltz 1979, 138–145, 182.) Mearsheimer’s Tragedy 
of Great Power Politics (2001) mentions the idea of “regional hegemons” 
and their balancing game but does not discuss the relationship between 
the hegemon and its subordinates (see pp. 40–42, 140–142, 247–249).
After the Cold War, geostrategising in the spirit of reducing spheres of 
infl uence to a territorial notion was continued by Zbigniew Brzezinski24 
(1998, 2004) and Saul B. Cohen (1964, 1973, 2003, 2005). Th e world-
view of Brzezinski is a very “Mackinderian” one with its emphasis on 
the leadership of Eurasia in the grand battle for infl uence. Brzezinski 
has promoted United States’ world leadership as the alternative to both 
anarchy and the rise of a rival power, that is, a new rise of Russia. Cohen 
(2003, 3–5) wrote about “world realms” in a book published in 1964 and 
continued to make the same statements even thirty years later. Cohen 
divides the word into diff erent realms dominated by a central power. In 
explaining what a realm means, Cohen (ibid.) writes, “A national state 
(the meso-level) may dominate the geopolitical region within which it 
is located, and forge the framework of a geopolitical realm”. But just 
like Brzezinski, Cohen does not engage in conceptualising infl uence in 
terms of political theory. Samuel Huntington, even though he mentions 
spheres of infl uence only four times in his Clash of Civilizations (2007), 
elaborates a similar view. Huntington’s famous thesis is that future confl icts 
will evolve between civilisations instead of states. What Huntington 
proposes – in a claim relevant to the study of spheres of infl uence – is 
24 Brzezinski is a Polish-American political scientist who also had a career the as 
United States National Security Advisor to President Jimmy Carter from 1977 to 1981. 
He has a very critical view of Russia, and Russian scholars and politicians often quote 
these criticisms.
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that civilisational blocs develop around ”core states”. Core states attract 
culturally similar countries to bandwagon with them (Huntington 2007, 
3118). Huntington (2007, 3121–3132) writes:
A world in which core states play a leading or dominating role is 
a spheres-of-infl uence world. But it is also a world in which the 
exercise of infl uence by the core state is tempered and moderated by 
the common culture it shares with member states of its civilization. 
Cultural commonality legitimates the leadership and order-imposing 
role of the core state for both member states and for the external powers 
and institutions.
Huntington emphasises cultural affi  nity, which we can see in Naumann’s 
work discussed in the following chapter, but this does not make 
Huntington’s sphere of infl uence acceptable in any way for the majority 
of people who view spheres of infl uence pejoratively. Th is negative view 
is based on the “clash” – the inevitability of confl ict – and, in addition, 
the injustice that are seen as part and parcel of spheres of infl uence. Th e 
clash of civilizations is an idea which has gained wide acknowledgement, 
but it does not off er tools for a theoretical conceptualisation of spheres of 
infl uence interested in discussing justice and international order.
Th e present understanding of spheres of infl uence leans towards the 
Mackinderian tradition of pointing out territorial struggles for power, 
making a “sphere of infl uence” a catchword or a metaphor rather 
than a contested concept. Th e following conceptualisations of sphere 
of infl uence, which bind international order to a normative agenda, 
promote the aim of contesting the concept and exploring the hidden 
knowledge of the present.
5.2 Friedrich Naumann and Mid-Europe 
If one enquires of a student of International Relations what the origins of 
the concept of sphere of infl uence are, right after the work of Mackinder 
the answer would likely refer to German geopolitical thinking, but not 
necessarily to the work of Friedrich Naumann (1860-1919). Naumann’s 
work Central Europe (1917) (German original Mitteleuropa 1915) is not 
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only a contextualisation of the idea of sphere of infl uence in terms of 
the fate of the German state, but also a theoretical piece leading the way 
for a wider discussion on international order and the disintegration of 
the system of states. Naumann’s Mid-Europe (in German Mitteleuropa) 
is interesting in the sense that it comes close to advocating regional 
integration but maintains the power relation of the infl uencing and the 
infl uenced states which in both the past and the present is at the heart 
of a sphere of infl uence. Mid-Europe is not a project which brings states 
together on an equal basis – which is why Naumann can also be seen as 
broaching the relevant normative questions – but the way that Naumann 
defends his vision of regional solidarism makes Mid-Europe a rather 
diff erent entity from a sphere of infl uence as it was understood during 
the Cold War. 
In Central Europe (1917), Naumann elaborates his wish to create a 
Central European Union, or Mid-Europe25. For Naumann (1917, 179), 
”the United States of the World” was far distant, but he took the view 
that groups of humanity were emerging and that Mid-Europe would be 
one of them. Naumann proclaimed that there was a growing unity of 
nations which belong to neither the Anglo-French Western alliance nor 
the Russian Empire but to the Central Powers of the German Empire and 
the Austro-Hungarian Dual Monarchy. Mid-Europe extends “from the 
North and Baltic Seas to the Alps, the Adriatic Sea and the southern edge 
of the Danubian plain”. (Naumann 1917, 1–3.) Th is Mid-Europe would 
be the new German-led Great State.
For Naumann, the three old Great States – the American, the Russian 
and the English – were intrinsically international. “International” was 
originally a religious notion, through Christianity. It then became a 
philosophical one as, according to Naumann, almost all great philosophers 
were cosmopolitan, but was soon taken over by nationalism (ibid., 
185–186). Finally, English commerce adopted the idea and it spread to 
the rest of the world through the concept of free trade. For Naumann 
“international” was not enough. Exchange did not guarantee peace, not 
as long as the old military and administrative state lived on. (Ibid., 187.) 
Naumann states, “Th e basis of all human order and organisation, all law 
25  Naumann was not the only German promoting the idea of Mid-Europe. See 
Heff ernan (2000) for the broader German discussion on Mid-Europe, and also on Ratzel’s 
Lebensraum, the idea of living space for Germany and the theory of the organic state.
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and coercion is the State”. He viewed the state as a living organism that 
cannot make the leap towards humanity from its national and territorial 
basis. (Ibid., 188.) Nevertheless, “the central points” (the Great States) 
were on the rise, counteracting the power of the state.
Th e context for Naumann’s (1917, 4) vision of Mid-Europe, just 
like the visions of other like-minded theorists, was the end of the old 
international order: 
All the allies in the Great War feel without argument that neither now 
nor in the future can small or even moderate-sized Powers play any 
large part in the world. Our conceptions of size have entirely changed. 
Only very big States have any signifi cance on their own account, all 
the smaller ones must live by utilising the quarrels of the great, or must 
obtain leave if they wish to do anything unusual. Sovereignty, that 
is freedom to make decisions of wide historical importance, is now 
concentrated at a very few places on the globe.
Small states had become dependent on great powers; large-scale industry 
and super-national organisation had seized politics. For Naumann 
Germany was too small, as were Austria and Hungary, to survive a world 
war. He concluded, “Hence to-day the Central European Union is no 
chance but a necessity”. (Naumann 1917, 4–5.) It was not with Russia 
that Germany should unite; rather, if it were to maintain an individual 
course Germany would require a union with Austria-Hungary (ibid., 
60–61). Mid-Europe was to be the fourth power among the other three 
great organisms, that is, Great Britain, America and Russia. Naumann 
describes how of the three Great States which had already emerged at 
the time that the Russian Great State was built on coercion while the 
American on free will, with England standing between the two. (Ibid., 
180, 182.)
For Naumann unifi cation was a political necessity; not unifying would 
mean political suicide (ibid., 15, 23, 25). States which could not keep up 
in the race would fall into third- or fourth-rank sovereignty (ibid., 189). 
He claimed that unless Mid-Europe emerged as a separate centre of power 
it would fall into being “a satellite nation” (notice the metaphor here). In 
Naumann’s view, satellites (Planet Nations) have a life of their own but no 
longer follow their own laws. Satellites only add strength to the guiding 
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group to which they belong. Neutrals, instead, do not belong to any 
“sun” but rather can be swept away into a satellite relationship with the 
Great Sovereignties. Naumann explains that a proper mixture of enforced 
unity and freedom draws the satellites in close to the centre of power. He 
describes how Russia ruled with fear but also with the magnetic power of 
the Russian spirit. (Ibid., 180–183.) Th e English, instead, request as long 
as possible, and only after that do they command. Th e American Great 
State represented the third way – “the most non-military great human 
organism that has ever existed”. Naumann observed that these Great 
States were not mere administrative districts but entities intermediate 
between nation and humanity with a specifi c essence that held the union 
together. (Ibid., 184–185.) 
Naumann’s ideas were very clearly written for the political elite of 
Germany and for those states which Naumann dreamed would become 
Mid-Europe. He knew that there was strong opposition to his vision in 
Germany, not least in Austria and Hungary (ibid., 15, 19). Naumann 
tried to explain that Austria-Hungary without allies would be even more 
lost than Germany without allies (ibid., 23). He wanted Germans to 
let go of nationalism for the sake of Mid-Europe (ibid., 11–12.). Mid-
Europe would be built upon the German language, but Germans would 
have to display tolerance and fl exibility with regard to neighbouring 
languages (ibid., 108). 
Naumann (1917, 108) described in detail what the Central Europe 
Union would be like. First of all, Germany would be the leader, the 
nucleus, of the new Union. Mid-Europe was to become a historical and 
political entity, not only an economical union (ibid., 35). Naumann 
exclaimed, “You must think of these stretches of country as a unity, 
as a brotherhood of many members, as a defensive alliance, as a single 
economic district!” (ibid., 3–4.) Naumann thought that it was not 
enough to build the Union on economic considerations alone, which is 
why he speaks of a common soul and common historical consciousness. 
Referring to the history of medieval Central Europe with Germany at 
its centre, Naumann calls forth the old unity “longing to return after 
its long sleep”. (Ibid., 44). Here Naumann’s Mid-Europe reminds one 
of an entity governed by a suzerain as the beloved and revered father (in 
chapter 3.2).
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But Naumann did not remain at such an abstract level; instead, he 
off ered a list of suggestions for the future union in which he proposed 
harmonisation of laws, a joint committee for foreign aff airs and a joint 
collector of taxes (ibid., 30–31). In many ways the union would be an 
economic and not only a military one. Th is economic partnership was to 
be implemented willingly and not by force (ibid., 177). For Naumann, 
the economic Mid-Europe would battle for success amidst other unions. 
He declares, “It will not only be Central Europe that will emerge from 
the war with schemes for equipment and defence, but all the other States 
as well” (ibid., 179). Naumann claims that smaller nations cannot be 
the leaders of economic world-groups. Th ey can only choose between 
isolation and adhesion and isolation would not very much longer be a 
choice. Th e small states needed to decide which union they would or could 
join. (Ibid., 194) According to Naumann, people did not understand the 
greatness of the older world-group economic areas. Germany could no 
longer keep up with them alone. (Ibid., 211.) 
Sovereignty would be an obvious concern in the new Mid-Europe, 
which is why Naumann addressed the issue. For Naumann, the creation 
of Mid-Europe would mean centralisation of certain political activities, 
but without sacrifi cing sovereignty. Mid-Europe was not an entity that 
would destroy sovereignty: “No State becoming a partner in the new 
super-State will consent to sacrifi ce thereby its political dignity, its own 
sovereignty which it has won with diffi  culty and defended with its blood.” 
Th e dignity of the state must not be touched, Naumann proclaimed. For 
Naumann, Mid-Europe was not a new state, but a union of existing states, 
with sovereignty remaining the organising principle. (Naumann 1917, 
254–255.) According to Naumann’s vision no state could be forced to 
join the union and emphasised the traits and rights of the satellites even 
though Germany was the central power. Although Naumann proposed 
the harmonisation of many laws in the political and economic union, he 
wanted the joining states to retain their political independence (ibid., 
272). At the same time, the union had to have its military dimension, 
which naturally created political limitations but also off ered a safeguard 
through the joint army (ibid., 281).
Naumann’s Mid-Europe was an ambitious imperialist project, as he 
reveals when examining the economic considerations in resisting the 
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power of the other great states. First, Central Europe would need further 
regional accessions to become greater than the existing dimensions of 
Germany and Austria-Hungary (ibid., 272). He added that Mid-Europe 
would need its share in overseas colonial possessions (ibid., 198), going 
on to predict, “Our Central European home population would be the 
centre of life of an economic body which stretched out its grasp into 
other quarters of the globe” (ibid., 203). Th is was thus not simply a 
regional union of states, but a union that leaned on the idea of overseas 
possessions as a necessity for economic success. 
Naumann’s German-led Mid-Europe clearly has something to do with 
a sphere of infl uence. Both are “between nation and humanity”; they 
may be seen as a solution to the demise of the nation. If we look at 
Naumann’s vision, excluding its imperialist ambitions, it is quite far from 
the pejoratively tinged concept of sphere of infl uence that we embrace 
today. Mid-Europe sounds much more acceptable because it is justifi ed, 
not by power political games but by the survival of cultural uniqueness, 
freedom in plurality and independence over Eastern domination. In 
addition to embodying a survival story, Mid-Europe is not an empire 
which will strip its constituent parts of their identity and sovereignty. 
Naumann took pains to justify the Central European sphere of 
infl uence and maintained the use of cultural affi  nity in organising the 
”Central European Union”. Membership needed to be voluntary, based 
on the brotherhood of nations, bearing in mind the absolute necessity of 
this development. Naumann did not scare his readers with the threat of a 
world hegemon, but rather warned about the demise of Central Europe 
as an independent centre of power. He wanted at least an illusion of 
sovereignty to prevail over the idea of total merger into one unit. He 
was nevertheless in favour of colonial expansion in order to keep up 
with the other great unions. But, most importantly, Naumann refl ected 
Mid-Europe against the emerging international order at the time, where 
small states were becoming satellites of the great ones. Th is approach of 
his has important theoretical value for the present discourses on spheres 
of infl uence, which take no interest in the more broader questions of 
international order. In their connecting spheres of infl uence with 
international order and considering the possibility of the end of the 
Westphalian system of states and the emergence of a system of unions 
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of states, thinkers such as Naumann and Schmitt are necessary literature 
for understanding spheres of infl uence. Th e world today is caught in 
the crossfi re of regional integration projects and still-strong nationalistic 
sentiments. Somehow, the world is between nationalism and humanism, 
just as Naumann felt it was almost a hundred years ago. Th is chapter is 
thus constructed on the idea that a sphere of infl uence lies between nation 
and humanity. Th is is also where Carl Schmitt situates his articulation of 
a sphere of infl uence.
5.3 Carl Schmitt, Nomos and Groβraum
When writing about spheres of infl uence, one cannot avoid discussing the 
work of Carl Schmitt (1888–1985). As controversial as Schmitt is with 
connections to the Nazi regime (because he was involved in the party 
during the years 1933-1936), his theory of spheres of infl uence has wider 
implications than just the future of Germany after the war. Even though 
Schmitt wrote about the Großraum (literally, “large space”; fi guratively, 
large spatial sphere) in a specifi c context, his vision of international order 
has relevance even today, not least when theorising sphere of infl uence.
Schmitt’s Th e Nomos of the Earth in the International Law of the Jus 
publicum Europaeum (2003) was fi rst published in German in 1950 
(Der Nomos der Erde im Völkerrecht des Jus Publicum Europaeum). Louiza 
Odysseos and Fabio Petito (2007, 1–2) call it the masterpiece of his 
intellectual production, a work that should be acknowledged as a classic 
of International Relations. Th e translator’s introduction to Th e Nomos of 
the Earth describes Schmitt’s idea of nomos as “a community of political 
entities united by common rules”. It continues, “It is the spatial, political, 
and juridical system considered to be mutually binding in the conduct 
of international aff airs – a system that has obtained over time and has 
become a matter of tradition and custom”. (Ulmen 2003, 10.) At the 
core, Schmitt is talking about the same international order, the same 
basic idea of a society of states, as the English School, with the state as the 
“decisive entity” of the political. Th is is why Alessandro Colombo (2007, 
22–25) calls Schmitt’s theory “realist institutionalism”, where the realist 
game of power politics is understood as an institution and international 
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anarchy is placed in a societal and juridical web. But what is important 
for the history of spheres of infl uence is the point when Schmitt begins 
theorising on the collapse of the institutions of the society of states. It was 
in describing the danger of modern states being at the verge of extinction 
from the political map of the world that Schmitt developed his vision of 
spheres of infl uence. 
Schmitt’s concept of nomos is the background for understanding his 
idea of how states should have been organised in post-War Europe. For 
Schmitt nomos means “the immediate form in which the political and 
social order of a people becomes spatially visible – the initial measure and 
division of pastureland, i.e., land-appropriation as well as the concrete 
order contained in it and following from it”. Schmitt further explains 
that nomos is not only the measure of dividing and situating a land but 
includes the political, social and religious order that follows from it. 
(Schmitt 2003, 70.) Nomos is not something fi xed, for new manifestations 
of world-historical events will always give rise to a new nomos (ibid., 78–
79.) However, Schmitt argues, not every land-appropriation constitutes 
a new nomos even though a nomos always includes a land-based order and 
orientation. A change needs to occur in international law in order for 
seizure of land to create a ”new nomos”, that is, “a new spatial order of 
international law”. (Ibid., 80–83). 
Th e reason why sphere of infl uence as a concept is situated specifi cally 
in classical geopolitics can be found in Schmitt’s defi nition of nomos: it is 
a social order that is made spatially visible. Perhaps this is also the reason 
why spatiality, the geopolitical dimension, of spheres of infl uence is 
emphasised over other dimensions. It is emphasised quite rightfully: the 
spatial element is at the core of spheres of infl uence as long as international 
relations is concerned with states and their borders. “Sphere” is the spatial 
element and when states begin to arrange themselves into unions, blocs, 
super-states, centres of power – whatever one wishes to call them – 
we witness  a spatial order based on  spheres of infl uence. A sphere of 
infl uence also tends to imply territorial proximity of the infl uenced states 
to the core, which is why infl uence in distant territories is not viewed as a 
sphere-of-infl uence policy as readily as relations between the core and its 
surrounding states. Kaufman’s (1976, 11) “direct sphere of infl uence” not 
only means that the infl uence is de facto instead of de jure but also that 
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the states have a geographical proximity. Spatiality is why it is logical to 
assume that if Russia has a sphere of infl uence somewhere, it is within the 
post-Soviet space. But Schmitt’s nomos is more than just spatial; it is also 
political and juridical, and this is where it becomes a conceptualisation 
of spheres of infl uence based on visions of international order and society 
of states. 
Nomos becomes important for Schmitt when he compares the pre-
global order –medieval Europe’s unity of international law, respublica 
Christiana, supported by an empire and the papacy – to state-centred 
international law, the fi rst global order of international law. Th is new 
age was founded on a spatial order of balance and it meant secularisation 
with the elimination of the holy empire and the imperial house of the 
Middle Ages. (Schmitt, 2003; 56–66, 127.) Th is was the epoch of jus 
publicum Europaeum, international law among sovereign territorial 
states, which prevailed from the sixteenth to the end of the nineteenth 
century. It was an order determined by Europe for the rest of the earth. 
(Ibid., 126–127.) Schmitt called the new nomos a marvellous product of 
human reason because it ended the religious wars of the Middle Ages and 
rationalised and humanised war. Schmitt writes that it was a European 
achievement that wars could be limited to involve sovereign states. (Ibid., 
141–142, 151.)26 Th is function of “bracketing war” is what makes states 
so important to Schmitt. For him it is the system of states that has made 
it possible to limit wars. By contrast, the end of sovereign states, and the 
emergence of a world hegemon, would mean that once the political (the 
ability to separate friend from enemy) was gone, a door would be opened 
to global interventionism.
Schmitt describes the territorial changes within a spatial order of the 
jus publicum Europaeum and illustrates the role of great powers. First, 
“the procedures for territorial changes in European international law 
were developed by the Great Powers at the major peace conferences in the 
18th and 19th centuries”. Schmitt claims there are diff erent principles at 
work whose purpose is to maintain the present order and its established 
members. One of the principles is “delimitation of spheres of infl uence” 
and “affi  rmation and recognition of great spheres of special interest”. 
(Ibid., 185–186.) Great powers are the strongest members of the spatial 
26 See Odysseos & Petito (2007) for discussions on Schmitt’s ideas of “humanised 
war”.
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order, and thus they march at the forefront of development. Th is 
primary status also requires recognition from others, which makes it in 
fact the highest form of recognition in international law. Th e practice of 
recognition, according to Schmitt, has had  an important eff ect on the 
spatial structure of the order of international law. Great powers could 
participate in European conferences and negotiations and could acquire 
colonies. Schmitt elaborates this point, saying, “Recognition as a Great 
Power became and remained a legal institution of international law, as 
important as recognition of a new state or government.” In his view, 
since great powers were the leaders of the spatial order, they were in a 
position to recognise major territorial changes. (Ibid., 190–192.) Th is 
is an indication of how seriously Schmitt took the institution of great 
power management. 
Th e spatial order of Europe was based on political balance; it was 
the foundation of international law. Schmitt writes, “Th e pervasive 
commonality of the spatial order is more important than everything 
usually associated with sovereignty and non-intervention”. Just like Bull 
then, Schmitt took the view that order took precedence over sovereignty. 
He was also openly in favour of a balance of power as the ordering 
principle, noting “the great practical superiority of the concept of balance, 
because therein lies its capacity to achieve a bracketing of war”. Moreover, 
just as Keal saw what good spheres of infl uence could produce, Schmitt 
saw the war-limiting eff ect of balancing. (Ibid., 188–189.) Th e English 
School vision of order and great powers and Schmitt’s vision of nomos 
and its leaders are very much alike and testify to the importance of taking 
this shared view of the system of states seriously when refl ecting on the 
present images of international order and spheres of infl uence. 
Finally, after his extensive explanation of the previous nomos of the 
earth, Schmitt addresses the topic of the future nomos, which in his view 
began with the collapse of the Eurocentric spatial order. Th e fl ag of the 
Congo Society, a new state on the African soil, was recognised by the 
United States on April 22, 1884. Yet, it was not really decolonisation that 
worried Schmitt but the growing power of the United States. Moreover he 
was concerned by what he saw as the decline of jus publicum Europaeum 
into a universal world law lacking distinctions. European international law 
was being transformed into universal international law; European order 
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was becoming part of the spacelessness of general universalism. Schmitt 
notes that at the same time as a new spatial order (of universalism) from 
America was challenging the traditional European order, there was also 
a new process of “several diff erent spheres (Großräume) of international 
law” that appeared on the scene. (Schmitt 2003, 227–231.) More 
specifi cally, Schmitt identifi ed what he saw as the threat of universalism 
as coming from the West and hoped that a new regional organisation 
of the global political map would be the solution. Schmitt was very 
concerned about the fact that Europe had lost its central position and did 
not even seem to have noticed it. What the Europeans had overlooked 
was that the recognition of new (non-European) states in international 
law had destroyed the system of states and was replaced by a collection 
of states randomly joined together by factual relations. Th is collection 
of states was not joined together by a spiritual or spatial consciousness, 
unlike states had been before. (Ibid., 233–234.) As Schmitt states, “With 
this rejection of international law, Europe stumbled into a world war that 
dethroned the old world from the center of the earth and destroyed the 
bracketing of war it had created” (ibid., 239). Put into English School 
terms, Schmitt thought that international society was turning into an 
international system.
Schmitt was not fond of the idea of World Government, or a solidarist 
international society with common morals. It was not only that Schmitt 
disliked the idea of a single sovereign; he had an aversion to any system of 
international society where spatial distinctions would disappear, whether 
dictated by the United States or a World Government. According 
to Schmitt, at the end of the First World War, the League of Nations 
was formed to oversee the re-division of European soil. As the League’s 
headquarters were situated in Geneva, Schmitt called the choice for 
universalism the “Geneva dogma”. (Schmitt 2003; 241, 244.) As Schmitt 
(2003, 243−244) saw it, 
Th e development of the planet fi nally had reached a clear dilemma 
between universalism and pluriversalism, monopoly and polypoly. 
Th e question was whether the planet was mature enough for a 
global monopoly of a single power or whether pluralism of coexisting 
Großräume), spheres of interest, and cultural spheres would determine 
the new international law of the earth.
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Th e League advocated universalism instead of pluriversalism, a position 
which Schmitt was not happy about. At the same time, the League failed 
to create a universal world order, since the Soviet Union and the United 
States were absent. (Ibid., 245.) Schmitt thought that the alternative of 
a plurality of Großräume was not discussed at the time of the League 
of Nations. What was at stake was a balanced spatial order against a 
centrally ruled world – pluralism against universalism, polypoly against 
monopoly. (Ibid., 247). A World Government was not what Schmitt 
wanted. Schmitt envisioned something else to counter the threat that 
universalism posed to the political, the system of states. Th at something 
was a sphere of infl uence: “Großräume spheres of interest, and cultural 
spheres” (ibid., 243–244). 
It was not only the Europeans themselves who were to blame for 
their plight at the time. When Schmitt wrote about universalism and 
became enthusiastic about the idea of a new pluralism, he would end 
up discussing the power of the United States. And indeed Schmitt put 
much of the blame on the United States for destroying political plurality. 
Th e United States was making its own rules of the game. As early as 
1823, Th e Monroe Doctrine had shielded the Western Hemisphere from 
further land appropriation by the European powers. (Ibid., 238.) Th e 
United States had not signed the Versailles Treaty and had not joined the 
League of Nations. It did not participate in the International Court of 
Justice in Hague. Although the United States was offi  cially absent from 
these forums, it was eff ectively present and involved in European aff airs. 
(Ibid., 251.) It controlled the foreign policies of states within the Western 
Hemisphere even though they were considered “sovereign”. Th ey were in 
fact within the spatial and political sphere of infl uence of the Monroe 
Doctrine. Schmitt (2003, 252) explains the relationship as follows:
[T]he controlled state’s territory is absorbed into the spatial sphere 
of the controlling state and its special interests, i.e., into its spatial 
sovereignty. Th e external, emptied space of the controlled state’s 
territorial sovereignty remains inviolate, but the material content of 
this sovereignty is changed by the guarantees of the controlling power’s 
economic Großräume).
Schmitt’s Großraum is something where the shell, or outer layer, of 
sovereignty is maintained but the content of it is sacrifi ced. What this 
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content was Schmitt (ibid.) describes with reference to the United States’ 
infl uence and right to intervention:
Th e controlling state had the right to protect independence or private 
property, the maintenance of order and security, and the preservation 
of the legitimacy or legality of a government. Simultaneously, on other 
grounds, it was free, at its own discretion, to interfere in the aff airs of 
the controlled state. Its right of intervention was secured by footholds, 
naval bases, refuelling stations, military and administrative outposts, 
and other forms of cooperation, both internal and external.
Th us, Schmitt has a list here, probably not an exhaustive one, of what kinds 
of acts are performed within a sphere of infl uence. Th e spatial sovereignty 
of the controlling state is extended to include other states within its 
sphere of infl uence, but formally sovereignty remains in the hands of the 
controlled state. Th is was the case with the Monroe Doctrine; this is the 
case with a Großraum; and this is also the basis for depicting spheres of 
infl uence in the present. Schmitt (2003, 252) continues to lament the 
exercising of the Monroe Doctrine by claiming that “it destroyed the 
order and orientation that had obtained in the previous form of sovereign 
territory”. For Schmitt there is a great diff erence between states whose 
freedom is limited due to interventions and states with the power to 
make their own sovereign decisions. Th e states within the spatial order of 
the Western Hemisphere, that is, the Caribbean and Central American 
states, belonged to the United States’ sphere of spatial sovereignty. (Ibid., 
252–253.)
Th us, the true challenge to the old nomos came from the United States 
and its proclamation of the Monroe Doctrine on December 2, 1823. 
Th e wording “Western Hemisphere” was now intimately connected 
with the Doctrine, as it became a Großraum in the sense of international 
law. (Schmitt 2003, 281–283). In the beginning, the Doctrine meant a 
defensive line of isolation directed against the powers of the Old Europe, 
but drawing such a line also gave the United States the freedom to 
undertake its own land appropriations in the hemisphere. Th is isolation, 
according to Schmitt, created a new spatial order by separating a sphere 
of guaranteed peace and freedom from a sphere of despotism and 
corruption. Th e line drawn by the United States between Old and New 
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Europe was seen as a moral one. (Ibid., 286–290). In the next chapter, 
where I discuss Cold War practices, this aspect of spheres of infl uence will 
become even more evident. If we step beyond seeing spheres of infl uence 
as a structural matter of hierarchy, inequality and a struggle for a balance 
of power, we fi nd a discourse of justifi cation, of “us and them”, of freedom 
and tyranny. If there was a moral line between the Old and the New 
World, it was also territorial and historical. Th e Western Hemisphere 
was a territory with its own historical tradition (ibid., 286). I argued 
before that the idea of sphere of infl uence subsumes a spatial or territorial 
dimension. I would now assert that it also includes the idea of some 
moral, historical or cultural closeness. Th is makes a sphere of infl uence 
look like a regional arrangement something that encompasses a delimited 
territory of states that are somehow related – or at least related in the 
opinion of the central power.
Going back to the Monroe Doctrine, Schmitt (2003, 292–293) 
writes that it did not take too long for the United States to transform 
a foreign policy of isolation into imperialism. It was this imperialism, 
not the isolationism that the Monroe Doctrine represented at fi rst, 
which caused Schmitt to take a very critical stance towards the United 
States’ ambitions. Th e United States was faced with a choice between 
isolation and intervention – a choice between a transition to the plurality 
of coexisting Großräume or a global claim to world power, and with it, 
global civil war. (Ibid., 296.) Th e threat of this interventionist policy was 
that it transformed the concept of war from one of interstate confl ict to 
one of intrastate struggle, that is, into a civil war (ibid., 299). What the 
Monroe Doctrine ultimately represented was a new spatial order – global 
universalism lacking any spatial sense – replacing the old one. Political 
control and domination were based on intervention, which destroyed 
the nomos of sovereign territory. (Ibid., 252–253.) Not only the Western 
Hemisphere was the target; eventually the United States made the claim 
for global interventionism and refused to recognise territorial changes that 
it considered illegal anywhere. Schmitt (2003, 307) writes, “Th e praxis 
of jus publicum Europaeum had sought to encompass confl icts within the 
framework of a system of equilibrium. Now, they were universalised in 
the name of world unity.” 
According to Schmitt, the Eurocentric nomos met its destruction in 
World War One and a division of the world into East and West became 
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reality. Schmitt listed three alternatives for the future order. Th e fi rst was 
that one of the great powers would emerge victorious and the dualism 
of East and West would be replaced by a complete unity of the world. 
“Th e victor would be the world’s sole sovereign. He would appropriate 
the whole earth – land, sea, and air – and would divide and manage 
it in accord with his plans and ideas.” For Schmitt this was the most 
undesirable alternative. Th e second option was an attempt to restore 
the balance of power of the previous nomos. Th e third was a balance 
maintained by several independent Großräume which needed to be 
homogenous internally but diff erentiated externally. (Ibid., 353–355.) 
Schmitt already saw the Western Hemisphere as one, and Eastern Europe 
as the second, new territorial Großraum (ibid., 305). Ulmen (2003, 19) 
writes that Schmitt saw Germany as being too small to be a world power 
but too big to disappear from history. Th us Germany could not survive 
the destruction of the state-system on its own. According to Luoma-aho 
(2007, 36), the Soviet Union, as well as the British and Japanese empires, 
also had their respective Großräume in Schmitt’s eyes. A German-
led Großraum in Central and Eastern Europe would balance the two 
universalistic powers of the United States and the Soviet Union. Only 
in this way would the political pluriverse be maintained as the prevailing 
international order. (Freund 1995; Luoma-aho 2000; 2007, 41.) 
Schmitt explained the dissolution of jus publicum Europaeum through 
international law. Th e international law that Schmitt idealised was 
the spatial international law seen in Europe, not least because its great 
achievement was the bracketing of war. Even though Schmitt declared 
that the challenger of jus publicum Europaeum was the United States, 
which had its own spatial international law, that is, one which allowed 
universalist-humanitarian interventions, Schmitt also blamed the 
Europeans for mistaking the universalising of international law for a 
victory of European international law. In fact, Europe itself made jus 
publicum Europaeum global through land appropriations. (Ibid., 133–
135.) Schmitt could not stand universal international law. He considered 
it the end of European international law because it was universal law that 
lacked all distinctions; it embodied a general universality and meant the 
destruction of the traditional global order . Th us, Schmitt began to see the 
development of an international law specifi c to Großräume as desirable. 
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He was afraid of the United States’ Großraum not because it created 
this kind of spatial international law – after all spatial diff erentiation 
was what Schmitt sought – but because it could turn into a universalist 
monster. As I understand it, the globalisation of European international 
law was not the focal problem until Europe’s domination over that law 
was jeopardised. 
Th e question remains, What is the form of international law, if any, 
that lies between the separate spatial international laws? Will anarchy 
still prevail between Großräume, and will there be international societies 
instead of a single international society? Does Schmitt’s system of 
Großräume mean suzerain-state systems? Th ese questions Schmitt leaves 
quite open when he focuses on exploring the universalist threat. One 
interpretation of Schmitt’s dilemma of the universal is the Russian 
approach, which I explore in chapter 7. Th e Russian vision is to choose 
universal international law but decline to accept universal values. Power 
is concentrated and spatially based, but relations among and within the 
spatial units follow general, universal international law. Th is guarantees 
peace among the great powers. Values, however, are particular and spatial 
– and should not be universalised. Universalisation of values would mean 
imposition of values by force, thus creating a universe. Schmitt’s concern 
was international law, but the Russian analysts try to separate values from 
law in order to come to terms with the separation of the particular and 
the universal.
Th e relevance for present-day spheres of infl uence is that Schmitt’s 
sphere of infl uence is a formal agreement. For Schmitt (2003, 252) the 
right to intervention was based on agreements and treaties, making it 
possible to claim that the action taken was no longer intervention. When 
Schmitt writes about Großräume as separate spheres of international law, 
he cannot be talking about informality and tacitness. In this respect, 
one could argue that Schmitt’s idea is a legal system resembling more 
colonialism and suzerain-systems and less the sphere of infl uence which 
Keal wrote on. Looking at history from the perspective of the present, 
the tacitness of infl uence is not necessarily a distinctive feature of a 
sphere of infl uence. Th e present understanding embodies the pejorative 
associations, but it also embodies a sphere of infl uence which is imperialist. 
Even the Cold War sphere of infl uence, though tacit, was well established 
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and included treaties, such as the Warsaw Pact. Th e ideological divide was 
also concrete and evident. If we think about Russia, it is accused of trying 
to establish its sphere of infl uence by formal means - integration. Because 
of the pejorative associations of “sphere of infl uence”, the integration 
project of the European Union in all its legality is not described as a 
sphere of infl uence. 
Schmitt’s universalist fear is very topical when we look at the Russian 
discourse which is obsessed, as I will argue in chapter 7, with the United 
States’ unipolarity. I am inclined to say that it is the idea of international 
order which makes Schmitt so interesting for any analysis of spheres of 
infl uence. He did not explain the idea of Großraum nearly as carefully as 
he did the idea of a nomos of the earth. It is Schmitt’s conceptualisation 
of international order and the moral stance that particular is good while 
universal is evil that accounts for his succeeding in giving the concept of 
sphere of infl uence a place in the history of international theory.
Whereas Naumann ’s vision of Great States seems to be situated more 
in the spatial order of states, with his defence of sovereignty and national 
sentiments, Schmitt’s Großraum takes the idea of spheres of infl uence 
a step further by legitimising them and creating a new spatial order of 
international law. Th is new spatial order of Großräume means a loosening 
of the Westphalian notion of sovereignty but does not mean the creation 
of a solidarist international society. Instead of solidarism, Schmitt clings 
to the pluralist system in the new form it takes. Schmitt’s rather complex 
system of thought about international law, the notions of universe and 
pluriverse , and, similarly, the English School’s notion of solidarist and 
pluralist international orders are helpful in understanding why Russian 
writers agonise over the questions of what kind of international law 
should be promoted, who can decide on it and how it should be applied 
in specifi c spatial cases.
5.4 James Burnham and E.H. Carr
Th e story of spheres of infl uence is also a story about the people behind 
the concept. It is also a story of the interconnectedness of these people and 
their ideas. James Burnham (1905-1987), an American political theorist, 
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was an inspiration to George Orwell, whose work I will introduce later. 
E.H. Carr (1892–1982), the well-known British historian, journalist, 
diplomat and theorist on International Relations, had a connection to 
the English School. Th e English School was born out of the emergence of 
IR as an academic discipline in Britain. In that process, Carr’s Th e Twenty 
Years’ Crisis had a great impact on the development of international 
theory. Carr not only refuted universalism with his “utopian realism” but 
he also broadened the study of IR from its narrow focus on law and 
organisation. (Dunne 1998, xii.) Dunne (1998, 13) even begins the story 
of the English School by fi rst introducing Carr’s Th e Twenty Years’ Crisis, 
which Dunne describes as the dissident work of the English School. Carr 
was not a member of the British Committee, and not everyone is willing 
to identify him with the English School (see Linklater and Suganami 
2006, 15.) In fact, Bull (1969, 638) himself criticised Carr for not 
dealing with international society: the common values, interests, rules 
and institutions of states. For Dunne, Carr’s relationship to the School is 
a semi-detached one; what keeps Carr a distance away from the School is 
his belief in the intrusion of power into all spheres of ethics and politics. 
At the same time, Bull and Vincent attach great importance to his work. 
(Dunne 1998, 36.)
Naumann’s Central Europe was cited by both Carr and Schmitt 
(Luoma-aho 2007, 45). Th e world-vision of Schmitt, Carr and Burnham 
rested on the same basic idea of a transformation of the system of 
states27. In fact, Luoma-aho (2007, 36) identifi es Schmitt’s writings as 
an academic landmark that anticipated the emergence of theoretical 
writings during the 1940s on post-war international order. In this 
sense, the English School’s work on international order can be seen as a 
continuation of what Schmitt initiated. Th ese links in thinking do not 
necessarily signify a linear line of development, but rather form a path 
that can be followed and that makes sense for the present understanding 
of spheres of infl uence. Indeed, this interconnectedness is one additional 
criterion for choosing these sources. I have already dealt with Schmitt 
but what is common to Carr and Burnham is that, unlike Schmitt, they 
are not generally associated with ideas on spheres of infl uence. Carr is 
27 Luoma-aho (2007) deals with the common ideas of all three in his article 
“Geopolitics and Grosspolitics. From Carl Schmitt to EH Carr and James Burnham”.
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known for his critique of idealism and Burnham is relatively unknown.28 
We are talking about buried knowledge. In the case of Carr, in particular, 
the knowledge on sphere of infl uence has been buried under his other 
signifi cant ideas rather than buried with the man itself. Th e conclusion I 
drew concerning the English School was the same: the general disinterest 
in sphere of infl uence as a concept has led to the dismissal of the School 
as a relevant source for theorising spheres of infl uence.
5.4.1 Nationalism versus Internationalism
Schmitt’s Nomos of the Earth, envisioning a new international order, was 
published in 1950. Carr’s Th e Twenty Years Crisis was published in 1939, 
reftecling on the result of the First World War, and Nationalism and 
After in 1945, outlining visions for international order after the Second 
World War. Both Schmitt and Carr expressed the currents of the time 
and each scholar’s vision of international order resembles the other’s. 
In Nationalism and After (1965) Carr even uses the term Großraum29. 
Luoma-aho (2007, 44) suggests that Carr’s conception of the political 
is adopted from Schmitt, even though Carr does not refer to Schmitt 
directly. Th e idea was nevertheless the same: politics took place between 
states in the context of violence. In a very Schmittian vein, Carr also 
promoted the pluriverse of states. (Ibid.) As Carr (1965, 49) saw it, within 
a national community the concentration of authority in a single organ 
would result in totalitarianism and the same applies to the international 
system, which is why a multiplicity of authority is required. In essence, 
Carr relied on the same idea of the duality of pluriverse and universe as 
Schmitt did – or, as Carr termed them, nationalism and internationalism 
– and the need to fi nd a middle ground between them.
Just like Schmitt and the English School, Carr recalls the history of 
international order: a state-system emerging from medieval Christendom. 
Carr divides the modern history of international relations into three 
distinct periods with diff erent conceptions of nation. Th e fi rst period 
28 See Roger Kimball’s (2002) excellent introduction to the thought of James 
Burnham.
29 Th e word Großraum was not Schmitt’s invention but he conceptualised it for his 
own theoretical purposes (Luoma-aho 2007, 39).
152
started with the dissolution of the medieval order and ended with the 
Congress of Vienna. During that period, international relations were 
between princes and kings, and a nation was identifi ed with the person 
of the  sovereign. (Carr 1965, 1–6.) Th e second period began with the 
Napoleonic Wars and ended in 1914. For Carr, this was a period which 
was successful in balancing between internationalism and nationalism. 
Th e asserting of claims to statehood by nations lived side by side with the 
creation of a single world economy, whereby the period was a compromise 
between politics and economy. Carr’s own nationalism caused him to 
admire the English supremacy in the world economy, which explains 
his enthusiasm for the post-Vienna order. But British supremacy ended 
in the First World War and the nineteenth-century economic system 
was ruined. (Ibid., 6–17.) Th e third period followed with “catastrophic 
growth of nationalism and the bankruptcy of internationalism” (ibid., 
17). Nationalism became catastrophic because of a new environment 
which included the increase in the number of nations (ibid., 18). Carr 
writes, “Down to that time the infl uence of nationalism had been to 
diminish the number of sovereign and independent political units 
in Europe”. Th e conditions of the period, the military and economic 
developments, favoured the concentration of power, but instead dispersal 
of authority was taking place all over the globe. (Ibid., 24.) Th e change 
compared to the previous order was that independence and statehood 
were assigned no more by might (by virtue of power) but by right (ibid., 
40–41). Carr did not view the equality of nations as proclaimed in the 
Charter of United Nations as being possible in the way that equality of 
individuals is. States are simply too disparate in size. (Ibid., 42–43.) Like 
Schmitt, Carr did not advocate a “supreme world directorate” that would 
follow the bankruptcy of nationalism or requests for the emancipation of 
the individual to equal a “sentimental empty universalism”. According to 
Carr, the world was not united enough for a universal authority. (Ibid., 
44.)
Th ese are the observations Carr made about the history of the system 
of states. What is noteworthy for discussing spheres of infl uence is 
the dualism of nationalism and internationalism and Carr’s interest 
in the location of power in international relations. What Carr would 
have liked to have seen was a power structure that we could call great 
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power management. Carr (1965, 34–37) made a prediction concerning 
the possible fourth period after the Second World War. Even though 
nationalism was still strong, the main forces of the world – the United 
Kingdom, the United States and the Soviet Union – were not built on 
nationalism in the old sense. According to Carr the world might well 
have been facing the end of “the ideology of the small nation as the 
ultimate political and economic unit”. (Ibid.) What Carr thought that he 
saw was a “clearly marked trend towards integration and the formation 
of even larger political and economic units”, which started in the latter 
part of the nineteenth century. Quoting Naumann, Carr refers to the 
concentration of sovereignty. (Carr 2001, 211.) In Th e Twenty Years’ 
Crisis (2001), Carr repeats the remark he made in Nationalism and After 
(1965): it was a dangerous fi asco when nationalism and disintegration 
were resumed in 1918; instead of political and economic disintegration, 
the post-war order would have required larger units. Making a reference 
to Naumann’s Mid-Europe Carr (2001, 212) notes that the process of 
concentration continued:
Th e United States strengthened their hold over the American 
continents. Great Britain created a ‘sterling bloc’ and laid the 
foundations of a closed economic system. Germany reconstituted 
Mittel-Europa and pressed forward into the Balkans. Soviet Russia 
developed its vast territories into a compact unit of industrial and 
agricultural production. Japan attempted the creation of a new unit of 
‘Eastern Asia’ under Japanese domination. Such was the trend towards 
the concentration of political and economic power in the hands of 
six or seven highly organised units, round which lesser satellite units 
revolved without any appreciable independent motion of their own.
Th us Carr saw a change in the post-war order. Th ere was no return to 
the pre-1914 world, nor would sovereignty remain static. For Carr, 
political power was territorially based but even this was not permanent. 
Territorial power had not always been centred on sovereign states and 
it was uncertain whether it would be in the future either. For Carr any 
other form of organising international relations than territorial units 
seemed revolutionary and thus it was more likely that territorial units 
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would change form instead. (Carr 2001, 210–211). Carr’s focal question 
was, “Will the nation survive as the unit of power?” (Ibid., 209).
Carr predicts that in the future sovereignty will be more blurred and 
indistinct than at present. Sovereignty had marked the distinctiveness 
of the authority claimed by the state after the medieval system. But 
“when distinctions began to be made between political, legal and 
economic sovereignty or between internal and external sovereignty, it 
was clear that the label had ceased to perform its proper function as a 
distinguishing mark for a single category of phenomena”. (Ibid., 212.) 
Th us, Carr questions the whole idea of state sovereignty as the organising 
principle of international order, since its original meaning did not fi t 
the conditions at the time. For Carr we had already lost sovereignty as 
a principle, and in the reality of international aff airs sovereignty was 
also becoming obsolete. Based on Carr’s observation, basing the idea of 
sphere of infl uence on assumptions about sovereignty is problematic if 
sovereignty no longer adequately describes the “present conditions”, or 
if it ever did. If there never was sovereignty other than in principle, then 
“violations of sovereignty” poorly describe what spheres of infl uence are 
about.
Carr states that in the future units of power will likely not take much 
account of formal sovereignty. He does not see why there should not 
be units consisting of formally sovereign states as long as the eff ective 
authority is exercised from a single centre. Nevertheless, these units would 
not be recognised by international law. (Carr 2001, 213.) What Carr 
means is the informal concentration of power, not a system of Großräume 
that would replace the system of states in the eyes of international law. 
Moreover, Carr suggests that international order cannot be based on 
naked power alone. Th ere needs to be consent, whether it be forced or 
not, on the order. At the minimum, the order needs to be viewed as 
better than any alternative. Th e ones creating conditions for the consent 
required are of course the ascendant powers. (Ibid., 216–217.) To sum 
up, for Carr the concentration of power is informal and does not require 
a change of international law, but does necessitate consent among the 
great powers.
 Even though for Carr (1965, 52) the future order would not be built 
on international law, he uses Schmitt’s terminology:
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If these predictions are realized, the world will have to accommodate 
itself to the emergence of a few great multinational units in which 
power will be mainly concentrated. Culturally, these units may best be 
called civilizations: there are distinctively British, American, Russian 
and Chinese civilizations, none of which stops short at national 
boundaries in the old sense. Economically the term Großraum 
invented by German geo-politicians seems the most appropriate. Th e 
Soviet Union is pre-eminently a Großraum; the American continents 
are the potential Großraum of the United States, though the term is 
less convenient as applied to the British Commonwealth of Nations 
or the sterling area which are oceanic rather than continental 
agglomerations.
Compared to Schmitt’s analysis, there had to be a British and not a 
German Großraum between the two other great powers (Carr 1965, 53). 
Carr did not want Britain to end up as subordinate to the United States 
or the Soviet Union but to lead a Western European Großraum (ibid., 
71, 73). Moreover, Carr makes it clear he does not promote “a division of 
the world into a small number of multinational units exercising eff ective 
control over vast territories and practising in competition and confl ict with 
one another new imperialism which would be simply the old nationalism 
writ large and would almost certainly pave the way for more titanic and 
devastating wars”. Carr admires the nineteenth-century order of only few 
great powers and wishes that would be the model for the future. (Ibid., 
53.) According to Carr, the eighteenth- and nineteenth-century order 
allowed great powers exclusively to decide on matters of war and peace, 
with small states agreeing to this practice. In turn, small nations could 
opt for neutrality and remain outside of wars. In Carr’s view, the option 
of total neutrality was no longer available. Collective security did not 
work either, as small states could not make any contribution to it. Th ese 
factors caused Carr to doubt the viability of small nations as independent 
entities. (Ibid. 54–55.) 
In Carr’s view, the only way for a small nation to maintain 
independence and contribute to international security was “by willingly 
merging some of its attributes into the common pool”. Th is would also 
solve the problem caused by the principle of national self-determination, 
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a product of the nineteenth century that has caused impracticably small 
units of power. (Carr 1965, 56.) Carr considers it natural for human 
beings to form groups of varying size and purpose. Th e multi-national 
units of power would not have to kill national feeling and culture; instead 
they could off er overlapping and interlocking loyalties. (Ibid., 59.) Th e 
new political units should not be based on national exclusiveness but on 
shared ideals and aspirations, just as Naumann envisioned. Carr wanted 
to avoid the multi-national units manifesting nationalism at a larger scale. 
Th e concentration of power should advance tolerance of the national 
and not the opposite. (Ibid., 66.) Carr is constructing an image of two 
diff erent ways to concentrate power: One represents a nationalistic-
imperialistic project ending up in more wars and the other advances 
tolerance and shared values. Carr does not explain the diff erence between 
the two types of infl uence well enough, but conclusions can nevertheless 
be drawn. First, nationalism is the core issue. It has the potential to ruin 
the beautiful idea of Großräume, just like it ruined the system of states. 
Second, Carr expresses the idea that there is a good Großraum and a bad 
Großraum, meaning that a sphere of infl uence has the potential to benefi t 
all the members of international society, not least because of the order it 
produces. 
Carr had a vision of a union of the great and the small which would not 
mean the formation of empires but a union of states with at least some 
level of independence. Interestingly, at the same time Carr (1965, 58–
60) proposed a world security organisation, supported by the three great 
powers for the management of some collective forces and strategic bases. 
Carr was not very consistent or clear in his vision of this organisation and 
its relation to the system of Großräume. Th e logic of trying to solve the 
dilemma of war and nationalism by organising the system of states into a 
system of Großräume is noteworthy for contesting the concept of sphere 
of infl uence with its present pejorative connotations. Even though Carr’s 
solution sounds like a triumph of the inequality of states, he is not as 
“realist” as it may fi rst seem. Matters of justice are not alien to Carr. He 
declared, quite radically, that the primary function of international order 
is not to maintain the status quo or rights of nations, but to improve 
the life conditions of ordinary people (ibid., 61). Carr does not seems 
to take the state at face value, but rather places individuals before it. 
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Even if a sphere of infl uence on a theoretical level is mainly concerned 
with relations among states, the pejorative associations of the concept, 
especially the images of the Cold War, nevertheless encompass the human 
factor. Th en the question becomes, How does a sphere of infl uence aff ect 
the people inhabiting the territories infl uenced? I believe that this is 
the one question that should be put more squarely at the focus when 
discussing spheres of infl uence. 
Carr could also make us consider whether his emphasis on social justice 
over nationalism could be applied to the logic of spheres of infl uence. Is a 
sphere of infl uence in fact a progressive idea (like it is for Carr) instead of 
a regressive one? Could it not be seen as progressive and at times justifi ed 
if we place the human being front and centre instead of clinging to the 
principle of state sovereignty and the nation-state? After all, protecting 
people is the cause that promoters of humanitarian intervention would 
appeal to in order to justify violations of sovereignty, the use of force 
and violence in general. Carr (1965, 69) insists that small or medium-
sized nation-states lack the resources to provide well-being for their 
people. He puts forward proposals on common action, conventions, a 
General Staff  and trade agreements as the measures needed to create the 
British Großraum – proposals which bring to mind the present practice 
of integration and not forceful domination (ibid., 72). Are the peoples 
of the small states better off  if they can let go of their state’s sovereignty 
and accept a merger into bigger entities? Or is Carr just as utopian as 
the those whom he accuses of being so, dreaming of prosperous and 
humanistic spheres of infl uence? 
Carr’s concern was war and peaceful change as he tried to make sense of 
a world free of the problems caused by nationalism and internationalism 
alike. He off ers the solution of larger units to war-causing nationalism 
and its counterpart, utopian internationalism. Th e solution cannot be a 
fantasy for Carr; it needs to be based on the realities of life. And in reality 
regionalism was more practical than universalism: ”Th e history of League 
of Nations, beginning with the insertion in the Covenant of the original 
Monroe Doctrine reservation, bears witness to the persistence of attempts 
to escape from a theoretical and ineff ective universalism into a practical 
and workable regionalism” (Carr 1965, 45). Internationalism for Carr 
meant universal dominion. He thought that world peace, based on the 
158
“harmony of interests” that internationalism proclaimed, was certainly 
desirable but its problem was that it could be used to mask hegemonic 
political interests. Carr notes, “[P]leas for international solidarity and 
world union come from those dominant nations which may hope to 
exercise control over a unifi ed world”. Moreover, those states which 
desire a position in the dominant group usually invoke nationalism 
against the internationalism of the dominant powers. Th e core problem 
of utopianism was that in the end, in a concrete political situation, selfi sh 
national interest would win out over any sense of common good. (Carr 
2001, 78−81). Th is is why, in his view, the emerging order that was 
challenging the system of nation-states had to be based on pluralism. 
Th is meant a compromise “between the past confusion of a vast number 
of nations, great and small, jostling one another on a footing of formal 
independence and equality, and the well-knit world authority which may 
or may not be attainable in the future” (Carr 1965, 52).
Carr insists that power is and will be the determining factor in world 
aff airs. Th us, “[t]he new international order can be built only on a unit 
of power suffi  ciently coherent and suffi  ciently strong to maintain its 
ascendancy without being itself compelled to take sides in the rivalries 
of lesser units. Whatever moral issues may be involved, there is an 
issue of power which cannot be expressed in terms of morality.” (Carr 
2001, 216.) Carr is a realist, sceptical about utopian dreams, which is 
why his stand is so strong. Th e realist paradigm has obviously left its 
mark also on the present understanding of spheres of infl uence. Th is is 
why the possibilities of the concept have not been explored outside the 
realist worldview of power politics. Carr is important for the concept of 
sphere of infl uence for situating it in the framework of problems with 
nationalism and internationalism, and especially by bringing forth how 
spheres of infl uence could solve the problems of nationalism. Carr’s 
sphere of infl uence cannot be built on nationalism and he argues that 
larger political units can improve the living conditions of citizens. What 
is more, Carr pointed out the blurring of sovereignty and the diffi  culty of 
discussing sovereignty which was never truly realised. Again, if we relax 
the idea of sovereignty, spheres of infl uence are not always and necessarily 
a violation of sovereign rights; that is, a sphere of infl uence does not 
inevitably deserve a pejorative interpretation.
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5.4.2 The Inevitability of Power Politics
Burnham considered that a new form of world organisation was emerging 
that challenged the system of nation-state at the centre. For Burnham, 
this meant the end of the system of states as the contemporaries knew 
it. Mika Luoma-aho (2007, 49) describes how Burnham was losing his 
faith in the old international system: “Th ough the world political was not 
one but many, it had become, in an age of world-wide movements and 
atomic weapons, simply too dangerous a place for a balance of power. 
Th is is pluriversalism with a vengeance.” Burnham can be described as an 
infl uential person in formulating American foreign policy. His books were 
widely read; he served as an intelligence offi  cer for the government; and 
he was one of the founding editors of the eminent journal Th e National 
Review (Luoma-aho 2007, 51). According to Roger Kimball (2002), 
Burnham was a fervent critic of communism but also of totalitarianism 
at large. For Burnham, communism was an expansionist ideology, 
ultimately aimed at world domination. 
Two of Burnham’s books are of interest to the history of spheres of 
infl uence: Th e Managerial Revolution: What is Happening in the World 
from 1941 and Struggle for the World from 1947. In Th e Managerial 
Revolution, Burnham (1941, 172) explains how under the political 
system of capitalism the world has consisted of a large number of 
large nations, with each nation claiming sovereignty for itself. In 
his view, this system was nevertheless being radically altered by the 
emergence of the managerial society. “One after another of the sovereign 
capitalist nations are being either wiped out altogether or stripped of 
the attributes of sovereignty”. (Ibid.) For Burnham the existence of a 
large number of sovereign nations was incompatible with contemporary 
social and economic needs (ibid., 173). What Burnham meant is that 
the development of the global economy did not support the system of 
sovereign states in the form in which it had been constructed in the past. 
Th is political system was already dead, Burnham declares. Burnham 
envisions a single world state   as the possible replacement for the system 
of states, which has reached its fi nal days. In the utopia of a world state, 
confl icts could be eliminated and production could be organised in the 
most eff ective way. Finally, Burnham does not believe that a world state 
is possible, because of all the practical problems in establishing it and the 
160
inevitable disintegrative forces which would emerge. For Burnham there 
is no unity of humankind upon which a world state could be built which 
is why it remains a utopia. (Ibid., 173−175). 
Instead of the emergence of a world state Burnham envisions that 
“a comparatively small number of great nations, or ‘super-states’, will 
divide the world among them”. For Burnham, unlike Schmitt and others, 
sovereignty will be reserved only for the super-states. Burnham writes, 
“Some of the many nations which are eliminated in fact may be preserved 
in form; they may be kept as administrative subdivisions, but they will 
be stripped of sovereignty”. (Ibid., 175.) Backward people may try to 
win independence but, lacking in technological resources for modern 
warfare, they will ultimately gravitate towards one of the great camps. 
(Ibid., 180−181.). He ( 1941, 181) goes on to observe,
Everywhere men will have to line up with one or the other of the 
super-states of tomorrow. Th ere will not be room for smaller sovereign 
nations; nor will the less advanced peoples be able to stand up against 
the might of the metropolitan areas. Of course, polite fi ctions of 
independence may be preserved for propaganda purposes; but it is the 
reality and not the name of sovereignty about which we are talking.
For Burnham, in Th e Managerial Revolution, the super-state  is a 
sphere of infl uence close to a federation. In the defi nitions of a sphere 
of infl uence by Keal (1983, 15) and Kaufman (1976, 11), spheres of 
infl uence entail a violation of the sovereignty of the infl uenced state, but 
not its complete denial. Nor does Bull (2002) make any reference to the 
absolute abandoning of sovereignty when discussing spheres of infl uence 
in various parts of Th e Anarchical Society. Naumann (1917) was careful 
about dismissing the sovereignty of the states of Mid-Europe. Schmitt 
(2003, 252) distinguishes external sovereignty, which remains intact, and 
the material content of sovereignty, which is aff ected by the controlling 
power. Carr does not claim that sovereignty is totally lost either. Th e fate 
of sovereignty is certainly the cornerstone in discussing the change of the 
state-system and spheres of infl uence. In the present use of the concept 
as well, sphere of infl uence means less the absorption of and more an 
attempt to dominate other states. Whether a sphere of infl uence entails 
a violation of sovereignty or its complete loss, sovereignty is a central 
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question to the concept of sphere of infl uence. David Armstrong (1999, 
559) writes that despite the changes in international relations over the 
last 50 years this central fact remains: “A sovereign state cannot formally 
be subject to any external jurisdiction except by its own consent” and 
international law remains the law of states. Th us, for a sphere of infl uence 
to have any legitimacy in the present it needs to be a voluntary union 
of states, a union where there is no longer a violation of sovereignty. 
Likewise, in a forceful unifi cation, which leaves no room to speculate 
about the sovereignty of the subjects, the new territorial unit is no 
longer a sphere of infl uence in its historical sense. On balance, if we 
dismiss concerns over the loss of sovereignty when considering spheres of 
infl uence of, we lose that which has for a long time defi ned the concept.
Burnham (1941, 176) was certain that the new system would be 
implemented through war, which is an interesting remark considering 
that other writers (not least Lippmann, whose work is analysed in the 
next chapter) did not consider war the way forward. Quite the contrary, 
in the context of ongoing war, the purpose was to fi nd a solution for 
organising the world after the major wars, and certainly not by means 
of a new war. Burnham was an American with national concerns: “Such 
political predictions as I have herein outlined are very much resented in 
the United States. Our offi  cial doctrine still continues in the Wilsonian 
tradition: international law and morality; rights of small nations; 
nonrecognition of territories acquired by force” (ibid., 182). Indeed, 
there was an opposing discourse regarding power politics in the United 
States, one that I will discuss in the next chapter, which Burnham was 
reacting to. For Burnham (1941, 262−263) expansionist foreign policy 
was a necessity for survival, not a matter of choice. For the United States 
this meant “modifi ed hemispheric defence”, drawing a ring around all of 
northern America and northern South America. Burnham was no doubt 
overtly expansionist in his thoughts, giving no consideration to the justice 
of the small. Th e United States needed to “make a bid for maximum 
world power as against the super-states to be based on the other two 
central areas”. (Ibid.) In this sense, Burnham’s imperialist approach to 
unifi cation diff ers from the softer models of the rest of the proponents of 
spheres of infl uence.
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As the title Th e Struggle for the World (1947) suggests, after the 
Managerial Revolution Burnham focused specifi cally on the challenge 
of the Soviet Union trying to take over the world. Burnham begins the 
book by declaring “Th e Th ird World War began in April 1944”. For 
Burnham (1947, 11) this was not a hangover from the Second World 
War but a phase in its own right, even though no grand battle had yet 
broken out. As we know today, no third world war ever broke out and 
the name “Cold War” came to signify the post-war era. Th e United States 
was intimately involved in world aff airs around the globe, which for 
Burnham was an irreversible development. But Burnham was dissatisfi ed 
with the “immaturity” of the United States in world aff airs and wanted 
to off er advice in creating a more successful policy to counter the Soviet 
threat. Burnham, like other theorists of the time, struggled to make sense 
of not only the new role of the state he himself represented, but also the 
changing international order. Burnham (1947, 23) ponders the meaning 
of the concept “one world” again in Th e Struggle for the World: “Th e world 
is one because all men share a common humanity, whether that humanity 
is interpreted in naturalistic, metaphysical or religious terms. What 
bearing, then, does the oneness of the world, so understood, have upon 
the cold historical problems of world politics in our time?” Burnham 
answers that it has almost no bearing at all since although connected by 
certain technology and economic production, “[p]olitically, and, most 
deeply of all, culturally, the world is many”. Men have always been divided 
fi ghting and killing each other. (Ibid.) Burnham’s harsh realism is based 
on his view of politics as unavoidably connected with power. Th is means 
that peace cannot be the objective of a nation if it wishes to survive. 
Politics is, in the end, about the will to fi ght and defend the interests and 
institutions which the nation is founded upon. (Ibid., 147−148.) Even 
if at an abstract level men might be one humanity, in concrete situations 
they are driven by diverging interests and clashing objectives (ibid., 24). 
Th us, in terms of world politics, Burnham saw division as inevitable, 
making him a pluralist in the Schmittian sense.
Burnham’s approach to universalism is dual. On the one hand, he is 
suspicious of the claim that a world government, even when exercising 
supreme world sovereignty, could put an end to war. Like Schmitt, 
Burnham noted that civil wars and rebellion would emerge within 
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a united world. On the other hand, Burnham was so overtly worried 
about the annihilating power of nuclear weapons that he began to 
think a world government made sense as an organ with a monopoly 
over atomic weapons. Burnham became more intrigued than Schmitt 
by the idea of universalism, turning his back on his initially pluralist 
approach: “However, if there was, or came to be a World Government, 
it would in fact provide the most rational structure within which to 
meet the problems of modern world policy, economy and technology. 
And it would give the complete answer to the greatest of all immediate 
issues: the issue of control of atomic weapons.” (Burnham 1947, 49.) 
Burnham did not believe, based on the historical experiences, that a 
world government could be created voluntarily; it had to be eff ected by 
conquest instead (ibid., 52). Shifting his attention to the idea of a world 
empire, established by force, Burnham notes that what Arnold Toynbee 
called ‘Universal Empires’ have indeed appeared in history. For Burnham, 
the battle for a universal empire was being fought between the two super-
states  of the United States and the Soviet Union. (Ibid., 55−57)
Burnham insists, in line with Schmitt, Naumann and Carr, that the 
reality of international order is that the time of a world consisting of 
a large number of independent and sovereign nations is over. “Smaller 
nations are no longer seriously independent factors in world politics”, 
Burnham writes. Th e United Nations is the last nail in the coffi  n, as seen 
in the inequality of small and big states regarding seats and veto rules in 
the Security Council. (Ibid., 58.) Burnham (1947, 155) explains further:
We cannot make all nations equal by calling them equal, or writing 
their equality into the provisions of the Charter. Th ey simply are not 
equal, and that settles the question. Th e so-called ‘revolts of small 
nations’ at various international gatherings during the past few years 
are deceptions. Th e net eff ect is never anything but an expression of the 
alignments of small nations in relation to the great powers. All the fuss 
over the veto power in the United Nations is energy wasted. Whatever 
the Charter said, the Soviet Union and the United States would 
always have a de facto veto power, because either of them is alone 
immeasurably stronger than the United Nations. What an absurdity 
to think for a moment that Ecuador is equal to the United States, or 
Sweden equal to the Soviet Union! And what a preposterous absurdity 
164
to imagine that the crisis of world politics could ever be solved with the 
help of such juridical nonsense!
For Burnham, justice is proportionate – a justice which takes into 
consideration the capacities and needs of persons and groups according to 
Bull’s (2002, 77) defi nition. In Burnham’s case it is capacity that matters. 
Just like Bull (2002, 21), he does not even see why states should have 
equal justice for all states. William T.R. Fox also writes how the analogy 
between equality of men and states should not be carried too far. States 
cannot be equal in the same sense. Moreover, for Fox equality does not 
guarantee a more “democratic” order if a state like Uruguay can obstruct 
eff ective action by an international organisation as easily as a state like the 
United States can. (Fox 1944, 144−148.)
Burnham argues that any attempt to formulate international law 
that would establish plurality will not work since it is against the reality 
that dictates world politics, that is, power politics. Burnham refers to 
his own conclusion in Th e Managerial Revolution that it is not a world 
state that would emerge but competing super-states. Th is was before the 
introduction of atomic weapons and the fact that only two super-states 
emerged from the ashes of the Second World War, making balancing 
trickier than it would be in a system of three or four super-states. Th e 
atomic bomb, most importantly, made Burnham inclined to put his faith 
in a world state. (Burnham 1947, 58.) “Who controls the atom, controls 
the world”, Burnham (1947, 59) declared. It is clear that Burnham 
was also conscious of the fact that if there were an attempt at world 
domination, it would have to be the United States that would make 
that attempt because “the ultimate goal of communist, and therefore of 
Soviet, policy is the conquest of the world” (ibid., 97).  Th e Soviet Union 
was attempting to control the Eurasian continent – the Heartland in 
Mackinder’s language – and attempting to weaken all nations not under 
Soviet control (ibid., 103). 
Burnham drew a picture of circles of infl uence, “concentric rings 
around an inner circle”, over which the Soviet Union would attempt 
to establish control. Burnham’s rings illustrate the global domination 
pattern with circles of absorption (the Baltic States, East Poland, Mongolia, 
etc.), domination (Finland, Germany, the Balkans, the Middle East, 
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etc.), orienting infl uence (Latin America, France, Central and Southern 
China, etc.) and fi nally infi ltration and demoralisation (the United States 
and England). Th e Soviet sphere of infl uence would ultimately be the 
entire world with more infl uence closer to the core. (Burnham 1947, 
104−105.) Burnham insisted the Soviet strategy was to draw the states 
of the circles closer inwards so that those within domination would be 
absorbed and those on the edge of domination would be drawn into the 
sphere of domination (ibid., 106−107). Within the circle of orienting 
infl uence, the aim would be to promote pro-Soviet foreign policy or 
at least minimise anti-Soviet policy either through pressure or through 
concessions and conciliation (ibid., 109). Yet, Burnham did not see the 
Soviet Union as really able to take over the world, so long as the United 
States remained the rival centre of power (ibid., 111). Burnham’s drawing 
represents an attempt to demonstrate the magnitude of the Soviet plans 
which the United States needed to resist in order to hold on to and spread 
its own infl uence. 
Burnham’s drawing is Schmitt’s greatest fear becoming a reality: 
the two imperialistic powers lacking a third balancing force and thus 
beginning to struggle for the world. Th e new World Empire would 
be a state, world-dominating politically if not world-wide in scope 
literally. Burnham writes that he does not advocate totalitarianism but 
intervening only when necessary to maintain the integrity of the Empire. 
Although it could be loose in other fi elds, the Empire had to have an 
absolute monopoly over atomic weapons. A more voluntary union of 
states in the form of a world government could emerge out of the World 
Empire. (Burnham 1947, 60−62.) Within the Empire, sovereignty would 
evidently be restricted. Burnham is trying to convince the reader that 
this restriction does not have to mean loss of concrete liberties and may 
even mean their considerable development. (Ibid., 119−220.) Instead of 
tyranny, the United States would rule by conciliation and concession, 
accepting others as partners (ibid. 222). For Burnham, in the world 
system, the choice is always between a balance of diverse powers and 
a monopoly of power (ibid., 217). A system that would be based on 
the universalism of the United States would not be based on a balance 
of power. Nevertheless, a balance of power would remain the method 
of preventing “any totalitarian crystallization of power” at other levels 
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of social power, except the military, which would be controlled by the 
United States. Powers within the federation would continue to interact. 
(Ibid., 222.) Th us, where Burnham diff ers from other theorists is that as 
he witnessed the weakening possibilities for three or more super-states, 
he began to believe that there could be a single super-state, one sovereign 
state with a sphere of infl uence encompassing the entire globe. But 
here Burnham was willing to accord some rights to other states and the 
absolute monopoly over the Bomb was the only thing he insisted upon 
fi rmly.
According to Burnham (1947, 184−186), in order to resist the Soviet 
attempts to become the sole empire, the United States adhered to the 
ideas that peace was not an object of foreign policy and that equality 
of nations and the non-intervention principle needed to be discarded 
in taking on political leadership of the world. In advocating a World 
Empire, Burnham’s political outlook for the United States certainly takes 
steps far from the idea of great power management through spheres of 
infl uence. Somehow Burnham wants to believe in spheres of infl uence, 
but fears the Soviet Union and the Atomic Bomb too much to believe 
that the bipolar or any multipolar system could endure. Adhering to 
spheres of infl uence would be the defensive strategy, but Burnham (1947, 
187−188) takes the view that the ultimate goal is an off ensive policy. A 
defensive policy would not be enough, because it would not solve the 
problem of the communist aim of world conquest. Th e world needed an 
alternative, a non-communist world federation, which only the United 
States could force into being. (Ibid.) Th is should take place by the United 
States maintaining its imperial relation towards the Americas. Burnham 
insisted that a union, not an alliance, had to be formed between the 
United States and Great Britain, along with its dominions. In this union, 
Britain would initially have been the junior partner due to the imbalance 
in material might. Under the union a European Federation had to be 
built. Burnham claimed that as Europe was too weak to form its own 
centre of power between the United States and the Soviet Union its 
only option was to merge with one or the other. (Ibid., 195−199). In 
Asia, states would be kept in line with the United States policy with the 
incentive of material benefi ts and resisting communist infi ltration (ibid., 
202). Burnham (1947, 226−227) writes:
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It will be useful to give a name to the supreme policy which I have 
formulated. It is neither ‘imperial’ nor ‘American’ in any sense that 
would be ordinarily communicated by these words. Th e partial 
leadership which it allots to the United States follows not from any 
nationalist bias but from the nature and possibilities of exiting world 
power relationships. Because this policy is the only answer to the 
communist plan for a universal totalitarianism, because it is the only 
chance for preserving the measure of liberty that is possible for us in 
our Time of Troubles, and because it proposes the sole route now open 
towards a free world society, I shall henceforth refer to it as the policy 
of democratic world order.
Burnham was a prophet of sorts for the post-war foreign policy of the 
United States (see also Luoma-aho 2007, 53), making his writings all 
the more relevant for analysing the present understandings of spheres of 
infl uence. Th e attempt to establish a democratic world order by the United 
States is much feared in Russia and closely related to Russian ideas on 
spheres of infl uence, as the forthcoming analysis will demonstrate. A 
democratic world order represents an aggressive world-dominating sphere 
of infl uence which Russia is trying to prevent from materialising.
Burnham does not use the concept of sphere of infl uence, nor would 
one fi nd many other American scholars theorising on the “United States’ 
sphere of infl uence”. For American scholars and intellectuals, spheres 
of infl uence represent a self-serving foreign policy practice which they 
fi ercely oppose; that is, the concept is a pejorative one. Much eff ort has 
been put into inventing names such as a democratic world order or Good 
Neighbor Policy in order to create an image of something other than the 
traditional (imperialistic) sphere-of-infl uence policy. Although Burnham 
at fi rst advocated the idea of super-states, he became convinced that in 
the age of atomic weapons and the Soviet threat, a world empire ruled 
by the United States was the only way to maintain some level of liberty 
within the international system. Instead of accepting a great power order 
that would be based on a balance of power through the establishment 
of spheres of infl uence, Burnham placed his trust in no other state than 
his own for the management of world aff airs. Next, I will introduce the 
Good Neighbor Policy, another phrase denoting international infl uence 
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that attempted to draw attention away from the concepts of balance of 
power and sphere of infl uence. 
5.5 Walter Lippmann and the Good Neighbor Policy 
Schmitt and Naumann proposed a new global political order for rescuing 
Germany from being absorbed by other great states and for the sake of 
pluralism. Schmitt and Naumann had their American counterparts who 
were interested in regional arrangements and developing a scheme for great 
power relations and relations among the big and the small. Burnham’s 
vision of a democratic world order, as he called it, was founded upon 
the American universalism that Schmitt was afraid of. What Burnham 
criticised was taking a soft approach towards world order that would 
allow the Soviet Union to continue its attempt at world domination. It 
was the communist threat that justifi ed the United States’ role as the ruler 
of the world empire. But there was also a vision, very diff erent from that 
of Burnham’s and one that Burnham could not endorse, called the ”Good 
Neighbor Policy”, which was supported by President F. Roosevelt and 
Lippmann. Roosevelt’s and Lippmann’s basic concern was the question 
of what kind of infl uence would be the right one for the new regionalism. 
In a meeting with Winston Churchill in 1941, Franklin Roosevelt put 
forward a proposal whereby the United States and Great Britain would 
together police world aff airs until an international organisation could be 
formed. Th is police force was later expanded to include Russia and China. 
Roosevelt’s post-war plan included proposals that great powers would act 
as guarantors of peace, that colonial empires would be disbanded and that 
other states would be disarmed. (Kimball 1991, 85.) Aleksandr Fursenko 
and Timothy Naftali (1998, 9) write that Franklin Roosevelt rejected the 
policy of Th eodore Roosevelt from 1904 which asserted that the United 
States could intervene in the domestic aff airs of the countries of Western 
Hemisphere. Th e new policy from 1933 onward would be that of non-
intervention with the name “Good Neighbor Policy”. Lippmann took the 
concept of Good Neighbor Policy and formulated the idea of the United 
States having a sphere of responsibility within the Western Hemisphere.
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Although we are concerned with “subjugated knowledges”, Lippmann’s 
signifi cance for the history of the concept of sphere of infl uence is evident 
when we embark on connecting Lippmann with spheres of infl uence. 
I found my way to his work through the English School and Keal. 
Lippmann (1889-1974) was a journalist and writer and worked as an 
advisor to Woodrow Wilson. He received the Pulitzer Prize in 1958 and 
1962 for his newspaper column “Today and Tomorrow.” One curious 
fact about Lippmann is that Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev was an 
eager reader of his columns. Fursenko and Naftali (2006, 487) write 
that Khrushchev appreciated Lippmann’s realism and his insight into 
international relations. During the Cuban Missile Crisis, on 26 or 27 
October 1962, Khrushchev was given the column Lippmann wrote in 
Th e New York Herald Tribune on 25 October. Lippmann proposed in the 
column that the superpowers should dismantle both the Soviet base in 
Cuba and the US base in Turkey. Th is idea possibly infl uenced Khrushchev 
(1962d) and prompted him to propose in a letter in 27 October the 
removal of missiles in Turkey. Fursenko and Naftali (2006, 488) even put 
forward the question whether President Kennedy might have delivered 
his message through Lippmann, since he knew Khrushchev’s enthusiasm 
for reading Lippmann’s columns. 
Th e reason why I consider this connection to Khrushchev signifi cant 
is that, fi rst of all, it indicates that political analysts such as Lippmann 
can be infl uential in transmitting ideas to the political level. It was not 
only Schmitt, Naumann and Lippmann, fi rmly rooted in politics, who 
wanted to infl uence the foreign policies of their respective countries; the 
British Committee had a similar interest as well, with its agenda of being 
involved in the development of international aff airs. Second, the fact that 
Khrushchev read Lippmann’s columns means that the ideas travel across 
borders, and even the Iron Curtain. Likewise, we can see when reading 
Russian discourses (chapter 7) how painstakingly international theory 
has been studied in Russia. Russian discourses on spheres of infl uence are 
passionate cries, but cries founded upon theorising on the society of states. 
It is no secret that IR in Russia has developed from Western research and 
concepts (Tsygankov & Tsygankov 2004, 8) but, interestingly, Russian 
analysts have also been able to move from the Cold War mindset into 
envisioning a future on the basis of international theory.
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For Lippmann, like his contemporaries, the world wars formed the 
context for thinking about international order. Lippmann (1945, 131) 
felt that a new world order could emerge from the ruins of the war, and 
with it a long peace. Lippmann pondered the war events in Europe in 
Some Notes on War and Peace in 1940. He lamented the balance-of-
power system in Europe and the lack of an authority to bind together 
the European nations (ibid., 38−44). Lippmann saw Europe as an entity 
in itself which would not fl ourish as a diversity of nation-states, but as a 
union, which required a centre of order: “If this is correct, then the great 
question of the war is whether there will be established a new and durable 
center of civilized union and authority, capable of repulsing attack, large 
enough and strong enough to exhaust the aggressors, and able in the end 
to admit and absorb into its unity the civilized peoples of the western 
world” (ibid., 45−46).
In Europe, small states had put their independence in the hands of the 
system of the balance of power, whereas in the New World relations among 
the great and the small were founded upon the Good Neighbour Policy 
(Lippmann 1945, 81). Relying on a balance of power was the mistake 
Europe had made. Instead, in the New World, a more successful policy 
had been developed. Lippmann thought that this model, successfully 
implemented in the Western Hemisphere, could form the basis of a new 
international order. A clearly spelled-out policy was needed that would 
tie nations together into unions of “good neighbors”. Bull called the idea 
of good neighbours represented by Roosevelt and Lippmann “spheres 
of responsibility”. Bull (2002, 215−216) writes that what Lippmann 
spelled out in U.S. War Aims (1945) was an idea that the post-war 
international order should be based on a division of three or four spheres 
of responsibility where each great power or combination of them would 
secure peace. Lippmann (1945, 87−88) in fact proposed that the world 
order would be “composed of the great regional constellations of states 
which are the homelands, not of one nation alone but of the historic 
civilized communities”. Lippmann argued that international order could 
no longer be established on the basis of collective agreements among 
individual national states; rather these had to be concluded among 
groups of national states (ibid., 64−65).
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For Lippmann (1945, 65), this organisation of the world meant 
the strategical systems of the Atlantic Community (the United States, 
Western Europe and Latin America), the Russian Orbit, China and later 
some constellation(s) in the Hindu and Moslem worlds. Lippmann was 
also prepared to counter voices against United States’ dominance over 
Europe from people who would rather have seen a European federation. 
But Lippmann did not see Europe as a single geographic and strategic 
entity that could form a political union. Th e main reason for this was that 
Germany would inevitably be its nucleus. (Ibid., 124−127.) Lippmann 
argued that war as it was known at the time was being fought precisely 
to prevent this from taking place. For Lippmann, European unifi cation 
could be implemented only by preventing German domination, and this 
could be done within the framework of the Atlantic Community. (Ibid., 
127−128.) 
Fundamentally, Lippmann was as nationalistic in his visions for 
international order as any other theorist presented here (see Lippmann 
1945; 53−57, 208−210). Th e purpose of introducing the Good 
Neighbor Policy was primarily to secure the Western Hemisphere as a 
distinct region free from interference from the outside. Referring to the 
Monroe Doctrine, Lippmann (1945, 49) declared, “Within the region 
of the world which fronts upon the Atlantic and Pacifi c Oceans, the 
United States is the enemy of all conquerors and the partisan of national 
freedom”. Lippmann called out for a common foreign policy since “[a] 
house divided against itself cannot stand” (ibid., 73). For Lippmann, 
the Good Neighbor Policy was a substitute for an empire (ibid., 85). 
Th e common foreign policy Lippmann called for did not mean political 
federation or a formal treaty of alliance, but rather a network of agreements 
and understandings. Lippmann explained, “Th e Atlantic nations remain 
separate sovereign states but they form a living community”. (Ibid., 77.) 
According to Lippmann, the Atlantic Community would follow the 
spirit of the Atlantic Charter30 (ibid., 79). Th e regional systems should be 
based on the Good Neighbor Policy of non-aggression, co-operation and 
good will and not on a policy of neutrality that depended on balancing 
between great powers (ibid., 82−83). Lippmann (1945, 83−84) made 
30 Keal (1983, 65−66) writes how the allies (United States, Britain and the Soviet 
Union) concluded a joint declaration of the Atlantic Charter for a post-war order that 
asserted principles which confl icted with ideas on spheres of infl uence.
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sure his proposal would be appreciated also by the small states, portraying 
the Good Neighbour Policy as a two-way game:
Th e Good Neighbor relationship is one in which small states and a 
great one in the same area of strategic security become allies in peace 
and in war. Th e great state provides protection – which the technology 
of modern war being what it is – no small state can provide itself. Th e 
small state reciprocates: it provides strategic facilities needed for the 
common defence, and it uses its own sovereign powers to protect its 
great neighbor against infi ltration, intrigue, and espionage. Insofar 
as the small state makes this critical contribution to the security of 
the neighbourhood, its independence is of vital interest to its great 
neighbor. (Emphasis added.) 
A great power provides protection for its small neighbours as 
compensation for the contribution they make to ensuring the security 
of the region. Th e independence of the neighbour is “of vital interest” to 
the great power and that will guarantee the protection of the neighbour 
states. As this protection comes with a price, Lippmann emphasised 
that small states can only assure their rights by general acceptance of the 
duties of the Good Neighbor Policy. Lippmann writes, “We must not, 
as many do, identify the rights of small nations with their right to have 
an ‘independent’ foreign policy, that is to say one which manipulates the 
balance of power among great states.” For him small states were too small 
compared to big states to pursue anything other than the Good Neighbor 
Policy. (Lippmann 1945, 84.) Th ere was simply an ever-growing disparity 
between the greatest states and others (ibid., 137−138). For Lippmann 
the relationship between the great and the small did not involve injustice; 
rather, it was a win-win relationship in which the great off ered protection 
for the price of commitment by the small to certain duties. Moreover, 
the small states were not innocent actors, but like any other states can 
play the games of power politics when given the chance. Th is was the 
most just system Lippmann could envision for the smooth working of 
the international order and the prevention of war. It is fair to say we 
have now strongly established the idea of reciprocity within a sphere of 
infl uence, which began with the suzerain and has ended with Lippmann’s 
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vision. Because Lippmann’s views embody subjugated knowledge of 
spheres of infl uence, they deserve detailed analysis.
Like Schmitt, Naumann and Carr, Lippmann dismisses the idea of a 
universal society in the form of a world government charged with policing 
humankind. As Americans had successfully implemented regional 
policies through the Monroe Doctrine, the Pan-American Union and the 
Good Neighbor Policy, Lippmann (1945, 190) asked why they should 
promote a universalist doctrine. First of all, no state would give away its 
legislative and executive power to such a world government (ibid., 183). 
Moreover, any comprehensive world organisation can only reinforce 
national measures of security, not replace them (ibid., 160). According to 
Lippmann, diplomatic relations dealing with security and prevention of 
war should be left to national states, acting within regional groups (ibid., 
167). Here, he holds on to plurality in world politics as much as Schmitt 
does.
Lippmann did not believe that separate states could form a world 
organisation but he did think that if single sovereign states combined 
in their neighbourhoods, and neighbourhoods combined into larger 
communities, then these constellations could participate in a universal 
society. Lippmann’s thinking here is along the lines of Carr’s, arguing 
for the incapabilities of the nation-state in guaranteeing peace. If we 
compare this thinking to Schmitt’s and Naumann’s, we see that the 
German scholars did not call the capabilities of the state itself into 
question unlike Lippmann (and Carr) did; quite the contrary, they felt 
that the international order had taken a turn in an irreversible direction. 
For Naumann and Schmitt this new world order was one where no 
small states, or states at all, could survive. If we look into the present, 
which is still a confl ict-ridden age, the same challenges of nationalism 
and disparity of power remain in international relations. Europe has 
indeed found a way to unity (although it has not eliminated nationalistic 
sentiments), but for most parts of the world Naumann’s dream remains 
unattained. I believe his ideas are valid for the present and they off er 
an interesting perspective on spheres of infl uence, not least because of 
Lippmann’s emphasis on peace.
In Lippmann’s (1945, 138) view, the world order that was forming 
around regional actors was crucial for world peace. He notes, “Th e 
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regional grouping of states in combined strategical systems is, therefore, 
indispensable to the general security of great and small nations alike, 
and to the stabilization of the relations among states.” Peace would be 
determined on the basis of great powers’ willingness to rest within their 
“orbits”:
Under the regional principle I am advocating, it would be held to 
be an over act of aggression for any state to reach out beyond its own 
strategical orbit for an alliance with a state in another orbit. Within 
the same strategical neighbourhood alliances are good: neighbours 
must and should combine for their common security. But alliances 
are bad if they disrupt the solidarity of a neighbourhood; they are 
entangling and interventionist if they bring an alien power into the 
midst of a neighborhood. (Ibid., 136−137.)
Th e problem remains, as Keal (1983, 211) notes, that spheres of infl uence 
are not stable. If they are not stable, there is not much prospect for peace. 
Lippmann, unlike Burnham, would allow spheres of infl uence for all the 
great powers, which would then act in a concert. Just like Burnham, 
Lippmann was nevertheless concerned about whether Russia was willing 
to keep within its orbit and whether any concert with Russia would 
guarantee peace. Lippmann still believed that a concert would be the 
foundation of a new order. (Lippmann 1945, 91.) And “concert” meant 
fi rst and foremost the relationship between the United States and the 
Soviet Union (ibid., 132). For Lippmann, a direct war between the two 
was as impossible as a war between an elephant and a whale – if only the 
two countries refrained from reaching out for allies within the orbit of 
the other. Moreover, neither should try to incorporate Japan or Germany 
within its orbit. (Ibid., 134–135.) Furthermore, Lippmann considered 
it possible to solve the emerging ideological disparity between Western 
democracy and Russian totalitarianism by meeting the Russians as allies 
and proposing to them that they commit themselves to democratic 
freedom (ibid., 150–151). To put the matter in Cold War terms, both 
superpowers would have their own spheres of infl uence which would lead 
to stability and avoid major war. For Lippmann this meant stabilisation 
of relations among states, both great and small (ibid., 138). 
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It was not only Lippmann’s concern for peace in general and the rights 
of small nations in particular that makes him an advocate of the idea of 
sphere of responsibility. For Bull (2002, 215), the diff erence between 
a negative sphere of infl uence and a positive sphere of infl uence (or 
responsibility) is that the negative infl uence takes the form of expansion 
while the positive is agreed upon and somehow accepted by the small 
states. Lippmann tries to make the case that his Good Neighbor Policy 
is something more acceptable, responsible and based on collaboration 
than what is traditionally understood in the case of spheres of infl uence. 
Lippmann (1945, 87) writes, “Objections present themselves at once 
to the views expounded in this book: they are that the world will be 
divided up into spheres of infl uence each dominated by a great power, 
that within these spheres the smaller and the weaker states will come 
under the infl uence of the great power, and that the huge constellations 
of states may become rivals and enemies.” Lippmann explained that the 
regional groupings had already been formed and that that development 
should not be prevented. Any hope for stabilising international relations 
rested on the perfection of these regional groupings. (Ibid., 187–188). 
Disputes, when they emerge, should be settled within the neighbourhood 
in question without the interference of any outside actors. Lippmann 
feared a chain reaction of other regional issues being drawn into a purely 
regional dispute if several great powers became involved. Failed attempts 
at global settlement of regional disputes could result in global war. Licence 
given to universal intervention means it would be used. (Ibid., 188–189.) 
Th e Good Neighbor Policy was the remedy to shifting alliances caused 
by power politics. Lippmann’s regionalism tried to prevent these shifting 
alliances so that each state would recognise that it belonged to only one 
larger strategic zone of security. (Ibid., 190.) Th is would not guarantee 
that no wars would emerge between the regions, but stabilising the 
alliances would remove the most provoking forms of interference and 
intervention, which are a cause of great wars (ibid., 191). Here one 
sees Lippmann the pluralist talking: ”In this view of things the horrid 
antithesis of nationalism and internationalism subsides” (Ibid., 193).
Going back to Roosevelt’s original idea of good neighbours, Kimball 
(1991) explains how there was confusion within the United States about 
the two approaches to coercion (sphere of infl uence) and leadership 
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(Good Neighbor Policy). Kimball writes that “[i]n the immediate, 
practical sense, the Monroe Doctrine in the era of World War II was a 
sphere of infl uence conception that gave the United States self-assigned 
special “responsibilities” in the Western Hemisphere”. Kimball sees the 
Good Neighbor Policy, in the end, as having been a reformulation of 
the Monroe Doctrine based on hegemony and not an equal partnership. 
(Kimball 1991, 123.) In the Good Neighbor Policy there remained 
a dilemma of how to exert infl uence without the use of power (ibid., 
125). Kimball asks, “But how are the regional ‘policemen’ to avoid the 
Orwellian temptation, even necessity of creating a sphere of infl uence 
in their region? How is such a region diff erent from a Pax Britannica, 
a Russian Empire, or a Monroe Doctrine?” (ibid., 96). For Carr (2001, 
215), the Good Neighbor Policy was by no means separated from power: 
“Th e ‘good neighbour’ policy of the United States in Latin America is not 
the antithesis, but the continuation of ‘Yankee imperialism’; for it is only 
the strongest who can both maintain their supremacy and remain ‘good 
neighbours’”. Keal (1983, 24) also identifi ed the problem of who would 
“police the policemen” in proposal put forward by President Roosevelt 
after World War Two for an international order of four policemen. Wight 
(1995, 42−43) as well warned of the double standards of great powers, 
which would justify their actions as enforcing peace and security while 
at the same time monopolising the right to create international confl ict. 
For Burnham, the Good Neighbor Policy was simply a propagandist 
name and by no means a policy that would guarantee the sovereignty of a 
great power’s neighbours. Burnham (1941, 263) strongly argued that the 
Good Neighbor Policy meant “the de facto elimination of independent 
sovereignty in all nations and colonies of the area except the United 
States, and thus the creation of a single interrelated territory so far as de 
facto political sovereignty goes”.
A critical look at Lippmann’s vision of the great regional constellations 
shows that it clearly has less aggression embedded in it than Burnham’s 
world-view, but it cannot be seen as a serious alternative to the proposals 
put forward by Naumann, Schmitt or Carr. Th ere is an emphasis on 
protecting the small states and maintaining world peace, but that is not 
unique to Lippmann’s proposal. Rather, the Good Neighbor Policy is an 
attempt to justify, in more acceptable words than Großraum or super-
state, the emerging order of great power management. Yet, Lippmann 
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was more optimistic and specifi c in describing the relationship between 
the great powers as one which would be based on collaboration and 
acceptance of the limits of infl uence. He was not as afraid of the Soviet 
power as Burnham was but rather believed that democracy, which Russia 
should also be persuaded to embrace, could be the prevailing ideology in 
international relations. 
5.6 George Orwell and the Totalitarian Super-states
George Orwell31 (1903-1950), was a well-known English novelist32. In 
addition to novels such as Animal Farm and Nineteen Eighty-Four, he left 
behind a body of diary entries, essays and newspaper journalism. Orwell 
died at the age of 46 of tuberculosis, leaving us to wonder what all he 
could have written during the years of the Cold War if he had not passed 
away. Even though Orwell did not live to witness the emergence of the 
international system that he himself foresaw, his input into the history of 
spheres of infl uence is signifi cant. 
It comes as no surprise to anyone who has read Orwell’s works that his 
novels were politically motivated. Orwell himself was passionate about 
political developments to such an extent that he volunteered to fi ght in the 
Spanish Civil War in 1937. Paul Anderson (2006, 28) describes Orwell’s 
political orientation as an engagement with the “dissident anti-Stalinist 
revolutionary socialist left that was obsessed with the degeneration of 
the Bolshevik revolution”. Furthermore, Anderson (2006, 32) writes 
that Orwell wanted to see democratic socialism as the prevailing form 
of political organisation and saw this threatened by Stalin’s carving out 
a sphere of infl uence. It was the future of the state, post-war Europe, 
democracy and the common people that Orwell passionately debated. 
He could not avoid the topic, for spheres of infl uence loomed on both 
sides of his home country.
Orwell (2009, 8–10.) in his own words, wanted to make political 
writing into an art. Orwell wrote from his sense of justice, mixing 
propaganda with prose style. Orwell fused political purpose with artistic 
purpose in a powerful way, making his voice far more widely heard 
31 Orwell’s real name was Eric Arthur Blair.
32 See Newsinger (1999) on Orwell’s life and political thought.
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among people than any political scientist or commentator. Even though 
Orwell’s work is not focused on spheres of infl uence, the powerful images 
of the super-states in Nineteen Eighty-Four must have made an impression 
on readers, thus contributing to our understanding of the concept. Two 
years after making these statements on his purpose in writing, in 1948, 
Orwell fi nished Nineteen Eighty-Four (2000). In this piece of fi ction we 
fi nd the antithesis to the spheres of infl uence which would save political 
plurality, prevent war and create a new functioning international order. 
Th is was the totalitarian sphere of infl uence, which Burnham saw as a 
possibility if the democratic world order failed to develop. It is Orwell 
who describes a world based on spheres of infl uence in its most oppressing 
and cruel form33. Orwell focuses on the totalitarian system that Winston 
Smith witnessed in London. In the novel, one can also see and, perhaps 
even more, sense the international system that is the context for Mr 
Smith’s experiences. Orwell’s fi ctional world consists of three super-states 
– Oceania, Eurasia and Eastasia – which are constantly at war with each 
other. One is always allied with the other, with the third party being the 
enemy. Russia, which has absorbed Europe, forms Eurasia, and United 
States, which has absorbed the British Empire, forms Oceania. Eastasia 
consist of China, Japan and fl uctuating parts of Manchuria, Mongolia 
and Tibet. Orwell (2000, 859) calls these super-states separate universes 
where ”almost any perversion of thought can safely be practised”. Th e 
borders are not stable but ”the balance of power always remains roughly 
even, and the territory which forms the heartland of each super-state 
always remains inviolate”. Fighting occurs in some distant disputed areas 
and there is never any attempt to invade enemy territory. (Ibid., 854–
855.) It sounds like the super-state system promotes stability and, in fact, 
some sort of peace for the masses. 
For Naumann the acceptance of citizens and their loyalty to the 
great state was crucial and likewise Lippmann envisioned international 
infl uence as responsible foreign policy, not something that would lead 
to totalitarianism. What makes Orwell’s fi ction the antithesis of, say, 
Lippmann’s sphere of responsibility is the crucial diff erence of motive. 
Where Lippmann’s sphere of infl uence is designed to prevent war, 
Orwell’s fi ctional world-system is in place to maintain war. In Nineteen 
33 See ”Chapter III: War is Peace” in Nineteen Eighty-Four (2000), where Orwell 
explores the system of super-states.
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Eighty-Four, war is the means to control people by fear and hatred, and 
thus it is needed for the sake of the order. Peace is not desired in a system 
which is based on total control of the people. Particularly illustrative of 
this mindset is the motto of “the Party” of Oceania: “War is Peace”. Wars 
are not meant to be won but instead they maintain a balance of power 
and prevent conquest by any world empire. In fact, war between the 
super-states   is peace in much the same sense as the peace which the non-
prosaic visionaries hoped super-states would create:
War, however, is no longer the desperate, annihilating struggle it was 
in the early decades of the twentieth century. It is a warfare of limited 
aims between combatants who are unable to destroy one another, have 
no material cause for fi ghting and are not divided by any genuine 
ideological diff erence. (Orwell 2000, 854.)
Th is world is actually not so diff erent from Schmitt’s and the others’ 
international order, except for the emphasis on the perverse eff ects of 
totalitarianism. Th e existence of super-states, even in a constant state of 
war, limits confl icts and maintains international order. 
Th e relevance of Orwell’s novel lies in the gloomy image of spheres 
of infl uence it conveys. I have argued that we need to transform this 
pejorative orientation into a normative debate and for this reason I have 
sought to bring forth arguments for spheres of infl uence. But we also 
need arguments against spheres of infl uence and Orwell provides one: 
a sphere of infl uence with injustice, repression and violence. Orwell’s 
construction of a system of super-states works as a warning story of great 
power order gone badly awry. 
Less well-known than Nineteen Eighty-Four are Orwell’s columns. 
During the period 1943–1947, Orwell wrote a weekly column to the 
Tribune (with a gap of 21 months while he worked as a war correspondent 
to the Observer) (Anderson 2006, 2). Th ese columns included Orwell’s 
insights into the logic of spheres infl uence. Orwell’s inspiration for 
portraying the world of super-states came from Burnham’s Th e Managerial 
Revolution (see Newsinger 1999, 106–107). Orwell (1946) summarises in 
an essay on Burnham’s thinking the essence of Th e Managerial Revolution: 
“Th e new ‘managerial’ societies will not consist of a patchwork of small, 
independent states, but of great super-states grouped round the main 
180
industrial centres in Europe, Asia, and America. Th ese super-states will 
fi ght among themselves for possession of the remaining unclaimed 
portions of the earth, but will probably be unable to conquer one another 
completely”. 
Even though Orwell in many ways refutes Burnham’s predictions 
on the new world order, he endorsed the prediction on the weakening 
of the small and the increasing power of the great. Th e threat of “the 
totalitarian super-states world order” was not fi ctional, but very concrete 
for Orwell. Orwell wrote in Th e Tribune on 2 February and 19 October 
1945 that the world was indeed splitting up into two or three super-
states, or great empires, just as Burnham predicted. In “As I Please 7”, 
written in 1944, Orwell argued, again referring to Burnham that Britain 
was decadent and bound to be rapidly conquered by Germany. After the 
conquest of Britain would come the attack on the USSR and Russia’s 
‘military weakness’ would cause her to ‘fall apart to east and west’. Orwell 
writes, ”You are then left with three great super-states, Germany, Japan 
and the USA, which divide the world between them, make ceaseless war 
upon one another, and keep the working class in permanent subjection”. 
(Orwell 2006a, 85.)
In his columns Orwell describes international order in the same 
manner as in his novel, saying that states will be at permanent war with 
each other but the war will not be very intensive or bloody. He sees these 
super-states as cut off  from each other, self-suffi  cient and in no need 
of trading with each other. Th ey are ruled by a self-elected oligarchy. 
(Orwell 2006b, 240; 2006c, 249.) Orwell writes, “If these two or three 
super-states do establish themselves, not only will each of them be too big 
to be conquered, but they will be under no necessity to trade with one 
another, and in a position to prevent all contact between their nationals. 
Already, for a dozen years or so, large areas of the earth have been cut off  
from one another, although technically at peace.” (Orwell 2006b, 240.)
Orwell foresaw what was to come after the war: the Iron Curtain. Two 
super-states embraced the world order of preventing interconnectedness 
as much as possible. Interestingly, this was not the prospect that other 
visionaries of spheres of infl uence or great power management portrayed. 
Quite the opposite: at the core of spheres of infl uence lay the ideal of great 
powers managing international relations in concert. Th e super-states were 
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indeed expected to keep away from each other’s spheres of infl uence but 
not to isolate themselves economically or culturally. International society 
would prevail in a system of spheres of infl uence as much as in a system of 
nation-states. According to Orwell’s prophecy, something fundamental 
would happen to international society; it was as if it would split in two and 
lose its global character. Th ere would only remain two suzerain powers. 
If we think about international order, this kind of development would be 
an even more drastic new nomos than that which Schmitt described. Th e 
scary truth which lies within Orwell’s fantasy is that the world witnessed 
the emergence of two separate, antagonistic super-states, of which one 
exhibited totalitarian features after the Second World War and has not 
yet fully recovered from it. 
Although Orwell sides with Burnham in predicting the division of 
world into super-states, he criticises “that school of thought” for its 
contempt for the common person and ignorance of the strength of 
democracy – its power of criticism (Orwell, 2006a, 85). For Orwell, the 
sphere of infl uence of a super-state presupposed a totalitarian system. He 
does not see super-states as capable of off ering respect for the common 
person, or of upholding truth, and thus upholding democracy. Orwell is 
explicit about the impossibility of incorporating international infl uence of 
the super-state with democratic government. Super-states simply cannot 
be democratically governed, and thus they cannot pursue any good. Th is 
view is what still persists. Perhaps this is one of the reasons, coupled with 
our bad memories of the Cold War, why we are so afraid of spheres of 
infl uence in the present. Orwell himself believed in the possibility of the 
all-mighty super-states and their totalitarian nature. Orwell’s account is 
an image of Cold War spheres of infl uence as comprised of super-states 
or great empires which are totalitarian by nature, possess the atom bomb, 
are self-contained and are maintaining “peace that is not peace” (Orwell 
2006c, 249).
5.7 The Shared Concern
According to Luoma-aho (2007, 52), ”Schmitt was quite possibly the 
fi rst theorist of international law and international relations to articulate 
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what exactly happened when President Monroe gave his seventh annual 
address to the United States Congress, and what had really begun almost 
a decade before in the Congress of Vienna: the dismantling of the Peace 
of Westphalia”. Perhaps Schmitt was the fi rst, but he certainly was not 
the only one. Th e common concern for the majority of these thinkers 
was the need to solve the problem of nationalism as the cause of major 
wars. If this was not an openly stated goal, the idea of breaking national 
boundaries – willingly or by force – and connecting peoples was. Only 
Burnham’s realist account was motivated by power politics to the extent 
that he ultimately favoured universalism and was ready to see it achieved 
even if it meant war. 
All the theorists presented here were interested in international order, 
not only the fate of their own state. Essentially all shared Schmitt’s 
concern for universalism, even Burnham – until the point when he 
became more afraid of the atomic weapon. Lippmann and Carr put more 
emphasis on prevention of major wars than their German counterparts, 
but Schmitt and Naumann both sought a peaceful world. For Lippmann 
and Naumann alike non-forceful unifi cation was a necessity, whereas 
Burnham accepted war as the means to achieving a world consisting 
of super-states. Schmitt was more occupied with the concept of nomos, 
and was not specifi c regarding the details of the actual unifi cation. Carr’s 
concern was also war and order: he declared the end of small states and 
dreamt of a British Großraum. Some were more concerned with matters 
of peace than others, but all attempted to paint a picture of some sort of 
super-states which would be the actors in the future international order. 
Th e predictions, or fears, came true in the form of the super-states of 
United States and the Soviet Union, although not in the way the scholars 
had perhaps hoped. In fact, Schmitt’s and Naumann’s fear was actualised: 
Germany lost the war and its position as a great power. Carr’s England 
did not succeed in becoming a pole of power either. Burnham’s World 
Empire did not materialise until the 1990s and even then it was not the 
sole guardian of the atomic weapon.
Th e theorists of the period of the world wars all relied on the idea of a 
balance of power. On the one hand, the balancing system is seen as the 
core problem and, on the other, as the ultimate solution. Schmitt based 
his ideal world on the idea of a balance of power: balance meant pluralism 
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and “no balance” universalism. For Schmitt, the necessity of spheres of 
infl uence as the basis of the new system of balance lay in the fact that the 
system was becoming that of two balancers with universalist ambitions. 
Either of them could gain too much power, turning the world into a 
single empire unless a third force was found. Initiated by the Monroe 
Doctrine, the development was towards Großräume, or balance through 
spheres of infl uence. Th ere could be no balance of power within the past 
system of states. Carr found balance in regionalism, which he situated 
between the bankruptcy of nationalism and empty internationalism. 
Burnham was in principle in favour of a balance of power. He, too, 
was afraid of universalism, although it was only the universalism of the 
Soviet Union that he warned against. Burnham claimed that instead of 
trying to form a system based on a balance of power that relied on several 
spheres of infl uence, it would be safer for all nations, for the sake of their 
“freedom”, to opt for United States’ universalism. A balance of power 
needed to be sacrifi ced if the nations of the world wanted to preserve 
even some amount of freedom. 
Roosevelt and Lippmann were concerned that small states could abuse 
balance-of-power politics. In a sense, they saw a balance of power as 
working just like Butterfi eld (1966, 142–145) described when he argued 
that it gave room to manoeuvre for small states. Lippmann set the idea 
of balance of power against that of a Good Neighbour Policy. Th e former 
resulted in war, while the latter in order. For Lippmann, a balance of 
power, as it let the small states “run around free”, was the source of disorder 
and war; by putting small states on a leash with the Good Neighbour 
Policy, war could be avoided. Th us for Lippmann the argument goes that 
the system of “responsible spheres of infl uence” was an alternative to a 
balance of power. In the end, Lippmann is simply proposing a balance-
of-power system based on his idea of good neighbours and not a system 
that lacks a mechanism for maintaining a balance of power. 
In Orwell’s fantasy-world of Nineteen Eighty-Four, a constant state 
of war enforced by a totalitarian government was a means to achieve a 
balance of power among the super-states. Orwell’s warning is powerful in 
all its extremity, because it is based on the perspective  of an individual. 
It lacks the nationalistic perspective of wanting to make one’s own state 
the model super-state. It is a story of how my super-state, along with 
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others, is corrupt and rotten. Th e system is rotten from the inside and the 
international order is based on the perverse equating of war with peace. 
Orwell lacks a general perspective on sovereignty, the role of small states, 
the development of international order, and so on. Yet, by the same 
token, he is not confi ned to the map metaphor, but focuses instead on the 
nature of the infl uencing state. Th e signifi cance of Nineteen Eighty-Four 
derives from the fact that its popularity is something quite diff erent when 
compared to any theory of international politics. Nineteen Eighty-Four 
was made into a movie and references to Orwell‘s imaginary world in 
popular culture are frequent (see Wikipedia on George Orwell). Even if 
extreme totalitarianism is the prominent theme of Nineteen Eighty-Four, 
the super-state system is the context for the emergence of “doublethink” 
and “Big Brother”. Th us, Orwell’s writings, and especially his prose, may 
have a greater infl uence on people (including state leaders and academics) 
than the less well-known theorisations on sphere of infl uence, which is the 
reason I saw the need to explore Orwell’s ideas. Clearly, Orwell’s sphere of 
infl uence represents cruelty and injustice at their utmost, complying with 
and reinforcing the pejorative associations of the concept today. 
Another common line of thought – sometimes overt, sometimes 
more hidden – is that the normality or necessity of power is what justifi es 
spheres of infl uence. It is not an abnormality that an inequality of 
power emerges if it is seen as a part of the social life and functioning of 
international relations. In fact, spheres of infl uence prevent tyranny and 
the disappearance of the political – pluralism – from the international 
arena by dividing power according to the principle of balance of power 
in a new form. Th e nation-states in Europe failed to achieve a balance of 
power among themselves against each other; war eventually prevailed. 
Nationalism urged states to take up arms. Th us, something bigger than 
the nation-state was needed as the seat of power, although such bigger 
entities also ran the risk of ending up either as world tyrannies or engaged 
in major wars with each other. But as the nation-state system was in crisis, 
and the world was already moving in the direction of a world empire 
or world government, spheres of infl uence, super-states or Großräume 
off ered a solution in between the two other options. Power seemed to be 
the basis of all the international systems in sight since humanity was too 
divided for a solidarist society to emerge on its own. Even Lippmann, 
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who wanted to cut power out of the equation, could not fully escape the 
fact that even in the Good Neighbor Policy sovereignty would not be the 
same for all.
Burnham’s and Lippmann’s approaches confl ict with regard to their 
approaches to responsibility and power politics. According to Wight 
(1995, 29), in common usage “power politics” does not mean merely 
the relations between independent powers. It is a translation of the 
German Machtpolitik, which means “the politics of force”. It denotes “the 
conduct of international relations by force or the threat of force, without 
consideration of right or justice”. (Ibid.) Burnham saw power politics as 
an unyielding element of international relations, emphasising off ensive 
over defensive foreign policy, whereas Lippmann, at least rhetorically, 
saw great powers as great responsibles. Whether Burnham liked it or not, 
the idea of responsibility was very much used (or abused) by the United 
States in defending its foreign policies, and whether Lippmann liked it 
or not, the United States also failed to abandon power politics altogether.
Th e world wars off er important insights as regards the justice and 
injustice of spheres of infl uence. In general, for the theorists presented 
here, justice was not a top priority and inequality of power was a fact of 
political life. Justice in the super-state was not a choice as such; it was 
more a question of convincing the infl uenced states that they needed 
to unite under the power of the centre in order to survive. Th us, justice 
was instrumental, and not a value. Bull and Keal discussed the justice of 
spheres of infl uence in the context of the system of states, not challenging 
the premises of that system, whereas Naumann, Schmitt, Carr, Burnham, 
Lippmann and Orwell proceeded from the view that there could be no 
system of states based on sovereign equality anymore. Even so, the rights 
of infl uenced states were a concern, because super-states could not be built 
by force. Th us, Naumann, Carr and Lippmann expressed sympathy for 
infl uenced states and wrote of the importance of small states’ acceptance 
of being dominated.
But, as small states still existed, as the system was only on the verge 
of destruction, the proponents of a new system needed to justify the 
systematic injustice that would emerge with it. For Naumann, Schmitt 
and Carr, unifi cation was a necessity. Schmitt’s focus was on the 
universalist threat and Carr’s on the problems of both nationalism and 
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internationalism. Naumann, like Schmitt, was worried about the future 
of the German state, and Carr was concerned about the future of Britain. 
For Burnham, it was the communist threat of world domination that 
justifi ed American hegemony. For Lippmann, it was the good-natured 
approach that made spheres of infl uence look like they would benefi t 
all parties involved. Orwell, by contrast, could not fi nd justifi cation for 
the super-states which came with totalitarianism, and resulted in “brain 
death” for the human beings who were subjects of the system. Burnham 
and Lippmann had no need to discuss the matter at all, since for them the 
United States was a democracy. For Burnham, even as the world hegemon, 
the United States would still be democratic; and for Lippmann, non-
democratic states simply needed to be converted. Orwell was concerned 
for the fate of the common people inhabiting the super-states. Naumann 
and Carr alike expressed sympathy for the people. Naumann insisted on 
voluntary unifi cation and saw Mid-Europe as a brotherhood of nations. 
Carr, with all his realism, thought that the foundation of international 
order lay in improving the living-condition of people. I think that when 
it comes to the normative dimension of spheres of infl uence, it is precisely 
the human perspective that we are lacking. I will return to this topic in 
the concluding chapter. 
One could argue that it is not necessarily spheres of infl uence that the 
selected theorists are talking about, but if we look at Schmitt’s account, he 
does bring up the concept. Th e idea of a sphere of infl uence was available 
knowledge and all of the thinkers discussed here must have been aware 
of it. Envisioning super-states with a strong emphasis on power politics 
evokes the pejorative associations of spheres of infl uence rather than a 
more acceptable form of infl uence or integration. Naumann’s Mid-
Europe comes closest to the concepts of regionalism and integration, but 
is unique in imagining a new international order, that is, a system-level 
change which restructures the world political map. Perhaps this was not 
the original colonialist idea of a sphere of infl uence, but if a sphere of 
infl uence can be traced all the way back to the suzerain system, there 
we fi nd spheres of infl uence determining global power relations and 
territorial borders. 
Although Burnham writes of super-states, his circles of infl uence are 
nothing but the map metaphor that often describes spheres of infl uence. 
187
Although Lippmann envisions a Good Neighbor Policy, his outright 
resistance to spheres of infl uence is evidence of conscious consideration 
on his part of the meaning of the concept. Th e reasons why sphere of 
infl uence is not a concept used by these theorists are manifold. One 
explanation can be its association with colonial practices and the need 
to fi nd new terminology. Lippmann’s case is clear: he wants to defend 
infl uence with a term which has no negative overtones, and this can 
very well be the reason why Schmitt and others avoid the concept as 
well. But this does not mean that they were not writing about spheres 
of infl uence. I argue that the grand designs during the period of the 
world wars, based as they were on the connection that is built between 
infl uence, international order and justice, strongly relate to the idea of 
sphere of infl uence. Geostrategy does not reach these far corners of ambit 
of the concept; and Empire lite, regionalism and integration do not have 
the history and centrality that the concept has within the vocabulary of 
the discipline. I am opening up the criteria – or the terms of discourse, 
as Connolly would put it – for an appraisal which can incorporate the 
normative dimension and questions of order into what at present remains 
an uncontested concept; what I envision is a sphere of infl uence conceived 
as situated between nation and humanity. 
For a history of spheres of infl uence, the period of the world wars 
off ers an untapped pool of ideas. Whereas the Cold War practices, such 
as those seen in the Cuban Missile Crisis, are presently connected with 
the concept of sphere of infl uence, the discussion on the concentration 
of sovereignty and the possible benefi ts and drawbacks of creating 
super-states are not. Schmitt’s ideas are perhaps the best known, but no 
serious thought is given to his or others’ visions on spheres of infl uence. 
At present, the international system is in a state of confusion about the 
principle of state sovereignty, unifi cation of states, inequality and balance 
of power, giving all the more reason to look into the past, where confusion 
and uncertainty resulted in theories on spheres of infl uence. 
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6 The Burden of the Cold War
Th ere is one episode in history which dominates the present understanding 
of spheres of infl uence in IR, Russian foreign policy research, the media 
and everyday language. Whereas colonial infl uence or the Concert of 
Europe is sometimes remembered, and the theories on super-states and 
Großräume prompted by the events the of world war era go virtually 
unacknowledged, the Cold War is seen as the true era of spheres of 
infl uence. We remember the division, the superpowers and their blocs, 
the ideological battle, and the Cuban Missile Crisis; and we remember 
how Russia lost its sphere of infl uence and the United States could freely 
pursue its universalist ambitions. Th e purpose of this chapter is not to 
tell the story of Cold War spheres of infl uence in its entirety or even 
comprehensively. I wish to raise questions on the interpretations of 
spheres of infl uence in the Cold War, to awaken an interest in examining 
how the Cold War can illuminate the concept of sphere of infl uence and 
to further problematise the present uses of the concept by bringing to 
light subjugated knowledge from the era. Th ere is a temporal overlap 
with other episodes (in particular the English School), but the chapter 
examines the Cold War setting and superpower relations in more detail. 
Th e purpose of this chapter is twofold:
1) To gain insights into the Cold War theorisation on sphere of infl uence. 
I will focus on the work of Keal, Kaufman and Vincent (as well as Bull, 
but to a lesser extent), which represents the analytical discourse of the 
time. One could read any Cold War texts and discover something of 
the history of spheres of infl uence there, but because my concern is in 
conceptualising the phenomenon, I found it more useful to look into 
sources which explicitly theorise spheres of infl uence. Keal and Kaufman 
off er perspectives on order and justice, which satisfi es the need to 
problematise that which is evident in the present, that is, the current 
pejorative associations of the concept.
2) In order to refl ect on actual Cold War practices, instead of just the few 
theoretical sources, I choose to take a closer look at the Cuban Missile 
Crisis as an example. Again Keal and Kaufman provide much of the 
material, because of their theoretical focus, but I have taken an interest 
in the speeches of state leaders and these will be explored as well. 
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In its simplicity, the Cold War understanding of a sphere of infl uence 
is that of a foreign policy practice of controlling smaller states for the 
sake of position, prestige and balance of power. It is infl uence for the 
sake of infl uence: any increase in the quality and quantity of infl uence 
is that much infl uence taken away from the rival power. Spheres of 
infl uence were interpreted through “imperialist geopolitics” and a realist 
worldview. Spheres of infl uence meant not only an ideological divide 
but also military superiority or inferiority and resources for prosperity. 
Looking more closely at the Cold War reveals that fundamentally, despite 
the cold, realist power calculations, spheres of infl uence were an aspect 
of international order: the threat of universalism should balancing fail, 
great power management, questions of sovereignty and intervention, 
tacit understandings, stability of possessions, and even consideration 
of justice. We lack theoretical studies on Cold War spheres of infl uence 
which would take an interest in the idea of sphere of infl uence, just like 
we lack interest in the relationship between spheres of infl uence and 
international institutions in the present. Th e Cold War made spheres of 
infl uence visible; the world became the battlefi eld of spheres of infl uence 
with the result that the Cold War manifestations of infl uence ended up 
overshadowing the earlier history of spheres of infl uence. Hence, the 
concept of sphere of infl uence came to be understood in the meaning 
ascribed to it during the Cold War.
Th en what is wrong associating the concept of sphere of infl uence 
with the Cold War? First, it is problematic to use the concept without 
contesting it, as I have argued throughout the study. Second, it is 
problematic to rely on an understanding of spheres of infl uence that 
is based on the history of the Cold War, without fi rst contesting the 
interpretations of this history. What do we really know about the Cold 
War spheres of infl uence with our lack of knowledge and interest in the 
conceptualisations of the phenomenon? Th ird, the problem of exporting 
Cold War images into the present, like that one would face in exporting 
“world war images”, is that the world is being transformed all the time. 
States change; their relations change; new states appear; and some old 
states disappear. Even if the institutions of the society of states stand 
rather fi rm, they, too, are under pressure whenever a new order emerges. 
Th us we should constantly renew our knowledge of what constitutes a 
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sphere of infl uence, as long as people continue to use the concept and 
it captures something essential about territorial infl uence. We are better 
equipped to do this when we study our history, in this case the history of 
the Cold War, the most powerful history of spheres of infl uence in our 
minds. Th us, the Cold War is full of potential. Because of the superpower 
practices of infl uence and because of the theory of Cold War spheres of 
infl uence (although minimal in number), we can bring the Cold War 
itself under the looking glass.
6.1 Theoretical Framework of the Cold War
Th e Cold War era off ers as yet unexplored theoretical insights for 
conceptualising and contextualising spheres of infl uence. For one 
thing, the English School literature is situated in the Cold War context: 
Vincent’s (1974) book on interventions off ers a perspective on the era 
which I will explore here. I also refer to Bull several times. However, 
Keal’s book Unspoken Rules and Superpower Dominance, from 1983, and 
Kaufman’s Th e Superpowers and their Spheres of Infl uence: Th e United States 
and the Soviet Union in Eastern Europe and Latin America, from 1976, 
deal specifi cally with the spheres of infl uence of the two superpowers. 
I have already presented Keal’s and Kaufman’s defi nitions of sphere of 
infl uence (chapter 1.1), as well as many other of their ideas, and here I 
will go into the consolidation and the formality of Cold War spheres of 
infl uence. Th e work of Keal and Kaufman is again important subjugated 
knowledge, because their theorisations are unknown and their insights 
can help us conceptualise the Cold War spheres of infl uence in particular.
6.1.1 Consolidating Spheres of Infl uence
Keal describes the post-war mentality when spheres of infl uence crept 
into international practices. Keal (1983, 65) explains how the Atlantic 
Charter, which was approved in 1941 by the allies: the United States, 
Britain and the Soviet Union, was a joint declaration of a post-war order. 
It asserted principles which confl icted with ideas on spheres of infl uence, 
denying a right to aggrandisement or territorial changes against the wishes 
191
of the people concerned and giving sovereign rights and self-government 
to those who had been deprived of them (ibid., 66). Contrary to the spirit 
of these initial wishes, spheres of infl uence nevertheless became a legacy 
of the war (ibid). Keal explains exactly how spheres of infl uences were 
formed after the war. First, they were determined by occupation of specifi c 
regions. Where the Soviets were present, the Western powers stayed away 
and vice versa. Th e Soviet Union stayed out of the aff airs of Italy and 
Greece, and the United States and Britain out of Romania, Bulgaria and 
Hungary (Keal 1983, 84–86). Th is is how spheres of infl uence worked as 
the “exclusion of other powers”, to cite Keal’s defi nition.
Th e interesting question is how exactly spheres of infl uence were 
consolidated during the Cold War. When we read Keal’s analysis of the 
Soviet Union consolidating its sphere of infl uence, it is not hard to guess 
where the pejorative associations of the concept come from. Keal points 
out that in 1939 the Soviet Union and Germany signed a non-aggression 
pact with a secret protocol dividing Eastern Europe into spheres of 
infl uence. Th at was the beginning of the Soviet establishment of spheres 
of infl uence, Keal (1983, 80) notes. For Keal, Stalin’s hegemony over 
Central East Europe was ”not compatible with the principles of the 
Atlantic Charter and was bound to bring the United States and the 
Soviet Union into confl ict” (Ibid., 83–84). Th e focal concerns here are 
the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact with the Nazis and Stalin’s hegemony, both 
very unpleasant memories for Europeans. What makes these memories 
important is that these are the very same memories that haunt Russia. I 
will show in chapter 7 how Russian analysts try to explain away this very 
same legacy (the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact and Stalin’s policies) of the 
country’s sphere of infl uence. 
 Keal writes that the United States opposed a Soviet sphere of infl uence 
in Eastern Europe but through its actions and inactions in fact allowed 
it (Keal 1983, 93; also Davis 1974, 170). In fear of its rival’s further 
expansion, the United States did not want to recognise the Soviet sphere 
of infl uence but it did nothing in practice to oppose it (Keal 1983; 94, 
96). But as the Soviet infl uence became more and more overt towards the 
end of 1945, the United States started to act according to the principle of 
balance of power (ibid, 97–98). On 12 March 1947, President Truman 
asked Congress for aid to Greece and Turkey to resist Soviet pressure. 
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Th is became known as the Truman Doctrine (see also Vincent 1974, 
188–193). Keal (1983, 99) writes: 
Most of the states in eastern Europe already had a communist 
government and ‘way of life’ and the region had been privately 
acknowledged by United States offi  cials as a Soviet sphere of infl uence. 
In eff ect the speech drew a line between these states and those where 
Soviet infl uence was not established. It was a formal declaration that 
the United States would resist any extension of the Soviet sphere of 
infl uence beyond its existing limits. As such it marked a resignation 
on America’s part that eastern Europe was a Soviet sphere of infl uence.
Other steps taking the United States closer to consolidating its respective 
sphere of infl uence was the recommendation for a collective defence in 
Northern America and Western Europe, strengthening regional order 
in Latin America and treating Soviet infl uence in Eastern Europe as 
irreversible (Keal 1983, 101–102). Behind the Marshall Aid Plan (1947) 
was an idea that economic support to Western Europe would diminish the 
conditions for Communism to spread, in other words, it was an attempt 
to prevent Soviet infl uence spreading westwards (ibid, 101–102). Th is 
was, of course, against Soviet interests. Keal (1983, 107) observes, “Th e 
Marshall Plan provoked the Soviet Union to further consolidation and 
the extent of Soviet infl uence was made clear by Poland, Czechoslovakia 
and Finland, all of which would have preferred to have participated in 
the plan, declining to do so”. In addition to preventing Czechoslovakia 
and Poland from joining, the Soviet Union consolidated its sphere of 
infl uence through a pro-communist coup in Czechoslovakia in February 
1948 (ibid., 104–105). Keal is explaining the practice of how the 
superpowers took control of the territories of the globe, dividing them, 
excluding each other, at times challenging one another and at others 
accepting one another’s infl uence, and accepting this as the post-war 
international order. Th e idea of inaction as an acknowledgement of a 
sphere of infl uence is interesting and I have already referred to it earlier 
in the context of intervention. Th is means that Cold War spheres of 
infl uences were established as a mixture of extending infl uence, fi nding 
the territorial limits of that infl uence, and abstaining from interference, 
intervention and other involvement. 
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For Keal and Kaufman, the Cold War represents a consolidation of 
spheres of infl uence, making them a normal practice of international 
relations. Kaufman (1976, 195) describes the “decisive presence” of the 
Soviet Union in Eastern Europe and the United States in Latin America 
as a normal state of aff airs. He (1976, 28) observes, “All the countries 
located in the two spheres of infl uence have suff ered from penetration by 
the superpowers to varying degrees. In some cases, the intervention has 
been permanent with annexation being the fi nal solution.” In the same 
vein, Keal (1983, 104) states, “Th us, the lines were drawn: what had been 
going on since before the end of the war was now explicit and open”. Th e 
openness and normality of the two spheres of infl uence is the reason why 
we associate spheres of infl uence with the Cold War. To invoke the term 
“sphere of infl uence” in the present is to evoke not the Großraum, Mid-
Europe, super-state, Good Neighbor Policy or the Great Responsibles, 
but the ideological hegemonic ambitions of the Soviet Union and, to a 
much lesser extent, the United States.
6.1.2 Interventionist Policies
When we look at Keal’s, Kaufman’s and Vincent’s accounts of Cold War 
superpower relations, we fi nd not only spheres of infl uence but also 
intervention, the Monroe Doctrine, universalism and the Good Neighbor 
Policy. In fact, this is the legacy of the post-war international order and 
theorisations which off ered visions of a new world order. All the way 
from Naumann to Keal and the English School, from 1915 towards the 
end of the Cold War the same themes surround the idea of sphere of 
infl uence. Th us, the clarity that related notions bring to the concept of 
sphere of infl uence are not only the legacy of the period of the world 
wars, but also of the Cold War. 
When Keal explains how spheres of infl uence became the normal 
state of aff airs, in the case of the United States he refers to the Good 
Neighbor Policy and the Monroe Doctrine. According to Keal (1983, 
67), the United States’ vision of post-war order was that of universalism: 
World aff airs would not be governed by spheres of infl uence and a 
balance of power but by international cooperation and organisation. Keal 
explains that Roosevelt was opposed to colonialism and power politics, 
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and supported the self-determination of peoples (ibid). He thought that 
the security of the United States depended on the security of the entire 
international society. Th is was at least the declared policy; the motivations 
were not as unselfi sh (ibid). Keal observes, “In short, it was thought that 
the interests of peace would best be served by a universal system based on 
an integrated world economy and on the United Nations rather than by 
the traditional state crafts of spheres of infl uence and balance of power” 
(ibid., 69).
According to Keal (1983, 69), the United States also argued that 
spheres of infl uence belonged to power politics which was not the 
way to a lasting peace.34 To quote Keal (1983, 70), “In place of power 
politics there would be collective security under the control of a universal 
organization”. According to Keal, Roosevelt saw great power “policemen” 
acting as good neighbours (rather than “infl uencing powers”) in the 
interests of world community with the explicit approval of other great 
powers (ibid., 71). Th us, offi  cially, the United States opposed spheres of 
infl uence and promoted universal order, even though there were some 
dissident offi  cials who favoured spheres of infl uence (ibid.). Kaufman 
(1976, 181), too, examined the Good Neighbour Policy, and remarked 
how the Monroe Doctrine became more acceptable in Latin America due 
to Roosevelt’s approach:
It is important to note that the greatest progress towards the acceptance 
of the Monroe Doctrine on a continental basis was made during F.D. 
Roosevelt’s ‘good neighbour’ policy, committing Washington to refrain 
from military intervention in the Southern Republics. During the 
years 1933-65 no direct military intervention took place in the region.
Even though Kaufman writes that the United States refrained from 
military intervention, Keal’s insight is that, in the end, Roosevelt’s vision 
of world order was not too diff erent from one with spheres of infl uence 
and great powers that were responsible for world order. Th e role of 
34 Lynn Davis (1974; 141, 143) wrote that throughout the war the United States 
was against spheres of infl uence, the tradition that had caused the outbreak of the war 
in the fi rst place. For the United States in order to achieve peace, a collective security 
organisation needed to be formed. Davis notes that the American offi  cials never saw the 
Monroe Doctrine or United States’ relations to Latin American states as analogous to 
Soviet or British infl uence in Europe, which they so feared.
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weaker states in this system of collective security was very much like the 
one within a sphere of infl uence (Keal 1983, 70). What Keal implies 
is that a sphere of infl uence can have diff erent names but in the end it 
involves the same conduct. In other words, if a foreign policy practice 
falls within the defi nition of a sphere of infl uence, then regardless of the 
name given to it, it is still a sphere-of-infl uence policy. Th e terms used 
to describe a particular form of conduct may then signify a diff erence 
between accepted and disapproved of policy. Th us, for Roosevelt the term 
“policemen” signifi ed an acceptable policy, whereas “spheres of infl uence” 
were disapproved of. What we are broaching here is the question of how to 
make infl uence acceptable. Th e Good Neighbor Policy is not necessarily 
a policy designed to thwart spheres of infl uence, but one establishing a 
sphere of infl uence by disapproving of intervention, thus “selling” the 
position of being infl uenced more easily.
Vincent confi rms the same story and we have heard this story before: 
Th e Monroe Doctrine was a discursive tool and an instrument for 
defending both non-interventionist and interventionist foreign policy. 
But this time Vincent also touches upon the legitimacy of infl uence 
implemented by invoking the non-intervention principle. According 
to Vincent, the American approach to Latin America until 1918 was 
interventionist but at the Inter-American Conference in Buenos Aires 
in 1936 a protocol of non-intervention was signed. Vincent (1974, 113) 
writes:
What was remarkable was that the United States should bind 
herself by treaty to the observation of an apparently absolute rule of 
nonintervention, allowing none of the exceptions with which she had 
increasingly indulged herself. By signing and ratifying such a protocol, 
it seemed that the United States had fi nally succumbed to the Latin 
American doctrine of nonintervention.
Before 1936 the United States had resisted the Latin American call for the 
adoption of the principle of non-intervention in their mutual relations, 
but here “Franklin Roosevelt’s Good Neighbour policy had extended to 
the international legal relations of the American States” (Vincent 1974, 
115). Th is was infl uence without intervention, making infl uence more 
acceptable, and in Vincent’s estimation transposing non-intervention 
196
from a principle to a term in a treaty was quite remarkable (ibid, 193). 
But this tendency of American foreign policy was short-lived. Vincent 
(ibid) explains how already before the Second World War hemispheric 
solidarity was becoming the foundation of relations between the United 
States and Latin America. Especially after Communism entered the 
hemisphere, the Monroe Doctrine became accepted as the hemispheric 
principle (ibid). Where the original Monroe Doctrine opposed the old 
European order extending to the Western Hemisphere, the Cold War 
transformed the Doctrine into one opposing Communism, at the same 
time broadening the idea of extrahemispheric intervention and counter-
intervention against it (ibid., 208). Vincent (1974, 193) also interprets the 
Truman Doctrine as an extension of the Monroe Doctrine (the exclusion 
of the old European order) into a worldwide doctrine of counter-
intervention. Th is meant the extension of infl uence from the regional 
to the global level. Here Vincent is pointing to the transformation of 
the United States’ policy from non-intervention to a sphere-of-infl uence 
policy fi rmly founded upon interventionism. Vincent thus establishes the 
connection between Cold War spheres of infl uence and the policy of 
intervention.
If we look more closely at the United States’ interventionist policy, 
we fi nd a new doctrine which explains what sphere of infl uence means. 
Both Keal (1983, 141–143) and Kaufman (1976, 29–30) mention the 
Johnson Doctrine as one instance of the United States establishing its 
sphere of infl uence in Latin America. Th e United States intervened in 
the Dominican Republic in 1965 after internal power struggles in that 
country which the United States saw as a threat to the inter-American 
system and peace in the hemisphere. President Johnson claimed there 
were outside agents, that is, communists, trying to seize control and that 
prompted the United States to announce its position, which became 
known as the Johnson Doctrine. Th e United States fi rst argued that the 
intervention was conducted in order to protect Americans living in the 
Dominican Republic, but the justifi cation was soon extended to include 
responsibility for law and order in the country, preventing the spread 
of international communism and, fi nally, protection of the hemisphere. 
Th e Johnson Doctrine limited the freedom of the Dominican Republic 
in conducting a revolution and choosing its form of government. (Keal 
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1983, 141–142; also Vincent 1974, 201–214.) But if intervention 
became characteristic of the United States’ infl uence, both regionally and 
globally, how could it be justifi ed? We can try to answer that question 
from the Soviet perspective.
Th e case for justifying intervention is found from Windsor’s (1984, 
54–55) notion of structural intervention. Reading from Vincent (1974, 
146–147), the Soviet Union’s internationalism was a form of structural 
intervention in which the nation-state was downplayed to the extent 
where intervention was considered an internal confl ict. Vincent observes 
that after the Russian Revolution there was no room for the norm of 
non-intervention, because Russia had substituted class for nation and 
imperialist war for civil war (ibid.). Reading from Vincent and put in the 
language of the Cold War, this meant that Russia had formed its sphere 
of infl uence, a realm where intervention was normal and acceptable. Th e 
establishment of the Communist International (Comintern) in March 
1919, and its strengthening in 1920 made respect for national self-
determination all the more insignifi cant for Soviet Russia (bid., 152–
154). Conversely, in Soviet relations with Asia national freedom was 
declared as a means to counteract imperialist oppression (ibid.). Vincent 
(1974, 155) writes, “It is possible to establish this dualism as a theme of 
Soviet foreign policy between the two wars containing a revolutionary 
motif which led to interference with the aff airs of other states and a motif 
of accommodation which proclaimed noninterference at the formal 
diplomatic level.” Here we see the unease over the principle of non-
intervention which Russia has yet to overcome: simultaneous upholding 
and violating of the principle of non-intervention. I will explore this in 
more detail in chapter 7. According to Vincent (1974, 184–185) non-
intervention as a legal principle was defended by the Soviet Union but 
it was superseded by interests derived from socialist internationalism. 
Moreover, adherence to the principle of non-intervention did not prevent 
the Soviet Union off ering support for national liberation movements 
due to the Soviet idea of sovereignty, which recognised the right to self-
determination of each nation irrespective of its statehood or lack of it 
(ibid.). 
For Vincent, it was the Brezhnev Doctrine justifying Soviet invasion in 
Czechoslovakia, as outlined by S. Kovalev in a Pravda article in September 
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26, 196835, which established the policy of structural intervention. 
Vincent (1974, 177–178) describes the Soviet Union’s discursive strategy 
of turning the matter of sovereignty upside down: by interfering in 
Czechoslovakia the Soviet Union in fact claimed to uphold the country’s 
sovereignty against internal and external counterrevolution, and had by 
no means violated it. Th e Soviet Union’s actions were thus protective and 
defensive (ibid.).
Th us far we have established the narrative of consolidating spheres of 
infl uence. Th e United States turned its back on non-intervention and 
the Soviet Union had established its interventionist sphere of infl uence 
policy already in the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. If adherence to the non-
intervention principle of the United States made the Monroe Doctrine 
and sphere of infl uence more acceptable, what happened when non-
intervention was abandoned? Th e answer on the part of the Soviet 
Union was to establish intervention as the state of aff airs - structural and 
permanent intervention, which, as the argument went, was no longer 
intervention. For the United States, legalising infl uence through treaties 
off ered a means to consolidate intervention as a part of its sphere-of-
infl uence policy. But we can go even further in discussing the normative 
aspect of acceptance.
6.1.3 De Facto or de Jure Infl uence?
Keal devoted pages to explaining how spheres of infl uence were 
agreed upon. His conclusion was that the interventions (in Hungary, 
Czechoslovakia, the Dominican Republic and Cuba) during the Cold 
War, and the inaction of the rival superpower against these interventions, 
testify to the tacit understanding of spheres of infl uence (Keal 1983, 
154). Tacit understanding “stems from perceived common interests 
and it is achieved through unilateral acts or the conspicuous absence of 
certain acts together with the response or lack of response to those acts” 
(ibid., 151). Keal (1983, 114) further explains that post-war spheres of 
infl uence were unilaterally consolidated but that at the same time they 
required implicit, by no means open, acquiescence from the other party. 
35 Brezhnev restated the ”doctrine” in a speech at the Fifth Congress of the Polish 
United Workers’ Party on November 13, 1968.
199
For Bull (2002, 216) as well, spheres-of-infl uence understandings were 
not formal or drafted in a treaty but based on reciprocal declarations of 
policy or “behaviour of the parties which is as if in conformity with a 
rule, even though that rule is not agreed, not enunciated nor even fully 
understood”. In addition, Bull (2002, 217) claims there was no “free 
hand” given to the other superpower, but rather the United States and 
the Soviet Union had an interest in and maintained contact with the 
other’s sphere of infl uence. According to Bull, as the agreements were 
tacit, their alteration did not take place through negotiation but through 
competition and struggle (Ibid., 218). 
Kaufman points out how there is de facto recognition of the superiority 
of one’s rival in the respective sphere of infl uence; condemnation is only 
verbal. He notes how world peace was more important than the goal 
of liberating the oppressed countries from their ideological opponent, 
referring to what Keal wrote extensively on regarding the “confl ict 
limiting eff ect of spheres of infl uence”. Kaufman also indicates that there 
was an understanding if not a mutual agreement on spheres of infl uence. 
Kaufman (1976, 21–24) calls this legitimacy by omission, tacit acceptance 
or indirect compliance with superpowers’ right to protect their spheres 
of infl uence. He describes the “decisive presence” of the Soviet Union in 
Eastern Europe and the United States in Latin America as a normal state 
of aff airs (ibid., 195). De facto infl uence and tacitness are not, however, 
the whole story. I have already pointed to the ideas of the normality of 
spheres of infl uence, structural intervention, acceptance, and treaties on 
non-intervention, all of which indicate the prospect of formalising and 
legitimising spheres of infl uence.
When writing about colonialism, I introduced Kaufman’s idea of 
de facto and de jure spheres of infl uence, of which Kaufman wanted to 
call the former a sphere of direct infl uence. Kaufman’s (1976, 10–11) 
aim was to argue that a sphere of infl uence was a product of the Cold 
War and was characterised by informality and geographical proximity.36 
Th is was also one reason why I have distinguished colonialism from a 
sphere-of-infl uence policy. Kaufman went on to put forward the idea of 
separating de jure and de facto also in the Cold War period. Th us, there 
36 Although Kaufman (1976, 181) makes the remark that in the case of the United 
States its sphere of infl uence has a longer history, he nevertheless writes that spheres of 
infl uence developed specifi cally after the Second World War (ibid., 11). 
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was also infl uence which is more formally agreed upon. Tacit agreement 
was no longer the only possibility. Keal makes the interesting remark that 
the Soviet Union had de facto predominance in Eastern Europe while the 
United States managed to create predominance by a juridical framework 
in Latin America. Keal (1983, 114) writes, “Th e nature of the infl uence 
it exerted was not of the same kind as the Soviet Union exerted in eastern 
Europe, and the United States was able to establish its predominance, 
to some extent, through a formal institutional framework.” Another 
diff erence, according to Keal, was that the United States had a presence 
in Europe that would have enabled it to challenge the Soviet Union’s 
infl uence but the Soviet Union had no means to oppose the United 
States’ actions in Latin America (ibid.). Kaufman’s (1976, 179) views on 
the Monroe Doctrine follow a similar reasoning:
In addition to the unilateral declaration, the de facto fulfi lment and 
the de jure universal acceptance of the doctrine, the US also sought the 
legitimisation of the principle through its acceptance by the countries 
of Latin America. In spite of intensive criticism of the unilateral 
use of the doctrine, and the amendments and additional clauses, 
the Fourth Pan-American Conference meeting in Buenos Aires, in 
1910, recognised the doctrine as ‘a factor of international peace in 
the continent’.
Kaufman’s argument is that de jure infl uence is more legitimate, more 
acceptable from the point of view of the infl uenced states. Like Kaufman 
and Vincent, Keal (1983, 107) argues that the United States invoked the 
Monroe Doctrine and made it acceptable as a hemispheric principle of 
continental solidarity in Latin America. Th e Inter-American Conferences 
of Foreign Ministers in Havana in 1940, in Rio de Janeiro in 1942, and 
later Inter-American Conferences made declarations in keeping with 
the Monroe Doctrine’s spirit of keeping non-American powers out of 
the continent (ibid., 108). Moreover, Article 52 of the United Nations 
Charter encourages regional arrangements for settling disputes (ibid., 
109). In 1947, the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance was 
signed, which placed responsibility for the defence of the region upon all 
members of the inter-American system; and in 1948, the Organization of 
American States (henceforth OAS) was formed (ibid.) (See also Vincent 
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1974, 195–196.) Th e Soviet Union had its juridical framework of the 
Warsaw Pact after 1955, which was also an organisation for protection 
against outside attack. Perhaps Keal does not take the Pact into 
consideration, since it came at a later period, when spheres of infl uence 
were already established. 
Kaufman explores the diff erences between the United States’ and the 
Soviet Union’s infl uence. According to Kaufman (1976, 34), inequality 
is manifested in diff erent terms for the two superpowers: Th e Soviet 
Union dominates its satellites in the political fi eld and the United States 
in the economic, social and educational sectors (ibid., 36). Moreover, 
there are fewer limitations on political and ideological freedom in Latin 
America than in Eastern Europe. Many Latin American countries enjoy 
freedom of the press, freedom of speech, and political pluralism (ibid.). 
Th e Soviet Union allowed diplomatic or other relations with capitalist 
countries, whereas the United States did not allow diplomatic relations 
with communist states (ibid., 38–39). Th e Soviet Union, nevertheless, 
had tighter political control overall (ibid.).
All in all, the de jure side of Cold War spheres of infl uence implied 
a certain acceptance of the infl uence, not only by the other infl uencing 
power but also by the infl uenced states. It even implied a legal framework, 
a treaty or an organisation. Regardless of this acceptance, Keal and 
Kaufman still speak of spheres of infl uence, which means that for them 
a sphere of infl uence de jure is not by defi nition diff erent from a sphere 
of infl uence which is imposed against the will of the infl uenced states. 
In present usage, a sphere of infl uence is always involuntary. Th e reason 
is discursive: How could we otherwise speak of a sphere of infl uence in 
a pejorative manner if it were not a tool of oppressive power politics? 
Reading Keal and Kaufman, a general image is beginning to emerge of 
Soviet infl uence being strongly negative and the United States’ infl uence 
being more legitimate. Legitimacy is a very important perspective when 
analysing spheres of infl uence because de jure infl uence allows us to relax 
the exclusively pejorative understanding  of the concept to include in it 
the notion of a sphere of infl uence which is not implemented against the 
will of the infl uenced and by force. Th is discussion of de facto and de jure 
infl uence has not lost its relevance and could contribute to a discussion 
202
of the means of infl uence (of Russia, the United States, European Union, 
China and other great powers) in the post-Cold War era.
What we can also conclude from the Cold War consolidation of 
spheres of infl uence by intervention, legal mechanisms and softer 
approaches is that the attempts to understand spheres of infl uence during 
the Cold War relied extensively on foreign policy doctrines. By evoking 
the diff erent sphere-of-infl uence doctrines – the “Monroe”, “Truman”, 
“Johnson”, and “Brezhnev” Doctrines – Keal, Kaufman and Vincent were 
able to make sense of spheres of infl uence by relating them to signifi cant 
historical signposts and the people behind them. Th ese doctrines are not 
the truth about spheres of infl uence, but they are the milestones we need 
to remember in order to remember what a sphere of infl uence meant. We 
need to remember them also because of their infl uence in the present. 
Evoking the Brezhnev Doctrine to criticise Russian foreign policy is a 
powerful discursive tool because of the associations with Cold War spheres 
of infl uence and interventionism it embodies. Th e policy and context 
behind the Brezhnev Doctrine, when approached analytically instead of 
emotionally, can be seen as incorporating historical knowledge that can 
be used for the conceptualisation of sphere of infl uence, for example, in 
explicating the idea of justifi cation and structural intervention. 
6.1.4 Subjugated Knowledges and Legacies
Both Keal and Kaufman acknowledge the good and the bad sides of 
spheres of infl uence. For Keal (1983, 156), tacit understandings were 
based on the common interest of avoiding a nuclear war. Th is function 
of limiting confl icts is related to the relationship between spheres of 
infl uence and international order that Keal wrote about extensively 
(ibid., 157). Kaufman observes that spheres of infl uence have decreased 
intraregional confl icts. Where Keal is concerned over confl icts between 
the superpowers and a nuclear war, Kaufman (1976, 196) writes that tight 
control has diminished confl icts among the members of a subsystem. 
When there have been confl icts, they have arisen as a consequence of 
an attempted emancipation from a controlling superpower (ibid.). Th e 
Cold War order rested on a balance of power, but Bull (2002, 109–111) 
thought that it did not rest on “general collaboration or concert among 
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the great powers concerned”. Th e Cold War balance was not the same as 
the nineteenth-century European balance-of-power system, which was 
based on rough equality of the fi ve members, a common culture and a 
common objective of balance (ibid.). Keal and Kaufman, the latter less 
directly, indicated that a tacit understanding of spheres of infl uence, and 
thus also a balance of power, among the two superpowers existed that was 
based on the avoidance of a nuclear war. 
Th e order the Cold War maintained was not something we can be 
particularly proud of. Even if we were to agree that some wars were avoided 
or some stability was maintained by Cold War spheres of infl uence, we 
could not justify the practice in the present. Th e power of the Cold War 
image is that it is a true example, from a very near past, of how spheres 
of infl uence divided people and how an ideological divide, military 
competition and antagonism almost led to a nuclear war. Accordingly, it 
is fair to say that we should remember the Cold War spheres of infl uence. 
We certainly do not want to repeat those mistakes. If we have forgotten 
the order-producing mechanisms in spheres of infl uence, the reason is 
straightforward: it was not a particularly good order. It was not even a 
particularly successful pluralist order, because ”the pluralism of two” did 
not really represent freedom, even though it did prevent the emergence 
of a world empire.
Clearly, the Cold War spheres of infl uence represented injustice. Th is 
is where I make my own normative statement; Keal and Kaufman were of 
the same opinion. Keal (1983, 212) recognised that spheres of infl uence 
were inherently unjust. Kaufman was perhaps even more concerned for 
the suff erings of the infl uenced states. Kaufman (1976, 11) describes 
a sphere of infl uence as a ‘prison’ condition for the countries of the 
controlled region. Even Cuba, which Kaufman describes as a deviant 
case, an exception to the inescapable prisoner status, suff ered from the 
limitations imposed by a superpower (ibid., 197–198). Th e Soviet Union 
could not “free” Cuba from the United States’ sphere of infl uence (ibid). 
In Kaufman’s view, the aim for a superpower in its sphere of infl uence is 
to keep the controlled countries in a position of dependency (ibid., 31). 
He writes that superpowers undermine and try to replace governments 
that have failed to maintain the values of the bloc (ibid., 82). “Satellite 
states” also renounce their interests in their external aff airs for the benefi t 
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of the superpower (ibid., 83). Kaufman also declares that the people 
of the dominated regions feel that their misfortunes are caused by the 
exploitative relationship to the superpower (ibid., 83–84). Today, in the 
discourses on spheres of infl uence, the prisoners of political and economic 
infl uence are the post-Soviet states; thus, the notion of imprisonment is 
one association that the concept of sphere of infl uence has carried along 
with it over the years.
Going back to subjugated knowledges, in addition to (the illusion of ) 
stability and order, there is the question of formalness and legitimacy 
of infl uence – expressed in the distinction between de facto and de jure 
infl uence – as the subjugated knowledge of the Cold War. It is hidden 
because presently only de facto infl uence is seen as infl uence constituting 
a sphere of infl uence. Nevertheless, Russia makes an exception. In the 
present discourses, if Russia’s infl uence is de jure it means a sphere of 
infl uence of the (self-serving) suzerain or imperialist power, not a 
legitimate form of infl uence – even if an infl uenced state accepts its 
position. In the case of Russia, attempts to establish infl uence via a treaty 
or an organisation are deemed instances of a sphere-of-infl uence policy. 
At the same time, in the present discourse no legal means of bringing 
states together, except when applied by Russia, deserves to be referred to 
as a sphere of infl uence. In general, there is no room to discuss spheres of 
infl uence as being legitimate. Keal and Kaufman discuss the legitimacy 
of infl uence with reference to its formality, but the present age does 
not separate infl uence as much by its level of formality as it does by 
classifying the states that exert their infl uence. Th is is why it does not 
make much diff erence how Russia exerts its infl uence, the fact that it does 
so is adequate for the condemnation of that infl uence. 
Th us, it is not only that de jure and de facto infl uence can be distinguished 
but there is also a question about the legitimacy of infl uence when it is 
related to a specifi c state. Keal and Kaufman try to suggest that a sphere 
of infl uence can be something diff erent for diff erent actors. Th e United 
States and the Soviet Union did not have the same type of legitimacy 
for their infl uence; yet, Kaufman and Keal used the concept of sphere of 
infl uence for both. Because they both had a defi nition in mind (exclusion 
of the other power, violation of sovereignty and mostly tacit agreement) 
they could refer to both the Soviet Union’s and the United States’ conduct 
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using the same term name regardless of the diff erences. At the same time, 
the United States’ infl uence emerges as more acceptable, because it is 
founded upon treaties; it is more “de jure”. 
Acceptable or not, for Kaufman and Keal, it is not the name of the state 
which determines whether its policy may be deemed one of establishing 
a sphere of infl uence; it is the policy itself, which is defi ned in relation to 
the prevailing international order. Th us, in this case, “sphere of infl uence” 
is not a pejorative expression and there is no need for Keal and Kaufman 
to describe the United States’ infl uence in some other terms (such as 
the Good Neighbor Policy). My ultimate point here is that that Russia, 
like any other state, is a member of international society and exerts its 
infl uence within the context of the world which its decision-makers see 
around them. Even though Russia is the successor of the Soviet Union, 
and even if we conclude that the Soviet Union engaged in an unjust 
practice in maintaining a sphere of infl uence, this is not a case for guilt 
by association. Indeed, it was Mikhail Gorbachev, the last head of state 
of the Soviet Union, who ended the “festival” of spheres of infl uence by 
abandoning the Brezhnev Doctrine and who demanded disarmament, 
the withdrawal of the country’s military presence in Eastern Europe and 
strengthening of global institutions like the United Nations. Gorbachev’s 
approach meant a clear break with previous policies. I believe we need a 
fresh look at Russia’s policy of infl uence, a perspective that does not cling 
to the country’s Cold War image. Th is means discussing the legitimacy 
and the nature of spheres of infl uence in general and in the case of Russia 
in particular.
6.2 The Cuban Missile Crisis 
We are still missing some elements from the Cold War story: the collision 
of and competition for spheres of infl uence, and the nuclear factor. Th ese 
elements I want to discuss by exploring the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962. 
Th is is not the only collision of the superpowers. We could very well 
discuss the Vietnam War (1955–75), the Berlin Blockade (1948–49), the 
Soviet war in Afghanistan (1979–89) or some other battle over spheres 
of infl uence. But the Cuban Missile Crisis represents “crossing the line”, 
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embarking on infl uence in the territory of the other superpower, and thus 
challenging the stability of international order as established by spheres 
of infl uence. More importantly, the missile crisis centres around nuclear 
weapons and encourages an examination of the meaning of the nuclear 
factor where spheres of infl uence are concerned. 
Th e number of sources which I draw on here is rather limited because 
my aim is not to explain the Cuban crisis in its entirety. Th e sources 
represent a set of examples through which we can raise questions about 
Cold War spheres of infl uence, and I am not attempting to discover 
everything there is to know about the event that took place in 1962. When 
it comes to discussing the concept of sphere of infl uence and Cuba, Paul 
Keal is really the only available source. Th ere is a need to take the concept 
of sphere of infl uence up a theoretical level and explore the crisis from this 
perspective. When it comes to fi nding out what happened in the missile 
crisis, I rely on Aleksandr Fursenko’s and Timothy Naftali’s “One Hell 
of a Gamble”: Khrushchev, Castro and Kennedy, 1958-1964 (1998) and 
Khrushchev’s Cold War: Th e Inside Story of an American Adversary (2006). 
For example, Graham Allison’s and Philip Zelikov’s Essence of Decision 
(1999) does not add anything signifi cant to Fursenko’s and Naftali’s 
account. A few other works are used as supplementary sources. In One 
Hell of a Gamble, Fursenko and Naftali share the story of the Cuban 
Missile Crisis using the archives with secret documents which have been 
opened since the collapse of the Soviet Union. In order to demonstrate 
the political discourse that Keal and Fursenko and Naftali refer to, I will 
present some speeches by President J.F. Kennedy and General Secretary 
Nikita Khrushchev. Again Keal’s and Fursenko and Naftali’s books 
function as a primary source as much as Kennedy and Khrushchev in the 
quest for the Cold War meanings of spheres of infl uence.
Th e Cold War was a time of constant threat of a nuclear war. Th is gave 
a special meaning to the balance of power and great power management. 
Th e possession of nuclear weapons by the United States and the Soviet 
Union created a unique concentration of power where maintaining the 
status quo became a matter of life and death for all of humanity. Th e 
basic line of thought is that the world came close to a nuclear war because 
of the collision of spheres of infl uence. On a theoretical level, we are 
dealing with the ideas of stability of possessions and limiting confl icts. 
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Burnham changed his mind on universalism as he became increasingly 
afraid of the atomic bomb. He thought that competition between great 
powers was too dangerous given their nuclear capabilities. Even though 
in the present we sometimes forget that the Bomb still exists – not only 
as a symbol (a material representation) of power, but also as an actual 
weapon of mass destruction – the fact is that nuclear deterrence makes 
struggles for spheres of infl uence extremely dangerous. Th is is one thing 
we should have learned from the Cuban Missile Crisis, but unfortunately 
there is as little discussion on the meaning of nuclear weapons for spheres 
of infl uence as there is conceptual discussion on spheres of infl uence in 
the fi rst place.
In January 1959, Fidel Castro, along with his brother Raúl, Ernesto 
“Che” Guevara and others from the July 26 movement, overthrew the 
Cuban dictator Fulgencio Batista. Th is was the beginning of a socialist 
Cuba which would seek the company of the Soviet Union. Castro 
considered the Americans imperialists and was irritated by the naval 
base in Guántanamo on Cuban soil, which reminded him of Th eodore 
Roosevelt’s “big stick” diplomacy. (See Fursenko & Naftali 1998, 5–7.) 
According to Fursenko and Naftali (1998, 9), since 1933 the foreign 
policy of the United States had been founded upon the principle of non-
intervention and since 1948, with the founding of the OAS, Roosevelt’s 
Good Neighbour Policy had been the basis of inter-American relations. 
But Fidel Castro was well aware that the time of Roosevelt’s Good 
Neighbor Policy was over. Th e United States once again opted for an 
interventionist foreign policy by participating in the overthrow of the 
regime of Guatemala’s Jacobo Arbenz’s in 1954. In 1954, the OAS signed 
the Caracas Resolution, which included a commitment by the members 
for joint action in case of any communist infi ltration (ibid.). Th is was the 
background to Cuba’s resistance to American infl uence. 
According to Fursenko and Naftali (1998, 55), when Castro took over 
Cuba, neither the United States nor the Soviet Union knew what course 
he intended to pursue. Th e Soviet Union was cautious in supporting 
Cuba, because it was uncertain of the country’s ambitions. In Cuba, the 
communists were not in complete control of the government (ibid.). 
Guevara and Castro’s brother Raúl were members of the communist 
party but Castro was not a Marxist; he was a “Fidelista” (ibid.). In the 
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end, Castro made his choice and pledged his allegiance to communist 
ideology; and fi nally, the situation in 1960 was that Cuba was sliding into 
the socialist camp and the United States “seemed prepared to accept this 
violation of its sphere of infl uence” (ibid.).
After January 1961, Cuba and the United States had no diplomatic 
relations and very little mutual trade (Fursenko and Naftali 1998, 83). 
Th e Kennedy administration could not just sit and watch Cuba turn into 
a communist Soviet outpost thus a plan was developed for a military 
invasion using Cuban exiles in order to overthrow Castro, which was 
implemented in April 15. One curious aspect of the plan and its execution 
was that, according to Naftali and Fursenko, Kennedy was concerned 
about the worsening of the international reputation of the United States 
and for this reason wanted to avoid off ering air support. Th e United States 
did not want to be seen by the world as an interventionist aggressor. Due 
to this cautiousness, the operation, known as “the Bay of Pigs Invasion”, 
completely failed. (Ibid., 77–100.) What can be concluded is that 
international institutions worked to limit states’ actions even during the 
Cold War: sovereignty and the non-intervention principle had not lost all 
meaning. Th e United States and the Soviet Union could not act as they 
pleased, especially because they had to consider each other’s reactions. 
Th e Soviet Union was cautious in supporting Cuba, for the sake of good 
relations with its opponent, and the United States feared for its reputation 
in the case of full-blown military intervention. If we compare the time 
of the missile crisis and the world today, some things have not changed. 
Th e ideological orientation of another state, be it close by or far away, is 
still a concern, even to the extent that a superpower is ready to intervene. 
Even the argument has not changed: intervention is resorted to for the 
sake of the people. It is still a means to put an end to dictatorship or 
tyranny, or to protect human rights. Intervention is now resorted to also 
by Russia, not only the United States and its allies, as exemplifi ed in the 
August 2008 confl ict in Georgia. Cuba was a manifestation of this same 
paradigm – intervention to save a people from an oppressive ideology, 
albeit in a very diff erent international order.
For the United States, a communist outpost in the Caribbean was not 
acceptable; the reason was not only the Soviet threat, but also the legacy 
of the Monroe Doctrine. Keal (1983, 113) explains, “After Guatemala 
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it was Castro’s government in Cuba that became the focus of United 
States anxiety about the infi ltration of international communism into 
the hemisphere. By the time Kennedy became President, the United 
States regarded Cuba as a Soviet satellite and as a transgression of the 
Monroe Doctrine that could not be tolerated.” (ibid.). Th e point Keal 
is making is that considerations of the peace and security of the United 
States overrode any of the independence of Latin American countries 
to decide on their internal matters. Th e threat was of course that those 
states would also fall under Soviet infl uence. Th e Cuban association 
with the Soviet Union was a threat to the balance of power in the region 
(ibid., 132). Moreover, Keal (1983, 113–114) writes, the United States 
had the right to determine what the threats to peace in the hemisphere 
were and what was considered an acceptable form of government in each 
of the American states. If we link this to the more general context of 
international order, the United States would seem to be following the 
principles laid down as early as in the 1815 Congress of Vienna about 
great powers’ rights to decide on matters of international security. In 
this perspective, we are not addressing something peculiar to spheres 
of infl uence or to the Cold War superpower rivalry but merely an old 
tradition of great power management. Th e idea of a sphere of infl uence 
needs to be understood as something that emerged with great powers and 
lives with great powers. Sphere of infl uence is a concept situated between 
the universe and the pluriverse and which is intimately connected to the 
principles of sovereignty and non-intervention. On the theoretical level, 
any conceptualisation of a sphere of infl uence must rely on the notion 
of international society, and as a practical policy the pursuit of spheres 
of infl uence always emerges as a part of international order. A sphere of 
infl uence belonged to the framework of international society, both as an 
idea and a foreign policy tool, even during the Cold War.
For the United States, the dilemma was to justify intervention and 
make it look like something other than a sphere-of-infl uence policy, 
which had such a negative ring to it for Americans. On 20 April 1961, 
President John F. Kennedy gave an address before the American Society 
of Newspaper Editors explaining the United States’ “Bay of Pigs” invasion 
in Cuba. Kennedy (1961) explained how intervention was against the 
American tradition and international obligations, but at the same time 
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stated: “Should it ever appear that the inter-American doctrine of non-
interference merely conceals or excuses a policy of nonaction - if the 
nations of this Hemisphere should fail to meet their commitments against 
outside Communist penetration - then I want it clearly understood that 
this Government will not hesitate in meeting its primary obligations 
which are to the security of our Nation!”. Th us, exactly as Keal explained, 
if it was a question of the country’s security, the United States’ considered 
that it had the right to act, even abroad. Moreover, inaction could be even 
worse than intervention if it led to accepting communist penetration. 
Th is is the logic whereby a small state’s sovereign rights can be violated 
for the sake of the greater good. Because of international order – the 
extreme division of the world into two camps – inequality had become 
the foundation of international relations. It was the right of a great power 
to decide what was acceptable in its “neighbourhood” and what was not 
– and for the United States communism was not. 
Kennedy (1961) made it clear that there was no room for the Soviet 
Union to deplore the United States’ actions in light of its own actions on 
the “bloody streets of Budapest”. Kennedy (ibid.) observed, “It is not the 
fi rst time that Communist tanks have rolled over gallant men and women 
fi ghting to redeem the independence of their homeland. Nor is it by any 
means the fi nal episode in the eternal struggle of liberty against tyranny, 
anywhere on the face of the globe, including Cuba itself.“. Kennedy 
explained at length how serious a threat communism was to the freedom 
of nations. Soviet tyranny was threatening to spread to other nations 
of the Western Hemisphere unless it was stopped. Kennedy wrote how 
this spreading threat of Communism turned support and help for the 
people into a reign of terror where discontent was repressed and self-
determination disappeared (ibid.). When reading these justifi cations for 
taking action, the idea of the inherent injustice of a sphere of infl uence 
becomes blurred. It becomes a matter of perspective: justice in whose 
opinion? In a concrete political situation, justice is not abstract; it is 
defi ned by those involved. Th e Cold War struggles for freedom against 
tyranny are perfect examples of spheres of infl uence representing either 
an alleged deprivation or declared bestowal of freedom.
According to Fursenko and Naftali (1998, 12), the day Khrushchev 
decided to send Warsaw Pact weapons to Cuba, in late September 1959, 
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was the day when Khrushchev decided to take the risk of a military clash 
with the United States by pursuing interests in Latin America. Fursenko 
and Naftali explain, in the logic of spheres of infl uence, that “[f ]or the 
most part, Stalin had left Latin America to the United States. It was 
America’s backyard, too far away for a man who had never traveled outside 
his own sphere of infl uence in Eastern Europe. But under Khrushchev 
the Soviet Union looked for allies among the young nationalist leaders of 
what became known as the Th ird World.” (ibid.).
Ultimately, the Soviet support extended beyond conventional weapons. 
Fearing that the Cubans could side with China, and receiving a report 
indicating that the CIA was recommending preventive war against the 
Soviet Union, Khrushchev, for the fi rst time, on 9 July 1960, spoke of 
extending the nuclear umbrella over Cuba (ibid., 50–52.) Fursenko and 
Naftali (1998, 171) write: 
Th e Soviet Union had never stationed ballistic missiles outside of its 
borders. But Khrushchev had broken rules before. Stalin had never 
seriously considered making inroads to Latin America. Th e idea of 
a missile gambit, which began in Khrushchev’s mind as a work of 
inspiration, even whimsy, stayed with him.
Fursenko and Naftali (1998, 180) quote Khrushchev’s statement at a 
meeting of the Defence Council where he insisted that nuclear missiles 
would not only protect Cuba but would equalise the balance of power. 
Th e missiles would eliminate the strategic imbalance, the military 
inferiority (ibid., 187). Fursenko and Naftali (1998, 183) write, “But 
a concern for Cuban security alone cannot explain why the Soviets 
took the risk of sending their most expensive and dangerous weapons 
seven thousand miles to an island republic”. Other reasons motivated 
Khrushchev: Kennedy’s decision to resume nuclear testing in April 1962, 
the lack of progress in the negotiations over Berlin and the American 
activity in Southeast Asia all posed a challenge to the Soviet Union (ibid.). 
Th e Soviets wanted to do more than just save Castro; their reasons for 
crossing the line were the balance of power, the nuclear balance and 
projecting power into the Western Hemisphere (ibid., 180–188).37
37 Fursenko and Naftali (2006; 469, 471) write that the missiles were placed in 
Cuba as a political threat, a restraint on the United States regarding Cuba, with no aim 
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When the Soviet Union fi nally reached out of its comfort zone, and 
approached the borders of its competitor, the move was not motivated 
only (if at all) by its interest in Cuba as such. Khrushchev did not 
involve Castro in the negotiations with Kennedy at any point (Fursenko 
and Naftali 2006, 490; Holbraad 1979, 69). In the terminology of 
postcolonial research, this was a case of marginalising Cuba (and later 
also marginalising the Cuban interpretation of the history of the crisis) 
(see Laff ey & Weldes 2008). If the Soviet Union was uncertain about 
supporting Cuba in the fi rst place, it was even more uncertain about 
providing military support lest something that was a minor relationship 
turn into a confl ict between the superpowers (Fursenko & Naftali 1998, 
23). Th e Soviet foreign policy bureaucrats were against fulfi lling the 
request made by Cuba to provide them with Polish weapons. Fursenko 
and Naftali claim that it was Khrushchev who saw the revolution in Cuba 
as being too important to deny it assistance (ibid., 24). Khrushchev also 
believed that for the United States general détente was an important 
enough reason to ignore Cuba in order to maintain good relations with the 
Soviet Union (ibid., 44-45). What comes to light here is the signifi cance 
of international society, even during the Cold War. Institutions and rules 
were at work, and both the United States and the Soviet Union restricted 
their actions because of them. And because of the restrictions created by 
the desire to act as a member of this society sphere-of-infl uence policies 
refl ected not only national interests but also interests of maintaining 
peace and order in general.
Keal concludes that the threat to the security and ideology of the 
hemisphere came not from Cuba’s internal developments but from Soviet 
intrusion. He (1983, 153–154) explains:
Although Cuba no longer had government under United States 
infl uence, it was strategically located within a region that was a 
United States sphere of infl uence. What was important was not that 
it had a communist government having links with the Soviet Union, 
but rather the extent of what the United States would allow the Soviet 
Union to do in and from Cuba. Th e Soviet Union was not to take 
advantage of Cuba either to improve its nuclear and strategic balance 
of unleashing a war. Taubman (2005, 535) also asserts that the missiles were meant to 
frighten and not to be fi red. 
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with the United States or as a base from which to promote more 
socialist revolutions in Latin America. 
According to Keal (1983, 1234) the confl ict involved a dispute 
between two infl uencing powers over the limits of spheres of infl uence. 
Th e interventions in Czechoslovakia and Hungary, by contrast, were a 
matter of the infl uencing power acting against the infl uenced (ibid.). 
Two observations follow: 1) We really have a collision here, exactly that 
which should challenge Keal’s idea about spheres of infl uence producing 
order and stability, and an event which was, nevertheless, limited by the 
existence of international society. 2) If we look at the history of spheres 
of infl uence, the great power competition for survival is always there. If 
sovereignty is fl uid, intervention a contested idea and justice a matter of 
interpretation, then great power rivalry is the one thing we can establish 
with reasonable certainty as a defi ning feature of spheres of infl uence 
when we look at the history constructed to date. Noteworthy for the 
present pejorative understanding of spheres of infl uence is that if there 
needs to be another great power against which a sphere of infl uence is 
constructed, this can hardly be a purely imaginary adversary. If Russia is 
trying to establish a sphere of infl uence, against whom is it being created? 
Where is the other great power with a sphere of infl uence? And why 
would Russia see the United States, the EU, China or some other entity 
as the other infl uencing power? Or is it just Russian paranoia after all? 
What followed the Soviet support for Cuba and the United States’ 
“Bay of Pigs” invasion was the missile crisis. Th e Soviet Union delivered 
36 R12 missiles to Cuba by the end of September 1962, and the fi rst 
shipment of nuclear warheads reached the island on 4October. On 15 
October, the United States’ U2 fl ights spotted some of the missiles. 
(Fursenko & Naftali 1998, 216–222). President Kennedy was reluctant to 
answer the Soviet threat with military action; he wanted to try diplomatic 
means. But the problem was that the more time the diplomatic solution 
took, the less likely military success became. If the Soviet Union was able 
to make the missiles operational, the United States would embark on a 
suicidal mission trying to destroy them. (Ibid., 226.) Th e tension was 
great and “spheres of infl uence” were bringing the world to the brink of 
war – instead of contributing to peace and stability. Despite the initial 
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constraints by international society, this was “stability of possessions” 
failing in the most tragic sense. Avoiding a military solution as the fi rst 
option, the United States answered with a naval “quarantine” preventing 
additional off ensive weapons reaching Cuba (see Fursenko and Naftali 
1998, 235). 
President Kennedy (1962) gave a speech on 22 October on the crisis. 
In the speech he stated that the purpose of the missile bases had to be 
to provide a nuclear strike capability against the Western Hemisphere. 
Kennedy (1962) referred to international agreements by stating that:
Th is urgent transformation of Cuba into an important strategic base--
by the presence of these large, long range, and clearly off ensive weapons 
of sudden mass destruction--constitutes an explicit threat to the peace 
and security of all the Americas, in fl agrant and deliberate defi ance of 
the Rio Pact of 1947, the traditions of this Nation and hemisphere, 
the joint resolution of the 87th Congress, the Charter of the United 
Nations, and my own public warnings to the Soviets on September 4 
and 13. […] Th e United Nations Charter allows for regional security 
arrangements--and the nations of this hemisphere decided long ago 
against the military presence of outside powers. Our other allies 
around the world have also been alerted. 
For Kennedy, United States interests in Cuba were legitimate and the 
country’s sphere of infl uence could be justifi ed on the basis of international 
law. In fact, Kennedy’s assertion of regional arrangements is like Schmitt’s 
idea of spheres (Großräume) of international law. Kennedy was not saying 
that there were tacit agreements about spheres of infl uence. He was saying 
that the Western Hemisphere constituted a legitimate Großraum which 
was under attack. Th ere is also a voice similar to Naumann’s in Kennedy’s 
claim for a regional international law. Kennedy insisted that Cuba was 
well known for its special and historical relationship to the United 
States and the entire Western Hemisphere. In the light of the legality 
of the United States’ sphere of infl uence, and the special relationship 
of the Cuban and American peoples, the Soviet Union had pulled a 
stunt constituting a “deliberately provocative and unjustifi ed change in 
the status quo” (Kennedy 1962). In addition, Kennedy (1962) accused 
the Soviet Union of attempts at world domination and assured that the 
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Unites States was ready to take action if the safety and freedom of peoples 
the United States was committed to were threatened. 
In letters to President Kennedy 23 and 24 October, 1962, Khrushchev 
(1962a, 1962b), just like Kennedy, invoked international law: 
I must say frankly, that the measures indicated in your statement 
constitute a serious threat to peace and to the security of nations. Th e 
United States has openly taken the path of grossly violating the United 
Nations Charter, the path of violating international norms of freedom 
of navigation on the high seas, the path of aggressive actions both 
against Cuba and against the Soviet Union.38 
You wish to compel us to renounce the rights that every sovereign state 
enjoys, you are trying to legislate in questions of international law, and 
you are violating the universally accepted norms of that law.
Both superpowers claimed to be on a mission to protect freedom and 
peace; that is, they were on the side of the law. Bull (2002, 211) writes 
that in fact both the Soviet Union and the United States have mainly 
appealed to peace and security, and not ideology, doctrinal rectitude or 
human justice, in justifying their interventions. Th is, for Bull, meant 
that they valued international order over norms of justice (ibid., 212). I 
agree that international order and peace were the main concerns for the 
two great powers after the confl ict unfolded in full, but, also the language 
of justifi cation was strong and even showed a humanitarian dimension. 
Again, I draw the conclusion that justifi cation mattered because of 
concerns for international society. Khrushchev (1962c) wrote to Kennedy 
on the 26th off ering to remove the missiles if the United States would 
promise not to invade Cuba. He also wrote that the Soviet military 
aid to Cuba was solely for “reasons of humanitarianism”, to support 
its revolution against outside attack, and not as a means to interfere in 
Cuba’s internal aff airs. It is hard to imagine how humanitarian reasons 
were at the heart of Soviet foreign policy here, but it is easy to understand 
that positions were defended with appeals to such a noble cause. 
Khrushchev proposed to Kennedy on 26 October that if the United 
States would end the naval blockade and refrain from invasion in Cuba 
38 A slightly diff erent transcription of the letter is found on the United States State 
Department web page (see Khrushchev 1962b for the source). 
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the Soviet Union would destroy its armaments in Cuba (Keal 1983, 137–
138). Th e next day (27 October) Khrushchev (1962d) wrote again to 
Kennedy, before receiving any reply to this previous letter, and presented 
additional demands for the settlement of the crisis. Th e letter stated that 
the United States had surrounded the Soviet Union with missiles located 
in Britain, Italy and Turkey and claimed that this was an unfair situation. 
Khrushchev proposed that the Soviet Union would remove its missiles 
from Cuba if the United States would remove its missiles from Turkey. 
Moreover, Khrushchev (ibid.) wrote to Kennedy: 
We, in making this pledge, in order to give satisfaction and hope of the 
peoples of Cuba and Turkey and to strengthen their confi dences in their 
security, will make a statement within the framework of the Security 
Council to the eff ect that the Soviet Government gives a solemn promise 
to respect the inviolability of the borders and sovereignty of Turkey, not 
to interfere in its internal aff airs, not to invade Turkey, not to make 
available our territory as a bridgehead for such an invasion, and that 
it would also restrain those who contemplate committing aggression 
against Turkey, either from the territory of the Soviet Union or from 
the territory of Turkey’s other neighboring states. (Khrushchev 1962d.)
Khrushchev demanded that the United States make a similar commitment 
regarding Cuba. On the part of the Soviet Union, Khrushchev’s statement 
was a promise not to include Turkey in the Soviet sphere of infl uence, 
“sphere of infl uence” as we understand it today: not to violate its borders 
or sovereignty, not to interfere in its internal aff airs or invade the country. 
Th e United States accepted the off er to refrain from invading Cuba but 
the agreement on the Jupiter missiles in Turkey would be concluded later 
under a secret protocol (Fursenko & Naftali 1998, 278–287).
Ultimately, the United States got its way, without a military invasion. 
Khrushchev did not want a war and eventually the Soviet Union returned 
the missiles to where they came from (see Fursenko and Naftali 1998, 
277). To quote Fursenko and Naftali (1998, 260), “He could not go to 
war in the Caribbean with any hope of prevailing. He had tried to achieve 
some measure of parity with the United States to defend Soviet interests 
in that region; but clearly he had failed.“ Keal (1983, 141) writes that by 
withdrawing the Soviet Union accepted that Cuba was in the sphere of 
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infl uence of the United States. Th e crisis was settled on 28 October with 
the promise from the Soviet Union to withdraw the missiles, but there 
were still diffi  cult negations ahead on how to implement the agreement 
(Fursenko & Naftali 2006, 493; Taubman 2005, 577). Nevertheless, I 
will end my account of the incident here and look at the contribution 
of the missile crisis to our present understanding of spheres of infl uence.
6.3 A Re-Reading of the Cold War 
Th e Cuban Missile Crisis is an ample example of how the struggle for 
spheres of infl uence encompassed ideology, “contamination”, fi ghting 
tyranny or imperialism, and defending the freedom of the people. Sphere 
of infl uence is not an idea which belongs exclusively to the Cold War, 
but there defi nitely are traits which make Cold War spheres of infl uence 
special. At the same time, the concept of sphere of infl uence relates to 
ideas on international order, that is, to international theory expounded 
by the English School, especially because that theory was born in the 
midst of the Cold War itself. Keal saw the missile crisis not as a matter 
of Cuba’s conversion to Communism as such but as the expansion of 
the Soviet sphere of infl uence. International order was also at stake, and 
war between the superpowers was the risk worth taking in a confl ict over 
Cuba. 
Even though the spheres of infl uence in the Cold War were based 
on tacit agreements, Kennedy argued for the legality of an American 
Großraum. Khrushchev did not spare words in appealing to international 
law. Th is, coupled with hesitation about turning a minor matter into a 
superpower confl ict, and the need to justify infl uence prompts me to state 
that concerns for international order aff ected the decisions on questions 
of infl uence. It was Bull’s international society at work. Th e missile crisis 
was also an example of the dangers of spheres of infl uence; it almost 
ended in a nuclear war. Because of the instability of spheres of infl uence 
and the balance of power, a struggle between two infl uencing powers 
took place and spheres of infl uence failed to provide for stability of the 
powers’ possessions. Yet, spheres of infl uence, although almost leading to 
nuclear war, did not, in the end, fail to provide for international order 
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during the Cold War. Th e Th ird World War never materialised and 
spheres of infl uence maintained the bipolar order. In fact, what I am able 
to read from the Cuban Missile Crisis is that somehow the nuclear threat 
overrode the powers’ considerations regarding their spheres of infl uence. 
Reading from Keal, and Fursenko and Naftali, international order – and 
maintaining it by nuclear parity – was a major motive for both parties. 
Th e Soviet Union gave up; it could not achieve nuclear parity and it could 
not extend its military infl uence to the Caribbean. Th e Soviet Union was 
ready to back off , because, in the end, luckily, peace was more important. 
Th e role of small powers comes into the limelight in the Cuban Missile 
Crisis. In the case of Cuba, sovereignty was defended and violated at 
the same time. Intervention was resorted to. Yet the small power was 
no victim. Although Cuba was ignored in the negotiations, marginalised 
as an object of superpower rivalry, it was able to choose its side in the 
beginning and play “the big game”. Castro wanted to join the Soviet bloc; 
he wanted the Bomb. Th e people were less enthusiastic, but of course 
it was not for them to decide. Moreover, if Cuba agreed to the Soviet 
infl uence, was the relationship anymore that of being part of the Soviet 
Union’s sphere of infl uence, or was it an alliance? Th is is the general 
question of where we draw the line between a sphere of infl uence, an 
alliance, integration, and so on, when it comes to the consent of the 
infl uenced state.
 Th e role of small powers includes infl uencing balances of power. 
Th e Cold War balance of power is generally viewed as something Wight 
(1966a, 152) calls a “simple balance”, that is, “selective concentration 
upon the greatest Powers”. But Wight argues there has never actually 
been, in Western international society, a simple balance. Th ere have always 
been lesser powers around or between the dominant powers (ibid.). A 
simple balance is only possible in an international system of established, 
stable Großräume. As long as small states exist as independent powers, no 
matter how small they are, as the Cuban case testifi es, balance is achieved 
by controlling the moves of the small powers. Th is destroys the dream of 
perfectly working great power management and it destroys the idea of 
perfect hierarchy. Th e Cuban Missile Crisis proves that not even the Cold 
War was built upon a simple balance; even “tacit agreements on spheres 
of infl uence” could not create a simple balance. Maybe this is the reason 
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why Burnham did not believe in great powers anymore, but put his trust 
in the Universal Empire. Maybe this is why Lippmann did not trust the 
balance of power, but believed that there must be a way to divide the 
world along lines of responsibility, willingly and in good spirit. 
If we re-read the Cold War, one inevitable question is whether 
spheres of infl uence provided for international order in the case of the 
Cuban Missile Crisis. Did the tacit agreement on spheres of infl uence 
cause the crisis or prevent its escalation, or both? Th is is a discussion on 
the confl ict- and war-preventing mechanism of spheres of infl uence, a 
discussion completely absent from IR today. In the present understanding 
of the concept, sphere of infl uence is the source of confl icts, not a check 
on violence and war. I have yet to encounter a statement from a non-
Russian affi  rming that Russia’s sphere of infl uence contributes to stability 
and helps to limit confl icts. In this light, the Cuban missile crisis is an 
example of how due to the struggle for spheres of infl uence and the 
balance of power the superpowers came close to starting a nuclear war. 
Because of spheres of infl uence, the United States took great pains to plan 
a military invasion and overthrow Castro. Because of spheres of infl uence, 
Khrushchev delivered nuclear armaments for the fi rst time outside Soviet 
soil. One could even put the blame on spheres of infl uence for Cuba’s 
turn towards Communism and the loss of many lives in Castro’s purges. 
It all makes sense: spheres of infl uence can lead to this. In any human 
endeavour, power has the potential to lead to death and destruction. But 
power has another side too, and the historical discourses on spheres of 
infl uence reveal that they may be vehicles for exercising  “responsibility” 
or using power for the sake of order. 
If we turn the matter the other way around, we could say that respect 
for spheres of infl uence eventually prevented the escalation of the confl ict. 
Keal (1983, 205) writes that the role of spheres of infl uence as a means to 
limit violence became obvious in the case of Cuba. Spheres of infl uence 
created a restraint on great powers interfering in each other’s spheres 
of infl uence. In fact, respect for those spheres of infl uence prevented a 
nuclear war (ibid). Th is claim can be refuted, of course, and I would say 
that it was rather the fear of a nuclear war that prevented a nuclear war. 
But what Keal means is that considering the antagonistic system, the 
existence of the fatal bomb, and the tension in international relations, the 
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spheres of infl uence created some rules whereby the superpowers knew 
their limits. Spheres of infl uence created order in chaos and helped to 
prevent a major war. Stalin had respected the rules drawn, and Khrushchev 
tried to cross the line, but eventually the system held together. What is 
more, spheres of infl uence helped to maintain the pluralist system against 
a single sovereign, although, as I argued before, this particular pluralist 
system was not a strong one in defending freedom. Cold War pluralism 
did not give states the possibility to do things their way. Keal (1983, 
199–200) also argues that not only did the system of spheres of infl uence 
maintain peace between the superpowers but hierarchical relationships 
maintained order within the blocs and the spheres of infl uence removed 
the infl uenced areas from external challenges. In addition, the infl uencing 
state managed relations among the infl uenced, preventing confl ict inside 
the bloc (ibid).
All this is not to idealise the Cold War or to say that Cold War spheres 
of infl uence were not that bad after all. I was only 8 years old when the 
Berlin Wall fell, and I could not possibly understand how people lived and 
felt during those years. Superpower politics aff ected millions of people, 
and Orwell foresaw that spheres of infl uence entail totalitarianism, 
violence, war, suppression and manipulation of people. But this should 
not mean that the concept of sphere of infl uence has no history, that 
it is fi xed within its Cold War uses. If a sphere of infl uence expresses a 
relationship between the infl uencing and the infl uenced; and if it aff ects 
international order and its rules and institutions; then it is necessary to 
take a historically and theoretically broader view on spheres of infl uence 
than the Cold War alone can off er.
Th e Cold War, including the Cuban Missile Crisis, constitutes much 
of our understanding of spheres of infl uence. Just like the Monroe 
Doctrine it is a beacon signalling spheres of infl uence at work: it is a 
memory which makes sphere of infl uence understandable. Th e Cuban 
Missile Crisis is a manifestation of, a concrete reference to what a sphere 
of infl uence is and, more specifi cally, what spheres of infl uence meant 
for the relations among the infl uencing powers. Th e usefulness of the 
Cold War memory is that it reminds us of the dangers of antagonism 
and division in the society of states in the age of nuclear weapons. We 
forget this too easily. But the question remains whether in the end the 
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issue in the Cuban Missile Crisis was spheres of infl uence rather than 
nuclear parity. Were spheres of infl uence reduced to a balance of power 
in a manner that prevents us talking anymore about a struggle for spheres 
of infl uence? Did the nuclear factor alter the sphere-of-infl uence logic in 
a fundamental manner? Was the fear of mutual suicide so overwhelming 
that it overruled considerations of spheres of infl uence and made even 
Khrushchev accept defeat and humiliation by retreating from Cuba? 
According to Lippmann (1963), nuclear deterrence does not prevent a 
nuclear war. I agree with Lippmann in that as long as there are nuclear 
weapons, the possibility of a nuclear war really exists. Lippmann (1963) 
commented on the missile crisis as follows:
Had the missiles been put in place, they would have changed seriously 
the balance of nuclear power in the world. Th e United States deployed 
its whole military power, nuclear and conventional, against such an 
alteration of the status quo. It would do the same, and for the same 
kind of reason, if the Soviet Union moved its military force against 
Berlin or against any other point which is critically important to the 
maintenance of the status quo in the balance of strategic power.
How much could little Cuba weigh on the scale where the other weight 
was nuclear war? If Kennedy and Khrushchev understood that nuclear 
war would become a reality if the missiles were kept in Cuba, they could 
not have cared for any trivial matters relating to spheres of infl uence. 
Khrushchev gave up the dream of nuclear parity; he gave up a balance of 
power, all for the sake of avoiding war. What drove the Soviet premier to 
give up the confrontational sphere-of-infl uence logic must have been the 
fear of destroying the entire planet, or at least the human race. It is even 
uncertain whether Khrushchev was after a communist bridgehead in the 
Caribbean or if he was planning all along to advance military parity, or 
even superiority. Even if the confl ict began as a competition over spheres 
of infl uence, it ended up in a negotiation on nuclear weapons. Even 
American missiles in Turkey entered the bargain. What was agreed on 
Cuba, where it all began, was not much: a promise from the United 
States not to intervene. Th e United States was left with communist Cuba 
and with Castro. Th e Soviet Union was left with humiliation. What the 
nuclear age brought as an extra for the logic of spheres of infl uence was 
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that, in addition to, or even instead of, fear of the spread of an alien 
ideology, spread of power of the Other, or losing the balance of power, 
great powers now had to take into consideration the dangerous military 
scenario that their game of infl uence could be opposed with the nuclear 
weapon. Th e missile crisis thus illustrates that even during the Cuban 
Missile Crisis there was no overt manifestation of spheres of infl uence, 
not even if we rely on the defi nitions of Keal and Kaufman, and agree on 
the meaning of the concept. 
I began this research by being critical of the transmission of Cold War 
thinking on spheres of infl uence into the present. I was also critical of 
how the Cold War forms a unitary yet uninformative picture of spheres of 
infl uence and dominates the image of Russia’s sphere-of-infl uence policy. 
Later I came to realise that that problem was not so much conceiving 
of spheres of infl uence in Cold War terms but the fact that even Cold 
War spheres of infl uence have not been studied. And how could they 
have been, when spheres of infl uence had not been theorised? With the 
knowledge we have today, with archives more and more open, the idea of 
spheres of infl uence, the assumed practice of spheres of infl uence during 
the Cold War, could very well be a fruitful source for theorising spheres of 
infl uence. I believe the Cold War off ers more than a burden of pejorative 
associations on the concept of sphere of infl uence: it contributes to 
a theoretical tradition in that it is a part of the history of spheres of 
infl uence, the most explicit and familiar phase, but not the only one 
in that history. Even if rooted in pejorative associations, the Cold War 
knowledge off ers material for the normative discussion we need and lack. 
Failing to read the Cold War policy of spheres of infl uence means we will 
not be able to take a critical view of the contemporary manifestations of 
spheres of infl uence.
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7 Russia, Order, Law and Infl uence
Th e purpose of this chapter is to examine how the Russian political and 
academic elite write about spheres of infl uence, international order and 
justice. What makes the Russian discourses of utmost importance is that 
in the present spheres of infl uence are located, mapped, in the “Russian 
neighbourhood”, that is, the post-Soviet space. In order to shake the 
foundations of the pejorative understanding of the concept, I had to 
ascertain whether there really was an idea of sphere of infl uence alive 
in the current Russian thinking and what conception of international 
order the Russian analysts want to present to the outside world. Like 
the previous chapters, this chapter represents an episode that draws on 
examples,. My purpose here is to problematise the present understanding 
of “Russia’s sphere of infl uence” by introducing Russian ideas on infl uence 
and international order. What we will discover is that the Russians also 
use the term “sphere of infl uence” in a pejorative sense and they fi nd it 
diffi  cult to articulate that, at the end of the day, infl uence is what Russia 
seeks.
7.1 The Sources of Russian Discourses
Th e following reading of spheres of infl uence operates on the same 
two perspectives of international order and justifi cation of infl uence 
as the previous chapters. Th e term “sphere of infl uence” is mentioned 
infrequently in the sources, but the idea of infl uence beyond the country’s 
borders is fi rmly rooted in Russian thought. Th e focus of Russian ideas 
on spheres of infl uence is twofold, representing: 1) a defence against 
the accusations that Russia has pursued and continues to pursue an ill-
intentioned sphere-of-infl uence policy and 2) an off ensive against the 
sphere-of-infl uence policies of others. Accordingly, I needed to fi nd texts 
that were directed to international audiences and that represent a forum 
for articulating the defensive and off ensive approaches. Th e material is in 
English and naturally some meaning may have been lost when the texts 
were translated. On the other hand, the intention of the authors is not 
my focus as much as the visions that can be discovered in the material, 
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in other words, the eff ects of the discourses. Identifying the speech acts 
that convey ideas on spheres of infl uence is the methodological basis of 
the analysis, even though I do not adhere to discourse analysis as such. 
 I also wanted to fi nd sources which would operate on the same level 
of language as the other parts of the history of the concept of sphere of 
infl uence, that is, writings which would express not only political interests 
but also theoretical thinking. Th ese two criteria were well met by two 
journals representing the Russian voices of academia, think-tanks and 
politicians alike: International Aff airs: A Russian Journal of World Politics, 
Diplomacy & International Relations and Russia in Global Aff airs39. I chose 
to use the issues from 2006 until 2010, which provide enough material 
for fi nding “present” Russian ideas at the time of writing this book. Th e 
articles represent rather coherent visions, indicating that the journals 
set the boundaries for the views expressed by excluding the most radical 
ideas, but also that the passing of years from 2006 to 2010 has not made 
a great diff erence. A majority of the contributors are in high government, 
ministry or academic positions40. I have not chosen the texts by author, 
only by topic. If some authors are quoted more frequently than others, 
such as Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, it is not because of their position 
but because of the amount of relevant published material written by 
them. My interest is not in personalities of the authors, but in the views 
that are expressed by them as representatives of the Russian political and 
academic elite. In the end, the number of Russian discussants rose to 66 
persons, and in order to keep the scope of the material manageable, I 
reduced the sources to those which both quantitatively and qualitatively 
off ered most for the analysis. When I generalise, I write “Russian writers”, 
“analysts” or just “Russians”. When I write “Russians” or “Russian” it 
does not refer to Russian people in general but only to the sources used 
in the analysis. Th e “Russian” ideas which emerge from the material, 
39 Russia in Global Aff airs is co-founded by the Council on Foreign and Defense 
Policy, the Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs, and the newspaper Izvestia. 
It has both Russian and English versions online. International Aff airs: A Russian Journal 
of World Politics, Diplomacy & International Relations is the English translation of the 
Russian-language journal Mezhdunarodnaia zhizn, published by the Ministry of Foreign 
Aff airs of the Russian Federation (MFA). Th e contributors are diplomats and independent 
analysts, and the articles often include roundtable discussions.
40 I have mentioned the affi  liation of the authors in the footnotes as they were 
reported by the journal at the time of publication.
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thus, represent the opinions of the Russian analysts chosen, but at the 
same time they become the visions of sphere of infl uence presented to 
the outside world.
Th e timeframe, the period from 2006 to 2010, encompasses a vast body 
of material dealing with enough political events to off er a varied source 
of ideas on sphere of infl uence. I call this period “the present”, although 
by the time this manuscript is published many signifi cant political events 
will have taken place in the world, and even the year 2010 will be long 
past. My idea of the present should not be taken literally but rather as 
a synonym for “topical”, or “relevant for the twenty-fi rst century” and, 
what is more, relevant for a history that should be written from that point 
onward. All in all, the discourses that cover fi ve years of international 
events are quite harmonious in content and the only clear change that 
occurs with the passing of time is that the closer we get to the year 2010, 
the less talk about spheres of infl uence there is. Th e language becomes 
more sterile. Moreover, there is less discussion of controversial matters. 
Th e tone softens, and rather than expressing opinions the authors relate 
what they see as facts. I do not think this means a moderation of opinions 
but merely that the style of writing has become more academic and 
scientifi c and less political in these particular journals.
Th e years 2006–2010 witnessed then-President Vladimir Putin’s (Prime 
Minister from May 2008 to May 2012) famous Munich speech (2007), 
the election of new presidents in Russia (2008) and the United States 
(2009), Kosovo’s declaration of independence (2008), a war in South 
Ossetia (2008), the fi nancial crisis (since 2008) and a “reset” in U.S.-
Russian relations (2010); all of these events aff ected the topics addressed 
in the journals. Th e Munich speech was interpreted in Russia as a cry 
for monumental change in international society, but in the West it was 
seen as an aggressive geopolitical manifesto declaring a new Cold War. 
Th e next attempt to promote the Russian idea of international order was 
the proposal for a new security architecture for Europe, put forward in 
June 2008 in a speech in Berlin by then-President Dmitri Medvedev. Th e 
proposed treaty was published more than a year later, on 29 November 
2009, on the Kremlin’s website (Kremlin.ru Archive). Th e intervention 
in Yugoslavia (1999), the recognition of Kosovo’s independence by many 
Western states and the confl ict in Georgia (2008) created an impetus for 
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Russian analysts to discuss matters of intervention, international law and 
justice related to ideas on territorial infl uence. Th e fi nancial crisis and, 
to a lesser extent, the “reset” of U.S.-Russian relations caused spheres of 
infl uence to fade into the background, and instead of promoting ideas, 
the journals provided more in the way of descriptive information. In 
addition to reacting to major events, the Russian writers addressed what 
they call falsifi cation of history. In the case of the discourses on spheres of 
infl uence, history is indeed a source to draw images from (for Russians, 
just like for anyone), but Russians have accused their neighbour states of 
politically motivated interpretations of the history of world wars and the 
Cold War.
What is peculiar to the Russian discourse is that the writers cannot 
argue for their vision of international order without trampling on the very 
principles they wish to promote. Th is applies to sovereignty, international 
law, justice, non-intervention, and ultimately questions of infl uence. For 
the Russian authors, sovereign equality and great power management are 
not contradictory notions; intervention and non-intervention are upheld 
when it suits Russia’s interests and sense of justice; universe and pluriverse, 
solidarist and pluralist international society go hand in hand according 
to Russia’s needs; justice in principle and justice in practice do not need 
to match; and spheres of infl uence are sometimes good and at other 
times bad. Th is indecisiveness or contradictoriness can cause confusion 
in Russia’s relations to its partners in the West. It could also explain why 
many think that there is a stark contrast between Russian foreign policy 
discourses and actions. Th is is not to say that Western foreign policies are 
coherent and understandable to all, least of all to Russians. In fact, one 
of the most prominent Russian discourses is to accuse the United States 
of double standards in foreign policy, that is, defending international law 
and violating it whenever it suits American interests. 
As regards the use of the emotionally and pejoratively loaded term 
“sphere of infl uence”, its use in shaming the other is not necessarily helpful 
in improving mutual relations. I believe that there is something to learn 
from analysing Russian visions of spheres of infl uence, especially if we 
depart from a broader set of tools of analysis by including ideas on order, 
great powers, sovereignty and intervention. At the minimum, it becomes 
clear that at the level of discourses no idea of Russia’s sphere of infl uence 
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is articulated. Th ere is no shared understanding of ”Russia’s sphere of 
infl uence” to be detected. Th e Russian idea of infl uence, as I read it from 
the material, resembles “regional solidarism” or a Good Neighbor Policy, 
as I will later argue, but it is not articulate aloud. Instead of a Russian 
vision of a sphere of infl uence, we fi nd discourses justifying the country’s 
own eff orts to exert infl uence and refuting others’ policies of doing the 
same. I believe the lack of coherence in articulating a Russian vision of 
infl uence and international order is refl ected in Russian foreign policy. 
Even if it is not possible to draw direct conclusions on Russian foreign 
policy from the following analysis of discourses, it should be remembered 
that language is inextricably linked with and thus has an impact on the 
conduct of world aff airs. 
My intention is not to defend any actions by Russia or the Soviet 
Union. It is a sensitive issue to begin opening up paths of unorthodox 
reasoning about Russia’s infl uence. As a Finn who has learned the history 
of her country, I know how this subject stirs national sentiments. History 
has a strong grip on us, which makes it all the more important to look 
it in the eye. I have not allowed my own understanding of the rights 
and wrongs of the past to aff ect my analysis of Russian discourses and 
I hope the reader can follow my purpose in explicating the Russian 
argumentation, which is not to justify Russia’s foreign policy choices, but 
to cultivate some understanding of them. 
7.2 International Society and Research on Russia 
In the following analysis I proceed mostly with the English School 
conception of international society and its institutions. For this reason 
it is relevant to take a look at how the English School’s ideas have been 
utilised before in the analysis of Russian discourses and state behaviour. Of 
course, the concept of sphere of infl uence is absent, because the English 
School notions of sphere of infl uence have not been analysed before, let 
alone used to examine Russian foreign policy or discourses. Nevertheless, 
there is an interest in studying Russia in terms of international society 
and I will introduce some of the salient works here. Alexander Astrov 
has edited a book which deals with the Russian-Georgian confl ict in 
228
2008 from the perspective of the English School theory, namely, its 
idea of great power management. Th is is the most interesting research 
on Russia I have read, because it comes so close to opening paths for a 
discussion sphere of infl uence. Th e book in its entirety is an example of 
the lack of interest in spheres of infl uence, which is especially curious 
when we have a multitude of articles dealing with the confl ict in South 
Ossetia. Even Astrov (2011b, 17) makes a clear statement about a 
sphere of infl uence being a manifestation of great power management. 
He laments the fact that great power management is the least theorised 
topic within the English School when it is actually “one of the defi ning 
practises of international society” (ibid., 2). Astrov even sees Russia as 
blatantly asserting its sphere of infl uence yet fails to extend the theoretical 
discussion to encompass spheres of infl uence (ibid., 3). Th e elements are 
all there: the idea of great power management, the English School, and 
even Carl Schmitt (Astrov 2011b and Prozorov 2011), but spheres of 
infl uence remain hidden. Sergei Prozorov (2011, 33) raises an important 
issue: the paradox of Russian claims to hegemony and the affi  rmation of 
the territorial integrity of the post-Soviet states prior to August 2008. Th e 
same paradoxes in argumentation about international order, along with 
spheres of infl uence, will be explored in my analysis of Russian discourses. 
Irina Papkova (2011, 56) has read about spheres of infl uence in Bull’s 
work but she uses the concept as something evident and descriptive 
rather than theoretical. While Papkova argues that Bull’s Th e Anarchical 
Society provides tools for understanding Russian-American relations in 
the context of the Georgian confl ict, she does not count a sphere-of-
infl uence policy among those tools (ibid., 58). Pami Aalto (2011) takes 
up the role of small states in great power management, also neglected in 
the English School literature. Elsewhere Aalto (2007) discusses Russia’s 
convergence with European and EU international society and what he 
sees as pluralist and solidarist tendencies in Russia’s view of international 
society. But also Aalto leaves questions of spheres of infl uence aside.
Other examples exist where the work of the English School is 
meritoriously utilised to explain Russian foreign policy, but without 
mention of the concept of sphere of infl uence. Neumann takes a historical 
approach to analysing Russia’s relationship to international society and 
argues that Russia has chose to remain in the outer tier of international 
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society because of its memories of emerging from a suzerain system 
(Neumann 2011, 483–484). Neumann does not accept Watson’s view on 
the expansion of international society according to which the European 
order spreads from the centre to the periphery without any residue. 
Th is is why Neumann writes about entry into international society as 
a relational process. (Ibid., 469–470.) Neumann’s conclusions bear 
resemblance to mine. He emphasises memories which inform present 
actions consciously or unconsciously. Th e memory which informed 
Russia’s entry into international society was its belonging to a suzerain 
system dominated by Mongol policy, emerging as its self-proclaimed 
successor and resisting becoming part of a new suzerain system, the Holy 
Roman Empire. (Ibid., 463–464) Th is analysis has interesting bearing 
on the present study. Neumann writes about expectations of certain 
behaviour in encounters with other people (ibid., 470–471, 484). If the 
Russians are still infl uenced by their memory of suzerainty, this means 
that their behaviour does not always match the expectations of those 
states which are in the centre of international society. If Russia’s memory 
of suzerainty explains its role in international society, this can mean that 
sphere of infl uence has a longer history, one extending all the way back 
to the suzerain systems. Perhaps it is sphere of infl uence as the successor 
idea of suzerainty which causes Russia to remain in the outer tier of 
international society. On the other hand, Russia is now perhaps the 
strongest and loudest proponent of international society, and sees other 
states as slipping away from the order which international institutions are 
designed to maintain. Th us, Russia sees itself as being in the centre of this 
order even if Neumann argues that Russia is anywhere but in the centre. 
Neumann (2011, 484) notes, “Th e question of in what degree Russia’s 
contemporary standing within international society is still marked by the 
diff ering narrative sociabilities that marked Russia’s entry into it, must 
await further investigation”. I hope to off er some perspectives on this 
matter by pointing at the Russian interpretations of history: the refusal to 
accept a view of Russia as an imperialist aggressor, the need to remind the 
world of Russia’s role as a historically rightful member of the great power 
club responsible for international order, Russia’s visions of (spheres of ) 
infl uence and of its relations to its neighbouring states, Russian ideas on 
hegemony and cosmopolitan values and its insistence on honouring the 
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institutions and rules of international society. All these discourses address 
Russia’s standing within the international society and prove the country’s 
continuing resistance to accepting rules of international society as 
dictated by Western states. In my analysis, Russian authors are producing 
an image of Russia not as a state which entered international society, but 
as one which, although operating from the outskirts of that society, is the 
only remaining defender of it. Th is defence is not particularly convincing, 
because Russia has diffi  culties, like other great powers, in obeying rules in 
practice and even discursively supporting all the rules they uphold. Why 
this diffi  culty? – Possibly because of the country’s memory of suzerainty, 
refl ected today in its conception of what a sphere of infl uence is. 
Th e discussion on Russia, Europe or the EU, and international society 
is also taken up by Richard Sakwa (2011). He asserts that Russia does not 
want to destroy the existing international order but rather is calling for a 
central role in this order and equal application of moral declarations by 
other powers. Russia promotes a thin international society (great power 
order) but is not ready for a thick version. As Sakwa puts it, Russia is not 
ready for “English School solidarism”. (Sakwa 2011, 199.) Russia has 
taken the role of norm-enforcer, demanding that the leading powers abide 
by the rules of international society (ibid., 202). Th us, as Sakwa notes, 
”Th ere remains a powerful normative current in Russia’s engagement with 
international society” (ibid., 203). Sakwa continues that Russia’s concern 
is to ensure that cultural diff erences are incorporated in the normative 
arena of international society. In other words, norms need to be mediated 
by Russia’s own history and culture. (Ibid., 205.) My analysis will prove 
these insights correct; but I will, in addition, explore in more detail the 
Russian discourses that express Russia leaning towards thin and thick 
international society alike. I discuss the problem of the universal and 
particular in Russia’s approach to the normative, that is, the universality 
of law and the particularity of values. I will furthermore illustrate how the 
Russian thinking on international society obscures the idea of ”Russia’s 
sphere of infl uence” with a focus on defending sovereignty and great 
power management over the threat of universalism.
S. Neil MacFarlane (2003) discusses the Russian view of justice and 
order in an analysis which off ers some important insights. First, the 
Russian view of justice is egoistic rather than solidarist. Th is means 
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that justice is justice for Russia in light of Russia’s sense of exclusion and 
unequal treatment. Th is egoistic approach to justice does not mean that 
institutions do not matter to Russia. Quite the contrary, participation 
in these institutions off ers recognition, status and a means to restrain 
other powers. (MacFarlane 2003, 178–179.) MacFarlane explores how 
Russia has applied this egoistic interpretation of justice historically: both 
the Soviet and post-Soviet periods represent an assertion of rights of the 
sovereign great power and disrespect for neighbouring, weaker states’ 
sovereignty (ibid., 188–201). MacFarlane implies that within the UN, 
a platform with a strong solidarist agenda, the Soviet Union/Russia has 
promoted its sovereign rights and great power interest rather than justice 
(ibid., 190). I read this as the ability to promote pluralist interests within 
a solidarist forum, picking the best of both pluralism and solidarism 
and blurring the boundary between the two. I will later argue, bringing 
international society into the centre of the idea of sphere of infl uence, 
that the Russian balancing between pluralism and solidarism is not only 
the central issue for Russian views on international order but the central 
issue for Russian views on spheres of infl uence as well. 
I begin the chapter by fi rst introducing Russian visions of order and 
institutions: chaos in world politics, great power management, balance of 
power, intervention in Kosovo and South Ossetia, and, fi nally, the proposal 
for a European Security Treaty. Next I introduce visions of infl uence: 
“historical politics”, justifi cation and depolitisation of infl uence, the 
United States’ universalist threat, and the Russian Großraum, between 
the pluriverse and the universe. Finally, I sum up the discourses and off er 
an explanation for the peculiarities I fi nd in Russian thinking.
7.3 Order and Institutions
7.3.1 Chaos and International Law
Many Russian analysts see international order heading towards a chaos. 
Sergei Karaganov, Timofei Bordachev, Eduard Kuzmin and Foreign 
Minister Sergei Lavrov (since 2004)41 are the ones who most explicitly 
41 Karaganov is Dean of the Faculty of World Economics and International Aff airs 
of the State University–Higher School of Economics, Chairman of the Presidium of the 
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warn about the emerging chaos. For these analysts, chaos in world 
politics is a result of a Western failure to consolidate the old international 
institutions after the Cold War and to integrate Russia into international 
society as a fully fl edged member. Th e West caused instability and tension, 
and ultimately ruined the global covenant.
According to Karaganov (2008), the West won the Cold War but 
failed to build a peaceful world. Finally, “[t]he system of governance 
over international relations and security, established over the previous 50 
years, was gradually disintegrating” (ibid). Th e view of the West operating 
against the lofty international order, missing the chance to build a fair 
and democratic international order, is the context for Russia’s need to 
insist on the role of international institutions in opposing those who 
disrespect them. But as if it were not enough for the West, intoxicated 
by a sense of victory, to undermine global security structures with claims 
of world hegemony, it has also made direct attempts to contain Russia 
(Lavrov 2007b). Containment is a Cold War metaphor for building 
dividing lines, isolating, ignoring and slandering Russia. According 
to Karaganov, in the “spirit” of containment, Russia is seen as a neo-
imperialist power “stigmatised for expansionism” (Karaganov 2007). Th is 
is where the need to defend Russia’s foreign policy springs from: the view 
of old divisions lives on. In this antagonistic world around Russia, the 
United States and NATO serve as the embodiments of the universalist 
project and disrespect for the most fundamental rules of the society of 
states – sovereignty and non-intervention. Bordachev (2010b) applies 
Carr’ ideas to explain how after the Cold War the Western countries took 
Carr’s maxim “Politics are in one sense always power politics” literally. 
Th e “the right of the stronger” was applied when NATO used force 
against Yugoslavia in 1999 and in Iraq in 2003; but military means are 
no longer effi  cient in pursuing political objectives and the irrational use 
of force has exterminated the order based on a monopoly of power of the 
status quo powers (ibid).
Council on Foreign and Defense Policy (SVOP) and Chairman of the Editorial Board 
of Russia in Global Aff airs. Bordachev is the Deputy-Dean of the School of International 
Aff airs and World Economy and the Director of Studies in the Council on Foreign and 
Defense Policy. Kuzmin is Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary and professor 
at the International Law Department of the Moscow State Academy of Law.
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Th e world is not a threatening place for Russia only because of 
NATO expansion or even the United States’ universalism. Bordachev’s 
concern for great power order fading away by itself, dissolving in the 
fundamental irrationality of the use of force, indicates a new challenge to 
international order. It is the erosion of international institutions which 
worries the Russians in particular. Th is erosion is not only the result of 
Western negligence or the universalist approach of the United States, 
but something that potentially comes with the pluriverse, or multipolar 
order, which the Russians hold so dear. Bordachev and Lukyanov (2008) 
write:
A number of participants in international relations view a multipolar 
world as a blessing, as they link many evils of the past few years to 
attempts by a single power to establish global domination. However, 
they ignore the fact that multipolarity arising amid a dilapidation 
of global institutions does not mean a reverting to stable multilateral 
formats. Th ere are grounds to expect an escalating confrontation of 
“everyone against everyone” and the cropping up of fl y-by-night 
alliances for solutions to specifi c problems.
Th is is chaos, a multipolar order where international institutions are 
not functioning. Th e problem is governability in a multipolar world. 
Th e chaos theme was voiced most clearly in a report by the Council on 
Foreign and Defense Policy (SVOP) published in 2007 (SVOP 2007). 
Lavrov reacted to the report, writing “I cannot agree with the opinion 
that a real alternative to a ‘unipolar world’ is ‘chaotization’ of international 
relations due to a ‘vacuum’ of governability and security” (Lavrov 2007a). 
According to Lavrov, multipolarity does not automatically increase 
the likelihood of confrontation, because ”things have always been this 
way, and there is nothing fatal about it” (ibid). What Lavrov off ers as a 
global covenant is informal leadership amongst the world’s leading states 
in addition to the authority of international institutions (UN) (ibid). 
Lavrov means that great power management, agreed on some tacit basis, 
is needed. Th us the solution to the emergence of new power centres is the 
formation of a concert among them, so that instead of confronting one 
another they would rule together. 
Not everyone is as optimistic as Lavrov about the functioning of a 
multipolar order. Bordachev (2010a) explains how the balance of power, 
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which has prevented hegemony and which was behind the establishment 
of international institutions, is now being replaced by chaos. For 
Bordachev (2010b), chaos means that the system of coordinates – the 
world order which is manifested in unipolar, bipolar or multipolar form 
– is eroding. Th e balance of power is eroding as an institution, because 
the fear of mutual destruction is no longer eff ective in managing relations 
between states. Th is was a bond that kept the international system 
together. Th e international system is losing its power to lay down rules 
for individual states and security interdependencies are weakening. States, 
even small ones, are beginning to behave more independently, Bordachev 
insists. (Ibid.) Kuzmin is another author who takes the view that the 
present lack of balance results in chaos: “Th e absence of such ’balance’, 
or a sort of a ’checks and balances’ system in world aff airs is a strong 
temptation for dominant states to use international instability for selfi sh 
ends, which inevitably ends up in arbitrariness and anarchy, disregard 
for conventional norms and principles of international law“ (Kuzmin 
2007, 79). International Law, in addition to great power management, 
is the sword used in the battle against chaos: ”Russia tends to build up 
its impact on the global processes for the sake of a fair and democratic 
world order based on collective decisionmaking at the global and regional 
levels, the rule of international law, and equal and partner relationships 
with all states.” (Kuzmin 2010, 160).
Th e ideal global governance system is fair, equal and democratic, but 
most importantly it is built on respect for international law. Respect for 
international law means respect for sovereignty and the non-intervention 
principle and, in practice, also restrictions on the use of force. Th e 
Russian writers absolutely oppose the use of force. Lavrov (2009, 3) does 
not even approve of economic sanctions and other means of pressure 
against “diffi  cult” states. Lavrov also writes that the confl ict prevention 
and resolution methods inherited from the Cold War are ineff ective. 
Lavrov puts his hope in strengthening the norms of international law 
and adherence to them. Ultimately, “[t]he choice in favor of law-based 
methods of international cooperation should subsequently bring about 
a situation where any forceful action – be it the use of force or threat 
of force – will be ruled out completely” (Lavrov 2010b, 2–3). Lavrov 
is proud of his country, which in his view is advancing in this direction 
(ibid., 5). For Lavrov, Russia is not looking into the past; Russia is not 
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a country succumbing to use of force and geopolitical games. Th is is a 
strong message against spheres of infl uence and their forceful imposition. 
Judging by Russia’s behaviour, for example in the case of the intervention 
in South Ossetia, admiration for international law appears like mere 
rhetoric. Indeed, there is no confl ict for Russians when it comes to 
Russia’s foreign policy and obeying of international law. In fact, as Russia 
promotes its national interests and aspires to be or become a great power, 
it needs international law. International law serves Russia’s interests and 
identity as a great power. Invoking international law is a means to defend 
the multipolar order and refute the power ambitions of any state trying 
to take over the world. In this capacity, it is a weapon against disorder. 
For Russia, international law includes hierarchy; after all, both hierarchy 
and international law are inscribed in the United Nations’ structures. 
International law is something that works as a regulative system among 
the great and for the protection of the small. 
Th e cry for order is an assertion of the system of states as the ultimate 
goal of international order, a position faithful to the tenets of the English 
School. It is also an ode to the balance of power – the old and respected 
method of maintaining international order. In the view of the Russian 
authors there is no other way. Th e system of states is so deeply ingrained 
in Russian thought that even Karaganov (2010b) declares that “[t]he 
role of nation states and regional blocs is reviving – to the detriment of 
the agencies and institutions of multi-party supranational governance”. 
Th us, even though the Russians warn about the dangers of (American) 
universalism, they do not envision it as ever fully materialising. As chaos 
gives room for violation of sovereignty by the strongest, it constitutes 
a threat to international society as such. Chaos means a lack of stable 
and predictable relations among states. Th ere is no power and no group 
of powers to lay down the rules and see that they are abided by. It is 
an anarchical system which lacks the element of great power order. 
Succumbing to chaos would mean not only that Russia would not be 
one of the guardians of international order, but that there would be no 
security structure, no global governance at all. It would be the end of 
polarity. When we continue with the analysis of Russian discourses, it 
becomes evident that chaos is not an abstract threat that just emerges 
out of nowhere. Th e source of the threat is specifi c: the United States 
and its unilateral use of force around the world. Some writers think that 
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the United States universalist project has failed, some see it as still more 
or less functioning; but everyone agrees that there is no attempt by the 
Western states to rebuild the international order – to rebuild a system 
of states governed by great powers. Th e trend towards remilitarisation, 
containment policy, unilateralism; and disrespect for sovereignty and 
non-intervention principles are the reasons why the multipolar dream is 
not becoming a reality and why chaos threatens to prevail instead. 
Th is is how the Russian writers see the world. Th e Russian worldview, 
imbued with the power of history, results in a fervent defence of 
international institutions, criticism of those powers which disrespect the 
good old international order, and idealisation of Russia’s foreign policy as 
lawful and just. In the midst of these discourses we fi nd ideas on spheres 
of infl uence.
7.3.2 The Great Responsibles and Cooperative Balance
We need multilateral diplomacy for a more equitable, democratic 
system of relations. Th e same framework should involve mechanisms 
of collective leadership by leading states, those states that have a special 
responsibility for the situation in the world. And such leadership must 
be a truly representative in geographic terms and in terms of diff erent 
civilizations. Th is is the foundation of the modern democratic 
architecture of international relations. (Medvedev 2008, 5; emphasis 
added.) 
Th e Russian solution to the erosion of global governance is great power 
management – not just any management, but responsible management. Th e 
discussants on great power management include Medvedev, Lavrov, Putin, 
Alexander Orlov, Yevgeni Primakov, Sergei Lavrov, Modest Kolerov42, and 
Segei Karaganov43.
42 ECFR report from 2009 describes Kolerov: “Modest Kolerov is Chair of the Free 
Russia Union of Nongovernment Organizations. Originally a journalist, he was in charge 
of the Kremlin’s unoffi  cial “neighbourhood policy” from 2005 to 2007, and has helped 
set up many Russophile NGOs in neighbouring states.” (Krastev et al. 2009).
43 Orlov is the Director of the Institute of International Studies, MGIMO. Primakov 
is former Foreign Minister (1996–1998) and Prime Minister (1998–1999), Member of 
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Great power management is at the heart of the Russian vision of 
international order: it is what saves the world from chaos. Great powers 
and infl uence belong together which makes the discourse on the special 
role of great powers in maintaining peace and order an important one 
for understanding visions of infl uence. Since the existence of great 
powers also signifi es inequality, it can only with diffi  culty incorporate 
the Russian enthusiasm for equality and sovereignty. Adding the element 
of responsibility becomes a means to relieve great power management 
of the structural injustice it entails. But the Russian analysts are not 
particularly convincing in their accommodation of equality and great 
power management. First of all, insistence on sovereignty does not seem 
compatible with the great power order. Th e reason is not only that great 
powers limit the independence of the smaller members of the society of 
states, but that they also need to restrain themselves (see Watson 1997). 
Would Russia be willing to set limits on its own power? Th e answer is 
“yes” if one looks only at the Russian discourse on international law. 
Russia should abide by it like any other state, and this would limit its 
freedom of action. Th e answer is “no” if one looks at the violation of the 
non-intervention rule by Russia in August 2008. However, there is no 
discussion on how Russia should restrain itself, only of how other great 
powers should obey international law. 
A second diffi  culty comes with the democracy and equality of great 
power management which Medvedev is calling for44. In the above 
quotation from Medvedev, the inherent contradiction between equal and 
unequal is clear. “Democratic”, “equitable” and “truly representative” 
represent relations among the leading states, not among all states. 
Moreover, for Russian analysts the UN Security Council is the highest 
international decision-making authority, imparting a very hierarchical 
image to the Russian notion of equality and democracy. Th e Russian 
ideas on hierarchy can be read as if the leadership of ”the Great” is 
needed to provide for at least some form of democracy. Or, as Bull (2002, 
the Russian Academy of Sciences, President of the Chamber of Commerce and Industry 
of the Russian Federation, and a member of the Editorial Board of Russia in Global 
Aff airs. Kolerov is the head of the President’s Department for Inter-Regional and Cultural 
Ties with Foreign Countries.
44 See also statements made together with China on the fair and democratic world 
order (Treaty of Good-Neighbourliness 2001, Joint Statement 2005).
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199–200) observed, if all were equal in power, it would be hard to see 
how international confl icts could ever be settled. Or, quoting Jackson 
(2000, 291), “War between the great powers is the biggest humanitarian 
threat of all“. However, democracy is a concept that hardly describes 
the representativeness of great power order. In fact, it is curious that 
Russians would want to use the concept of democracy in the fi rst place, 
considering their dislike for the imposition of democracy on other states, 
including their own. As a form of government, democracy describes the 
great power management order poorly when the dominant states are not 
elected by vote. Great powers establish themselves by power, be it soft 
or hard, but necessarily by power, size and prestige. Th e underlying idea 
of great power order is that states are not equal in size and power, and 
thus not equal players in global decision-making structures. Although the 
domestic analogy is hardly the best to describe the anarchical system of 
international relations, or the global covenant, I would like to evoke an 
image of the biggest, strongest and richest individuals claiming the right 
to be the great responsibles. In addition, they could be in that position 
also by virtue of their glorious past or their fi ght against injustice (in 
their own opinion). One could hardly call this democracy or equality. 
Democracy only applies to the relations among the great powers, not to 
international society in general. 
If we continue to ponder the question of equality, we are aff orded 
some insights in Orlov’s (2010) explanation of the development of the 
decision-making structure of the UN. In his view, when the UN was 
being established, the United States wanted to grant more powers to the 
General Assembly, the plan being to use its supporters in Latin America 
to vote as the US ordered. “Nevertheless, in the distant year 1945, it 
was only thanks to the USSR’s fi rm position that an optimal balance 
of powers between the Security Council and the UN General Assembly 
was found. As a result, the only correct and therefore durable and long-
term system of cooperation evolved between the main UN agencies, as 
enshrined in the UN Charter.” (Orlov 2010, 133). Th ere are interesting 
arguments here: Th e fi rst is that regarding the potential of the General 
Assembly, manipulated by the United States, to turn from a democratic 
body into a tool for the United States. Th us, initially, because of bloc 
discipline it would have been very dangerous to establish true democracy 
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in the form having the General Assembly be the decision-making body 
of the UN. Luckily, the Soviet Union saved the day, and insisted on the 
power that was ultimately given to the Security Council. Here we see 
democracy becoming more complicated since the political fact is that, at 
the end of the day, states diff er in size and power. In this light, for Orlov, 
the General Assembly turns into a power tool and signifi es less democracy 
than a system that includes the Security Council, where great powers have 
votes of equal signifi cance. Th is “not so equal and democratic system” is 
constructed, without a sign of unease, as the marvellous product of the 
great power order. For Orlov, the Security Council represents an eff ective 
instrument for the maintenance of international peace and security, and 
this was backed up during the Cold War by the “huge moral and political 
authority” of the leading states (ibid., 134). 
Orlov (2010, 136) tries to defend the inequality within the UN by 
claiming that there is no alternative system in sight. Order is the primary 
goal and if it comes at the price of some inequality, then so be it. Orlov 
(2010, 136) emphasises the “responsibility role” of the great powers, if 
only they take this privilege seriously by following international law:
It is another matter that permanent members of the Security Council 
themselves, in their actions, should give no cause for new attacks on 
their unique, hard-won prerogatives, secured by the generation of 
victors in World War II and that to date remain a precious instrument 
in their hands for the maintenance of peace and security. Th e 
permanent members of the Security Council that other countries look 
to for guidance are called upon to serve as a model of behavior on the 
international arena, faithfully and painstakingly following the UN 
Charter and other norms and principles of international law. And 
they defi nitely must exclude actions involving the use of military force 
or the use of other forms of coercion without approval from the UN 
Security Council.
I fi nd it interesting that the Russians can incorporate inequality and 
equality with so little eff ort, because it tells us something about the Russian 
image of international institutions in general and spheres of infl uence in 
particular. I argue that the awkwardness which plagues the idea of sphere 
of infl uence results from two simultaneous and contradictory lines of 
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reasoning: On the one hand, Russian analysts insist on equality; on the 
other, their vision of the world ultimately draws on the inequality which 
was legitimised in Vienna 1815 and institutionalised in the UN Security 
Council. In other words, they perceive the society of states in traditional 
Westphalian terms but end up supporting the great power system and, 
without noticing it, the inequality in entails. 
If we take a closer look into what great power management means for 
the Russian analysts, we fi nd discourses on 1) balance of power and 2) bloc 
politics. Primakov (2006) argues that the Russian idea of multipolarity 
does not mean “coalition-type military and political alliances between 
diff erent world poles” but a departure from confrontation and competition 
and a move towards interdependence. For Lavrov (2006), the concert of 
great powers and a balance of power are two opposite things:
Th ese changes have resulted in the development of conditions for the 
formation of a global “orchestra” of the leading powers. Th is orchestra 
would be able to consolidate the collective principles in global politics 
and put an end to the practice of creating various kinds of balances 
of forces in the world. I am sure that collective leadership of this kind 
would be welcomed by an overwhelming majority of states. 
Th e Russian writers favour a balance of power as a source of stability and 
prevention of hegemony. But there are two types of balance: competitive 
and cooperative. Little calls the two types of balance “associational” 
and “adversarial”. Adversarial balance means the manipulation of the 
distribution of power by the great powers in their own favour in an 
anarchical international order (Little 2007, 11–12). In associational 
balance, the metaphor of scales applies, but the image of balancing is 
closely associated with the other institutions of Bull’s international 
society: diplomacy, great power management and international law (but 
not war). It is a balance of power in international society which is closer 
to the solidarist end of Buzan’s spectrum.
Even if we see (cooperative) balance of power belonging to a thick 
international society of coexistence through shared rules, such a 
(competitive) balance entails power politics, confl icts, war and the 
pluralist order as well. Competitive balance would be the one where 
241
spheres of infl uence are a method of balancing45. When Lavrov speaks 
of “balance of forces” he means competitive balance – balance in a 
pejorative sense. Lavrov’s “concert” is also an idea of balance, but one that 
promotes cooperation. At the level of language, just as “responsibility” 
sounds better than “infl uence”, “orchestra” sounds better than “balance”. 
With the idea of concert Lavrov wants to add the element of “society” 
to the “system”, that is, the balance of power which appeared after 1815, 
the concert of great powers. Th e great responsibles are not meant to fi ght 
for power and position; they are meant to cooperate and rule together. 
Th e element of balance is there, however, because imbalance would mean 
that the great powers were not equal or, what is worse, one of them would 
be superior. Th us, the Russian analysts cannot do without the idea of 
balance even in a system of responsible great powers; and if they cannot 
be rid of balance, they cannot dispose of the negative images of balance 
and its implications for small states. A balance of power is a method of 
equality only for the great. Moreover, imagining a cooperative balance 
does not take away its confl ictual aspect. When a balance of power 
”vindicates”, that is, empowers, small powers to play the balancing game, 
great powers might enter into confl ict over infl uence. In fact, this is what 
the Russians call “the Great Game”. Lippmann (1945, 82–83) warned 
of the dangers of the neutrality of states because it enabled balancing 
between the great. Th e Good Neighbor Policy solved the problem of 
balancing, for under it the small states would choose their sides and stay 
put. Even if, in an ideal world, states could achieve a balance of power 
harmoniously, ruling the world together in a great power club without 
disagreements and confl icts, this type of cooperative balancing is not 
expressed explicitly by the Russian analysts. Distinguishing working in 
concert, or cooperative balance, from confl ictual balance, would make 
it possible to argue for a more acceptable form of balance of power, and 
the infl uence which possibly comes with it. Not many would read the 
Russian idea of a balance of power as a cooperative model; rather, they 
would see it as a confl ictual notion imbued with a lust for infl uence.
Th e controversy does not end with the problems of equality, democracy 
and balance, but extends to the division between leaders and followers. 
45  Hans J. Morgethau (1993, 197) argues that alliances are historically the most 
important manifestations of balance of power.
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While the analysts promote a special role for leading states, they are 
disillusioned with bloc politics. Medvedev (2008, 2–3) writes: 
I am convinced that with the end of Cold War the underlying reasons 
for most of bloc politics and bloc discipline simply disappeared. We 
simply do not need to return to that paternalistic system whereby 
some states decide for all the others. Th e behavior of states in the 
international arena is now much more varied and independent. 
Even though Medvedev is convinced that bloc politics have come to an 
end, many see them as still continuing (Furman 2006, Karaganov 2010a, 
Dvorkin 2007, Kortunov 2010, 53). Kolerov (2006) also dislikes bloc 
politics to the extent that he encourages Georgia to build its sovereignty 
on the basis of national sentiment instead of alignment with either Russia 
or the United States. As lofty as the renouncement of bloc politics is, it is 
not in line with the idea of great power management. Th e roles of leaders 
and followers come with the idea of grouping. Naturally, some states 
choose to follow one leader, while others choose another. Th e follower-
states will gravitate towards the leader which appears most appealing to 
them. But this is not the system Russia wants, perhaps out of recognition 
of the fact that its followers are not that numerous. Th e Russian writers 
are against military blocs such as NATO, but on the other hand Russia 
is involved in and highly praises other sorts of groupings (CIS, BRIC, 
SCO, CSTO46), which, they claim, are not against anyone and do not 
aim for world leadership.
Th is is bloc politics in the pejorative sense of the term. How would the 
Russians solve the problem of inevitable groupings within a great power 
order? Th ere is as little real discussion on the topic of “equality for all vs. 
equality among the great” as there is on the problem of the quite inevitable 
grouping of states in the face of a leadership system. But reading between 
the lines, I would suggest that the Russian idea of bloc politics is a Cold 
War memory of gross violations of sovereignty, forced alliances and an 
ideological divide. But Russians are not against integration. In 2011 
then-Prime Minister Putin suggested a “Eurasian Union” as the future 
46 Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS); Brazil Russia, India, China (BRIC); 
Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), Collective Security Treaty Organisation 
(CSTO)
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integration project for the post-Soviet space. If this is not bloc politics 
then what is it? If “bloc politics” is a pejorative term, hailing from the 
Cold War period together with “sphere of infl uence”, then integration 
could very well be the idea of a regional solidarist order. Integration 
represents a less forcible and more subtle way to enter the solidarist order, 
or at least the middle of the spectrum, such that sovereignty remains the 
foundation of international order. Within integration there is no need 
to discuss violation of sovereignty because it is voluntary. Putin (2011) 
writes, “A state must only join on its sovereign decision based on its long-
term national interests”. Th en great power management would allow for 
integration where there is at least formal sovereignty and where external 
sovereignty would remain strong (as it is in the European Union). It 
begins to sound like the possibility in Buzan’s spectrum: sovereignty as 
a social contract. Another reason for accepting integration, in addition 
to its being voluntary, is that it connects whereas bloc politics divide. To 
quote Putin (2011) again, “[w]e do not intend to cut ourselves off , nor do 
we plan to stand in opposition to anyone”. In Putin’s vision, integration 
projects would overlap somewhat, or at least cooperate intensively with 
one another, which would provide some solution to the problem of 
divisions that comes with concentration of power. 
Karaganov is not quite so optimistic about the prospect of the great 
responsibles, the reason being that the facts of international political life 
entail the elements of division and confrontation. In the following quote 
from Karaganov (2007) one can see the chaos discourse casting a shadow 
of doubt on the idea of great responsibles:
Th e very idea of establishing a community of powerful and responsible 
states that could lead the struggle against new threats to world 
order is quite reasonable. But in the new epoch of an all-against-all 
competition, such an idea is not only highly unlikely, but also simply 
harmful, as it may sow the seeds of a new ideological divide and 
systemic confrontation.
Karaganov recognises the danger that a leadership system has of developing 
into confrontation and divisions, but does not put the blame so much on 
the inherent interconnectedness of styles of leadership and bloc politics 
as on the ”new epoch of all-against-all competition”. Curiously, one year 
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later, in 2008, Karaganov appears to have acquired some confi dence in 
the community of the powerful and responsible after all when he explains 
the Russian proposal for a European Security system that would consist of 
”14 to 20 of the most powerful responsible and states capable of assuming 
responsibility for global governance”. Karaganov (2008) now proposes 
joint elaboration and coordination of policies instead of attempts to 
establish hegemony by one or an all-against-all struggle. Th e discursive 
strategy of Russian analysts is to organise the idea of great responsibles as 
a dichotomy of the ”Concert of the Great” versus competitive balancing 
or some chaotic, uncontrollable anarchy. Later, I will show how the great 
responsibles are also fi ghting a battle against the single sovereign or the 
world empire. For the Russians, if one really wants to make a case for this 
type of global covenant, there can be no discussion of a relationship of 
equality between the great and the less great, or the possibility of divisions 
into (hostile) groups.
7.3.3 Intervention in Kosovo and South Ossetia
Th ose conducting intervention will defi nitely describe it as 
humanitarian. Th ose opposed to it will call it aggression. (Valeyev 
2009, 93.)
For Keal (1983, 182) and Wight (1995, 194), intervention is an 
instrument used in a sphere-of-infl uence policy. Th e role of the Monroe 
Doctrine in the history of the concept of sphere of infl uence also testifi es to 
the intimate relationship between spheres of infl uence and intervention. 
Indeed, Vincent discussed the Monroe Doctrine as a doctrine of non-
intervention which turned into an interventionist policy. Th e Russian 
discourse on intervention revolves around two topics: Kosovo and South 
Ossetia. Criticising the intervention in Kosovo is a means to criticise the 
United States and NATO for disrespecting international law. Defending 
the Russian intervention in the territory of Georgia is necessary not only 
because of the Kosovo case, but also because of the accusations against 
Russia regarding the illegitimacy of its intervention in Georgia and its 
sphere-of-infl uence motives. Professor Alexander Buzgalin and researcher 
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Andrei Kolganov (2008) write about the reaction of the international 
mass media and world community to Russia’s intervention: ”Th e recent 
outbreak of violence in the Caucasus has given rise to a version of these 
developments in which a huge and aggressive authoritarian Russia, 
loaded with nuclear bombs and missiles, attacked a small, defenceless 
and democratic Georgia.” Russia faced harsh criticism of and very little 
understanding for its intervention. Th e discussions on Kosovo and South 
Ossetia probably prompted the most discussion and sparked the most 
contributions. Here I will bring up only the most relevant arguments 
related to sphere of infl uence; curiously, the opinions of the academic 
elite are well represented here. In addition to Buzgalin and Kolganov, 
Professor Yevgeni Lyakhov, Associate Professor Aleksei Moiseev, Professor 
Vladimir Kotlyar and Professor Stanislav Chernichenko off er their views 
on intervention.
Russian analysts imagine international law as something perfected by 
great power management. Th ey do not recognise Bull’s (2002, 132) claim 
that conformity to international law is not separate from its violation. 
Th is is why they cannot relax even for a moment in their concern for 
formal justice: equal application of rules. If they did, it would be possible 
to justify not only intervention in some cases, but also the inequality 
which comes with infl uence, spheres of infl uence. Upholding the non-
intervention principle means recognising the existence and legitimacy 
of others’ sovereignty (Vincent 1974, 30–31). Th is is what the Russians 
maintain adamantly, and this is why they cannot justify their intervention, 
even as ‘humanitarian’.
For Russia, defending the intervention in South Ossetia is a matter 
of explicating the complex relationship between the principles of 
sovereignty and non-intervention. Given their aversion for invoking 
humanitarian reasons for an intervention, the analysts fi nd it diffi  cult to 
defend the incident in South Ossetia. Moreover justifi cations put forward 
in case of South Ossetia are intertwined with statements condemning 
the intervention in and independence of Kosovo. Th e problem with 
intervention is that it has pejorative overtones for the Russians. Kosovo 
in particular signifi es a reprehensible sphere-of-infl uence logic for the 
Russian experts. Lyakhov (2010, 195) writes, “Today, the recognition or 
non-recognition of a state is to a very considerable degree linked to the 
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division of the world into blocs, and has become a method of involving 
it into a bloc’s sphere of infl uence, and this applies both to Kosovo and 
other unrecognized states”. Th e case of Kosovo represents a violation 
of international law, sovereignty, the non-intervention principle, and 
territorial integrity; and it represents brutal use of force. Intervention 
in Kosovo was a violation of the pluralist international order that Russia 
wants to defend (see Moiseev 2008, 139). Moiseev (2008, 140) writes, 
“In the logic of Kosovo’s partners, in the context of international law, 
force leads to the abandonment of the principle of legal equality of 
big and small States and the establishment of an order where some are 
recognized to have more rights than others, which, therefore, results in 
the breach of the principle of sovereign equality of States”. For Russians, 
the intervention in Kosovo is an example of the inequality of the great 
and the small, yet they have endorsed this very same inequality in the 
form of great power management and undermining sovereignty by their 
own intervention in the territory of Georgia.
In the case of Kosovo, Russia chose to defend international law through 
non-action: not interfering in Kosovo and not recognising Kosovo’s 
declaration of independence. But then Russia conducted its own military 
intervention in South Ossetia in August 2008 and with it a dilemma of 
justifi cation emerged. Th e universality of international law means the 
universality of the non-intervention principle and sovereignty. Russians, 
who so much opposed the armed intervention in Yugoslavia, had to 
explain how the intervention in South Ossetia was justifi ed. Th ey had to 
struggle with the dilemma of upholding the principle of non-intervention 
and fi nding legal grounds for their country’s own intervention. Th ey had 
to refute any claims that they were motivated by considerations of power 
politics, that is, ambitions related to the establishment of a sphere of 
infl uence.
Th en how do the Russian analysts justify the intervention? First of 
all, they do not argue that its purpose was to ensure a balance of power, 
because that would mean a balance in the pejorative sense – a competitive 
balance – and Russians only believe in a cooperative balance. “Balance 
of power” is most often understood as referring to the competitive form, 
making it a negative term in Russians’ eyes, not one that can easily be 
used to justify a foreign policy. Since maintaining a balance of power in 
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the region was not a justifi cation, Russians found ways to defend their 
intervention based on international law. Th e usual argument is that it was 
self-defence in keeping with Article 51of the UN Charter, which allows 
members of the United Nations to resort to self-defence in the case of an 
armed attack against them. Georgia’s attack on Russian peacekeepers was 
interpreted as such an armed attack against Russia. Another tempting 
argument is to embrace putative humanitarian reasons. Indeed, the 
intervention in South Ossetia forced the Russians to discuss the meaning 
of the term “humanitarian intervention” and the possibilities to use it 
as an argument of justifi cation (see, for example Roundtable discussion 
2009). Humanitarian intervention does not really qualify as a justifi cation 
for the Russian analysts, because there is too much suspicion regarding 
the term. Humanitarian intervention is problematic not only because 
of its complicated relationship to international law but also because it is 
seen as an excuse for furthering geopolitical goals. For Professor Vladimir 
Kotlyar, Yugoslavia is one such example, and he ultimately argues that 
the Russian military acted on the basis of the right to self-defence in 
South Ossetia and did not conduct a humanitarian intervention (Kotlyar 
2009, 87). Professor Stanislav Chernichenko (2009, 85) takes the view 
that Russians should not speak about humanitarian intervention at all 
not be used at all, because it “is an attempt to lend a certain measure 
of legitimacy to a term that has a purely negative connotation”. 
Instead, Kotlyar (2009, 87) sees “humanitarian intervention” not as a 
term with a negative connotation, but as one which attempts to “lend 
support on the emotional level to unlawful intervention”. In addition 
to the term “humanitarian intervention” being associated with the 
alleged geopolitical motives of Western interventions, the problem for 
Russia is that accepting humanitarian intervention in principle means 
accepting the interventions of all other states. And that would not do 
for the Russians who insist on compliance with the principles of non-
intervention and respect for sovereignty. 
Most of the discussants defend Russia’s intervention in South-Ossetia, 
but there is one exception. Buzgalin and Kolganov (2008) criticise Russia, 
although they blame the United States for initiating the war. In their 
view, Russia is not wholly innocent and they suggest that by protecting 
the South Ossetians Russia could ”fi nally satisfy some people’s nostalgia 
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for the Soviet Union”. Buzgalin and Kolganov continue: ”Th e Russian 
authorities, who had long wanted to portray themselves as at least 
having some kind of empire and who had planned to do that precisely 
in the Caucasus region, could not but take advantage of the situation.” 
Buzgalin and Kolganov defend the rights of nations to enter into alliances 
voluntarily without pressure, and strongly condemn imperial ambitions 
by any state. Th e Russian people have accepted the imperial geopolitics 
of their state in the past and in the present, leading to a situation where 
the world does not believe in Russia’s good will. (Buzgalin & Kolganov 
2008.) Th e credibility of Russia as a responsible great power suff ered a 
blow with the intervention, as Buzgalin and Kolganov (2008) write:
To begin with, the inconsistency of the Russian authorities – who 
sometimes oppose the sovereignty of “small peoples” and sometimes 
advocate it, depending on tactical considerations – has backfi red, and 
very painfully, on themselves and, indirectly, on all Russians. Th is 
happened at the precise time that the Russian authorities did something 
really useful; that is, when they defended thousands of people in South 
Ossetia. Th e world does not believe the Russian government, and this 
is bad. But still worse, it does not believe Russian citizens, many of 
whom personally helped the South Ossetians and some of them even 
gave their lives for that cause.
Even though it is “unique”, this statement is signifi cant in opposing the 
dominant discourse and in exposing Russia’s own double standards and 
inconsistency in defending the rights of the small. 
Even if we believe the majority of Russian writers, and fi nd justifi cation 
for the intervention in Georgian territory, we would still be left with 
the fact that intervention is always a violation of the sovereign rights of 
the state intervened in. If intervention were considered legitimate by all 
the parties involved, it would no longer be intervention. Any form of 
intervention, humanitarian or other, involves the broader question of the 
value of international order and the right to sovereignty. Th is is the core 
problem of the anarchical international order: the goal of maintaining 
that order as a system of states is uneasy with the goal of protection 
of human rights and humanitarian intervention. For Buzan (2004a, 
48–49) this uneasiness can be resolved by agreeing on sovereignty as a 
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social contract instead of an essential condition, thus tolerating a level 
of solidarism within the system of states; but the Russian approach to 
international society is less fl exible. Bull’s (2002) solution would be to 
say that some level of violation is needed for upholding international law, 
and in such a situation even a balance of power is a justifi ed reason for 
intervention. But this is not a possibility for the Russians either, because 
it would mean an open statement about the injustice of international 
society and again allow the United States to continue its interventionist 
policies.
Intervention is also intertwined with great power management, and 
this is something Russians fail to notice. Bull (1984a, 184) states that 
great inequalities of power make interventions possible. Intervention is 
embedded not only in the notion of sphere of infl uence but in great 
power management as well. Russia proved this in August 2008 by taking 
unilateral military action against another state. Intervention then becomes 
a privilege or even a responsibility of the great powers, and small states’ 
rights are violated. Since intervention has pejorative associations for 
Russians, they should address how their idea of great power management 
solves the problem of rebel-states or violations of human rights, both 
of which might require intervention. Even an intervention sanctioned 
by the Security Council is an intervention. If the Russians connected 
great power management with spheres of infl uence, they could argue that 
spheres of infl uence provide for stability of possessions and thus reduce 
the need for interventions. But as I will later show, Russians do not take 
this step towards endorsing spheres of infl uence.
7.3.4 The European Security Treaty 
I have now discussed Russian ideas on great power management, the 
balance of power, and the rules of sovereignty and non-intervention. 
Before introducing the discourses on infl uence, I want to examine 
the proposal for a European Security Treaty put forward by President 
Medvedev in June 2008. Th e historical point of reference for the 
proposal is the Helsinki Conferences of 1975. Th e Security Treaty and 
the Helsinki Final Act both articulate a conception of international order 
which does not tolerate spheres of infl uence. Th e Helsinki Act is evoked 
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because for the Russian analysts it attests to Russia’s role as a great power 
that participated in the creation of the international order. Th is the order 
which the analysts so admire and which they see as nearly demolished by 
the Western states. Th e Treaty represents a reintroduction of the Helsinki 
principles and is an affi  rmation of undivided security instead of spheres 
of infl uence. Th e main discussants on the Security Treaty are Medvedev, 
Lavrov, Sergei Kortunov, Igor Panarin and Andrei Zagorsky47.
Th e Helsinki Final Act is a document in which sovereignty and non-
intervention are affi  rmed as the organising principles of the society of 
states. According to Ambassador Mikhail Maiorov (2008, 102), it 
represents international law which has been undermined by the Western 
countries ever since the Soviet Union disintegrated. In Kortunov’s (2010, 
54) view, NATO’s attack on Yugoslavia in 1999 and the United States’ 
involvement in the fi ghting in Iraq and Afghanistan destroyed the world 
order based on international law; and the use of force came to prevail 
over reason and humanism (see also Alekseev 2008, 134). In addition to 
the importance attached to the Helsinki Act, the Russians consider the 
agreement of the Yalta Conference (1945) as an affi  rmation of post-war 
international institutions and moreover as a reminder of the country’s 
great power status. Like the Helsinki Act, the Yalta Agreement was to 
serve as the model for a new nomos in Europe, one not founded upon use 
of force. Panarin (2010, 218–219) describes the connection as follows:
Yalta and its spirit need to be rebooted within the framework of 
the Treaty on European Security. Th e balance of powers should be 
enforced and, as our president correctly proposes, the obligations of 
the European countries and the U.S. on non-application of force must 
be legally enforced. Th is is precisely why the Yalta Conference and the 
spirit of its agreements can be instrumental in creating a new system 
of European security.” 
According to Kortunov (2010, 54), the principles of the proposed treaty 
are “respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity of all its members, 
47  Kortunov is the head of World Politics Chair at the Department of World 
Economy and World Politics, State University-Higher School of Economics. Panarin is a 
professor at the Diplomatic Academy of the Ministry of Foreign Aff airs, and Zagorsky is a 
leading research associate at the Institute of International Studies, Moscow State Institute 
(University) of International Relations (henceforth MGIMO).
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non-interference in the domestic aff airs and, as a matter of course, 
the principle of undivided security which means that none would be 
allowed to ensure its security at the expense of others”. Th e Security 
Treaty represents the international law of a new nomos – but it is not 
new at all. Th e Treaty is founded upon the idea of the sanctity of the 
post-war system of states. Any new international order would rely on the 
traditional institutions of international society but without the elements 
of confrontation, militarisation and nationalism. In essence, the Treaty 
would be an affi  rmation of the Helsinki Act. It would re-establish order 
based on international law, restrict the use of force and end the division 
of Europe. Th e use of force is the core question for the Russian analysts 
because it ultimately involves setting limits on interventions. 
Th e Russian writers are on the defensive when it comes to explaining 
the Security Treaty, because the proposal was greeted with suspicion 
abroad. Lavrov (2010a) writes that the Treaty is not meant to destroy 
NATO or weaken the European Union, unlike some claim. After the 
Cold War, to Russia’s disappointment, European security remained 
divided and the OSCE did not take on the challenge of creating a 
common European security architecture. Lavrov (2010a) states, “Th is 
opportunity was missed, however, as the choice was made in favor of 
the policy of NATO enlargement, which in practice meant not only 
the preservation of the lines dividing Europe into zones with diff erent 
levels of security, but also the movement of these lines to the East“. Th e 
Russian view is that security is defi ned and force used, not according to 
any agreed rules, but in a contradictory manner. For Lavrov (2010a) this 
is expressed in taking opposite approaches to the intervention in Kosovo 
and South Ossetia. But then Lavrov (2010a) really goes to the core of the 
matter when he writes:
Th e European Security Treaty initiative is aimed at building a truly 
open and democratic system of region-wide collective security and 
cooperation, which would ensure the unity of the Euro-Atlantic area – 
from Vancouver to Vladivostok – and would help overcome the inertia 
of bloc approaches. It is strange to hear people say that our initiative 
is an attempt to return to the 19th-century policies of “spheres of 
infl uence.” On the contrary, the Treaty off ers a real opportunity to 
rebuild Euro-Atlantic politics on a collective basis and will help redeem 
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the time lost after the end of the Cold War. It provides a universal 
answer to all imaginable and unimaginable security defi ciencies in the 
region. So far, no one has undertaken to convince us that this is not so.
For Lavrov the focus of the Treaty is not spheres of infl uence. On the 
contrary, its purpose is to fi nally end the old divisions. Lavrov is trying to 
eliminate the image of a pejorative sphere-of-infl uence policy from being 
associated with the Security Treaty. 
Even though the Treaty establishes regional democracy, that is, it 
incorporates Russia as a full-fl edged partner, it has universal meaning 
for Lavrov. Th e old international institutions are universal; they are 
the best model of international society. Perhaps Lavrov is thinking that 
establishing great power order by re-affi  rming the weakened principles 
of international law in Europe would translate into a universal model. 
Medvedev (2008, 4) writes that the legacy of the essential principles 
of interstate relations, embodied in the Helsinki Accord and treaties 
between the Soviet Union and NATO, should be examined. According 
to Medvedev, “If these principles retain their universal importance, we 
have to honestly examine why they have ceased to be universally applied” 
(ibid.). Th e Russian idea of universal is very Euro-centric, which comes 
from the importance attached to the role of Europe in creating the rules 
and institutions of international society – that is the Helsinki and Yalta 
Conferences. While constantly emphasising the rising importance of 
such states as Brazil, India, and China, Russian writers completely ignore 
their role in great power management. I wonder if the purpose of the 
Security Treaty is to create regional international law or if the Russian 
analysts wish that “universal” (international law) could still be defi ned by 
the Euro-Atlantic great powers.
If Lavrov denies that the Security Treaty is designed to create a great 
power order based on spheres of infl uence, Zagorsky (2009,111) asks:
Do we want to create “zones of responsibility” in the Russia-U.S.-EU 
“triangle”? Do we want to create a mechanism that would make it 
possible, on the one hand, to avoid the worsening of relations in the 
“triangle” in the event of confl ict situations arising in a particular 
“zone of responsibility,” and on the other, to harmonize our positions on 
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those issues that do not fall into any particular “zone of responsibility”? 
Do we mean something like a “new Yalta”?
Th e Security Treaty has the same fundamental problem as the vision of 
the great responsibles: implementing great power management, with its 
inevitable forming of groups or coalitions. Because of this, it is quite 
understandable that outside Russia the Treaty raises suspicions of a 
sphere-of-infl uence mentality. Again, we witness the Russians’ confusion 
about their preferred international order. Th e noble idea is a great 
power concert but one which is not based on dividing lines. But if the 
international system is hierarchical, based on several diff erent centres of 
power – the Russian view, where does this leave the lesser powers? If we 
look at the world today, alignments of some sort are evident. Since its 
independence, Finland has been struggling to balance between East and 
West, wanting to join the European family and keeping its distance from 
Russia. Th e same applies to many post-Soviet states, which have aspired 
to membership in not only the European Union but also NATO. Th us, 
states tend to lean towards centres of power and cooperate more with 
some than others, sometimes more institutionally and at other times on 
an ad-hoc basis. No treaty made by the great powers will force other 
states to change their loyalties, which are often infl uenced by national 
identity and historical experiences. Th e idea of sphere of responsibility 
to which Zagorsky refers attempts to solve the dilemma posed by the 
pejorative associations of the notion of sphere of infl uence. It is an idea 
diff erent from sphere of infl uence; it is something more benevolent, but 
at the same time it is dangerously close to the idea of sphere of infl uence. 
Proposing spheres of responsibility would be too close to accepting, in 
principle, the fact that sovereignty is not the same for all. Th is is why 
Zagorski enquires but does not answer. 
Th e Security Treaty is backed up by a declaration of the importance of 
Russia as an independent centre of power (Kortunov 2010, 55; Lavrov 
2008). In this respect, the new treaty brings to mind an old security 
architecture, one which was developed in 1815. Th ere is no security treaty, 
no security architecture, without the system of great powers, without a 
hierarchical international order. Th us, what the Treaty expresses in terms 
of spheres of infl uence is the sanctity of old international institutions, 
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especially the idea of great power management. Sovereignty and non-
intervention are among the lofty principles of the society of states, 
but they fall by the wayside under a great power order. Th e attempt to 
establish a common security space in Europe is admirable as such, but the 
discourse on equality, democracy, and fairness does not fully fi t in with 
the Russian idea of international order. Th ere is such a fi ne line between 
the idea of spheres of infl uence and spheres of responsibility that unless 
the distinctions between the two types of spheres are fully discussed, it 
is impossible to expect anyone to understand what kind of great power 
order the Russians seek.
7.4 Just and Unjust Infl uence 
Th us far the Russian discourses on order and law have been presented 
as expressing the dilemma of upholding sovereignty and great power 
management simultaneously. “Balance of power” has a pejorative ring for 
the Russian analysts when it suggests the confl ictual side of balancing, 
but as a cooperative model it is something to strive for. Th e Russians 
experts have a distaste for bloc politics but integration is valued. Th ey 
do not discuss how to avoid blocs when dividing lines emerge in a great 
power order. Th e authors feel the need to defend Russian intervention, 
because it confl icts with their unwavering support for the non-
intervention principle and because they seek to distance themselves to a 
certain extent from sphere-of-infl uence policies. Finally, the drafting of 
the European Security Treaty indicates that Russians value Westphalian 
institutions above all, and these institutions do not incorporate spheres 
of infl uence. In the sections to follow, we get even closer to the Russian 
vision of international order, which consists of 1) sphere of infl uence as 
a pejorative concept; 2) support for ”responsible infl uence” and regional 
integration; and 3) the universalist threat of the United States, which 
conditions all other discourses. First, Russia’s past policies of infl uence 
are purifi ed of their pejorative associations. Next, the present Russian 
infl uence is depoliticised and portrayed as normal. And because the 
element of territorial infl uence of a great power never left the Russian 
imagination, a Großraum emerges, albeit a hidden and secret one. I use 
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the pluralist-solidarist divide to situate the Russian vision of infl uence 
between the two extremes. A sphere-of-infl uence policy is shown to 
signify United States interventionism and the export of democracy, 
whereas Russia’s infl uence is deemed to be only natural.
7.4.1 Falsifi cation of History and the Small Powers 
Historical politics is highly pragmatic, one may even say cynical. It 
exploits the ambiguous pages of history to deal with the burning issues 
of domestic and foreign policies. (Dyukov 2010, 165.)
Th e need to justify Russia’s infl uence extends quite far back into history. 
Of course, Russians do not want to be associated with the oppressing 
state which was playing sphere-of-infl uence games at the expense of 
others; rather, people should remember how Russia saved Europe from 
the Nazis and defeated Napoleon. Other states should remember that 
Russia is one of those states which established international order after 
both Napoleon and Hitler fell (see Fomenko 2010, 146.) Russian 
analysts defend the Yalta Conference, because for many it represents the 
upholding of traditional institutions of international society and Russia’s 
role as a great power deciding on those institutions. Mikhail Narinsky 
(2010, 211), who is the Head of the Chair of MGIMO, argues that 
contrary to the popular view in the Western world, the focus in Yalta was 
not on the victors dividing Europe into spheres of infl uence: ”If all the 
documents of the Yalta Conference are carefully read and the discussions 
held in Yalta analyzed, it becomes obvious that nothing was said there 
about dividing Europe up into spheres of infl uence. Th e Declaration 
on Liberated Europe in fact declared noble, democratic principles that 
would allow the people to create democratic institutions of their own 
choice, hold free and unfettered elections, and so on.“ Th is is an attempt 
to cleanse Russian history of the negative image associated with spheres 
of infl uence. Contrary to Narinsky’s view, Professor Aleksandr Dugin, 
well known for his strong geopolitical views, argues that Yalta established 
zones of infl uence, but even so he admires Yalta for bringing about a 
functioning international order (Dugin 2010, 212–215).
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But even more than it alludes to admiration of Yalta, the term 
”historical politics” refers to the role of small powers as interpreters of 
history to Russia’s detriment and as playing power-games in the present. 
In 2010, International Aff airs featured several articles on the Second 
World War and historical politics, and if intervention caused academic 
discussants to participate, historical politics attracted more governmental 
representation (such as Ambassadors Maiorov and Stegniy). According 
to Russian authors, their state has become a victim of “falsifi cation of 
history”, whose purpose is to portray Russia as an inherently aggressive 
and expansionist power, as part of the identity project of some newly 
independent states (Stegniy 2008, 2). Th is matter became so serious that 
in May 2009 Medvedev issued a decree establishing the ”Commission 
of the Russian Federation to Counter Attempts to Falsify History to the 
Detriment of Russia’s Interests” (Dyukov 2010, 173). From the Russian 
perspective, the falsifi cation of history is anti-Russian propaganda and 
aimed at dividing Russia from Europe and damaging the country’s 
international image (Yakovenko 2010, 225; Maiorov 2008, 102–103). 
What is more, Maiorov (2008, 97) explains, the falsifi cation of history 
is meant to discredit the post-war order and blame Russia for all the 
tragedies of the past century. 
Historical memories are important. In this case the historical memory 
is one involving sphere-of-infl uence politics; something Russia does 
not want to be associated with. Th e analysts do not want Russia to 
be remembered for its totalitarian past but rather for its fi ght against 
totalitarianism and expansionism in Europe. Th is positive image will 
wither away if a reading of history prevails where Russia is accused of 
playing imperialist or sphere-of-infl uence games during the period when 
it supposedly defended freedom in Europe. Discourses on historical 
politics represent a Russian outcry against drawing parallels between the 
Soviet policy of establishing a sphere of infl uence and Russia today. Th ere 
is an attempt to purify the image of Russia’s history where spheres of 
infl uence and the pejorative interpretations of the concept are concerned. 
Th e reason why discourses on spheres of infl uence in a pejorative sense 
are important to Russian analysts is that there is a concern that historical 
images of the “evil Soviet oppressor” are being used in the present to 
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isolate Russia from Europe by portraying it as a country which only 
wishes to extend its infl uence over others.
Russian analysts implicitly warn of the power of the small to disturb the 
stability and balance of forces maintained by the great powers. Karaganov 
(2010a) writes, “Th e tiny neighboring states like Georgia or the Baltic 
countries would be pointing to “huge Russian supremacy” over them 
and demanding counter-measures. As a result, the already observed trend 
of European politics towards re-militarization will receive a powerful 
boost.” Karaganov is arguing that the disproportionate power of the small 
is causing re-militarisation in Europe. Militarisation here means NATO 
enlargement, the (already abandoned) plan of building a missile defence 
system in Poland and the Czech Republic, failure of the Conventional 
Forces in Europe Treaty (CFET), from which Russia withdrew, and 
United States military campaigns, to mention a few. In the same vein, 
Eduard Solovyev (2010) from the Russian Academy of Sciences expresses 
how the post-Soviet states are using geopolitical competition to their own 
advantage. Th ese states balance between their nation-building project, 
which is based on a clear friend (US) - enemy (Russia) demarcation, their 
fear of “balkanization” by the United States, and a neighbour (Russia) 
which does not care so much about their democracy (or lack thereof ) 
while it can off er them military assistance (Solovyev 2010, 99–100). 
Th us, from the Russian perspective, the post-Soviet states are not only 
victims, and they have interests in cooperating with both “infl uencing 
powers”.
Th e potential of the small states to disturb the relations among the 
great is the reason why a hierarchy of power is needed. Or this would be 
the argument if it were voiced explicitly. Russia wants the Westphalian 
order, where great powers have a status preventing the reckless behaviour 
of small states. Th e falsifi cation of history is one means for the small 
states to play the great against each other by containing Russia, excluding 
it from Europe, and invoking fear of it. I have argued that the class of 
small powers is important for theorising sphere of infl uence, because it 
is only by addressing small powers that we can see their role in the game 
of spheres of infl uence. Th e Russian fear of the falsifi cation of history 
testifi es to this. 
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Th e reason why I want to bring Russian historical politics to light is 
to demonstrate the power of historical interpretation. As much as the 
Russians wish the Cold War was a thing of the past, they cannot help 
fi nding the world dragging the legacy of old spheres of infl uence with it. 
Dmitry Furman48 (2006) asserts, “Th e Russia-West struggle in the CIS is 
a struggle between two irreconcilable systems, as was the struggle between 
the worlds of Capitalism and Communism”. For Karaganov (2010a), the 
Cold War is still on, Europe is still split, and this legacy almost caused a 
replay of the Cold War in autumn 2008. Russians fear the re-emergence 
of Cold War bloc politics, especially “containment”, and feel that some 
states are trying to slander Russia by malicious accusations and history 
politics. Russia has not yet found its way to the West: it has remained 
outside European integration and NATO, and its cooperation with the 
United States has not been very productive. In this light, to think that 
spheres of infl uence do not matter anymore, or that the Cold War is a 
thing of the past, is to close one’s eyes to the fact that history has no end. 
We carry history with us. Some histories we want to remember and some 
we would prefer to forget. In the case of Russia, the history of spheres 
of infl uence is the present of spheres of infl uence. Both Russian and 
Western analysts hold on to images of spheres of infl uence in the Cold 
War context, importing the meaning of the concept and shaming one 
another with it while viewing their own states as being free of the past.
7.4.2 It Is Only Natural 
Every country has a natural desire to see friendly regimes in neighboring 
countries (Lukin 2008).
Meddling in the internal aff airs of another state, for example, by trying 
to infl uence elections, would be interpreted as a sphere-of-infl uence 
policy in the present – at least if it were Russia perpetrating such an act. 
Even Russians are suspicious of such interference, whatever the motives. 
Furman off ers a new perspective on the matter that even Paul Keal missed. 
48  Furman is leading researcher at the Institute of Europe, Russian Academy of 
Sciences.
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Although Furman does not mention the concept of sphere of infl uence, 
he still writes about infl uencing the nature of regimes in neighbouring 
states. For Furman (2006) this is a matter of survival, because all states 
want to be surrounded by regimes which are similar to their own. For 
Russia, being surrounded by managed democracies protects the managed 
democracy of Russia itself. Furman is not shy about admitting that Russia 
was “gathering the lands together” after the collapse of the Soviet Union. 
He laments the fact that because there can be no open goal of promoting 
managed democracy, there can be no well-thought-out strategy for 
promoting that goal either. (Ibid.). I will come back to this lack of an 
open “sphere-of-infl uence strategy” later.
Th ere is an important lesson in Furman’s thinking: the interest in 
infl uencing regimes is not a Russian sin. Th e reason why we view it as 
a sin is that we think Russia is imposing the wrong type of regime. It 
is easy to judge the infl uence of a country which is not built on pure 
Western democracy and respect for human rights. Th e infl uence of a 
country which is not the same but the other simply cannot be supported. 
Th e West, instead, promotes democracy, which we view as the best model 
of government. As the West represents that which is good and pure, its 
infl uence is not only accepted but preferred. But what Furman points 
out is that, in the end, we are still talking about infl uence which serves 
our national interests and stability, from our perspective. Th e question 
then is who gets to judge what infl uence is right and what is wrong. In 
this sense, infl uence is not anything peculiar or extraordinary; it is part of 
international politics for better or for worse. But a sphere of infl uence is 
peculiar, because of its unspoken negative function.
Russian discussions on infl uence take up its pejorative aspects as much 
as the Western ones do. Th e Russian writers face the same dilemma of 
distinguishing good and bad infl uence as analysts in the West. Russian 
infl uence needs to be justifi ed as acceptable, pragmatic and benefi cial, 
while the infl uence of the United States, and sometimes Europe, is just 
the opposite. It is not diffi  cult to detect a general Russian discourse which 
attempts to justify Russian infl uence, but what is lacking in that discourse 
is discussion of how the country’s infl uence relates to the idea of a sphere of 
infl uence. Despite the large variety of Russian analysts, a single discourse 
can be detected and those who criticise Russia’s infl uence or refer to it as 
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a sphere-of-infl uence policy are few49. Th e Russian analysts who express 
ideas on Russia’s infl uence are many, and here I have collected thoughts 
from Lavrov, Karaganov, Solovyev and Putin, among others50.
Reading from the Russian discourses, sphere of infl uence as a concept 
is used in a pejorative sense, whereas infl uence (without the sphere) is free 
from disapproval (see Roundtable discussion 2010, 107–108). Infl uence, 
unless it is defi ned specifi cally as military or ideological, is something 
abstract. It has the potential to be neutral or even good, whereas “sphere” 
implies a bad, or at least suspicious form of infl uence. Th us one fi nds 
“infl uence” used much more often than “sphere of infl uence”, especially 
when it comes to describing Russia’s infl uence. For example, Viktor 
Kremeniuk (2008, 47), Deputy Director of the Russian Academy of 
Sciences, writes about “Russia’s infl uence” while the United States has a 
“sphere of infl uence”. Solovyev is concerned about the lack of soft power 
as a means of infl uence. For Solovyev (2010), soft power constitutes 
acceptable infl uence, and he openly promotes Russian infl uence in the 
post-Soviet space via soft means, which include economic cooperation, 
promoting Russian language and culture, and diplomacy geared to 
“winning the struggle for the ‘hearts and minds’ of the once brotherly 
nations”. Using soft power means that Russia’s infl uence will not be 
interpreted as some form of “imperial revenge”. (Solovyev 2010.)
Lavrov (2009, 14) writes that there can be no return to the former 
“spheres of infl uence” and continues:
Yet this does not give anyone the right to deny, let alone undermine, 
the natural mutual gravitation of nations toward each other generated 
by historical and other objective factors and based on mutual interests. 
49 Lukyanov and Bordachev (2008) use the term “zone of infl uence” with reference 
to Russia and “zone of responsibility” for NATO although NATO’s infl uence-policy is 
strongly criticised. For Professor Lev Klepatsky (2008, 140–141) both Russia and the EU 
have a sphere of infl uence. Yevgeni Satanovsky (2008, 6) also makes reference to Russia’s 
sphere of infl uence. Th ese are not discussed or explained, but rather just “thrown in” as 
within contemporary Western literature.
50 Others include Konstantin Kosachev, chairman of the State Duma International 
Aff airs Committee; Ambassador Ramazan Abdulatipov; assistant professor Andrei 
Suzdaltsev from the State University-Higher School of Economics; Sergey Chernychev, 
who is an associate professor at the International Trade Department of the Russian 
Academy of Foreign Trade; and the Director of the Department for Economic 
Cooperation with the CIS at the Russian Ministry for Economic Development.
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Speaking of our closest neighbors, Russia wants them to be friendly, 
stable, and dynamically developing states. Th is approach is consistent 
with the plans of these states and cannot contradict anyone’s interests.
Th us, even though the Cold War spheres of infl uence are not celebrated, 
the gravitation of nations towards others and an interest in a peaceful 
neighbourhood is only natural and should not off end anyone’s interests. 
Th ere is an assumption within IR that great power and infl uence go 
hand in hand. Th is is also the conclusion the English School came to. 
Discourses on great powers are inseparable from discourses on infl uence 
for this very reason. Where one fi nds a great power, one fi nds infl uence. 
If this connection appears evident, it is altogether a diff erent matter to 
say that great powers necessarily have or aspire to establish “spheres of 
infl uence”. Th e reason for this is that adding “sphere” is a statement in 
its own right: infl uence loses its innocence and becomes enveloped in 
pejorative associations. What then is the diff erence between exerting 
infl uence and establishing a sphere of infl uence? A sphere of infl uence 
in its present use implies territorial control which can even lead to 
annexation. “Sphere” is the geopolitical element of infl uence; and this is 
the legacy that geostrategy and geopolitics have left us with. I believe that 
use of the term “infl uence” without “sphere” is an attempt to eliminate 
the geopolitical elements from international infl uence. Separation of 
infl uence from sphere of infl uence also implies an attempt to cleanse 
“infl uence” of its pejorative associations. It is part of “neutralising speech” 
in which infl uence is natural, normal and nothing to cause alarmism (see 
below). Infl uence is a normal part of international relations, but spheres 
of infl uence involve geostrategy, a great game or an ideological struggle. 
Just as a distinction emerges between infl uence with or without a 
sphere, one appears between infl uence and interests. Russian writers 
favour the word “interest”, and it works to neutralise the meaning of 
infl uence just like leaving “sphere” out of “sphere of infl uence” does. 
Interests are also defended against bloc politics or the universalist threat 
(Lavrov 2007a). Several variations can be found: Russia’s strategic/ 
privileged/ special/ vital and legitimate interests (see Bordachev 2008; 
Minaev 2010; Markenodov 2007; Markenodov 2008; Nikolaev 2009, 
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27). Karaganov (2010b) posits an opposition between Russia’s security 
interests and the United States’ infl uence or domination:
Th e real irritant of Russian-U.S. relations is America’s unwillingness 
to acknowledge Russia’s right to a zone of its own security interests. It 
nearly resulted in direct confrontation in August 2008, when Georgia 
attacked South Ossetia and Russian peacekeepers, and Moscow gave 
a tough response, aiming at the logic of NATO’s endless expansion. 
Th is occurred amidst the constant expansion of the U.S. zone of not 
so much security interests as of infl uence – if not domination – in the 
military-political fi eld, the most sensitive to Russia.
Kosachev (2007) argues that Russia has no sphere of infl uence: No one 
is now compelled to join new structures and the economic dependence 
card is not played in order to consolidate what might be construed as 
a sphere of infl uence. Russia has not even insisted that the rights of its 
Russian-speaking minorities in post-Soviet states be ensured – a subject 
where the West’s democratic concern always stops (ibid). Abdulatipov 
(2008, 157) continues depoliticising Russia’s infl uence by arguing that 
Russia is not playing any games in Central Asia or seeking a monopoly 
in the region. He writes that Russia “works taking into account its own 
interests and the interests of its strategic partners” (ibid.). He concludes, 
saying “I should also stress that, despite some opinions, we do not treat 
our partners in Central Asia as ‘younger brothers’” (ibid.). Th us, instead 
of infl uence Russia has interests, and instead of “younger brothers” it 
has strategic partners. Th e Russian analysts do not deny that Russia has 
interests in the post-Soviet space, but they perceive a need to explain the 
motives for pursuing those interests and make explicit the soft power 
means of their infl uence. In Putin’s (2006, 4) words the aim is to develop 
a “common humanitarian space”. Putin (ibid.) explains the purity of 
Russia’s motives: ”Our responses are therefore based on the genuine 
aspirations of the peoples living in the CIS, and these aspirations are 
for cooperation and good-neighborly relations on an equal basis and for 
integration that brings greater practical benefi ts and impact”. Underlying 
the “normality discourse” is the need to justify Russian foreign policy. 
Lavrov (2008) insists on the normality of Russian’s foreign policy and 
wishes that this could be understood abroad:
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Unfortunately, the Cold War experience has distorted the consciousness 
of several generations of people, above all political elites, making them 
think that any global policy must be ideologized. And now, when 
Russia is guided in international aff airs by understandable, pragmatic 
interests, void of any ideological motives whatsoever, not everyone is 
able to adequately take it. Some people say we have some “grievances,” 
“hidden agendas,” “neo-imperial aspirations” and all that stuff . 
Th e argument is geared not so much to proving that Russia’s infl uence is 
good, but that it is normal. Whenever the analysts explain Russia’s relations 
to the post-Soviet states in response to what is a hail of accusations from 
the West, they defend Russia’s policy as something logical, rightful and 
a normal way to handle inter-state relations. One such “normal” type of 
infl uence is leadership. For Suzdaltsev (2010), leadership is mandatory 
in any integration process and in the post-Soviet space Russia is the 
only state which can shoulder this responsibility. Chernyshev (2010) 
continues on the same theme, insisting that instead of imperial ambitions 
Russia wants leadership, and the members of the CIS are beginning to see 
that. Th e post-Soviet space is logically a foreign policy priority for Russia, 
since the economies are closely interlinked and problems are common 
to the region (ibid). According to Lavrov (2007a), Russia is building 
non-politicised relations in the CIS space with the aim of stabilising the 
region. For Lavrov, non-political in this context means that Russia is not 
playing any power games in its economic relations with its neighbours.
All this begins to sound like the Good Neighbor Policy, but with the 
exception that there is no talk of wider geopolitical signifi cance, not to 
mention explicit statements that some forms of spheres of responsibility 
are preferred. For Lippmann, the Good Neighbor Policy was a matter 
of international order and bringing peace on earth. It was a model of 
organising the system of states into regional units. But this idea has already 
made its debut, especially in Europe; Russians do not have to ”invent it”. 
Instead, they are on the defensive, trying to argue how they are in fact 
pursuing a Good Neighbor Policy of their own. Th e Russian analysts 
try to dissociate the country’s foreign policy from negative infl uence, 
and the notion of interest serves this purpose. In fact, by denouncing 
the United States’ foreign policy and, albeit less often, the EU’s as well 
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while portraying Russia as the only defender of international law, Russia 
emerges as the only power with pragmatic and depoliticised motives. Th is 
is not a sphere-of-infl uence policy any more than the Good Neighbor 
Policy was for Lippmann. At this point it is useful to remember the 
concern that arose in the case of the Good Neighbor Policy: Is replacing 
one word with another an indication of a change of policy, or merely 
a way to justify a long-standing tendency? Is the emphasis on interest, 
pragmatism and normality mere rhetoric?
What we can learn from reading Russian discourses on the country’s 
infl uence and relations with its neighbour states is that deep down the 
idea of sphere of infl uence is alive and well. One cannot escape the logic 
by sidestepping the term and concept. Th e notion of sphere of infl uence 
comes to the fore, for example, in the dispute over the motives of Russia’s 
new pricing policy for gas for some post-Soviet states (mainly Ukraine 
and Belarus). While the Western world accuses Russia of “sphere-
of-infl uence politics” the Russians say they are promoting equality, 
sovereignty, fairness and normal relations – everything but consolidating 
a sphere of infl uence (see Arbatov 2007, Karaganov 2006, Lavrov 2007a, 
2007b; Medvedev 2008; Putin 2006, 2007b). Th e Russian perspective is 
that those who accuse Russia of geopolitical games are themselves guilty 
of upsetting the stability of the region with their grand strategies (see 
Medvedev 2008, Putin 2006). It is not diffi  cult to notice that although 
Russian writers do not invoke the concept of sphere of infl uence in this 
context, we can recognise the discursive game of accusations. Th e idea 
of sphere of infl uence has considerable power in pointing out the (geo)
political (that is, selfi sh and unjust) motives behind the Other’s actions.
Balance of power is a topic avoided when justifying Russia’s infl uence 
in the post-Soviet space. Because balance of power is an idea of concert for 
the Russian analysts, it cannot be evoked to justify a policy of infl uence; 
otherwise it would become to signify competition. Th e Russian analysts 
cannot argue that Russia wants to be involved in the post-Soviet space in 
order to achieve a balance of power with the United States, because this 
indicates the competitive balance which has a negative connotation and 
it comes too close to the idea of establishing spheres of infl uence. Th e 
geopolitical aspect of infl uence has been eliminated from the discourses: 
there is no geostrategy to follow or a “Great Game” taking place on Russia’s 
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part. Infl uence has not been eliminated, however, and the argument that 
Russia’s foreign policy constitutes “normal relations” justifi es the right to 
pursue one’s interests. Balance of power will come to shine as salvation 
against the universalist threat but, just like for Lippmann, that balance 
has no value when it comes to justifying infl uence beyond state borders. 
It is not peculiar for Russia to want unity with the post-Soviet states in 
the hope of achieving integration, economic cooperation and protection 
for Russian minorities. Th is is what any country would wish for territories 
that once belonged to it. When I say that the authors do not promote 
“spheres of infl uence”, this is not to say that Russia wants to relinquish 
its infl uence in the region. If the post-Soviet space were insignifi cant to 
Russia, the writers would not steadfastly resist NATO enlargement or 
United States’ infl uence. Th e concept of sphere of infl uence indicates 
hard power and the Great Game, a relic from the Cold War which for the 
Russians better describes the democratisation and world police actions of 
the United States.
7.4.3 Infl uence of the Single Sovereign
Unipolarity, quite simply, is an encroachment on God’s prerogatives 
(Lavrov 2007b).
If the Russian writers have not read Schmitt, they are defi nitely embracing 
his spirit. Schmitt (2003, 296) wrote, “[T]he Western Hemisphere 
had found itself facing an enormous alternative between a plurality of 
Großräumen and a global claim to world power, pluralism and monism, 
polypoly and monopoly”. Vladimir Pechatnov (2006), from MGIMO, 
writes, “Today, when the United States is going through a new period 
of ‘imperial temptation’ – this time as the ‘only superpower’ – it is faced 
with the same dilemma: fi nd a modus vivendi with other emerging power 
houses, sharing with them its rights and responsibilities, or strive to 
preserve its global hegemony at any cost”. Th e United States’ interventions, 
export of democracy and export of universal values represent for the 
Russian analysts that which is “the new sphere-of-infl uence policy”. It is 
an extension to Cold War spheres of infl uence. When the Soviet Union 
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collapsed, the United States continued where it had left off : spreading its 
own ideology around the world.
 Between the two journals the quantity of material on the United 
States’ “export of democracy” and interventionism is overwhelming and 
deals with cases varying from Kosovo to the Middle East and the post-
Soviet space. Governmental representatives such as Putin, Lavrov and 
Kosachev are pouring energy into discussing United States’ hegemony51. 
Again, it is no news to discover the Russian resistance to unipolarity, or 
criticism of the United States’ foreign policy. Th e argument goes that 
exporting democracy around the world is undemocratic to begin with 
and represents interference in the internal aff airs of another state (for 
example, Chernichenko 2009, 149; Kosachev 2007). I argue that we 
need to connect the Russian concern for unipolarity with the concept 
of sphere of infl uence, especially if we wishes to claim that sphere-of-
infl uence policy is an integral part of Russian foreign policy.
Russia has a long tradition of being high up in the hierarchy of states, 
where it had an interest in infl uencing and the capacity to infl uence the 
institutions of the system. Th e Russian concern for the international 
system is very much dependent on political reality, that is, the role and 
power of the United States. If Russian infl uence is portrayed as normal 
and just, then the infl uence exerted by the United States is presented as 
its antithesis. It is the infl uence of the single sovereign. Th is is refl ected in 
President Putin’ s (2007b, 56) Munich Speech in 2007:
However, what is a unipolar world? However one might embellish this 
term, at the end of the day it refers to one type of situation, namely one 
center of authority, one center of force, one center of decision-making. 
It is world in which there is one master, one sovereign. And at the end 
of the day this is pernicious not only for all those within this system, 
but also for the sovereign itself because it destroys itself from within.
Th e political reality for Russia is the threat of the one master who destroys 
sovereignty from within. We can interpret this resistance of hegemony as 
the defence of the pluriverse over the universe. Even when many of the 
51 Also Orlov, Yekaterina Kuznetsova, an International Aff airs observer, and Valdimir 
Batyuk, the Head of the Center for Regional Aspects of the U.S. Military Policy at the 
Russian Academy of Sciences, are concerned about universalism as global democratisation.
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analysts believe that the time of unipolarity is over, or it never even fully 
materialised, Lavrov’s harsh words express the seriousness with which 
Russian writers approach the topic. Th ey are talking about a state playing 
God. Th is god is not particularly benevolent or fair, and the idea itself of 
a god-state presages the end of history, the end of everything particular 
and diff erent, the end of sovereign states.
For Orlov, the universe is a reality: the world is a product of total 
domination by one superpower, the sovereign. Orlov evokes the memory 
of “gunboat diplomacy”, which was used against those who were slow to 
grasp American values (Orlov 2008, 67; also Satanovsky 2008, 7). Th e 
descriptions of the United States are harsh and melodramatic. For Oleg 
Ziborov (2007 15), from the Ministry of Foreign Aff airs, the United 
States is a tyrannosaurus rex which intimidates and destroys its enemies. 
For Leonid Ivashov52 (2007) and Igor Maksimychev53 (2007, 58–59), 
the United States is an evil empire: one either becomes its servant or 
faces destruction. Referring to the US plans for an anti-missile system 
in Eastern Europe, Maksimychev (2007, 59) writes: “Th e United States 
is setting up an absolute anti-air defense system to rule out the slightest 
possibility of retribution. Th is will make it the master of the world.“
For Lavrov (2008), who argues for the “pluriverse of cultural and 
civilisational diversity,” the ultimate threat is universal interventionism 
and a transition toward the construction of a global empire: 
As regards the content of the new stage in humankind’s development, 
there are two basic approaches to it among countries. Th e fi rst one 
holds that the world must gradually become a Greater West through 
the adoption of Western values. It is a kind of “the end of history.” 
Th e other approach – advocated by Russia – holds that competition is 
becoming truly global and acquiring a civilizational dimension; that 
is, the subject of competition now includes values and development 
models.
Kuznetsova (2006, 68) writes in the same spirit:
52 Ivashov is the President of the Academy of Geopolitical Problems.
53 Maksimychev is a Chief Research Fellow at the Institute of Europe, RAS.
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Universalist projects are fraught with danger, especially if proposed 
by a strong state. Force, as a rule, cancels out all other arguments 
not based on force. At the same time, any universalist project has a 
limit to its own universality because there are no values for the sake of 
which people would agree to give up their individuality. Humanity, 
alas, is not disposed to embrace universal values. At the same time, the 
presence of force gives rise to the temptation to use it for imposing or 
establishing “universal” values all over the world.
For Kuznetsova, universalism means two things: universal values and 
their imposition by use of force, which are both totally unacceptable. 
Together, these two form the universalist threat, in which people lose 
their individuality. Th is resistance to universal rules for humanity is 
tantamount to saying “no” to the solidarist international society.
Th ere is an obsession with the United States which aff ects Russian ideas 
about the international system. All the eff orts to defend international law, 
equality, sovereignty and non-intervention, and great power management 
and to resist the idea of universalism are conditioned by the threat of the 
United States. Th e dilemma in the case of international law is that when 
Russia defends universal international law it defends its right to be one of 
those who defi ne that law and who force that law upon rebels. If Russia 
is not empowered to decide on the application of universal international 
law, that is, when it is not accepted among the Great Responsibles, it 
cannot support it. For Russian analysts, international law is universal 
when it is not being imposed and interpreted by a single sovereign. But 
when a single sovereign begins dictating the law, it turns into universalism. 
Th is is when “universal” becomes negative; it comes to signify imposing 
values by force. Th is makes the idea of equality in international relations 
to mean equality between the United States and Russia. Sovereignty and 
non-intervention alike are principles which are, ultimately, defended 
fi ercely as a response to the power of the United States.
When it comes to universalism, the core question, obscured by the 
anxiety over the United States, is values. Values are often presented by the 
Russian analysts in a negative light, implying an ideology or something 
forced upon others. Universal values, in more concrete terms, represent 
the import of democracy and Western models of development. “Law” is 
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the opposite of values, the opposite of ideology. Law is universal but values 
are particular. Law also means freedom in the sense that international 
law (as respect for sovereignty and non-intervention) guarantees the right 
to choose one’s own values. Th e separation of values and law is a bit 
artifi cial, because laws must have some values behind them; otherwise 
laws would be hard to formulate. Sovereignty and non-intervention are 
in fact values that express that which is preferred, right and, ultimately, 
also universal. Th e dichotomy of law and values again springs from the 
political reality which the Russian analysts face with the United States’ 
superiority and global activeness. Values are interpreted as the weapon 
of the single sovereign, not as the foundation of laws. In an approach 
that pits values against law, “universal international law” is expressed as a 
fortress against the United States’ tyranny of values. But the universalist 
threat of the United States is not just some abstract idea of a tyrannosaurus 
rex constructing a global empire. For Putin (2008, 13–14) it means a very 
concrete dismissal of sovereignty:
Today’s world is not becoming any simpler. On the contrary, it is 
becoming ever more complicated and tougher. We have seen how the 
lofty slogans of freedom and an open society are sometimes used to 
destroy the sovereignty of a country or an entire region.
From the Russian perspective, the United States’ universalism is 
a continuation of the Cold War policy of ideological infl uence. 
Vladimir Batyuk (2010, 96) explains, “We have witnessed an amazing 
metamorphosis: the Russian Federation has become a conservative 
country, a zealot of a stable and immutable international law while the 
United States can be described as “the main revolutionary force of our 
time” to use a Soviet formula.” He continues, “Th is is signally important: 
for the last few years, Moscow and Washington were gradually being 
sucked into an ideological confrontation similar to that of the Cold War 
period. While in the past it was our country which hoisted the fl ag of 
the ‘world revolution’, after 1991 the United States is marching under 
the slogan of global democratization American style.” (Ibid.) Kosachev 
(2007) explains why Russia does not go along with “democratisation 
American style”:
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Moscow’s refusal to participate in the collective harassment of the “last 
dictators,” and in other passionate “crusades for freedom,” is explained 
not by the absence of democratic views. Rather, Russia is guided by 
sober realism and its own bitter experience of imposing the “only true 
teaching” on others.
It has already become clear that Russian experts portray the foreign 
policy of Russia as the opposite of that pursued by the United States. 
Th e argument goes as follows: the United States is stuck in the Cold War; 
Russia is the country which respects international law, promotes fairness 
and equality, puts its faith in the UN and has proposed a Euro-Atlantic 
security structure based on common security. Moreover, Russia does not 
resort to the use of force and is aware of the responsibility that comes 
with an active role in international aff airs (Lavrov 2008, 2). But how does 
all this relate to spheres of infl uence? First of all, reading from the Russian 
analysts, if there is a sphere-of-infl uence policy it is the American export 
of democracy and forceful imposition of Western values. Th e reference to 
Cold War-style infl uence is a reference to spheres of infl uence. Second, 
the capacity and willingness of the Russian analysts to articulate Russian-
style infl uence is conditioned by their perceptions of the United States. 
Th e universalist threat is spelled out clearly but the response to it is not 
the Großraum, because, just like for Burnham, the world is simply too 
dangerous a place to propose that infl uence per se is acceptable. Instead, 
the Russian analysts invoke the supremacy of the principle of sovereignty. 
Next, I discuss the Russian vision of international order in the pluralist-
solidarist logic conditioned by the unipolar threat.
 
7.4.4 The Middle Way 
Buzan (2004a, 46–47) suggested that pluralism and solidarism should 
not be seen as the two extremes of positive law (state-centric) and 
natural law (rights of individuals, cosmopolitan values and shared moral 
norms) but together as a spectrum where international society is thinner 
at the pluralist than at the solidarist end. Th e pluralist end has more 
diffi  culties with collective enforcement of rules, and the solidarist end is 
more interventionist. For Buzan (2004a, 49), in a spectrum of pluralism 
271
and solidarism there are “ends” but these are not opposing positions, 
but rather represent degrees of diff erence. We can include a sphere of 
infl uence, Großraum or Good Neighbor Policy between the two ends of 
the spectrum whereby a sphere of infl uence can be seen as incorporating 
both pluralist and solidarist ideas. Th us, it situates between the two ends. 
In this way the pluralist-solidarist divide off ers a framework for theorising 
on Russian visions of spheres of infl uence within the international society.
Russian experts do not uphold either of the two extremes of pluriverse 
or universe. From the Russian perspective, the extreme pluriversalist 
approach of a system of states with minimal elements of a society is not 
preferred. Instead of a system, the Russians want a society of states, which 
implies enforcement of international law and limitations on hegemonic 
tendencies. On the other end of the spectrum lies the universe of 
a single sovereign, which is tantamount to a cosmopolitan world 
society. Solidarism, in the form of common values and humanitarian 
interventions, is the platform on which the single sovereign operates. 
Between the two ends of the spectrum is the system of Großräume/
super-states/Good Neighbor Policy. But because Russian analysts do not 
openly promote this middle way, their ideal system is sooner situated 
somewhere between a system of Großräume and the pluriverse. Th e 
characteristic feature of this system is that it is not quite a system of 
spheres of infl uence, because of the unease Russians feel about the idea 
of withering sovereignty and explicit inequality. What makes it a regional 
solidarist order is that even with the pluralist agenda the Russian analysts 
see opportunities for historical, cultural, political and economic unity 
within the post-Soviet region. In the form of integration, this solidarist 
order could materialise, but the analysts are not really making a strong 
case for integration either. 
However, the authors accept Russia’s territorial infl uence and try to 
convince others of its normality. Th ere is no sign of the country wanting 
to relinquish its infl uence in the post-Soviet states. Th e dream lurking 
behind the Russian discourses is a Großraum in the style of the Good 
Neighbor Policy, even if the Russians are afraid to say so. Th e leaders 
of Russia see their country as a peacemaker in the region, mediating, 
bringing stability, fi ghting drug traffi  cking, and so on, but this still 
does not translate into an explicit vision of a Good Neighbor Policy. 
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Th e reason why the Russians cannot verbalise their idea of a sphere of 
infl uence is that it represents systematic injustice (see Bull 2002, 89) and 
is too close to the idea of bloc politics. Russia has chosen to uphold 
international law, which does not allow spheres of infl uence, because 
of the preoccupation with the United States, its universalist threat 
and interventionist policies. Even though the Russian analysts would 
take advantage of all the normative aspects of sphere of infl uence (like 
contributing to order and peace), the injustice that inheres in spheres of 
infl uence cannot be articulated aloud, for this question would have to be 
answered if the Russians began speaking in favour of establishing a sphere 
of infl uence. Another reason for depoliticising infl uence is that there 
is a great deal of resistance against Russia’s foreign policy. Arguments 
legitimising spheres of infl uence, or whatever the name one chooses for 
territorial infl uence, are of little use if the infl uenced states do not accept 
their position. Naumann paid great attention to this, and that is why 
he wanted to make sure that above all infl uence would be acceptable 
for the infl uenced states. Moreover, with the erratic progress with regard 
to democracy and human rights in Russia, there is also a danger of any 
Good Neighbor Policy coming closer to the Orwellian version of a super-
state than that of responsibility. Th is is what the Western analysts in fact 
propose when they use the concept of sphere of infl uence as a pejorative 
notion to describe Russian foreign policy.
If the Russian authors fear the extreme form of solidarism – the single 
sovereign – and do not openly promote spheres of infl uence, their vision 
of international order is not quite the pluriverse of equal nation-states 
either. Th is is because great powers are seen as the “great responsibles”. In 
Watson’s (2007, 20) pendulum, great power status makes the pendulum 
swing towards hegemony (a hegemon is able to ”lay down the law” on 
behalf of others where their relations are concerned, but leaves them 
domestically independent.) If we imagine pluralism and solidarism as a 
spectrum with a thinner and a thicker international society at each end, 
the Russian vision falls on the thinner side. Th ere is a longing for an 
international society bound together by universal international law. Even 
though Russia has not been eager to go along with collective enforcement 
and interventions, it did support the United States after the terrorist 
attacks in 2001. Yet, besides the country’s rallying for international 
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law, there is not much solidarism to brag about in the Russian vision 
of international society, especially when common values are so strongly 
criticised. What makes the Russian discourse take yet another step toward 
pluralism is the fact that the Russian “quasi-pluriverse” is founded wholly 
on the principle of sovereignty. Lukyanov and Bordachev (2008) argue 
that not even globalisation will ever wipe out sovereignty completely, and 
Gennady Gatilov (2009, 54) from the Ministry of Foreign Aff airs writes, 
“Despite the allegations about ’the erosion of state sovereignty’ in global 
politics, nation-states should preserve and even strengthen their position 
as basic elements that make up the complex mosaic of international life”. 
In addition, Buzan (2004a, 47) makes an observation that goes directly 
to the core of the Russian thinking: ”Pluralism stresses the instrumental 
side of international society as a functional counterweight to the threat 
of excessive disorder, whether that order comes from the absence of 
states (a Hobbesian anarchy), or from excesses of confl ict between states, 
whether driven by simple concerns about survival, or by rival universalist 
ideological visions”. Th e ”chaos discourse” centres precisely around the 
functionality of pluralism.
Th e principle of sovereignty poses a dilemma that haunts the Russian 
analysts: Even though many Russian analysts uphold the principle of 
sovereignty as the guiding light in the darkness of international politics, the 
realities of the changing world force them to incorporate solidarist ideas 
to their thinking. A good example is Kuzmin (2010, 158), who begins 
with the argument that states should relinquish some of their sovereign 
rights to the world community in order to tackle global concerns, such 
as environmental and economic problems. Moreover, Kuzmin (ibid.) 
writes: ”Th e consistently intensifi ed universal nature of social processes 
and the ever increasing impact (or even pressure) of universal problems 
on international relations have brought us to the limits beyond which 
the world order should be transformed into an integral structure based 
on shared values and common interests.” But then Kuzmin goes on to 
make a declaration at the end of his article which wipes away these traits 
of universalism. In fact, he (2010, 159) sees universalism, in the form of 
a world government, as completely impossible:
Th e present ineffi  ciency of global governance and its inadequacy are too 
obvious to be denied. Th e Western development model (and American 
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unipolarity as its part) imposed on the world looks like a fl agrant 
violation of the unifying nature of the United Nations Organization 
as devised by the “founding fathers.” We should move away from the 
highly ideological international relations of the Cold War era and 
avoid ideas of the world government as noble and romantic on the 
surface but far-fetched and essentially Utopian. Instead it is advisable 
to strive for a self-regulating world order based on tolerance and 
pluralism without betraying the tested principles of sovereign equality 
of all states, mutual benefi t and international law. In the West, too, the 
ideas of world government are doubted as unpractical and unviable 
(M. Virally, C.W. Jenks, R. Falke and others).
Th us, Kuzmin is fi rst looking in the solidarist direction by proposing 
some unravelling of sovereignty and shared values. But when solidarism 
manifests itself as a world government or Western superiority, Kuzmin 
turns his back on it and begins to argue for a pluralist international 
society. What makes solidarism so unpleasant for the Russian experts 
is not necessarily that it requires a loosening of sovereignty and the 
principle of non-intervention, but rather that in a solidarist society 
(ruled by a world government or single sovereign), there is no great power 
concert which could agree on the limitations to sovereignty. Th e Yalta 
and Helsinki Conferences were examples of great power management, 
even though they affi  rmed a pluralist rather than a solidarist international 
society. At present, according to Russians, we are witnessing violations of 
international law and hegemonic tendencies, which is not a basis upon 
which solidarism can be founded. 
Another problem with solidarism is that it should allow doing it “my 
way”. Lavrov (2009, 10) resists universalism by stating that conditions 
are ripening for the coexistence of various models of social-economic and 
social development and value systems. In fact, Lavrov (2007b) admires 
the Westphalian system for placing value diff erences beyond the scope 
of interstate relations. In other words, value diff erences should not come 
to defi ne relations among states, as happened during the Cold War. It 
gets all the more complicated when Russians demand the right to choose 
their path of development, pursue national interests (regardless of others) 
and resist the imposition of democracy on other states. Th is approach is 
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hardly possible in the light of the system of shared values which Kuzmin 
calls for. For the Russian analysts, a solidarist international society 
does not mean universal values which lead to accepting humanitarian 
intervention. It does not mean the end of states and sovereignty. But 
some solidarist underpinnings can be found, given how much energy 
the authors invest in defending “society” in the international system. Th e 
importance of common rules and institutions for Russians, even if those 
institutions derive from the pluralist system, is pivotal to the vision of 
one world that is fair and even democratic.
Th e controversy related to the institutions of international society 
boils down to the political reality in which theory becomes fused with the 
world that Russia is surrounded by. It comes down to the perceived role of 
the United States. In theory, universal values are good, and international 
law is good. But when universal norms, such as democracy, are imposed 
by United States, they become bad. Th ey destroy plurality. Intervention 
is justifi ed when Russia so decides but it is a selfi sh plot when it is 
orchestrated by the United States. Th is dilemma of the universal and the 
particular reminds me of Burnham’s dilemma: longing in principle for a 
pluralist order but due to the political facts (the Atomic Bomb and the 
Soviet threat) leaning in the end towards the dream of a World Empire of 
the United States in order to secure at least some form of democracy and 
plurality. I am also inclined to argue that if only the Russians were not 
so obsessed with the universalist threat and the defence of sovereignty, 
they could openly propose great power management with spheres of 
responsibility as the suitable international order. But since the Russian 
experts cannot let go of their discourses on sovereignty and international 
law, they cannot make a case for an international order of Großräume 
which would uphold tolerance and plurality against the negative sides of 
the solidarist order, and at the same time admit that such a system would 
run a high risk of violating the rights of the infl uenced.
7.5 Conclusion: Perfectly Ruled, Perfectly Free
Th e most compelling concern for the Russian analysts is the erosion 
of international society. Th is erosion is taking place for two reasons: 
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First, because the chaos of multipolarity and the reckless use of force 
have emerged due to the lack of concert among the great. Second, 
because the United States is attempting to establish a world order 
with a single sovereign, which, if it materialised, would mean the end 
of universal international law and justice, and imposition of a single 
value-system. Th e Russian solution is the re-establishment of the old 
international institutions: international law, great power management, 
and the (cooperative) balance of power; and the rules of coexistence: 
sovereignty and non-intervention. But there is such uncertainty in the 
post-Cold War order and in Russia’s place in it that the authors end up 
undecided, unable to formulate an idea of international order which 
could incorporate both the superiority of sovereignty and the necessity of 
great power management. I argue that the contradictory views of order 
stem from issues related to the source of normative decisions.
According to Carr, personifi cation of the state made possible the 
creation of international law on the basis of natural law. He even claims 
that it is impossible to discuss international relations without the fi ction 
of a state as a person with rights and obligations. (Carr 2011, 136–137). 
We can also explain international society as theorised by the English 
School as an imagined society of state-persons. Th us we can use the 
domestic analogy to explain the normative dimension of the Russian 
view of international order and spheres of infl uence. I have already hinted 
at this by speculating on the impossibility of democracy in great power 
management (chapter 7.3.2). If we think about states as individuals, we 
can use the ideas of Arthur Allen Leff  (1935-1981) on the United States 
Constitution and the morality of individuals. In fact, Allen Leff  (1979, 
1229) expresses perceptively what the Russian discourse on the society of 
states really means:
I want to believe – and so do you – in a complete, transcendent, 
and immanent set of propositions about right and wrong, fi nd able 
rules that authoritatively and unambiguously direct us how to live 
righteously. I also want to believe – and so do you – in no such thing, 
but rather that we are wholly free, not only to choose for ourselves 
what we ought to do, but to decide for ourselves, individually and 
as a species, what we ought to be. What we want, Heaven help us, is 
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simultaneously to be perfectly ruled and perfectly free, that is, at the 
same time to discover the right and the good and to create it.
Th e Russian analysts presented in this research want the world of states to 
be both perfectly ruled and perfectly free. Th is means that international 
relations are to be strictly based on international law, which must be 
applied equally to all the members of the society of states. At the same 
time, perfect freedom gives Russia the right to decide on the normative 
and pass judgement on others. Where there is law, there is also a law-
maker. Law does not come from nowhere. Russian analysts not only 
claim the historical role of their state as a law-maker (by the right of the 
victor) but also claim to possess the ultimate truth about that law. Th ere is 
no room for others’ normative assertions, a position that renders Russian 
multipolarity hypocrisy. For the Russians, great powers are the source 
of law but Russia is the one country that correctly interprets this law. 
At the same time, the analysts do not want the world to have the single 
sovereign, or in Allen Leff ’s (1979, 1240) terms “the unjudged judge, the 
unruled legislator”; it is an arbitrary idea. Prozorov (2011) argues that 
Russia is not a norm-maker but rather a norm-keeper, meaning that it 
accepts the Western norms of international relations (most importantly 
sovereignty, non-intervention and territorial integrity) and attempted to 
defend them – until the war in Georgia, where Russia took the liberty 
to go against the norm of non-intervention it so strongly upheld. Here 
we can see the wish to be perfectly ruled and perfectly free in confl ict, 
going against the norm that Russia so fervently defends. But I argue that 
Russian analysts see Russia not only as a norm-keeper but also as a norm-
maker: in Vienna in 1815, Yalta in 1945, Helsinki in 1975 and in its role 
as a permanent member of the UN Security Council. What is more, the 
Russians see their country in a third capacity as a norm “interpreter”. A 
Norm interpreter is an actor who passes judgement on others’ behaviour 
based on its understanding of right and wrong, lawful and unlawful.
“Perfectly ruled and free” also has bearing on spheres of infl uence. 
For Russian analysts, wanting to be perfectly ruled means speaking out 
forthrightly for sovereignty and non-intervention; but wanting to be 
perfectly free means that Russia should have the right to act in keeping 
with its own morality. If we look at the Russian idea of the role of small 
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states as being simultaneously free and ruled, the analysts are defending 
the rights of the small to equal sovereignty yet without wanting to 
empower them to infl uence world aff airs or relations among the great 
powers. Spheres of infl uence are located within this dichotomy: a sphere 
of infl uence is unjust because small states deserve to be free, but great 
power rule is justifi ed because small states need to be controlled when 
they cause disharmony. Infl uence and interests are just as long as they 
can be depoliticised. Th e need to be perfectly ruled by the principles of 
sovereignty and non-intervention also leads to the inability to propose a 
Good Neighbor Policy or Großraum, that is, a hierarchical great power 
order with spheres of infl uence.
As I have argued, the concept of sphere of infl uence has pejorative 
associations, attached to the nature of the United States’ policies of 
infl uence, for the Russian analysts whom I have discussed. While the 
American style of infl uence deserves to be called a sphere-of-infl uence 
policy, Russian infl uence is seen as free from selfi sh political motivations. 
Ideas on sovereignty explain the pejorative notions in the Russian idea of 
sphere of infl uence. Sovereignty is holy, and so is the non-intervention 
principle – in principle. But the Russian experts avoid discussing the 
relationship between actual power and sovereignty. Th e logic is that 
Russia should be a great power because it has been great historically, is 
presently and can be in the future. It is stronger than some other states and 
always has been. Russia is a historical great power and victor of the last 
major war. It did not even lose the Cold War, because it triumphed over 
totalitarianism and ended the division of Europe. Accordingly, it should 
have a rightful place among the great powers. With this argumentation, 
how could sovereignty possibly be the same for all the members of the 
system of states? If there is a class of great powers, it automatically follows 
that other classes are lower and this in turn has practical implications. It 
is already a practical implication to decide on something in the Security 
Council, for example, on an intervention that relates to a state not 
empowered to take part in the decision. Th e uncompromising defence 
of Westphalian sovereignty is simply not compatible with the insistence 
on the role of great powers. Th e two are not incompatible as such: a 
hierarchy of power is as old as sovereignty itself. Carr was perhaps right 
in stating that sovereignty was dead as soon as it was invented. It has 
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so many “buts” to incorporate that it becomes by defi nition something 
which cannot be absolute. But the Russian writers do not explain how 
great power management necessitates a measure of inequality. Instead, 
they vociferously advocate equality, which only comes to mean equality 
between great powers. When the Russians claim great powers should be 
the great responsibles, they are saying that sovereignty is not the same 
for all. It is not a revolutionary discovery to fi nd that there is a tension 
between the admiration of sovereignty, on the one hand, and hierarchy, 
on the other; but the insight here is that this can explain the diffi  culties 
in articulating the Good Neighbor Policy.
Th e Russian view of international order is somewhere between the 
pluralist society of states, deeply rooted in sovereignty, and the Großraum, 
deeply rooted in great power management. For the Russians, international 
order should remain the same as it has been since the Congress of Vienna. 
Great power management is important because it contributes to order 
in the anarchical system. For Russia, a concert of great powers is the 
best available – no, the only available – option to avoid chaos. For the 
Russians, if the great powers are numerous and representative enough, 
this constitutes a fair, just and democratic international order. If great 
power order is a dream come true for the Russian writers, then why not 
argue at the same time for the Good Neighbor Policy, or outright spheres 
of infl uence, which would settle the problem of geopolitical games and 
changing affi  nities? Th e Good Neighbor Policy could be defended as 
protection of the small: it could be a win-win situation. Or it could be 
argued that great powers – the great responsibles – mediate confl icts, 
limit confl icts and stabilise international relations. It would only mean 
letting go of, or loosening, pluralist ethics and establishing small powers 
as second-class citizens in the international system – not only in practice 
but also in principle. I have argued that what at least partly explains 
the Russian authors’ the diffi  culty of formulating a coherent idea of 
international order – and a vision of infl uence – is that the political 
reality obstructs theoretical thinking. Th e idea of national interests 
overrides broader considerations of international order. Th is is not a 
unique situation as such: all states struggle to accommodate national 
interests with the interests of the society of states. What is unique in the 
case of Russia is how the fear of universalism culminates in a feeling of 
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inferiority compared to the United States in such a way that the authors 
formulate the idea of international order on that basis.
I believe that with the support of the pluralist-solidarist debate we 
can understand the Russian view of the world better. What is crucial is 
to theorise the middle range of the spectrum, because that is where the 
Russian idea of territorial infl uence can be found. For me the middle 
of the spectrum looks like an unarticulated idea of Good Neighbor 
Policy or a Großraum, depending on how much consideration is given 
to defending the rights of the infl uenced (Good Neighbor Policy) and 
concerns for pluralism against the universalist thereat (Großraum). Th e 
Russian analysts are at odds with the nomos of the earth because it is 
changing in the wrong direction – into a dissolution not of sovereignty 
but of great power management. Th inking back to those theorists who 
witnessed the withering of their beloved sovereignty, they could not 
uphold it anymore, but they had to invent new ideas to save at least 
something of the greatness of the old world. Th e Russian proposal for 
a new nomos is the European Security Treaty, even though it does not 
extend beyond the Euro-Atlantic space. But this is not enough for Russia’s 
Western partners, who interpret Russia’s agenda in negative terms. It is 
not only the Western analysts and decision makers who should open 
their eyes to the idea of sphere of infl uence; Russians, too, could benefi t 
from spelling out international order not in terms of the duality of the 
pluriverse and the universe, but in terms of the regional solidarism which 
lies in the middle. 
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8 Conclusions 
8.1 Framing Sphere of Infl uence
I have argued that sphere of infl uence is an important concept in 
international relations because of its continuous use in political language. 
Yet, it has not sparked theoretical discussion since the Cold War. Sphere 
of infl uence has become a concept to use when judging the foreign policy 
of Russia, a concept in which one fi nds inscribed the map metaphor of 
territorial infl uence spilling over state borders. Th e historical meaning of 
the concept of sphere of infl uence is drawn from the memory of the Cold 
War, which imbues the concept with pejorative associations. Th ere is a 
silent agreement on this pejorative pall, which means that IR has settled 
the normative question without even beginning to discuss it. Because 
sphere of infl uence is used in a pejorative rather than an analytical 
sense, I have run into diffi  culties in trying to fi nd relevant theoretical 
conceptualisations to support my own study of ”Russia’s sphere of 
infl uence”. As I could not fi nd conceptualisations and debates on the 
phenomenon, I had to initiate some myself. I have tried to challenge a 
notion of sphere of infl uence which is taken as self-evident by contesting 
and conceptualising the concept though historical sources. I began from 
problematising the pejorative uses of the concept, and concluded with 
studying Russian discourses on infl uence. In my search for the origins 
and meanings of the concept of sphere of infl uence, I have identifi ed the 
dimensions of order and justice as the framework for the inquiry.
Th e relationship between spheres of infl uence, order and justice 
explains where the pejorative associations of the concept have originated. 
A sphere of infl uence either contributes to international order or it 
does not, but no conceptualisation of it can not avoid questions of 
international order. Th is means that if we wish to use the tem ”sphere 
of infl uence” we should not only refl ect on what actions constitute a 
sphere-of-infl uence policy, but also address the nature of the international 
system: a sphere of infl uence, when viewed historically, defends plurality 
against solidarist or universalist tendencies. When spheres of infl uence do 
not involve an open regional solidarist agenda; as they did for Naumann, 
Schmitt, Carr and Lippmann; they relate to international order by tacit 
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understandings, stability of posessions, limiting confl icts, sovereignty, 
great power management and non-intervention/intervention. Even if a 
sphere of infl uence is not necessarily confi ned to a particular region it 
most often expresses a regional solution to the demise of the system of 
states and to the dangers of a world state. Th us, to the initial ”Do spheres 
of infl uence contribute to order?”, a second question can be added: 
”What kind of order do spheres of infl uence contribute to?” 
Justice, the second element that is relevant for our present understanding 
of spheres of infl uence, refers here to justice between states. When an 
analysis of spheres of infl uence addresses interstate justice, the context 
is the sovereign equality of states and in particular relations between the 
great and the small. When it is claimed that a sphere of infl uence can 
contribute to international order, or that political unifi cation is a necessity, 
the argument is that the order-producing eff ect of a sphere of infl uence 
takes priority over the rights of the infl uenced states. Spheres of infl uence 
have not been seen as having bearing on human justice because there is 
practically no discussion on the relationship between spheres of infl uence 
and the individuals living within them. Indeed, the interconnectedness 
of intervention and spheres of infl uence is discussed in terms of the 
violations against the states that are the objects of intervention, not the 
human beings aff ected by it. Th e focus on sovereignty strengthens the 
link between spheres of infl uence and international order as a system of 
states. On the other hand, the history of spheres of infl uence also points 
to a system where sovereign states did not yet exist, the suzerain system, 
but even more to an international order where the state ceases to function 
as the principal international actor. Th is in turn directs our focus to 
the middle of the pluralist-solidarist spectrum of international society, 
where spheres of infl uence could be called regional solidarist projects, 
Großräume or super-states.
Th e table below summarises the visions on spheres of infl uence, 
order, justice and the nature of the system in the selected historical and 
conceptual episodes. Th e entries refl ect the answers to the following 
questions:
1) Do spheres of infl uence contribute to international order among the 
society of states?
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2) Do spheres of infl uence violate interstate justice, that is, do they 
necessarily violate state sovereignty?
3) Do spheres of infl uence operate within the limits of the system of states?
Table 1. Relationship between spheres of infl uence, order, justice, and 
the system. 
Present 
studies
The English 
School
Theories 
bridging 
nation and 
humanity
Cold War Russian 
discourses
 Order Does not 
promote 
order
Promotes 
order or 
instability 
Promotes 
order
Promotes 
order or 
instability
Does not 
promote 
order
 Justice Violation of 
sovereignty
Violation of 
sovereignty
Justice for 
the small
Violation of 
sovereignty
Violation of 
sovereignty
 System System of 
states
Regional 
solidarism 
within the 
system of 
states
New nomos Regional 
solidarism 
within the 
system of 
states
System of 
states
I have chosen the elements of order, justice and system as the theoretical 
anchors for the reassessment of the concept of sphere of infl uence. Th ey 
represent elements which bind spheres of infl uence to international 
theory and the pejorative uses of the concept. Order connects justice 
and the system, for it expresses the potential of spheres of infl uence 
to resolve or worsen problems within the society of states. Arguments 
that spheres of infl uence can contribute to order and represent regional 
solidarism act as justifi cations for the violation of sovereignty which 
spheres of infl uence tend to result in. When it comes to international 
order, at present a sphere of infl uence is not envisioned either as just or 
as contributing to international order; rather, it is considered a Cold War 
relic that represents power games of the system of states. But when we 
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look into the past, a sphere of infl uence is conceived of as an arrangement 
which can promote international order, and even one that can create a 
new order to replace the system of equal sovereign states. When it comes 
to justice, it seems that violations of sovereignty are part and parcel of 
spheres of infl uence, and only the theorists refl ecting on the world wars 
tried to defend and support sovereignty as much as was possible within 
the new nomos. Looking at the above table, these theorists can be seen 
as promoting the most radical view of spheres of infl uence. If we ignore 
Burnham and Orwell, we get the least pejorative visions of spheres of 
infl uence. Next, I present the three factors of order, justice and system in 
more detail.
8.1.1 International Order
Within the English School, Bull and Keal discussed the contribution 
spheres of infl uence could to make to international order. In Th e Anarchical 
Society (2002) Bull establishes his idea on great power management 
which is maintained by a balance of power. Th e spheres of infl uence of 
the United States and the Soviet Union are a part of that balancing game 
and contribute to international order (Bull 2002, 199–204). Keal makes 
an even stronger case for spheres of infl uence with a potential to promote 
stability of possessions and containment of confl icts, and thereby the 
potential to contribute to international order. Th e problem with order 
for Keal (1983, 211) is its instability. If spheres of infl uence contribute to 
the stability of international order, it is only very temporary, and as long 
as spheres of infl uence are composed essentally of relations among the 
infl uencing powers, competition between them entails the prospect for 
confl ict over spheres of infl uence.
Th e present understanding of spheres of infl uence from a pejorative 
perspective means that there is no discussion on their possible contribution 
to order. Great power management, humanitarian intervention and 
the principle of a ”responsibility to protect” are examples of ideas of 
international infl uence without pejorative senses; in other words, they 
can be both defended and opposed. Th us, other forms of infl uence, ones 
more justifi ed, can be seen as contributing to international order. We lack 
studies which would examine the order-producing mechanism of spheres 
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of infl uence during the Cold War. Th e same applies to Russian discourses: 
spheres of infl uence are most often discussed in pejorative terms and refer 
to dis-order rather than order. Russian infl uence, on the other hand, is 
order-producing. Th e Russian discourses on international order resonate 
with the dilemma of the particular and the universal captured by the 
historical conceptualisations and visions of spheres of infl uence. Russian 
writers defend the state and object to universalising tendencies and 
hegemony, but because they admire great power management and speak 
in favour of regional infl uence as something natural, they end up in the 
middle of the spectrum – as if secretly envisioning a Good Neighbor 
Policy or a Großraum.
 If we look at Keal’s and Kaufmann’s accounts, Cold War spheres of 
infl uence are seen as contributing to some kind of order, but the Cuban 
Missile Crisis and its interpretations demonstrate that this order is rather 
problematic. Keal recognised that instability was a weakness of the order 
produced by spheres of infl uence. Spheres of infl uence were part of the 
international order that prevented a third world war and maintained 
bipolarity, but it is altogether another thing to argue that that order was 
a good one. It was an order which could also have led to a nuclear war. It 
was an order which was based on hatred, fear, division and competition. 
For the theorists situated in the context of the two world wars, spheres 
of infl uence were the salvation of plurality and thus they embodied the 
promotion of order. Only Orwell imagined the system of super-states 
as a rather frightening order. Burnham concluded that nuclear weapons 
made it necessary to abandon the otherwise functioning idea of super-
states, sacrifi ce plurality and embrace the hegemony of the United States. 
Instead, Naumann, Schmitt, Carr and Lippmann all envisioned how a 
sphere of infl uence, or whatever they liked to call it, would become the 
middle way of international political organisation, contributing to a new 
nomos.
8.1.2 Justice in Spheres of Infl uence
Within the English School, we fi nd discussion not only on the inherent 
injustice of spheres of infl uence but also on intervention and great power 
management. In the English School conception a sphere-of-infl uence 
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policy clearly entailed a violation of sovereignty. Nevertheless, even 
though a sphere of infl uence is unjust for the infl uenced state, it can 
promote order and thus is not completely condemned by Bull and Keal. 
Moreover, the English School affi  nity for great power management and 
discussing the occasional justifi cation of intervention indicates that some 
sympathy is found for spheres of infl uence. Still, the only way to justify 
a sphere of infl uence is to argue that it contributes to international order, 
as Keal does. Th is means that spheres of infl uence bring regional order 
but, more importantly, that management of them becomes an ordering 
principle in the relations of the infl uencing powers. Th e inherent injustice 
of spheres of infl uence becomes manifest if infl uence is exerted without 
the consent of the states subjected to that infl uence, and this problem of 
injustice troubled Keal.
Injustice also troubled Naumann and Lippmann, who both tried 
to elaborate a sphere of infl uence policy which would turn injustice 
into a mutually benefi cial relationship of protection. Th ey also began 
their reasoning with the system-level consideration of how to manage 
international relations in an age of confl ict and war, that is, how to 
create a viable international order. Spheres of infl uence, Schmitt’s and 
Carr’s Großräume, Burnham’s super-states (later the single super-state), 
Naumann’s Mid-Europe and Lippmann’s Good Neighbor Policy were the 
answers. Creating units larger than nation-states was in fact a necessity, 
since the time of sovereignty was clearly over. Spheres of infl uence 
would create rules and boundaries regarding international infl uence, 
establish a new balance of power, and reduce the number of international 
actors, making the management of international relations simpler in 
the process. Justice is the issue where the theories relating to the period 
of the world wars diverge most from those in all the other episodes, 
because it is the only area where we can fi nd an attempt to overcome the 
inevitable injustice of infl uence. Th ree justifi cations are presented: the 
benefi ts for the infl uenced (Lippmann and Naumann), pluralism against 
universalism (Schmitt, Carr, Lippmann, Burnham) and, ultimately, 
world peace. It was only within the context of the world wars that spheres 
of infl uence emerged as regional constellations of the willing. If there 
was unwillingness, those resisting needed to be converted for the sake of 
preventing another great war.
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Th e Cold War spheres of infl uence are deemed unjust by Kaufman 
and Keal, but these scholars also draw attention to the legitimacy of the 
spheres of infl uence at that time as more formal arrangements of infl uence, 
which is an important point. To read from the Cold War episode, spheres 
of infl uence can be built in a manner in which the infl uenced state 
accepts its position and is even ready to commit this acceptance to paper. 
Formality, nevertheless, does not make a sphere of infl uence necessarily 
just if the infl uenced state is forced into a union with the infl uencing state. 
But legitimising infl uence through such an agreement could be viewed as 
justifi ed as part of the process of normalising spheres of infl uence as a de 
facto practice of the time. Th e questions arises: What does legitimacy do 
for the idea of a sphere of infl uence and does the establishment of a sphere 
of infl uence then turn into integration? Th e Cold War period off ers an 
interesting possibility to study how much justice a sphere of infl uence 
can actually incorporate. Was there consideration of justice or were the 
small states simply relegated to the role of puppets of the superpowers? 
Keal (1983, 212) and Kaufman (1976, 11) were of the opinion that there 
was not much, if any, room for justice. 
In the present pejorative understanding of the concept, spheres of 
infl uence are evidently unjust but this they are for Russian scholars as 
well. Taking “sphere” out of the expression “sphere of infl uence” tends 
to mitigate some of the pejorative connotations. Infl uence as such is not 
pejorative, only “a sphere of infl uence”. Th is is why the EU’s infl uence 
can be just for Western observers and Russian infl uence for Russian 
writers. Th e Russian idea comprises a strong defence of sovereignty 
while celebrating the great power order, making the defence of justice 
refl ect the age-old dilemma of equality in principle and inequality in 
practice54. Th e Russian elite of the twenty-fi rst century believe in the 
same great power management as the theorists situated in the world wars’ 
period and the English School, but are afraid to discuss the injustice that 
their vision of international order entails. Many Russian writers believe 
in a balance of power, although, like Lippmann, some see it also as a 
problem. Th e Concert of Europe proved to some that a balance of power 
can contribute to peace and order. Yet, the Russian authors, like their 
Western counterparts, do not seek justifi cation for spheres of infl uence 
54 Th is is not to say that Russia is the only country to face this dilemma; it concerns 
all the states which promote great power management
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since there are as few examples of successful spheres of infl uence periods 
in history as there are defenders of the policy. Th e colonial period, the 
Cold War, and post-Cold War “Russian sphere of infl uence” all look to us 
like the embodiment of injustice in international relations.
8.1.3 System of States or a New Nomos?
Finally we get to the relationship between spheres of infl uence and the 
nature of international order as a system of states. Th e world-war-era 
theorists again make an exception by positing spheres of infl uence as an 
aspect of a new nomos. Yet, even if there is an explicit idea of new order and 
its constituent regional units, it still hangs on to the idea of sovereignty. 
Th is is not because sovereignty as such would be upheld as it was before 
– the theorists did, in fact, declare the end of sovereignty – but because 
of the need to explain that regional solidarism would still enable its units 
to hold on to the power to decide over their internal aff airs. In order to 
sell the idea to those aff ected, sovereignty was promoted as the means 
to avoid an image of (Burnham’s and Orwell’s) super-state. With the 
question of sovereignty as the focal point, Schmitt and others positioned 
their visions of spheres of infl uence between nation and humanity. Just 
as I believe that the English School conceptions of spheres of infl uence 
should be placed in the middle of the pendulum of international society, 
so, too, should Großräume, the Good Neighbor Policy and the super-
states, but with the recognition that the international society is composed 
not of sovereign states but of regional constellations. Th e state has run 
its course and something new is taking its place. Because this kind of 
”regional solidarism” is constructed as a force against the state and the 
world state, it constructs an idea of a new nomos. Th e explicitness of the 
argument for a new nomos is important, because that argument becomes 
the justifi cation for spheres of infl uence. A sphere of infl uence becomes a 
necessity; it becomes a means to achieve peace.
In the contemporary literature, a sphere of infl uence is seen as a 
foreign policy tool strictly confi ned to the policies of states and not an 
entity, a regional constellation in its own right. A sphere of infl uence is 
not an instance of integration or regionalism; it is not a progressive, but 
a regressive and conservative idea of infl uence. For the English School, 
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spheres of infl uence are part of the society of states. Even though spheres 
of infl uence are not the centre of attention, they clearly emerge in the 
context of international institutions. Spheres of infl uence are fi xed within 
the system of states and can be found within the debate on pluralist and 
solidarist societies. Jackson’s concept of regional solidarism becomes an 
apt description of what a sphere of infl uence looks like from the English 
School perspective. Likewise, in Keal’s and Kaufmann’s analysis of the 
Cold War, spheres of infl uence represent regional solidarism which 
emerges as a bipolar order within a system of states. Th us, they do not 
discuss the demise of the state itself, unlike Schmitt and others. Th e 
Russian perspective is the most state-centred, making discussions on 
spheres of infl uence fi rmly rooted in the Russian desire to preserve the 
society of states.
In addition to debating spheres of infl uence from the normative 
perspective, looking at their inherent injustice and justifi cations, theorising 
international order adds substance to the concept of sphere of infl uence. 
Th e two episodes I have detailed in this thesis, English School theory and 
“between nation and humanity”, reveal that spheres of infl uence can be 
located in a debate on the nature of international order. Th is means that 
spheres of infl uence can be the answer to the weaknesses of the other two 
options for an international order: the system of states and the world 
state. Th is less pejorative view of spheres of infl uence is implied in the 
theorisation on Mid-Europe, Großraum and Good Neighbor Policy. I 
wanted to take the idea even further, by identifying spheres of infl uence 
as falling in the middle of the pluralist-solidarist spectrum. Th e reason 
why the idea of a sphere of infl uence sits so well within the pluralist-
solidarist/universalist debate is that it contributes to the criticism of the 
world state and world society of individuals. If we want to situate the 
concept of sphere of infl uence both theoretically and historically within 
the discipline of IR, it is exactly here that it can be found. Th is is where I 
step out of the genealogical caution in defi ning, seeking the correct origin 
and setting the limits of the object of inquiry, because I argue that the 
present pejorative associations of the concept of sphere of infl uence can 
be traced to the dichotomy of pluralism and solidarism. Th ese traces have 
gone unnoticed until this research. Th is makes sphere of infl uence, not 
necessarily “an old-style concept”, conservative or even pejorative, but 
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a progressive idea in the attempt to imagine a new pluralist order after 
the system of states. Th e concept combines that which is seen as good 
and valuable in pluralism and solidarism alike. To be sure, spheres of 
infl uence might not solve the tension between pluralism and solidarism; 
they might well represent an unimaginable international order, but they 
can still address the contemporary challenges of international order. 
Stepping out of the fi xed meaning of sphere of infl uence does not mean 
the acceptance of unjust practices; it means refl ecting on a sphere of 
infl uence as an idea which encompasses theorisation on international 
order and justice among states.
8.2 Future Research Agenda
In this research, the concept of sphere of infl uence has been reviewed and 
revised based on its normative history in international theory, but this 
should be considered only a beginning. Th e study, which has drawn upon 
examples of history and contemporary challenges, is not meant to uncover 
everything there is to know about spheres of infl uence. I have opened up 
paths towards the English School, ideas on regional constellations, the 
Cold War and contemporary studies, and the current thinking in Russia. 
Next I will express my thoughts on the concept of sphere of infl uence in 
international theory and put forward those questions which I feel merit 
further investigation.
Th e English School is clearly a source in which the topic of spheres 
of infl uence was not suffi  ciently explored. I wonder whether, had the 
English School theorists taken spheres of infl uence seriously, we might 
now have students interested in studying spheres of infl uence. If the 
English School had paid attention to Schmitt, Naumann, Lippmann and 
Carr (or some others) as theorists of spheres of infl uence, that is, if they 
had been interested in the history of sphere of infl uence, there could 
now be studies on spheres of infl uence, just like there are on every other 
topic the English School ever took up. Keal’s (1983) book on spheres of 
infl uence is an interesting case, because it has not been noticed within 
the discipline and especially not within the English School. Keal is the 
missing link between the English School and spheres of infl uence. His 
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study draws on English School concepts and he comes close to writing a 
conceptual history of spheres of infl uence. Keal writes about colonialism, 
the Monroe Doctrine and the Good Neighbor Policy, for example, 
connecting spheres of infl uence to other episodes of history than only the 
Cold War. However, even Keal’s account is not enough: First, it is focused 
on tacit understandings in international order and not on the history 
of the concept of sphere of infl uence; second, it needs updating in the 
post-Cold War situation; third, it neither pays attention to the uses of the 
concept in political parlance nor situates the concept within IR theory. In 
a word, the English School missed sphere of infl uence: the concept and 
phenomenon were never framed within the institutions of international 
society. However, the subject of spheres of infl uence is not wholly lacking 
in the English School theory if one looks carefully enough. If the English 
School overlooked its opportunity to scrutinise spheres of infl uence, we 
have overlooked the English School’s omission in neglecting spheres of 
infl uence.
Th e need to theorise the concept of sphere of infl uence becomes 
evident when discussing the relationship between spheres of infl uence 
and sovereignty, because violations of sovereignty take central stage 
when attempting to defi ne the concept. Sovereignty is also important 
for the present understanding of spheres of infl uence, because when 
seen violated, it reinforces the pejorative associations of the particular 
conception of infl uence involved. Suzerain or imperialist infl uence 
are the pejorative manifestations of a violation of sovereignty. But 
considerations of sovereignty are also important for conceptualising 
sphere of infl uence, because sovereignty is such a central concept of IR; 
by aff ecting sovereignty, sphere of infl uence becomes a central concept 
as well. Since modernity, sovereignty and the international have been 
seen as interdependent (see Bartelson 1995, 189–190). Th ere can be 
no sovereignty without the international system and no international 
system without sovereignty. Th us the state has taken centre stage in 
international political theory. A sphere of infl uence breaks this canon by 
foreshadowing an international system that is not formed out of sovereign 
states but some sort of “great-states”. Could spheres of infl uence really 
become the basis of a new international order, a new international law? 
Or does sovereignty nevertheless persist within a sphere of infl uence to 
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an extent where it could accommodate the inequality which a sphere of 
infl uence entails? Does a sphere of infl uence only take away the content 
of sovereignty and leave it formally intact, as Schmitt envisioned? One 
could turn the attention away from sovereignty by focusing on the 
consent of the infl uenced. So, rather than discussing whether a sphere of 
infl uence violates sovereignty, we could discuss whether the consent of 
the infl uenced determines the appropriate term: Where the infl uenced 
state resists its position, this qualifi es as a sphere of infl uence; where 
the infl uenced state happily agrees to its position of being infl uenced, 
the relationship is one of alliance or integration. Here, the pejorative 
connotations follow the concept of sphere of infl uence, but the notion of 
infl uence would assume diff erent levels of legitimacy.
Watson sees international society as a concert of hegemonial powers 
where peripheral states are becoming increasingly willing to accept the 
donors’ terms for the aid they need. State independence is becoming 
limited and nation-states everywhere may come to exercise less than 
total sovereignty. (Watson 2007, 65–66.) Th is trend toward collective 
hegemony began back with the Concert of Europe in the form of not 
so much a right as an obligation to intervene in other states. Watson 
asserts that after the collapse of the Soviet Union a concert has formed 
again. (Ibid., 66–67.) But this new concert is less concerned with 
maintaining the system of separate states than it is with peace and 
prosperity (Ibid., 79). Watson (ibid., 82) identifi es ideas which belong 
to the hegemony-suzerainty area of the pendulum (see chapter 3.2), for 
example, management of the international system, the privileges and 
responsibilities of great powers and rich nations, the Concert of Europe, 
intervention, standards of civilization, human rights and women’s rights, 
donor and recipient states, strings being attached to aid, derogations of 
sovereignty, and limits to independence. Th is is actually quite illustrative 
of the picture that emerges out of the history of sphere of infl uence, 
from the Congress of Vienna all the way to the war in South Ossetia. We 
see a movement towards a solidarist international society, but one which 
retains the special role of great powers and their infl uence over other 
states. We see sovereignty and non-intervention fading, giving room to 
the solidarist claims to human rights, but we see neither equality of states 
nor a world government emerging. We see the same pendulum gravitating 
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towards great power management, just as it has been for the past two 
centuries. If we believe Watson and his pendulum theory we need to start 
taking the idea of sphere of infl uence more seriously, for it suggests that 
a sphere of infl uence is a fact of contemporary world politics, not merely 
a metaphor, a discourse or a pejorative term used as a means of shaming 
nations. IR is guilty of not theorising sphere of infl uence in the context 
of international order and justice, and hopefully the present research is a 
step towards correcting this state of aff airs.
An analysis of the Cold War theorisations on spheres of infl uence and 
the Cuban Missile Crisis proves that there is still much to learn when it 
comes to understanding the phenomenon of spheres of infl uence. Th ere 
is also much potential to theorise on spheres of infl uence with reference 
to the unique setting of the Cold War, as the research and open archives 
that are available today off er better opportunities to study spheres of 
infl uence in that era. For example, we can ask if the Cuban Missile Crisis 
is an example of spheres of infl uence contributing to international order 
or rather to disorder: Was the crisis caused by competition over spheres 
of infl uence (causing disorder), or was it caused by a struggle for nuclear 
parity or some other form of confl ict in which respect for spheres of 
infl uence prevented the escalation of the crisis (maintaining order)? Th e 
Cold War image of spheres of infl uence becomes more complex when 
that episode is examined. One question is the relationship between 
institutionalisation and legitimisation of infl uence. Keal and Kaufman 
deemed the Cold War spheres of infl uence unjust but they recognised 
diff erent forms of infl uence, with de jure infl uence representing an act of 
legitimisation. Th e Cold War idea of sphere of infl uence was not pervaded 
by pejorative connotations to the extent it is today, which made it possible 
to see a sphere of infl uence as a formal arrangement that an infl uenced 
state can accept. In addition to questions of order and legitimacy, there is 
room to speculate on how much bipolarity depended on the division of 
spheres of infl uence and how much on the nuclear parity. Moreover, one 
could study if Cold War spheres of infl uence maintained order inside the 
blocs and restrained or prevented confl icts. Answering these questions 
would require empirical studies geared to conceptualising spheres of 
infl uence in the Cold War context. 
Cold War history is important also for understanding our present 
discourses on Russia. When arguing that Russia is trying to establish a 
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sphere of infl uence, Cold War style, it should be noted that at least at 
the level of speeches there is clearly a dislike among the Russians of Cold 
War spheres of infl uence. Th e Russian analysts presented in this research 
are not particularly sympathetic to the idea of sphere of infl uence even 
though they do embrace great power management. Can we still claim 
that sphere of infl uence is the concept that explains how the Russians 
see the drama of great power politics unfolding? And if so, what kind 
of sphere of infl uence is involved – one following the spirit of Schmitt’s 
Großraum, Lippmann’s Good Neighbor Policy, a new Soviet Union, or 
perhaps the super-state that Orwell was so afraid of? Rather than making 
claims about Russia’s sphere of infl uence, it would be more interesting to 
ask what kind of sphere of infl uence the country has and how it is being 
justifi ed.
Th e dilemma in the Russian discourses is how to defend hegemony 
and freedom at the same time. If we look at the Good Neighbor Policy 
or the idea of Mid-Europe, for example, both contain hegemony with 
freedom. It is not denied that one state is more powerful than the other, but 
infl uence is accompanied by mutual benefi t and assistance. Th e present 
Russian discourses on international order do not reveal any attempt to 
formulate an idea which could encompass both the special rights and 
needs of the great powers and the right to equal sovereignty and freedom 
for the infl uenced states at the same time. Th e Russians have no concept, 
theory or argument which would explain how the principle of non-
intervention can tolerate Russia’s intervention, but not those of other 
states. As I have suggested, it would be useful for Russians to develop a 
vision of international order which would not be shy about articulating 
the Good Neighbor Policy which Russia appears to be pursuing. It would 
mean connecting the idea of great power management to the idealisation 
of sovereignty and proving that the two are not incompatible. Th e next 
step would be to connect the compatibility of great power management 
and sovereignty with the dream of a cooperative balance of power 
and to explain what the solution is to bloc politics, which a balance 
of power often leads to. Th en, fi nally, what would be required is self-
refl ection on how the fear of the United States aff ects Russian discourses 
on international order and infl uence. I would really like to see Russian 
scholars and politicians elaborate on these questions.
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One way to make sense of spheres of infl uence and the Russian 
discourses alike is to cease thinking about spheres of infl uence in terms 
of absolute dichotomies. If the Russian discourses on international order 
seem incoherent, it is because the authors seem to have diffi  culties in 
envisioning the solidarist and pluralist orders as points on a spectrum 
and not as mutually exclusive choices. Watson off ered the pendulum 
idea and Buzan the spectrum for breaking the pattern of thinking 
about solidarism and pluralism as opposite choices. If we take Watson’s 
spectrum of primacy and domination as the two ways to consolidate a 
sphere of infl uence, we could see the movement between the two ends 
such that primacy represents less of a violation of the rights of the 
infl uenced and domination involves more of a trampling of those rights. 
Th en we would not have bad and good infl uence but violations of the 
rights of the infl uenced on a diff erent scale. Moreover, if we attach to this 
“spectrum of violation” the consent of the infl uenced, we have another 
variable. More consent would make infl uence closer to primacy and less 
would take us towards domination. We would then have two variables 
to determine whether a sphere of infl uence constitutes primacy or 
domination: violation of (sovereign) rights and consent of the infl uenced. 
Taking Buzan’s spectrum idea, if sovereignty is a social contract, if we 
cast doubt on the usefulness of the nation-state in principle, and if we 
imagine concentration of power working together with limitations on 
sovereignty, we can fi nd the middle of the pluralist-solidarist spectrum. 
Th e reason why we need to make sense of the middle of the spectrum is 
that it can help us make sense of Russian visions of order and infl uence. 
Th is way we can also discuss spheres of infl uence from the normative 
perspective. Th e Russian discourses appear to me to be a perfect example 
of the need to study Buzan’s spectrum idea in greater depth and challenge 
the idea of international order as being constructed upon a dichotomy of 
the pluriverse and the universe.
8.3 Beyond the Pejorative
Th e normative problem is the heart and soul of the concept of sphere 
of infl uence. Th en why is it that, in the present, we lack a discussion 
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on the justice/injustice of spheres of infl uence? It is because we have 
ignored the history of spheres of infl uence and left unexamined the place 
the concept holds in IR. Th e Cold War mindset has left the concept of 
sphere of infl uence unchallenged; IR has failed to acknowledge that it is a 
contested concept. Especially because the concept of sphere of infl uence 
is so strongly normative, it must be contested. Connolly (1993, 2) writes, 
“For to adopt without revision the concepts prevailing in a polity is to 
accept terms of discourse loaded in favor of established practises”. If one 
accepts the concept of sphere of infl uence without revision, one ends 
up constructing a certain image of Russian foreign policy. In fact, in 
order to condemn the practice of establishing or consolidating spheres 
of infl uence, one must begin by contesting the very concept. Contesting 
the concept of sphere of infl uence means problematising its present 
distinctive features that have rendered it an immutable and emotional 
metaphor of injustice. As a conclusion to this study I will devote the last 
words to elaborating the more positive views on spheres of infl uence. My 
purpose is to stimulate discussion on the normative aspects of spheres 
of infl uence by bringing to light that part of the intellectual history of 
sphere of infl uence which has so far remained hidden and unarticulated.
Sphere of infl uence is not in essence a pejorative notion; it has been 
forged into one in the fi res of the Cold War. Yet, sphere of infl uence 
is fundamentally a normative notion, because it has always needed 
justifi cation. Colonial infl uence experienced its normative rise and fall, 
but this never happened to spheres of infl uence. Spheres of infl uence 
emerged as a type of political infl uence which embodied questions of 
inequality of power and violation of sovereignty and it has remained just 
that. What makes the concept of sphere of infl uence so topical is not 
only its popularity in political language, but its relationship to questions 
of law, order and justice within the system of states and outside of it. 
But when I look at the history of the concept of sphere of infl uence that 
I have attempted to unravel, the most relevant origins of the concept 
lie in the period when the globe was devastated by the two world wars. 
In this context the idea of infl uence beyond state borders, of regional 
constellations, is one which attempts to envision international order in 
order to rescue the world from war caused by nationalism. Th e origin of 
the concept, which I believe I have succeeded in ascertaining, was not in 
297
justifying oppression, violence and power. Th e impetus for establishing 
and consolidating spheres of infl uence is indeed war, but preventing war, 
that is, managing relations among the great states and preventing major 
war between them. Even the English School, especially through Bull 
and Keal, is concerned with imagining the contribution that spheres of 
infl uence and great power management can make to international order. 
Th ose who theorised on the “compassionate sphere of infl uence” often 
did it from the perspective of their own nationalistic sentiments, but 
even still they considered the world at large, because they knew that 
a new international order based on spheres of infl uence could not be 
forged by force. Th e project would have to work on a global basis and 
people would have to benefi t from it. Th e power relation is expressed as 
responsibility with the argument that this is the only way forward in the 
process of transforming the international system. But like any idea, when 
interpreted and put into practice it can suff er in the process and become 
transformed into something that is the complete antithesis of its initial 
intention. Th e Cold War destroyed the ideals of those who theorised on 
the creation of spheres of infl uence as an order for world peace. I believe 
none of them would have wished to see the bloc politics of the Cold War 
unfolding. Th e Cold War caused spheres of infl uence to lose that perhaps 
small, but still evident, element of compassion. 
International Relations has been moving away from the state-centric 
perspective in recent years to study not only non-state actors on the 
international scene but also the eff ects that international theory has on 
individuals. For example, the concepts of human security and women’s 
security have been established by moving beyond the traditional security 
concept dominated by the state. Sphere of infl uence, as I have stated, is an 
idea about the system of states but, as a theory, it must be viewed also as an 
attempt to organise international life such that people could live together. 
Th is is the eternal dilemma of humankind – how to live together in 
diversity. Both pluralism and solidarism are answers which international 
theorists have off ered to us. But the history of spheres of infl uence has 
somewhat neglected the human perspective. Th e consideration of justice 
proceeds at the level of states and thus remains an abstraction. One way 
to approach justice in the case of spheres of infl uence, and as something 
more than a relationship between states, is to ask questions about the 
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nature of the infl uencing state’s regime. Th is is even more relevant when 
the dissatisfaction with Russian foreign policy relates to dissatisfaction 
with the progress of democracy in the country. During the Cold War, 
both the United States and the Soviet Union were recognised as having 
a sphere of infl uence, regardless of the diff erences between their regimes. 
Th e capitalists and the communists alike were capable of consolidating 
spheres of infl uence. Even though spheres of infl uence were implemented 
by diff erent means and meant diff erent things in practice, the same name 
was given to both superpowers’ policies of infl uence. In sharp contrast, 
Lippmann thought that the United States would rule its neighbourhood 
in good will and Burnham as well assumed that the United States 
expressed the supreme ideology and type of regime. But what kind of 
democracy can sphere-of-infl uence policies represent? Th e closer we get 
to a notion of democracy in spheres of infl uence and the benefi ts they 
entail for the states infl uenced, the further we get from the pejorative 
associations of the concept, and the closer we step towards ideas on 
regionalism and integration. Orwell’s Nineteen Eighty-Four is written 
from the perspective of the individual, demonstrating what life could be 
like in a totalitarian super-state, but we are left to wonder what is off ered 
at the other pole – that with better-justifi ed spheres of infl uence. Even if 
spheres of infl uence have been discussed historically more than anything 
as a matter of interstate justice, one should ultimately judge the justice 
and legitimation of spheres of infl uence at the level of the individuals 
aff ected. Naumann, Lippmann and Orwell got closest to capturing this 
perspective, even though none of them theorised how the super-state 
would, for better or worse, provide for the good life. 
Something Carr wrote left an impression on me – something which 
seemed insignifi cant at fi rst but which confl icted with the pejorative 
image of the concept of sphere of infl uence. Carr (1965, 69) wrote 
that small or medium-sized nation-states lack the resources to provide 
well-being for their people. Th is was his justifi cation for constructing a 
Großraum. I wonder if it would be possible to transform the questions of 
interstate justice relating to spheres of infl uence, that is, the sovereignty 
dilemma and inequality of states, into a discussion on how spheres of 
infl uence aff ect the people living within them. Does a sphere of infl uence 
connect or divide people? How about the security and well-being of the 
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infl uenced people rather than of the infl uenced state? Sovereignty is a 
value for a state, not necessarily for its inhabitants. Bringing in human 
justice to complete the normative discussion on spheres of infl uence 
means writing a new history of the phenomenon. Th is research began 
by exploring what has been a pejorative yet uncontested concept but it 
should end with the words of Carl Schmitt (2003, 39): 
Th e earth has been promised to the peacemakers. Th e idea of a new 
nomos of the earth belongs only to them.
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